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ABSTRACT
This study proposes a framework for measuring and explaining partnership
formation and resilience. The motivation for this study is that we currently do not
understand the precise mechanism by which partnerships form or how they stay
together in the face of change. The framework draws on a design view of systems to
argue that partnerships manage change through boundary spanning practices that
operate on multiple levels of social reality. The literature suggests that there are
many different types of boundary spanning practices. Some types foster socialtechnical innovations called “boundary objects” while others facilitate the
progressive standardization of those practices through the comparison and
selection of boundary objects by social actors who are themselves transformed by
their adoption of these objects. The framework proposes a way to measure
partnership capacity and social learning that corresponds to the orders of boundary
spanning practices. It furthermore proposes three hypotheses, one concerned with
partnership formation and two concerned with resilience. The first hypothesis
states that partnerships form through a convergence of boundary spanning
practices and a community of practice. Convergence depends on a host of factors,
including the capacity of innovators and early adopters to leverage their early
successes to build additional capital to further promote and eventually
institutionalize their boundary spanning practices. The second hypothesis predicts
that partnerships that demonstrate a pattern of alignment practices integrating
operational and strategic concerns will tend to oscillate within a defined range of
i

partnership functions or “states” (restricted resilience). The third hypothesis
predicts that partnerships that inculcate a learning culture of institutional design
practices will tend to persist under a theoretically limitless range of environmental
demands (general resilience). To assess the framework, four case studies of water
resource management partnerships in the Columbia River Basin were carried out.
Data collection centered on interviews with boundary spanners, field trips, and
secondary data. The results partially confirmed the first hypothesis, while
evaluations of the resilience hypotheses were inconclusive. However, boundary
spanning practices were catalogued according to the various types of partnership
processes to demonstrate how the methodology can be used for cross-case
comparisons and theory-building.
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“We must not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to
arrive where we began and to know the place for the first time.” – T.S. Elliot
Chapter 1
Introduction
The present study proposes a framework for understanding and examining
boundary spanning practices and processes as they relate to the formation and
continuing success of partnerships. This framework will then be assessed in 4 case
studies of water resource management partnerships in the Columbia River Basin
located in Oregon and Southwest Washington. The study grows out of the
recognition that, to date, we still do not understand very well the processes involved
in forming partnerships. All too often, partnerships are explained away by
simplistic references to “cost-efficiencies” or “collaborative synergies” that assume
social actors are for the most part rational. Yet there are many instances where
such potential advantages exist and still partnerships fail to form. Similarly, case
studies of partnerships already on the ground often take their continuing success for
granted, an assumption perhaps reinforced by the tendency to study only
“successful” partnerships. The problem, however, is not only empirical but also
theoretical. When confronted with the real-world limits of collaborative efforts,
normative theories of partnerships tend to lay the blame on one side or other of the
agency-structure debate. Thus, depending on whom you ask, either irrational
power is to blame or naïve rationalism is the problem. Yet regardless of which side
of the debate one is on, ad hoc references to factors extraneous to one’s model to
1

explain some anomaly amount to an implicit admission that our current theories of
partnerships, and collaboration more generally, are either inconsistent, incomplete,
or both.
Working in the crevices between the “great divide” have been practitioners
and theorists of a pragmatic bent who prefer a more balanced approach to
understanding and building partnerships. The central problem that has been the
focus of this work is the problem of collective action: how to organize the actions of
otherwise disparate institutional actors toward a common purpose? Practitioners
and policymakers confronting increasingly wicked environmental and social justice
problems have not had the luxury to wait for an answer. Over the past thirty years
environmental governance has witnessed a remarkable shift toward more
decentralized and distributed forms of policy-making that are characterized by
creative adaption of policy principles to local conditions (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003).
Policies are now regularly deliberated and made through local experiments as much
as through administrative or judicial ruling. The adaptive, networked form of
governance, with its creative integration of local practices and grander theories,
reflects profound changes in the relations between the state, market, and civil
society (M. P. Mandell, Spring 1999).
Social theorists have struggled to adequately account for the implications of
this shift in governance, in large part because their theories and frameworks are
based on dualisms, including the separation of agency and structure, that no longer
apply, if they ever did. More successful accounts, in contrast, eschew such easy
2

oppositions and instead attempt to treat collective action as a problem requiring
explanation. Some rather sophisticated frameworks, mostly coming out of the New
Institutionalist vein, have been proposed in an attempt to explain these newer
governance structures. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework
developed by Elinor Ostrom (1999) is a notable example. But these approaches
usually fall short of their promise by reducing institutional effects to either
aggregates of individual decisions or to the constraints of monolithic institutional
fields, or both. Consequently, they often cannot sufficiently capture the dynamics of
“meso-level” actors, including multi-sector partnerships, that operate between the
level of individual and organizational actors and the larger society. Another
promising line of work draws on practice theory to posit that social actors engage in
multiple and overlapping fields or “communities of practice” (E. C. Wenger &
Snyder, 2000). A key insight to emerge from this work is that communities of
practice must strike a balance between differentiation from and communication
with “others.”
A primary claim of the present framework is that boundary spanning is
centrally concerned with striking this balance. There are in fact many different
types of boundary spanning, but they all have the common element of bringing
different ideas, practices, objects, and agents from different fields of practice into
interaction with one another. Boundary spanning is closely associated with the
work of collaborative leadership and will typically involve a combination of:
building sustainable relationships, visioning, influencing and negotiating, honest
3

brokerage, managing the complexities associated with institutional and strategic
interdependencies, and managing roles, accountabilities, and motivations to ensure
collaborative processes continue to move forward. The literature on boundary
spanning suggests that it is more of an art than a science that depends in large part
on the ability of boundary spanning practitioners to make good and timely
judgments about which actions are appropriate to take under a given circumstance
(Williams, 2002). Boundary spanning calls on a wide range of skill sets, which may
explain why collaborative leadership, and therefore boundary spanning, is typically
distributed to include: thought leaders and “imagineers,” networkers, codifiers and
documenters, and pioneers, among others (Austin, 2002; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006;
E. C. Wenger & Snyder, 2000). Boundary spanning must somehow integrate
collaboration ideals and pragmatism, “rational” and “irrational power” (Vangen &
Huxham, 2003).
The framework proposed here starts with the idea that communities of
practice are shot through with boundaries of all kinds – be they technical, social,
economic, political, ideological, linguistic, or cultural – that serve to socially
differentiate ideas, practices, objects, and communities. Partnerships, then, are
basically composed of boundary spanning practices and processes. This is, in a
sense, simply a reformulation of the problem of collective action. But this
reformulation suggests yet another question concerned with the emergence of new
joint fields of action, namely: how does the social learning underlying coordinated
action take place? Two points are worth noting here. The first concerns the change
4

in the language of our question as we go from inquiring about joint fields to
inquiring about the emergence of joint fields. This change introduces the
phenomenon of orders of language, or logical typing, which, in and of itself, suggests
that social learning is ordered. The second point harkens back to our reformulation
of the problem of collective action. If communities of practice are, in fact, organized
by boundaries, then this suggests that social learning is primarily concerned with
spanning those boundaries in new, boundaried, ways. This conceptualization shifts
the emphasis in environmental governance away from achieving consensus to the
management of differences and to the creative management of uncertainty
associated with changes in those management regimes. Viewed in this light, the
problem of collective action becomes a variant of the age-old problem of change.
A central challenge we face at this point in the discussion is that while
practice-theoretic formulations like the concept of “communities of practice” at least
acknowledge the importance of boundaries, they typically lack a language of orders
to account for social learning. The same limitation plagues social network and
actor-network theories. To address this shortcoming, the present framework
proposes a framework based on the design view of systems that treats fields of
practice as social communication systems capable of learning. The design view of
systems conceives of fields as consisting of nested levels of feedback processes. The
conceptualization lends boundaries a more recursive rather than lineal quality, and
provides a more natural basis by which to map the interaction of multiple
boundaries that characterize complex social situations. Furthermore, the
5

framework treats partnerships as instances of fields of practice. This moves us
away from overly-narrow, juridical-legal definitions of partnership entities to
consider how partnerships participate in communities of practice. It is an attempt
to locate partnerships within an institutional ecology of communicative practices.
The framework also seeks to clarify the role that perception plays in the
interaction of structure and agency, particularly in the formation and evolution of
joint fields of practice. Cognitive models of institutions tend to conceptualize social
perception largely in rational terms (e.g., “bounded rationality”), which leads to
confusion not only in locating agency but also in explaining social change and
learning (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; D. Katz & Kahn,
1978; R. N. Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997). The current framework, in contrast, allows
for “social mind” to operate on and between many orders of social reality. It can
therefore begin to account for the peculiar convergence of ideas and practices from
adjoining fields which more conventional theories of social and policy learning that
rely on a largely lineal (even spatial) conception of innovation and diffusion cannot.
More fundamentally, a socio-cybernetic framework locates causality in the
differences or gaps between processes. These gaps constitute ruptures in the fabric
of expectations that have the potential to carry new meanings and produce novel,
i.e., “boundary spanning,” social practices and objects. The framework draws on
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to show that these ruptures can occur dramatically
and without warning. From a methodological standpoint, the framework allows us
to more systematically study how the misunderstandings that emerge from
6

boundary encounters themselves interact through the selective sorting of the
consequences of those misunderstandings on the parties and fields involved. The
process of “sorting out” can be long and fraught with uncertainty. When we
consider that this sorting occurs along multiple dimensions, we begin to understand
why partnership work is so difficult. As the study title suggests, partnership work
entails “navigating the edges” of substantive, institutional, and strategic
uncertainties. And of all the edges to navigate perhaps the most important is the
one where those uncertainties meet.
Toward a Unified Theory of Partnership Processes
By conceptualizing partnerships in terms of boundary spanning, the
framework treats partnerships as problematic, rather than taking them for granted.
But this approach also moves us away from any normative theorizing about
boundary spanning. Boundary spanning isn’t necessarily “good.” Indeed, a
boundary spanning practice may in fact be quite disruptive to partnership work – it
all depends on one’s perspective, or more precisely, on one’s system level-ofreference. A design view of systems suggests general typological criteria by which
to classify boundary spanning processes that refer to changes in their orders. This
point is worth reiterating – it is the change in orders, not the orders themselves, that
is our concern. After all, if we are to accept that a system and its functions are
always defined by an observer – in other words, if systems are perspective-driven –
then the idea of “absolute orders” becomes meaningless. And if, as our theory
contends, partnerships are primarily concerned with the management of change
7

and uncertainty, then our typology of boundary spanning will be based on criteria
for detecting changes in their orders. Such a typology requires, in turn, that our
system level-of-reference does not change. For any given level of analysis, then, the
framework posits the following types of boundary spanning processes: “core
practices” are associated with the routine practices or operations of a partnership;
paradigmatic “boundary spanning practices” are innovative practices which have
the potential to transform a given field of practice; while “alignment practices,” are
concerned with the mutual adjustment of operational and strategic concerns. A
fourth kind of boundary spanning, institutional design, can be added to our typology
to capture a learning culture that encourages the creative generation, modeling, and
documentation of issues associated with institutional processes.
It should be noted that this formulation brings concepts from
neoinstitutionalism and practice theory into closer alignment and, in some cases,
reinterprets those concepts. The principal concepts that comprise the framework
fall under the familiar labels “boundary spanning,” “partnership capacity,” and
“social learning.” But these labels acquire new and arguably richer and more
rigorous meaning in the context of the present framework. As already stated, the
design view of systems taken here emphasizes that partnerships are recursive
processes and furthermore that those processes are organized into a (nested)
hierarchy that effectively classifies processes into discrete communicative events, or
messages. Socio-technical practices that break the mold, as it were, are
transformative. It follows from this that partnership work is fundamentally about
8

organizing innovative but otherwise “noisy” boundary spanning practices into a
community of practice which lends them some coherence. Partnerships reduce
environmental uncertainty by folding a part of it into its management domain or,
viewed by the alternative vantage-point, by expanding its sphere of ownership.
Once we view partnerships as ordered processes, it becomes natural to inquire into
the relations between partnerships. In principle, we can imagine partnerships
achieving some integration in “meta-partnerships.” But sooner or later all systems
must confront the fact that they are bounded and therefore subject to error. A
problem of a new order arises: how to learn to learn? And having surmounted that
problem, how can we replicate learning communities elsewhere?
We can discern in this discussion at least 3, if not 4, general types of
collective action problems of increasing orders of complexity. At this point we are in
a position to classify partnership or community capacities in terms of the orders of
the general problems they address: Partnership Capacity I (PC I), Partnership
Capacity II (PC II), and Partnership Capacity III (PC III).1 PC I refers to the capacity
of a joint field to regularly sponsor the interaction of agents, practices, and their
objects among the different partnering fields to solve “routine” problems. By
“routine problem” is meant a problem that does not require a structural change in
the organization of the partnership to solve or address it. PC II, in contrast, refers to
the capacity of the partnership to reinvent itself in the face of a recurring set of
1

Partnership Capacity IV – the institutional capacity to establish learning partnerships on a regular
basis – will not be explicitly examined in the present study, although the framework predicts that
fields of practice demonstrating PC IV will of necessity be found in fairly complex fields or
communities of practice and are probably rare.
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challenges. An important aspect of PC II is that the reinvention tends to be of a
cyclical nature, so that a partnership with PC II will tend to anticipate, rather than
simply react to, problems. This notion of PC II is closely related to a more restricted
notion of resilience. In the context of the case studies, this means looking at the
extent to which a partnership drives, rather than simply follows, the water resource
management agenda of its community. A key ingredient of PC II is what Etienne
Wenger (2000) calls “alignment practices,” which are essentially social actions and
processes that allow for the mutual adjustment of everyday and more strategic
practices. One example might be the communication between staff and board, a
challenge, we may note in passing, with which many watershed councils have
struggled. Similarly, partnerships that incorporate implementation planning into
their strategic planning are often more effective than those that carry out
implementation planning as an afterthought. Finally, PC III refers to a more general
capacity of a community of stakeholders to learn and adapt. In the case of PC III,
alignment practices are themselves subject to periodic review and modification.
Such a capacity is necessarily of a fairly high order and requires a culture of learning
that promotes rather than discourages inquiry and even dissent. The concept
behind “PC III” closely follows Churchman’s (1971) “Singerian System” and the
notions of the “learning organization” and “learning network” which it inspired.
Having established such a typology of partnership capacities, we have a
natural basis by which to classify social learning. Social learning is about “bringing
forth,” to paraphrase Maturana and Varela (1992), a worldview that organizes
10

boundary spanning practices into a coherent pattern of interaction. Since social
learning can be properly understood as the acquisition of a given capacity to
communicate across socio-technical boundaries, our typology of partnership
capacities suggests a typology for social learning: Social Learning (SL) I, referring to
the emergence of a new joint field of action, or partnership; SL II, referring to a
partnership field learning how to anticipate its own problems; and SL III, referring
to a partnership community learning how to adapt to socio-technical and policy
surprises. The typology of social learning proposed here corresponds closely to
Bateson’s (1972) “levels of learning.” Indeed, Bateson’s typology comprises the
backbone of the current process framework, which enables us to take previously
disparate concepts of institutional capacity and place them in a system of
classification that measures them in a consistent and coherent manner. For, as
Bateson recognized, to measure something is to act on it, and vice-versa.
A Methodology of Institutional Change
Such a general system of classification is intended to inform, rather than
replace, any understanding of the particular historical form a given partnership will
assume. It predicts that a partnership will demonstrate some pattern in its
boundary spanning practices, but it cannot predict the precise form of that pattern.
Further classification of partnerships and the boundary spanning practices that
comprise them requires empirical study grounded in a particular context. But the
framework provides a place to a start such an empirical study by anchoring our
inquiry in a particular level of analysis that corresponds to the order of the
11

partnership process we happen to be examining. That is, we can start by grouping
boundary spanning practices that fall under the same descriptor of change – e.g.,
“deviation in Partnership X’s way of doing business with the timber industry
community” – and proceed to look for patterns among those practices. A pattern or
set of patterns would be evidence of a still-more complex partnership process,
which may, in turn, provide a descriptor of change – e.g., “change in core
(partnership) business practices between Partnership X and the timber industry
community” – for further inquiry, and so on. Our final mapping would contain 2
important pieces of information: first, it would communicate something about the
general capacity of the partnership under investigation to manage changes of
varying orders; and second, it would convey a “thick description” of the specific
boundary spanning practices occurring at the various levels of governance and, if
our study is longitudinal, occurring at the various stages of the partnership’s
evolution.
Some of the advantages of this framework over existing approaches have
already been suggested, but let us state them more clearly now. First, the
framework represents not only a more complete synthesis of neoinstitutionalist and
practice-theoretical approaches, but it also suggests a methodology for measuring
these rather abstract concepts. For example, the framework links Wenger’s (2000)
notion of alignment with the framework’s concept of “meta-boundary spanning” to
suggest that PC II can be demonstrated by the existence of an enduring pattern of
alignment practices. And this point is not just academic: it turns out that the
12

operationalization of the concept “partnership capacity” can inform strategic
interventions designed to enhance partnership effectiveness. In addition, the
proposed methodology requires us to state the level of analysis we’re applying,
which enables the reader to critically evaluate whether that analysis is internally
consistent and complete. This is an improvement over practice-oriented accounts
that tend to obscure and even falsify the level of causation, and therefore agency, in
structuration.
And finally, we have a set of typological criteria to measure these concepts
which, if it is validated, will enable us to investigate the distribution of their variants
across cases. We can then start to determine whether certain kinds of partnership
practices – for example, education and outreach – tend to be associated with a
certain class of boundary spanning, for example, alignment practices. In other
words, we can start to determine whether these practices tend to carry a specific
function with respect to the management of institutional change. This, in turn, will
enable us to formulate testable hypotheses about the correlation, if any, between
specific forms of boundary spanning-, partnership-, and social learning processes.
For instance, Rugkåsa et al. (2007) discuss the difference between “boundary
spanning across,” which refers to communication and learning across peer
networks, and “boundary spanning downward,” which refers to communication and
learning with a community of users who are to adopt a given innovation. We can
now inquire whether one kind is more prevalent in partnerships with PC I as
opposed to those with PC II or PC III. In some cases we may discover that
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distinctions in the literature become meaningless in the current framework, or,
contrawise, we may discover important distinctions between previously conflated
concepts or terms. Either way, we will have learned something.
Study Aims
The study, then, has 3 principal and related aims. First, it proposes and
assesses a new methodology for studying boundary spanning, social learning, and
partnership capacity. Especially, it posits general criteria for measuring these
concepts that are rooted in a process view centrally concerned with the problem of
change. Assessment of the framework will be driven by several criteria. For one,
the framework can be judged by its theoretical and methodological coherence,
which concerns both its logic as well as its alignment with our current state of
knowledge about partnership processes. The framework can also be judged by how
well it “covers” the range of observations we make about those processes. And
finally, the framework can be assessed indirectly by the predictions of its model.
These last two criteria anticipate the next 2 study aims.
The second aim of the study is exploratory, namely: to begin to catalogue the
many varieties of boundary spanning practices in different partnership contexts and
to sort those varieties by their orders to determine the relationships, if any, between
these varieties and the types of social learning, partnerships, and partnership
capacities we encounter. To this end, each of the 4 partnership cases in this study
will be summarized with tables enumerating the various instances of boundary
spanning that fall under each major type: core-, alignment-, and institutional design
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practices. This enumeration will then be transposed from each case study into a
table listing the boundary spanning observations for all 4 cases. The structures of
the tables – as well as the transposition – reflect the assumptions of the model
showing the link between types of boundary spanning, social learning, and
partnership capacity. In the exploratory mode, these assumptions are not tested;
rather, the objective of the tables is to compare the distribution of observations
across cases for each boundary spanning type to determine whether there are any
patterns. For example, we may start to determine whether education and outreach
appears to play an alignment function in partnership work.
The third aim is to evaluate the theory embedded in the framework by
assessing its predictions with respect to 2 questions that motivated this study: first,
how precisely do boundary spanning practices on the edges of fields coalesce into
new joint fields of practice in the form of partnerships?; and, second, how do
partnerships adapt to changing social, technical, and policy conditions? It is now
possible to begin to formulate hypotheses to these questions. First, if boundary
spanning practices and processes persist for long enough, eventually they may
spawn new joint fields of practice, complete with their own identities, knowledgebases, practices, and objects (e.g., standard operating procedures, models, and other
social-technologies). As already stated, partnerships are treated here as instances of
these joint fields of practice. Furthermore, the theory contends that an extra
ingredient for the emergence of new joint fields is some kind of opening in the larger
social, technical, or policy environment that creates a demand for its “boundary
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objects.” And, according to the theory, the process of this emergence is often even
more nuanced, since these partnership fields can catalyze, as it were, their own
crystallization by helping to create demand for their products.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Having sketched the relationships between the theory’s core propositions,
we can restate the research questions and propose some preliminary answers:
1. Research Question I: How do partnerships form exactly?
Hypothesis I: A socio-technical or policy need creates a structural
opportunity for boundary spanning practices to begin to influence the larger
institutional ecology. Boundary spanning practices will begin to converge with the
ecology of participating fields through an iterative process of social judgments
embedded in communicative practice and capital exchange. If the boundary objects
(innovations) are deemed both technically desirable and culturally feasible, then the
practices and ideas that produced them diffuse along with the innovations, further
reinforcing the convergence. Boundary spanners play an important role in
managing the convergence (however imperfectly) through visioning, strategic
judgments, and steering capital flows, even as they are thereby changed in the
process. The entire process is summarized as “Social Learning (SL) I” and results in
a partnership with a basic capacity (Partnership Capacity I) to address a fairly welldefined policy problem.
2. Research Question II: How do partnerships sustain themselves over time?
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To survive in the face of changing policy conditions, a partnership must learn
(SL II) to engage in alignment practices that periodically allow for the mutual
adjustment of core operations and more strategic and even constitutional concerns.
This ensures that partnership goals and strategies are informed by local practices
and conditions and facilitates the partnership’s role in shaping the community
agenda on a policy issue. Therefore:
Hypothesis IIa: Partnerships demonstrating a pattern of alignment practices
will tend to oscillate about a defined range of “partnership states,” as measured by
programs, initiatives, or other strategic emphases.
Partnerships that develop the capacity (SL III) to reconfigure or “design”
alignment practices to address socio-technical and policy surprises acquire a
general capacity to learn and adapt that is enhanced with each iteration of the social
learning cycle. Partnerships demonstrating PC III are characterized by a learning
culture that promotes innovation and critical reflection of alignment practices in
experimental settings. Therefore:
Hypothesis IIb: Partnerships demonstrating a pattern of institutional design
practices will tend to persist in varying forms and under a wide range of
environmental conditions.
This framework and its hypotheses will be assessed through 4 case studies of
water resource management partnerships in the Columbia River Basin. Cases were
to a large extent selected to enhance the study’s replication logic as called for in
explanatory case study designs. Thus, every attempt was made to select
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partnerships that shared as many extraneous traits as possible while focusing on
the model’s major relevant variables. For Hypothesis 1 (explaining partnership
formation), these include: presence of pre-existing “need,” presence of innovative
(boundary spanning) practices, technical desirability, cultural feasibility, degree of
interest and support for innovations, the exchange of capital forms to promote
innovations, extent of adoption, “structural distance” between innovations and
wider community of practice (measure of convergence), and pattern of boundary
spanning practices (measure of PC I). For Hypothesis IIa (explaining partnership PC
II), the relevant variables are: coherence of alignment practices and presence of
defined range of partnership states (measure of PC II). And for Hypothesis IIb, the
relevant variables are: coherence of institutional design practices and the absence
of outstanding partnership issues (measure of PC III). Otherwise, cases were
selected which were similar with respect to several potentially significant,
complicating factors, including: policy domain (water resource management),
cultural-geographic region (the Columbia River Basin), scale (regional
partnerships), and historical incidence (contemporary).
Nevertheless, 4 case studies can only provide a very selective sample of
partnership experiences, especially when one considers the number of variables
contained in the model. Subsequent empirical studies will need to be carried out to
more fully test and develop the ideas proposed here. An ongoing research challenge
will be to identify those conditions where the framework applies and those where it
does not.
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Chapter 2
Review of Relevant Literature
Partnership Capacity
Contemporary commentators of policy processes observe that the world has
experienced over the past 40 years a remarkable reshuffling of the relations
between state, civil society, and the market (Kettl, 2002; Salamon, 2002).
Technocratic and managerialist approaches to governance that were largely
premised on the ideological if not practical separation of the major sectors are
giving way to new, networked forms of governance characterized by “deliberative
policymaking” in which the institutional context of collective action is improvised
along with policy (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Toffler, 1970). Adaptive networked
governance is not only upending policies but also deeply held assumptions about
policymaking, especially the separation of planning and implementation and even of
theory and practice (Fischer, 2000, 2003; Keast, Mandell, Brown, & Woolcock, 2004;
Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006; M. P. Mandell, Spring 1999; Ozawa, 1991; Selsky & Parker,
2005). In its wake, classical models of decision- and policymaking that often
assumed actors were rational, even if boundedly rational, are being replaced with
new theories highlighting the ways actors both shape, and are shaped by, the
institutional context in which they engage (Giddens, 1984). In the context of
pluralism and socially wicked problems, the long-standing problem of collective
action – how do differently (and differentially) constituted actors nevertheless
manage to organize their actions toward a common purpose? – acquired a new level
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of urgency. This question has had special relevance for the planning and
management of common pool resources like water, where “defection” is always a
real possibility (Axelrod, 1984; Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Hardin, 1968;
Karkkainen, 2002; Ostrom, 1999).
A number of schools of thought drawing on social constructionism have
emerged in the past 30 years to better account for collective action, including
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD), which contends that policy actors
make strategic decisions to form alliances and mobilize discourses or resources
according to “structures of opportunity” which may themselves change as a result of
these decisions (Ostrom, 1999; Rydin, 2003). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith’s (1999)
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) propose a similar marriage of structure and
agency in their model of policy systems and subsystems. More generally, the
“communicative turn” in policy analysis and planning theory during the 1980’s
began to shed light on how social actions, including policies, could be made to
communicate something about, and therefore impact, the social relations engaged in
the action (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; P. Healey, 1996;
Hoch, 2007).
The (Deweyian) pragmatist impulse, particularly in the United States and
Great Britain, has brought greater attention to the subtler operation of “power” both
within and outside of planning processes (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Forester, 1989, 1999; P.
Healey, 1996, 1999; Hillier, 2003; Innes & Booher, 1999). However, this more
pragmatic approach is also marked by an optimism, especially embodied in
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negotiation theory, that implies that sufficiently undistorted disclosure of interests,
or “communicative rationality,” can counteract “irrational power” and lead to
innovative solutions that expand the pie of payoffs (Carpenter & Kennedy, 1988;
Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Poirier Elliott, 1999; Scharpf,
1993; Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987). But missing from this formulation is an
appreciation of the importance of relational dynamics with the result that it
overestimates the capacity of human reason to solve social problems. Especially, if
interests are context-dependent, this suggests that a stable solution may not be
found by merely articulating those interests. Furthermore, we need to consider how
interests are culturally construed and negotiated in the identity politics of social
interactions. There have been some notable exceptions of attempts to theorize “the
shadow negotiation” of relationships, but they have focused on dyadic or at least
face-to-face interactions (Kolb & Williams 2003; although cf. d’Estree 2003). We
need a better understanding of the institutional processes governing policymaking,
particularly on the “meso-level” of inter-organizational action.
To address this lacuna, new institutionalists focus on the institutional “fields”
or “communities of practice” in which social actors engage (Berger & Luckmann,
1966; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; D. Katz & Kahn, 1978; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Meyer & Scott, 1983; R. N. Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; W. R. Scott, 1992; Silverman,
1971; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985; Thompson, 2005; Weick, 1995; Zucker, 1991).
This line of thinking has informed important theoretical work not only in policy
analysis but also organizational learning and development. Unfortunately, however,
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application of these theories has been mostly limited to strategic planning in the
private sector (Banner & Gagné, 1995; Collins & Porras, 1996; Haines, 2000). And
even within the private sector, most theoretical and empirical work has
predominantly been concerned with firms, although strategic alliances have
deservedly gotten more attention in recent years (R. N. Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997;
Pentland & Feldman, 2007; Zollo, Jeffrey, & Harbir, 2002).
Not surprisingly, there has been a lot of interest in understanding
collaborative or partnership capacity and ways to bring it about (Agranoff &
McGuire, 2003; Gronn, 2002; Huxham & Vangen, 2004; Lasker, Weiss, & Miller,
2001; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). Notions of “collaborative advantage” and
“partnership synergy” have been developed to describe the accomplishment of a
task or function which individual partners could not accomplish on their own
(Weiss, Anderson, & Lasker, 2002). Research on partnership capacity suggests that
partnerships that afford their members opportunities to collectively reflect on their
experiences are often more effective (Armistead & Pettigrew, 2004; Sullivan,
Barnes, & Matka, 2002). Much of this work has been carried out in the context of
water resource management, where the complex intersection of technical, policy,
and social problems typically call for a collaborative approach (Bidwell & Ryan,
2006; Connick & Innes, 2003; Shandas, Graybill, & Ryan, 2008; although cf. Imperial,
2005). Some attempts, popularized of late by the concept of “social sustainability,”
have been made to measure the relationship between stakeholder views about one
another and collaborative capacity (see, for example, Weber et al., 2007). These
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studies are to be commended for conceptualizing “collaborative capacity” as an
outcome measure rather than as a given. Still, there is a tendency to confuse
collaboration with consensus. More generally, there is currently a dearth of
understanding of inter- (or “trans-“) organizational dynamics and the institutional
conditions that promote collaborative capacity (Agranoff, 2007; RodrÌguez, Langley,
Béland, & Denis, 2007). At the same time, while network actor and learning
network theories have shed important light on the contemporary conditions of
governance, empirical studies show that there are forms of inter-organizational
innovation that do not conform neatly to a network structure (David, 2004; M.
Mandell & Steelman, 2003). More seriously, the network analytic lens tends to
flatten our view of social processes and thus fails to account for both the differential
capacities to manage change and the changes in those capacities.
Some important work has been done to situate collaboration in larger fields
of practice (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990). Zollo et al.
(2002) introduce the concept of “interorganizational routines” referring to “stable
patterns of interaction among two firms developed and refined in the course of
repeated collaborations,” and argue that these routines are useful predictors of the
performance of strategic alliances. Pentland and Feldman (2007) similarly
introduce a concept of “narrative network” to describe “patterns of ‘technology in
use”’ (2007: 781). In addition, some promising lines of analysis that build on the
Open Systems tradition have started to shed light on the influence that broader
institutional fields have on organizations and inter-organizational dynamics (Baum
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& Rowley, 2005; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). Many of
these studies show that partnerships whose members vary in their collaborative
commitment and resources must strike a balance between setting and meeting
standards and being flexible to allow for diverse forms of participation that are
sensitive to the real constraints of the organizational and interorganizational
environment (Ivery, 2007; Takahashi & Smutny, 2001).
Ivery (2007), for example, uses an organizational ecology approach in a case
study of the Tri-cities Partnership (TCP) to address homelessness. "Linking pin,” or
bridging organizations, like the TCP that overlap in their ties to different
components can: serve as communication channels between organizations; provide
general services by transferring people, information, and resources across the
network; and serve as models or otherwise influence partners toward collective
action. Ivery concludes her case study by arguing that the organizational ecology
view allows one to focus on both the relations within a partnership and on the
nested structure of those relations. She points out that more often than not
partnerships are composed of subsystems having both strong (core members) and
weak (periphery members) coupling. Finally, Ivery calls for research that studies
collaborative partnerships in all its diverse organizational forms.
However, the majority of the work has tended to focus on the impacts that
inter-organizational collaboration have on the single organization, reflecting its
status as the dominant unit of analysis (Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 2003). But even
firm-level studies can be mined for insights into partnership capacity. For example,
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Von Krogh and Vicari (1993) employ an autopoiesis approach to conceptualize an
organization's knowledge-base as part of the organization's environment, with
implications for managing strategic issues. They define “strategic issues” as those
environmental disturbances relevant to the system which, if unaddressed, will
change the system ("S"). For Von Krogh and Vicari, then, Strategic Issue
Management (SIM) is about managing surprises through continuous scanning,
diagnosis, and response. This entails the "management of strategic experiments:"
triggering and discovering experiments; retaining knowledge about the
experiments; and applying knowledge from the strategic experiments. More
generally, there is a rich and still growing literature on learning organizations,
including strategies for measuring the learning capability of organizations (see, for
example, Goh & Richards, 1997). Summarizing, there is growing appreciation that
partnership capacity centers in some way on the inculcated capacity and inclination
to manage change in a consistent manner.
Social Learning
Because partnerships require the integration of diverse perspectives,
identities, interests, and resources, the capacity to build and maintain partnerships
implies social learning. Baumgartner’s (2006) Punctuated Equilibrium Theory
(“PET”) attempts to explain changes in policy images – what he calls "heuristic
short-hands" – and institutional venue, noting that they tend also to interact. The
central mechanism hypothesized in PET is the interaction of negative and positive
feedback loops which, Baumgartner observes, make them unpredictable on a case25

by-case basis. Among the processes comprising these loops are the interactions of
policy streams which policy entrepreneurs both bring about and capitalize on (F. R.
Baumgartner & Jones, 2002; Bogason, 2009; Patsy Healey, 2005; Kingdon, 1995;
Marcussen & Torfing, 2003). Furthermore, while the processes may vary in their
content, the overall structure should be the same across different levels of analysis.
Baumgartner calls for case studies that can elucidate just how these positive
feedback processes come to interact to create sudden change. He adds that case
studies of successful cases need to be carried out over long periods of time to see
whether it was a change in response to changing contextual variables or if indeed a
positive feedback process occurred that would explain the punctuated change
(Baumgartner, 2006).
PET provides a useful framework to understand the emergence of
partnerships. Indeed, in the context of water resource management, partnership
capacity is often discussed in conjunction with “social learning” (Armistead &
Pettigrew, 2004; Berkes, 2009; Davidson-Hunt, 2006; Fernandez-Gimenez, Ballard,
& Sturtevant, 2008; Ison, Roling, & Watson, 2007; Maarleveld & Dabgbegnon, 1999;
Manring & Pearsall, 2005; Maurel et al., 2007; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007; Tabara &
Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Unfortunately, however, these discussions often fail to make
meaningful distinctions between social learning occurring at different levels of
governance. There are, however, some notable exceptions. Gonzalez and Healey
(2005) propose a three-level conception of governance dynamics – specific
episodes, governance processes, and governance cultures – to address 3 questions,
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basically: 1) how to identify and assess urban governance changes; 2) how to
evaluate whether any changes promote social innovation (in their case, social
justice); and 3) what are the “power dynamics” that come into play (both for and
against) during the attempted diffusion and institutionalization of such innovations?
They argue that real innovations change governance relations in some way, but
perhaps most relevant here, they argue that a focus should be on the interaction of
actors from different communities of practice and on sustaining or institutionalizing
such interactions in new forms of governance. Echoing PET, the authors speculate
such changes occur in the interaction of “endogenous processes and exogenous
forces” that create "cracks" or openings in the opportunity structure from which
novel practices may emerge and take hold. As they write:
Innovations which manage to insert themselves in such a ‘crack’ may, in
favourable conditions, come to have considerable power to transform
governance relations. Endogenous and exogenous forces are therefore not
separate, encountering each other in septic institutional sites. They are
mutually interacting and, over time and space, co-constituting (2005, pg.
2065).
The critical ingredient then becomes planting "seeds" or "sediments" that can
have a cumulative or reinforcing effect in the direction of social innovation.
Describing their own case study of a citizen network that formed to challenge the
local and regional government’s planning vision for Ouseburn Valley in Newcastle,
U.K., they note that the very act of deliberating with different actors in novel
contexts was disruptive:
In the case used above, a non-traditional mobilisation initiative opened a
crack and softened a boundary. This ﬁssure in the traditional and tight
governance mechanism has been mostly made by active linking by key
27

individuals across arenas, cultures and frames often by-passing formal
structures. The ability to link across structural holes (Burt, 2002) creates an
exchange around non-redundant information (2005, 2065).
Perkins et al. (2007) similarly take a level-of-analysis approach to social
learning to propose 3-dimensional cube that links 3 levels of learning – the
individual, organizational, and community – with 2 distinct orders of change, one
ameliorative and the other "transformative" or systemic. Their 3 case studies show,
among other things, the importance of overlapping institutional roles in fostering
broader learning. Methodologically, they show how a level-of-analysis approach can
help clarify the different orders of social learning that occur and the dependencies
and linkages between them. An important insight is that complex adaptive systems
survive not by eliminating but rather “enveloping” and managing change (Harter &
Krone, 2001; Innes & Booher, 1999). But, as with many of these accounts (Alutto,
2002; Jansen, 1996; Whelan-Berry, Gordon, & Hinings, 2003), the authors reify their
levels of analysis by relying on overly concrete objects ("individual," "organization,"
and "community") to serve as reference, leading to a simplistic and even
reductionist treatment of social learning. More systemic approaches to strategic
change and learning are less susceptible to this problem (see, for example Jelinek,
2003).
Boundary Spanning
The most promising lines of inquiry into social learning focus on, to use
Burt’s (2002) evocative phrase, the “structural holes” and the bridgework over
them. The term “boundary spanning” emerged largely in the context of classical
28

studies of firms, where it was evaluated for its role in enhancing (or dampening) the
information-processing capacity of a firm (Dollinger, 1984; R. Katz & Tushman,
1979; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). These earlier studies suggested that evaluations
of boundary spanning depended on one’s level of analysis. On the one hand, there is
clear evidence that activities and exchanges across socio-technical or policy
boundaries could induce system-wide changes. On the other, in fluid and complex
environments, boundary spanning appears to be an important survival strategy. In
fact, the literature on boundary spanning has grown considerably as the
decentralization and fragmentation of governance has placed greater emphasis on
the ability of “boundary spanners” to “manage out,” or across, social and
professional ties to influence policies and practices (Austin, 2002; cf. also Bradshaw,
1997 ; Cash, 2006; Klein, 1996). Austin (2002) shows how much of boundary
spanning work is focused on community practices, that is, on external relations
between an organization and its community and on balancing those with internal
demands. For middle-managers, "managing out" means devoting more time to
building interdisciplinary relationships, especially with counterparts. For uppermanagement, it means paying more attention to external issues, building
community partnerships, and cultivating a learning organization culture. Similarly,
in her study of public and independent human service organizations (HSOs), ManoNegrin (2003) observes that the different sources of funding between public and
independent HSOs was such that the latter's reliance on less stable funding meant
that their managers and units had to function more as boundary spanners searching
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out and interpreting signals from the environment about how the organization was
doing and correct course as needed.
However, Rugkåsa et al. (2007) argue that too much attention has been paid
to boundary spanning upward and across and not enough on boundary spanning
"downward" that is, boundary spanning with the clients or community that the
partnership supposedly serves. Downward boundary spanning, they contend,
serves both the community and the partnership by providing the clients with
support and information needed to benefit from and utilize the services, thereby
improving implementation. All indications are that boundary spanning is important
for both generating and managing uncertainty. Studies on knowledge and
technology brokers emphasize how organizational intermediaries facilitate learning
by making analogies between problems in different sectors and combining
technologies in creative ways and adapting them to "local" problems, creating value
to their clients (for review, see Winch & Courtney, 2007 ; see also Conway, 1995 ).
Furthermore, studies of cooperative technical organizations show how boundary
spanning reduces the uncertainty of innovation by providing standards and
interfaces for firms working from different industries to address a problem or need,
thereby facilitating implementation. Here, innovation brokerage functions to
provide standards, role clarification and accountability (Winch & Courtney, 2007).
More generally, it appears that organizations and partnerships rely on boundary
spanning practices to manage, as Harter and Krone (2001) succinctly put it: “the
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ongoing dialectic of controlling and being controlled by their environments" (pg.
257)
Other observers highlight the varied management skill set required of
boundary spanners and boundary spanning organizations. Boundary spanning
entails managing, through influencing and negotiating: complexities and
interdependencies, as well as roles, accountabilities, and motivations (Koppenjan &
Klijn, 2006; Williams, 2002). Boundary spanners are especially effective when they
have both the familiarity, legitimacy, and position to know how to navigate and
enhance inter-organizational structures. Ideally, therefore, boundary spanners
possess that rare combination of technical, policy, and socio-cultural competencies.
Much of the theoretical and applied work on boundary spanning emphasizes
its close relationship to “collaborative leadership.” A boundary spanning form of
leadership operates through building and influencing relationships and
corresponding frames to bring about collective change (Austin, 2002; Crislip,
Larson, & King, 1997; Feyerherm, 1994; Uhl-Bien, 2006). That is, boundary
spanning is critical to “social learning systems” by creating and enacting novel
structures of social interaction (Kerson, 2002; E. Wenger, 2000). Viewed this way,
boundary spanning practices function as “framing practices” (Gray, 1989).
Furthermore, to the extent that partnerships must manage change, they require
continuous and “embedded” boundary-spanning in all stages (Feyerherm, 1994;
Orlikowski, 2002). The literature is convergent on this point: successful partnership
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managers are collaborative leaders and therefore successful boundary-spanners
(Ferreyra & Beard, 2007; Miller, 2008; Vangen & Huxham, 2003).
Researchers furthermore describe the “distributed” quality of collaborative
leadership, noting that many of the leadership functions are usually not restricted to
a single individual or authority (Armistead & Pettigrew, 2004; Gronn, 2002; Hahn,
Olsson, Folke, & Johansson, 2006; Yukl, 1999). Collaborative leadership’s many
dimensions include: thought leaders, networkers, people who document the
practice-in-question, and pioneers (E. Wenger, 2000). The distributed nature of
collaborative leadership also means that partnership success cannot be adequately
explained by “strong leaders” alone; instead, it requires “interorganizational
leadership infrastructures” (Miller 2008 ; cf. also Bardach, 2001). It follows that
boundary-spanning is also typically distributed among individuals or other
functional units (Orlikowski, 2002) that must integrate collaboration ideals and
pragmatism (Vangen & Huxham, 2003) or “rational” and “irrational power”
(Flyvbjerg, 1998).
Summarizing the Gaps in Literature
Still, despite the inroads that both research and experience have made in
understanding the vital role that boundary spanning and boundary spanners play in
partnership work, our view of partnerships is still rather static when one considers
the many orders of change that are involved in their formation and management. As
Williams (2002) writes:
"The skill demands of each of these phases [of partnership development],
and the relationship between strategic and operational boundary spanners,
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represents an interesting avenue for further exploration. A deeper
understanding of the dynamics of boundary spanners' interventions would
also be an invaluable contribution." (122).
Specifically, a review of these literatures suggest 2 important gaps in our current
state of knowledge about partnership processes. First, there is relatively little
understanding of the processes by which partnership capacity actually gets
established through boundary spanning activities and interventions. And second,
there is relatively little understanding of how partnership capacity, once
established, is sustained over time (Ferreyra & Beard, 2007; Gronn, 2002; Miller,
2008).
Toward a Unified Theory of Partnership Processes
This study proposes a framework for conceptualizing “fields” or communities
of practice as socio-cybernetic systems that manage change through a recursive
hierarchy of feedback processes and thereby organize “differences” into classes of
social facts. Social practices entail the interaction and comparison of actions and
traits that thereby either reinforce or challenge this system of distinction (Bourdieu,
1977, 1984; Giddens, 1984; Luhmann, 1995). Since a field is internally
differentiated, there must already be some competence for boundary spanning
among its constituent members, objects, and practices (cf. also Wenger, 2000).
Viewed more dynamically, the central practices of any field are “remnants” of what
were once marginal practices on the periphery of other fields, just as today’s
marginal practices could constitute part of tomorrow’s central practices of an asyet-unimagined community of practice.
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Fundamentally, the framework adopts a design view of systems by positing
that a field’s boundary condition is embedded in, and gives structure to, the
relations among its parts (Larsson 2001 ; cf. also: Brocklesby 2007 ; Romme 2003 ;
Vickers 1965, 1968, 1973; West 2005). The design view builds on Action Theory
(AT) to assert that systems are “doubly problem-driven:” first, a system recognizes
problems it can anticipate and therefore address; in this sense communication and
cybernetic control are related (Ashby, 1956). Secondly, this problem recognition is
itself governed by a deeper purpose that, to the extent the system-as-search-rule
“survives,” addresses a correspondingly deeper problem (D. T. Campbell, 1974;
Simon, 1996). A design view stresses the importance of the observer who defines or
“brings forth” a system as the focus of some kind of intervention (Lendaris, 1986;
Maturana & Varela, 1992).
AT asserts that the “purpose” of a given action is only revealed in the effect
that the relation between the action and the evoked response has in addressing a
given problem. Thus, “behavior” is properly understood as a pattern of interaction.
AT also emphasizes the importance of implementation since, in this view, a system
of interacting parts is only as good as its performance in its relevant, or task,
environment. The task environment is a “world of differences” between a desired
behavior pattern (DBP) and the system’s actual behavior, where these differences
comprise the “stuff” of communication and control. The task environment, in other
words, centers on system implementation.
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Figure 1 illustrates the design view of systems.

The 2 nested circles together

represent the system’s structure or “metasystem,” which is some observer or
designer/intervener. The metasystem reflects a given purpose by acting as a
fundamental boundary condition or filter that deteörmines which part of the real
world is a relevant problem (“input”). The filtering has the tautological effect of
suggesting its own response (“output”). Thus, the system’s behavior pattern is
“downwardly caused” (in terms of orders of abstraction) by its design:
Real world of flux
(matter and
energy)
(task) environment
input
system
metasystem or
“observer” (world of
“differences”)

output

Figure 1: A Design View of Systems holds that “systemness” is a function of an observer or intervener
in the form of a boundary condition. The boundary condition acts as a filter and a rule for
transforming input to output. Systems thereby reduce the uncertainty in their environment by
selecting a part of it and “folding” that part into itself (Baum & Rowley, 2005; Smircich & Stubbart,
1985).

A design view of systems is consistent with the recursive paradigm in
communication theory (Pearce & Cronen, 1980; B. Scott, 2002). In this paradigm,
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social action is meaningful to the extent that it fits within a context of interaction
that is itself selected for (Luhmann, 1995).
The boundary condition, then, can be thought of as an institutional field’s
most fundamental parameter. This means that a field’s internal boundary spanning
competence coincides with increased differentiation with other fields of practice.2
In terms of orders of abstraction, the direction of cybernetic control is “downward”
(cf. D.T. Campbell, 1974). An important implication is what Bateson (1979) calls an
“economy of flexibility”: a communication system can only obtain greater flexibility
and thus resilience vis-à-vis environmental disturbances by losing some of its
autonomy to a more encompassing communication system. All fields or
communities of practice must therefore strike a balance between differentiation
from and communication with “others.” This view is consistent with the use of the
concept of “BATNA” to explain collaboration: partnerships form when the calculus
for each stakeholder shifts such that the benefits of collaboration outweigh the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement, or “BATNA” (Fisher, et al., 1991). But the
tradeoff between integration and flexibility is not linear, for a field’s core
competencies can also enhance its ability to exchange and learn from other fields,
and vice-versa, but only up to a certain point. There is a sweet spot where core
competency and new experiences may serve one another (S. Campbell, 1996; Star,
Bowker, & Neumann, 2003; E. Wenger, 2000).

2

In socio-cybernetic systems, change is regulated and managed through communication of encoded
difference. The tautological character of these systems centers on the social production and
reproduction of “problems” for which there is already a response (Bateson, 1972; Luhmann, 1995).
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This theoretical framework also carries methodological implications for
studying boundary spanning. First, the measurement of boundary spanning
depends on the level of description and analysis. If boundaries are a function of
systems, then so is boundary spanning. And since systems are by their very nature
internally differentiated – that is, they are composed of a nested hierarchy of
boundaries – it is important to first identify the focal level-of-reference against
which boundary spanning will be measured. The internal boundaries of a field are
not the same as the field’s boundary condition that organizes them. By extension,
boundary spanning at the center of a field – communication across internal
boundaries – is not the same as boundary spanning at its edges, which entails
communication across the field’s boundary. Boundary spanning within an already
specified system implies communication across difference and can be thought of as
that system’s basic unit of information. In contrast, boundary spanning across
specified systems is by definition unclassifiable with respect to those systems. The
first entails routine operations that reinforce the field; boundary spanning at the
edges is more problematic since it holds the potential to transform the entire field.
“Boundary spanning,” then, is a function of system perspective: what may appear
on one level to be truly transformative boundary spanning will appear at the next
“higher” (or “deeper”) level to be routine social practice.
Toward a Methodology of Institutional Change
We therefore need a methodology to distinguish orders of boundary
spanning that correspond to the orders of events and processes that are implicated
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in boundary spanning. Gregory Bateson’s (1958) ground-breaking application of
Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Logical Types to problems in cybernetics provides an
important starting point for developing such a framework. In short, Bateson’s
methodology calls for us to be explicit about the explanatory status of our
statements about communicative processes. His line of reasoning starts by
observing that causation in communicative systems is not material but rather
informational: behavior, be it biological or social, is organized by classification of
changes. Since our systems of explanation of behavioral phenomena are
themselves communicative systems, they are subject to the same principle of
causation. A sound explanation should therefore be an isomorphic mapping of the
structure of relations underlying the observed patterns of behavior. An explanation
is an aggregate of linked propositional statements about change. A “naturalistic
methodology” like the one proposed by Bateson requires that the logical status of
each descriptive proposition in our explanation be properly “typed” to reflect this
structure. The result is an internally consistent and complete explanation with a
logical typology that corresponds to the complexity of the problem and composed of
statements whose logical typings correspond to the orders of change they describe
(Bateson, 1958: 296).
To emphasize the problematic nature of boundary spanning from a design
view of systems, this study will use the term “boundary spanning” in the
transformative sense, that is: social and cultural practices at the margins which
bring together agents, objects, and practices from different fields in novel ways and
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which have the potential to thereby form new fields of practice. Boundary spanning
may entail many things, but it essentially involves making connections across
technical, policy, and social differences. It is in these boundary encounters with
others that a community of practice is able to reflect on itself through a mode of
belonging which Wenger calls “imagination” (E. Wenger, 2000). In contrast, routine,
or institutionalized, boundary spanning occurs at the system level. This study will
refer to institutionalized boundary spanning practices, which take the form of
various established policies, processes, and procedures, as “core practices.”3 These
core practices comprise a “way of doing things” that often has a taken-for-granted
quality to it. Wenger contends that the predominant mode of belonging in core, or
everyday, practices is “engagement,” where socially differentiated actors, objects,
and practices interact in ways that tend to reinforce prevailing norms and identities
(E. Wenger, 2000).
Third, we should expect that a well-established field of practice will manifest
a relatively stable and comprehensive pattern of core practices from which a “local”
typology of practices may be derived. Core practices will be more or less loosely
coupled in a system of differentiation. They routinely communicate information
about the relationship between whatever agents, objects, or other practices are
involved in the interaction or comparison being made. We know too that systems of

The use of the term “core practices” here, which diverges somewhat from Wenger’s (1998, 2000)
use of the term, to refer to routine boundary spanning is meant to emphasize the idea that, contrary
to popular thinking, fields or communities of practice are organized around difference, not sameness.
A community’s “way of doing things” consists, upon closer scrutiny, of a complex repertoire of social
practices that is based on, and elaborates, social distinctions along multiple dimensions and levels (cf.
Bourdieu, 1984).
3
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differentiation link multiple dimensions and levels of distinction that cover the
social, economic, political, cultural, and symbolic domains (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984).
Thus, a mature field of practice will tend to carry a unique and distinct culture of
discourses, policies, procedures, and other artifacts embodying an equally unique
set of rules, norms, competencies, identities, and ultimately, worldviews. This
“grammar of practices” gives a field its distinct pattern of core practices. All fields of
practice, ranging from businesses and organizations to sectors, academic disciplines,
professions, and policy systems, are organized by some sort of grammar that can
become an object of study.
At the same time, a field of practice is always subject to change, in part
because the communicative aspect of social practice also affords agents the
opportunity, albeit constrained, to reflect on and negotiate the meaning of these
relationships. The literature on boundary spanning suggests that it is at the edges of
a field, where its boundary spanning practices facilitate the interaction and novel
recombination of agents, objects, and practices originating in different fields, that
the identity and function of a field is reflected on and negotiated (Levina & Vaast,
2005; E. Wenger, 2000).4 As defined here, boundary spanning brings together
diverse practices and associated objects and agents in novel ways. If those novel
recombinations find sufficient technical and social support, they are likely to change
4

The degree of freedom that boundary spanners working on the edges enjoy will depend on the
strength of the coupling of each field’s elements and processes. As stated before, dominant core
cultures will tend to lead to anemic boundary spanning. Compounding matters for aspiring
boundary spanners, the principal of unintended consequences will operate to frustrate the best-laid
plans.
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the relations between those practices to form a new field of engagement (Levina &
Vaast, 2005). The emergence of a new joint field of practice also changes the fields
that participate in it. As more agents adopt the innovations of the joint field, these
innovations become what Levina and Vaast (2005) refer to as “boundary objects-inuse.” Some of the agents may themselves participate in the production of boundary
objects-in-use to become “boundary spanners-in-practice”(Levina & Vaast, 2005).
More fundamentally, the relations between the fields will change, resulting in
changes in the core practices and functions of those fields.
Wenger’s (2000) framework for understanding “boundary spanning
processes” is useful in highlighting the fact that boundary spanning involves
brokering among people, boundary objects, and boundary interactions. His
typologies for each of these elements provide a starting point to study boundary
spanning processes. Most germane to this discussion is Wenger’s classification of
boundary interactions according to their duration and intensity. “Peripheries” refer
to those visits by outsiders or the larger public who are curious about the field or
community of practice in question and may even be contemplating joining.
“Boundary encounters” afford opportunities for agents to participate directly in
another field for just enough time to get a taste for its culture and way of doing
things, as in the case of sabbaticals or most ethnographic fieldwork. Finally,
Wenger’s “boundary practices” are more protracted interactions that become
institutionalized to a certain extent as a field or community of practice in its own
right. It is a central hypothesis of this study that Wenger’s “boundary practices”
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contribute significantly to the emergence of new joint fields of practice such as
partnerships.5
While Wenger’s framework helps to clarify the major dimensions of
boundary spanning, its emphasis on “processes” tends to gloss over the important
interaction of structure and agency in these processes (cf. also Levina & Vaast,
2005). In contrast, this framework attempts to integrate a design view of systems
with practice theory to highlight the way that the entire boundary spanning process
is driven by exchanges of what Bourdieu (1977) identified as varying forms of
economic, social, political, cultural, and symbolic capital that reflect and reinforce
changing relations among existing and emergent fields of practice. Here it is
important to stress that Bourdieu’s concept of “capital” is intended to operate within
a practice-theoretical framework that integrates the communicative aspects of
social practice and the reflexive modes with which social actors engage during social
interaction. A key insight of Bourdieu’s theory of practice is that capital formation
entails an exteriorization and distortion of otherwise embodied competencies.
Thus, for example, economic wealth is ideologically separated from social
connectedness, cultural upbringing, and political influence, effectively obscuring
their interdependence and representing these various measures of value as natural

5

The stricture that we be consistent in the logical typing of our account of boundary spanning
processes means that Wenger’s “boundary encounters” and “peripheries” would not be treated as
boundary spanning practices within the present framework, since they do not by themselves entail
changes in communities (systems) of practice. Indeed, this slippage in logical typing is a serious
shortcoming in Wenger’s framework. However, the present study also acknowledges the important
roles that these other kinds of boundary spanning practices play in sustaining communities of
practice, such as those involving partnerships, once they are established.
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or intrinsic. Bourdieu’s concept of “capital” and capital exchange is useful for
studying boundary spanning and the emergence of joint fields by providing a way to
link the strategic, if always somewhat misguided, actions of individual boundary
spanners to larger systemic processes of social communication and control. By
extension, this approach can shed light on the gaps between agentic and
institutional understandings or expectations that translate into ruptures in
institutional fields and which may trigger larger order changes. In short, the
conceptual integration of structure and agency affords us the opportunity to
examine the ways in which technical, institutional, and strategic uncertainties
interact in the complex and dynamic context of networked governance (Koppenjan
& Klijn, 2006; Ostrom, 1999).
For example, boundary spanning carries inherent risks for its practitioners
vis-à-vis their field-of-origin, but if a new joint field is able to establish itself,
boundary spanners-in-practice may eventually accumulate sufficient capital in
various forms to further support their boundary spanning activities (Levina & Vaast,
2005). This all suggests that there is a threshold of institutional legitimacy which
marks a tipping point in the establishment of new joint fields (Lawrence, Hardy, &
Phillips, 2002). Particularly skilled boundary spanners are able to mobilize diverse
forms of capital from their respective fields in such a way that participation in the
emergent field translates to benefits back in the home field, and the cycle of capital
accumulation repeats itself. We may surmise that the strategies used to link the
inchoate system of capital exchange with those of the surrounding fields to produce
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this positive feedback loop entail an especially sophisticated form of boundary
spanning. They reduce the “entry costs,” transaction costs, and associated risks for
would-be participants who might not otherwise adopt practices of the new field and
enhance the legitimacy of the boundary spanning practices in the new field.
Boundary spanners-in-practice, boundary objects-in-use, and the new joint field
emerge together and thereafter co-evolve with linked agents, objects, and fields of
practice.
Boundary spanning changes relations in partnering fields through the
creative recombination of practices and functions that transforms the system of
value exchange itself. If a perceived need for the creative boundary spanning
practices of the new field – say, for example, a perceived need for an interstate
compact – can take hold, then eventually those practices will accrue value of their
own. At root is the accumulation of a certain “institutional cache” associated with
these creative practices, and this cache depends on the parallel process of
generating demand for the practices and their products. Leaving aside, for the
moment, the question of demand creation, the theoretical framework being
proposed here suggests that once the partnership field is established as an
institutionalized field of boundary spanning practices, an “indigenous” system of
capital exchange will operate as a sort of evolving model of the relations between
the partnering fields. It is through the creation and exchange of boundary objects
that the relative standings, roles, and responsibilities of the partnering fields are
reflected on, negotiated, and elaborated.
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Chapter 3
Methodological and Theoretical Framework
Statement of Propositions
This study draws on practice theory, social constructionist theory, and
systems theory to propose a framework for understanding the relationship between
boundary spanning, social learning and partnership capacity. The following
propositions comprise the skeleton of the framework:
1. Proposition: social practice is communicative, that is, it achieves its effects to
the extent that it is meaningful
2. Proposition: routine social practices also reflect and reinforce a cultural
boundary that defines a field of practice
3. Proposition: these fields can be conceived as systems of relations governing
the interaction of elements and processes nested within them
4. Proposition: a system manages change by “coordinating” the changes in its
parts and the changes in the relations between the parts, thereby reducing
the “total uncertainty” in its relevant environment
5. Proposition: from propositions 1-4, it follows that the unit of social practice
is the message embedded between events or actions (viewed diachronically)
and between traits (viewed synchronically)
Understanding Boundary Spanning as a Communicative Practice
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Applying this understanding to partnerships, it is clear that we should treat a
partnership as a field of relations and various demands on those relations. For
convenience, we may conceptualize the partnership field as the “system” and the
various socio-technical and policy demands as the partnership’s institutional
ecology or “environment.” The “partnership system,” then, is the partnership field
plus its institutional ecology (system + environment). A central argument being put
forward here is that communities of practice can be conceptualized as “partnership
systems,” in the sense of the term used here. This conceptualization suggests that
partnerships derive capacity from reflecting and anticipating the values and mores
of the communities they serve. In a completely determined system, the partnership
and its community reflect and anticipate one another perfectly. In actuality,
however, the degree of correspondence between the two will always be incomplete
to the extent that the coupling is incomplete. Thus, for example, partnership costsharing arrangements that value, either explicitly or implicitly, the contributions or
skill sets of one partner-organization over another may become a source of
disagreement if they conflict with the way the organizations normally do business
with one another outside of the context of the partnership. Perhaps more
fundamentally, the partnership and its community may differ in the degree to which
they are organized. A partnership that prefers, for example, a more rigid structure
of roles, responsibilities, and standards will have a hard time recruiting from a
community that prefers a more informal approach.
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Figure 2 illustrates the partnership system as a system-environment relation
having some degree of uncertainty. The “variables” in the schematic are meant to
represent the various socio-technical and policy practices, agents, and objects that
are organized into a field of practice.

Legend
= sociotechnical or policy
variable
= direction of
influence
= structural
distance

Relevant institutional
ecology
Partnership field

Figure 2: Partnership system comparing the structure of relations of the partnership field and its
relevant institutional ecology. The total uncertainty of the partnership system is equal to the
uncertainty within partners, between partners, and the discrepancy (“structural distance”) between
the partnership and its community.

Partnership work is difficult because it requires managing many different
and often conflicting demands on the partnership, on each member organization
and participating field, and on the larger community. At times the interests and
allegiances align but often they don’t. Caught in the middle of the dance between a
partnership and its community are the participating fields which must negotiate
these competing demands, their internal demands, and finally the always
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unpredictable demands of the still larger socio-technical and policy environment.
This condition introduces a significant amount of institutional uncertainty about the
trajectories of the fields, including the trajectory of the partnership itself, which
manifests itself in the disparity between the partnership and its community. From
the point of view of the partnership, its environment often appears to be complex
and unpredictable (cf. Emery & Trist, 1965). This disparity is a source of continual
tension, particularly to the extent that partnerships are decentralized, but this
discrepancy, or more precisely the management of it, is also the basis of partnership
work and partnership resilience.
A Typology of Partnership Capacity
Given the above discussion, we may now propose a relationship between the
concepts of “boundary spanning” and “partnership capacity.” First, if we conceive of
a partnership in systems terms as an embodied social model of relations between
fields of practice having different worldviews, inclinations, customs, and so forth,
then on a general level, partnership capacity is simply the institutional competence
to organize and communicate these differences through boundary spanning
practices. Partnership capacity always assumes a particular form of institutional
competence adapted to a specific context. But because contexts may change, we
must distinguish partnership changes that constitute adaptation and those that
constitute demise. We need a language that is suitable for talking about orders of
change.
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Thus, the study proposes the term “Partnership Capacity I” to refer to an
institutional capacity of a partnership to organize boundary spanning practices of
participating fields under a specific environmental condition. Usually, this implies a
specialized partnership addressing a specific coordination problem. In contrast,
“Partnership Capacity II” is the institutional capacity of a partnership to renew itself
over a defined range of changing environmental conditions. Such a partnership can
address a range of coordination problems either simultaneously, by strategically
deploying multiple programs and initiatives, or dynamically, by shifting its focus
through a defined range of problem filters, as needed. “Partnership Capacity III”
shall refer to the general capacity of a partnership to reinvent itself as changing
environmental conditions demand. It is inspired by the concept of “Singerian” or
Inquiring System first described by Churchman (1971) and later developed in
literature on “learning organizations” and “learning networks” (see, for example,
Senge, 1990; McDermott, 1999). Partnership Capacity III is closely related to the
concept of resilience, and as such can only be assessed over time. Moreover, general
resilience implies a degree of creative freedom that is only possible if the
partnership is not unduly constrained by partnership obligations of its own. In
other words, we can expect that PC III will be an attribute of fields of a fairly high
degree of order and scale. These would be communities of practice that periodically
produce novel partnerships of varying capacities. For example, the prevalence of
watershed management partnerships suggests that the watershed management
field, taken as a whole, has an institutional capacity that could be classified as PC III.
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This typology of partnership capacity relies on a design view of systems and
is intended to move away from normative theorizing that tends to assume that
partnerships are self-sufficient and toward a more empirically-driven framework
that attempts to explain their survival and demise. It also compels us to specify the
system-level-of-focus we are using when assigning partnership capacity types, since
the classification of capacities will depend on our frame of reference. A watershed
basin may contain a diverse array of partnerships. Treated as separate cases, the
partnerships do not provide any basis to infer anything about the institutional
capacity of the basin community itself. But if a comparison across those cases
reveals an underlying pattern of organization in boundary spanning practices, we
may infer an underlying capacity of the basin community – what the framework
refers to as “PC II” – to coordinate partnerships toward a common purpose. Beyond
that, if it can be shown that the basin community spontaneously reorganizes the
coordination of those partnerships to meet changing extra-community demands,
then we may classify the basin community as having PC III, as being generally
resilient. Note that we have come full circle, and yet are transformed: if we regard
each instance of coordination as a partnership case, the situation appears
indistinguishable from the first scenario describing separate partnerships classified
as “PC I.” The transformation can only be discerned by specifying the change in our
focal level. Finally, it should be clarified that the typology does not have a spatial
dimension, but rather refers to the organization (and communication) of relations
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and does not have a spatial dimension. Under this framework, partnerships and
their capacities are not necessarily place-bound.
Second, the framework posits that the primary concern of a partnership is to
foster and organize boundary spanning among its members and their respective
communities. A partnership’s environment is not monolithic but instead composed
of manifold layers of relations cutting across the various partnering fields of
practice. Ideally, a partnership enhances the density but also strategic coherence of
connections for the community it serves. The core practices of the effective
partnership will therefore be concerned with facilitating inter-organizational and
inter-community communication and coordination. At the same time, the boundary
spanning practices of the partnership field itself will be concerned with value
questions about how the partnership should be organized. From this point of view,
partnership work centers on parallel and occasionally mutually informative
boundary spanning processes – one set of processes at the level of operations and
the other set at the more strategic and constitutional levels. The mutual adjustment
between these levels entails a kind of meta-boundary spanning which will be
discussed more below.
This conceptualization implies that a partnership consists of boundary
spanning practices that have become institutionalized to some degree as core
practices operating in a particular field of conjoint practice. It is reasonable to
expect that the strength of the coupling between a partnership and its institutional
ecology will fall along a continuum. The discussion so far identified a complex
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relationship between a field’s internal coherence and its communicability with other
fields – this relationship is inverse except in “local regions” of what we may call the
“partnership state-space,” where the two factors may reinforce one another. The
literature supports this view by suggesting that effective partnerships manage the
considerable uncertainties associated with networked governance by striking an
appropriate balance between formal and informal rules as well as between weak
and strong ties (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006). Thus, we should expect effective
partnerships will fall somewhere on the continuum between a loose collection of
independent organizations where partnerships exist in name only, and dominant or
“strong” partnerships where member organizations are essentially co-opted entities
subject to the rules and reproductive requirements of a partnership bureaucracy.

Figure 3: Partnership on a Continuum of “Coupling Tightness”
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Partnerships that endure can be thought of as complex adaptive systems in
which partnerships and their community co-evolve (Innes & Booher, 1999). The
framework posits, then, that such partnerships will tend towards a hybrid condition
characterized by a fluid exchange of agents, ideas, objects, and practices both among
the partnering fields and between these fields and the partnership as a whole.
Indeed, the boundaries themselves will tend to shift back and forth in their salience
between home field boundaries and the partnership boundary. The present
framework posits that resilient partnerships neither completely govern their
institutional ecologies nor are they completely governed by them; rather, they are
interdependent.
Because boundary spanning at the partnership level changes the partnership
field as a whole, this mutual adjustment will be reflected in a parallel process of
mutual adjustment between the partnership core and boundary spanning practices
in what observers have described as a kind of dialectic between creative idea
generation and problem structuring (Knight & Pye, 2005; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006;
Senge, 1990; Thompson, 2005). A simple adjustment of core operations to fit an
existing goal(s) and action plan – what we may call “simple alignment” – involves
feeding the discrepancy between the goal(s) and the actual state of affairs back to
change partnership functioning. This process is a relatively straightforward matter
of monitoring and control. However, if these changes are allowed to somehow
inform partnership goals or, similarly, management of the discrepancy, then the
loop of adjustment is closed and the result is a dynamic partnership with the
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capacity to precipitate and thereby control changes in its relevant socio-technical
socio
and policy environment. Figure 4 depicts a local partnership
artnership learning to cooperate
with a federal agency through the complex alignment of operational and strategic
concerns. The figure builds on Figure 1 to illustrate how complex alignment confers
PC II by closing a loop about the environmental input and system output.
output Both the
system and the environment become variables on a still-larger-ordered
ordered cybernetic
circuit or system:

Partnership
x (consisting
of variables
A, B, C, D, E)

Figure 4:: Alignment practices confer PC II by closing a loop about input and output

Vital partnerships set community agendas as much as follow them
them,, while the mutual
adjustment of boundary spanning and core practices helps to ensure that
partnership goals remain grounded in local contexts of pra
practice. Partnerships
artnerships that
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endure tend to strike a balance between being visionary and relevant.6 The general
picture of resilience described here is not unlike the ideal community of practice
described by Wenger (2000) and characterized by the balancing of engagement and
imagination through periodic alignment. But the framework goes one step further
by distinguishing restricted, or “bounded” resilience (i.e., PC II) and the general
capacity to learn and adapt (i.e., PC III).
We may now summarize this discussion in a set of causal loop diagrams. PC I
can be explained in terms of a simple negative feedback loop that guides a
partnership towards its stated vision. This is the “simple alignment” of monitoring
and control, described above. PC II subjects this implementation regimen to
periodic review and amendment.7 In other words, PC II implies that the alignment
practices are somehow coordinated over time to achieve a more general purpose.
We may furthermore posit that the criteria of meta-boundary spanning will center
on both the technical or “systemic” desirability and social or “cultural” feasibility of
the implementation regimen itself. For instance, a partnership may decide that its
response to certain policy stressors is too weak or too slow and evaluate alternative
response strategies. The governance structure of a partnership with PC II – the
aggregate of links that bind disparate ideas and practices, and the quality and
strength of those links – will tend to reflect the community’s worldview of the
partnership’s proper role in it.
6

I owe this insight to a conversation I had with John Moriarty, former Executive Director of the
Network of Oregon Watershed Councils (personal correspondence, December 17, 2009).
7 It is important to stress that PC II implies that this governance process recurs with some regularity
of pattern – otherwise, a one-off change in the regimen constitutes a single case of partnership
boundary spanning.
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Figure 6 and 6 show causal loop diagrams (CLDs) depicting Partnership
Capacity I and II, respectively. Wenger’s modes of belonging and Checkland’s twin
concepts “systemic desirability” and “cultural “feasibility” have been superimposed
on the concepts “core practices,” “boundary spanning,” and “meta-boundary
spanning” in order to clarify the relationships of the concepts in the present
framework. The figures emphasize that alignment practices are distributed: they
are embedded in the entire cybernetic circuit.8 Furthermore, the CLD’s represent
“Larger socio-technical and policy processes,” “Ideal correction,” and “Ideal
discrepancy” as exogenous variables to underscore their status as environmental
variables (i.e., “givens”) with respect to partnerships: they are rooted in
community- and larger processes. The model status of “Vision” varies between the
two scenarios. Under PC I, it is for all intents and purposes exogenous to the
partnership process, reflecting the partnership’s role as an implementing agent of
the community’s vision. Under PC II, the partnership plays an active role in shaping
the vision and associated policy agenda. Its resilience – in the restricted sense of PC
II – stems from this capacity to influence its immediate socio-technical and policy
environment. A couple final notes on the CLD: while valances are not indicated for
the arrows, the letter “B” denotes a negative or “balancing” feedback loop among the

Alignment practices are distributed in the sense that they cannot be assigned in any
straightforward way to one social position, act, or domain of action. For example, staff sometimes act
as a voice for the community and sometimes that role is enacted by the board. Even if we were to
only consider staff-speaking-for-community functions, those functions may either be operational or
more strategic. In fact, we can represent the distributed nature of alignment practices using a 2x2x2
matrix intersecting the binary variables staff/board, core/boundary, and partnership/community.
From this system-theoretic perspective, alignment practices are distributed over a state space of 2³ =
8.

8
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enclosed elements in question. In addition, the CLDs do not show time delays in
problem perception, decision-making, and response which are implied in the
diagrams and indeed may be objects of strategic intervention:
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Figure 5: CLD of Partnership Capacity I
Figure 6: CLD of Partnership Capacity II (all loops are
balancing)

Viewing PC II in system dynamics terms, we can expect to observe partnership core,
boundary spanning, and alignment practices oscillating around a set of values or
configurations and furthermore that these oscillations will be linked.
Finally, PC III can be represented by a CLD of continuous learning and
adapting. In this schema, partnerships are designed as experiments whose function
is not to “solve,” but rather to generate, new problems from which the learning cycle
repeats. In this scenario, boundary spanning practices routinely combine elements
in new ways – much as many learning organizations will encourage socio-technical
experimentation – and then look for issues that arise which defy classification.
Bateson (1958: 280), paraphrasing Whitehead, points out that the goal of science is
to leave the “darkness unobscured.” Similarly, learning partnerships routinely map
their own darkness.
We can imagine a kind of “laboratory of social learning” that grows rather
than diminishes surprises through a positive feedback loop that increases rather
than decreases the discrepancy between expectations and observations. These
problems are then catalogued or “typed” according to the order of boundary
spanning processes that are associated with them. That is, the problems will be
explained in a language appropriate for describing changes in the partnerships they
represent. The successful modeling of these problems reduces the discrepancy and
triggers subsequent experimentation. In the spirit of Senge’s (1990) “system
archetypes,” partnerships with PC III can build a library of problems and a
corresponding repertoire of responses. They will feature an experimental test bed
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for developing what amount to socio-technical models for collective action
appropriate to specific contexts.9 As the combinatorial possibilities of these models
explode with the number of stakeholders and technologies, PC III partnerships are
in a position to address a potentially vast range of problems. We may assume that
such laboratories of social learning will only be found in partnerships with the
resources required to invest in them. We can furthermore safely assume a learning
curve function operates which increases the efficiency of learning with each
iteration of the learning cycle so that the partnership becomes progressively adept
at responding to surprises. Of course, the notion of continuous learning and
adapting implies some monitoring and control that reflects a culture that values
learning for its own sake. This includes promoting "useful ignorance" in which not
knowing is encouraged, rather than shunned (McWilliam et al., 2007; see also:
Cohen et al., 2007; Gonzalez & Healey , 2005).
Figure 6 is a CLD depicting the learning cycle associated with PC III. Related
concepts have been similarly superimposed, and the CLD is, in fact, consistent with
Checkland’s (2000) depiction of the learning cycle in Soft Systems Methodology.
“Innovation” refers of course to a creative activity of combining disparate elements
and processes in new ways – it is quintessential boundary spanning. Since
innovation – which is basically model-building – is always driven by a particular
perspective, and since there are almost invariably multiple perspectives, it follows
that innovation activities will produce multiple socio-technical models. Scanning for
9

Because these models are rooted in specific historical contexts, they differ from Senge’s archetypes,
which he terms “generic structures.”
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issues involves critical thinking in a more reflexive mode than is usually the case
with boundary spanning or even alignment practices, for it involves stepping
outside of each partnership innovation and questioning its most basic assumptions,
usually through comparison to other innovations.10 It involves, as Checkland (2000)
terms it, “a structured debate about desirable and feasible change.” “Institutional
design” involves configuring the compared innovations so that the various issues
actually support one another’s resolution. Outstanding issues become inputs that
drive a larger partnership process.11 Note that we similarly see social learning
distributed among scanning and designing for institutional issues. In fact, the notion
of mutual accommodation of innovations anticipates our discussion, in the next
section, of convergence leading to the formation of partnerships. Finally, the same
general comments concerning the conventions and limitations of representation in
the previous 2 figures apply here, except the letter “R” denotes “reinforcing” to
indicate a positive feedback loop among the enclosed elements in question:

Scanning for issues is akin to model-testing in which models are put through a rigorous and
iterative process of de-bugging, verification, and validation.
11 Note that this is consistent with our understanding of abduction as the primary mechanism of
learning which involves searching for rules which, if they were true, would transform surprising
cases into expectable ones (Khisty, 2000).
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Figure 7: CLD of Partnership Capacity III

A Closer Look at Boundary Spanning
It is now necessary to describe what these core, boundary spanning, and
mutual adjustment processes look like in more concrete terms, starting with the
core practices. First, if core partnership practices can be thought of as mostly
routine boundary spanning, then we should look for them in partnerships that have
already been established. Furthermore, these practices will consist of mostly
routine exchanges between: partnering organizations and their respective
communities of people, discourses, perspectives, knowledges, information, policies,
heuristic procedures, and resources, including tools, technical documents, and
models. Core practices cannot become too formalized or rigid since this only
defeats the purpose of the partnership. Many partnerships will be governed by
rules of engagement ranging in formality from a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) or an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) to bylaws and charters, as in the
case of, for example, a 501(c) 3. In many cases of looser networks or affiliations,
however, standardization of practices will most likely be restricted to social
technologies that facilitate communication, interaction, and coordination (e.g.,
communication and information systems such as listserves, databases, various
decision support tools, and social networking). But even in less formal
partnerships, core practices also serve to reflect and reinforce the relations among
the partner organizations and their respective fields. Thus, there will be a division
of labor in roles and responsibilities that tend to reflect the social differentiation of
the larger community of practice which the partnership serves. The various forms
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of capital will also be distributed among partnership members to reflect this social
differentiation. From an organizational point of view, core partnership practices
will include shared staff positions and other cost-sharing arrangements, as well as
mixed teams or committees that bring together diverse disciplines, professions,
policies, and socio-political philosophies.
Given the dynamic quality of partnerships, some of the core practices of
partnerships may appear, from the perspective of member organizations anyway, as
boundary spanning practices. In fact, the boundary spanning among members and
the core practices of the partnership entity will be essentially indistinguishable to
the extent that boundary spanning practices do not deviate from partnership rules
and norms. Furthermore, we can expect that partnership functioning will often
depend on a certain amount of deviance within participating fields. For example,
boundary spanners will often pull their constituents out of their comfort zone –
advocating for an unpopular or otherwise risky position, say – in an attempt to quell
reactionary or extremists elements that threaten a coalition. In this way, boundary
spanners act as political buffers for the partnership: they, in effect, dampen
schismogenic processes between partnering fields by amplifying differentiation
within them. Of course, if political buffering continues unabated, it may, under the
right conditions, actually induce schisms within the partnering fields that ultimately
undermine the partnership itself.
How do we explain the fact that differentiation sometimes facilitates
communication and sometimes inhibits it? The apparent paradox is resolved once
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we assume a level-of-analysis approach. When we do, we see that differentiation
“within” has an entirely different effect compared to differentiation “between.”
Similarly, how are we to distinguish boundary spanning and core practices? The
distinction is clarified once we maintain a consistent frame of reference. Boundary
spanning practices that transgress a field’s rules and norms, such as clandestine
communications, subversive coalitions, subterfuge, treason, or heresy can then be
distinguished from boundary spanning practices that support the social
reproduction of that field. With respect to any given field of (conjoint) practice, the
former are properly understood as “boundary spanning practices” and the latter as
“core practices.”12
The distinction is important because it means that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to attribute partnership formation to specific boundary spanning
practices until the partnership has congealed enough to enable the investigator to
match its criteria to those practices. The inherent difficulties of studying such an
emergent phenomenon as partnership formation will be discussed more below.
Suffice to say, however, that once a partnership and its membership rules are
somewhat established, it should be possible to identify those core practices that
serve the overall function of the partnership to coordinate the communications and
actions of community partners toward a common purpose.

12 Note that this framework makes no normative assumptions about “boundary spanning” being
either “good” or “bad.” Our principal criterion is simply that the practice or process cannot be
accommodated by – and is therefore transformative for – a system that has already been specified.
Boundary spanning is by this definition unsustainable.
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Alongside these core practices, we can expect to see boundary spanning
practices at the edges of the partnership community that support but also
occasionally inform the partnership’s routine operations. At the partnership level,
the principal function of boundary spanning between the partnership and its
members is to ensure that the partnership does not become too set in its ways and
thereby become alienated from the community it is supposed to serve. As stated
before, partnership boundary spanning is largely a strategic affair concerned with
protecting the partnership against obsolescence. Thus, we can expect partnership
boundary spanning to include the ongoing collection and integration of viewpoints
and pertinent information regarding what the partnership should look like. This
sweeping-in of different perspectives invariably centers on a range of questions
germane to the organization of the partnership field, especially: what is the proper
problem domain?, what is the overall vision and mission of the partnership?, what
are the membership criteria and the roles and responsibilities attached to
membership?
In this way, boundary spanning articulates community norms that guide the
day-to-day operations of the partnership. By collecting and assembling different
perspectives on these fundamental matters, and by providing a forum for comparing
and integrating these viewpoints, a partnership’s boundary spanning practices
provide the partnership community opportunities for collectively reflecting on what
the partnership should look like. On a concrete level, then, partnership boundary
spanning will include all those activities and practices that emphasize – to use
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Wenger’s terms – imagination, including: newsletters, executive or board meetings,
discussions regarding values, vision or mission statement, criteria for partnership,
membership, success, or other “constitutional” matters, white papers, listserve
discussions or other community fora, and special events such as future search
conferences.13
But these collective imaginings are not, by themselves, sufficient to ensure
that the partnership remains relevant. There must be a sustained interaction
between core and boundary spanning practices. As suggested earlier, this
interaction or mutual adjustment between the two types of practices is what
Wenger (2000) refers to as “alignment.”14 Thus, we should expect to find, to use a
somewhat clumsy term, “meta-boundary spanning” that supports the strategic
alignment of partnership operations with its values and vision. As already
suggested, this alignment includes critically re-evaluating partnership and,
ultimately community, goals and changing them, if necessary, to adapt to changing
circumstances. The emphasis is in articulating goals and plans that are grounded in,
rather than divorced from, the technical, policy, and social realities of everyday
practice. In doing so, meta-boundary spanning confers what we have called
Partnership Capacity II. We should furthermore expect to find these alignment
practices in contexts similar to those enumerated in the discussion of imagining
13

It should be clarified that the collection of information and viewpoints regarding the partnership
and its overall organization may include those from outside of the partnership, but the subsequent
deliberations are likely to involve only its members and “honorary affiliates.”
14 The concept of “alignment” is similar to Schön and Rein’s (1994) “reflection-in-action,” whereby
opposing frames are compared to generate new metaphors that enable users to move between
frames (cf. also Barrett & Cooperrider, 1990; Gold, 2001; Torlak ,2001).
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practices but with more explicit emphasis on strategies for bringing about
organizational and institutional change.
The theoretical framework used here suggests that these “imagining-“ and
“alignment practices” are facilitated by the mobilization and exchange of various
forms of capital that carry communicative consequences for the partnership and its
partnering fields. Collective imagining raises existential questions about the
partnership that places it in a suspended state of scrutiny and uncertainty with
regard to its future. Similarly, alignment tackles tough questions about how to
translate abstract values and visions into concrete identities and practices. Given
the stakes, it is reasonable to expect the “expenditure” of various forms of capital
within the partnership community to continually re-establish the partnership’s
legitimacy as the primary broker for the community. This may range from mundane
fund-raising, calling on favors, or lobbying, to more elaborate symbolic efforts that
seek to tie the partnership to a larger social cause or community identity. The
important point to make here about alignment practices is that they help to
establish and maintain a system of capital exchange between the partnership’s
exchange system and those of its partnering fields. It is in the alignment of the
diverse systems of capital exchange that meta-boundary spanning operates.
In many if not most cases, interest blocs will compete and negotiate to define
what the partnership is or at least ought to be. Boundary spanning practices may
then become proxy struggles among blocs that, if left unchecked, threaten to
dissolve the entire partnership. In such circumstances one may observe boundary
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spanning practices that attempt to reconcile competing or otherwise destructive
boundary spanning practices. These may take the form of de-escalating measures
such as throwing one’s weight to a probable “victor,” succoring, negotiation,
mediation, or some combination of these. In all these instances of boundaryspanning, the mobilization and exchange of various forms of capital, and the social
communication that accompanies such exchanges, may range from ritualized to
highly strategic. Clearly, there is a need for empirical research to uncover the
distinct varieties of boundary spanning practices that fall under the general
headings “imagination” and “alignment.”
Finally, it should be stressed that the framework described here is not meant
to imply a strict correspondence between Wenger’s three modes of belonging –
engagement, imagination, and alignment – and the core, boundary spanning, and
mutual adjustment practices, respectively. Given the distributed and dynamic
nature of communities of practice, and as Wenger’s own framework implies, all
three modes of belonging are likely to operate to varying degrees and at various
times on all three levels. However, the implication is that engagement is likely to
predominate in core practices, imagination is likely to be predominate in boundary
spanning, and alignment is the dominant mode in the mutual adjustment between
the two.
A Typology of Social Learning
The motivating research question driving this study is: how do boundary
spanning practices foster and sustain partnership capacity? In the present
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theoretical framework the question can be reworded as: how do boundary
spanning practices that bring together agents, objects, ideas, and practices from
diverse fields in novel ways become institutionalized in the form of partnerships
with boundary spanning practices of their own? The term “social learning” shall be
used here to refer to the institutionalization of boundary spanning practices in the
form of partnerships of varying capacities. If social learning is the emergence of
partnership capacity, then there are at least 3 types of social learning that
correspond to the 3 types of partnership capacity. “Social Learning I” shall refer to
the emergence of Partnership Capacity I, that is to say, the emergence of a particular
institutional competence for routine boundary spanning appropriate for a specific
policy task. “Social Learning II” shall refer to the development of Partnership
Capacity II, namely: the development of an institutional capacity to routinely align
core and boundary spanning practices into a specific range of configurations that
addresses a specific range of issues. “Social Learning III” is akin to Argyris and
Schön’s (1978) concept of “double-loop learning” and refers to a partnership
developing a culture of learning to innovate new partnerships of varying capacities
as needed.15 Figure 8 illustrates the relationships between the types of social
learning and partnership capacities. The relationships that comprise the
“partnership system” are embodied in nested processes of communication and
Although outside the purview of this study, at least a fourth type of social learning – and, by
extension, partnership capacity – suggests itself: the development of the capacity to form
partnerships with the general capacity to learn (PC III). As with the simpler forms of social learning,
SL IV is usually inferred after the fact. Fields must demonstrate a capacity to routinely generate PC
III partnerships. Obviously, PC IV fields are necessarily of a high order of complexity and will usually
involve management on large scales. Within the private sector, for instance, there are certain
industries that could be classified as having PC IV.

15
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control. Partnerships are not really “things,” but rather boundary spanning
processes:

Figure 8: Process View of Partnerships

The inherent difficulties of studying emergent phenomena such as
partnership formation have already been suggested. If boundary spanners-inspanners
practice and boundary objects
objects-in-use co-emerge
emerge with the joint field that organizes
them, then the chain of causatio
causation connecting boundary spanning practices between
fields and the formation of a partnership is not a lineal one. There are no a priori
criteria we can use to predict either which boundary spanning practices will
produce partnerships or, for that matter, wh
what
at those partnerships will look like. The
two will always coalesce in a particular and historically unique form. Boundary
spanning practices cannot, strictly speaking, bring a partnership into existence.
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Instead, the recursive framework proposed here suggests that it is a change
in the relations between fields that precipitates the formation of a partnership. As
already discussed, partnerships are distinct forms of social organization
characterized by their distributed or networked structure connecting semiautonomous organizations and institutional fields through webs of communication
and mutual influence. Partnership formation entails participating fields losing some
autonomy and their relationships with one another being reshuffled.
Whenever boundary spanning practices become institutionalized, it is always
in a particular form precisely because they rely for their legitimacy and social
reproduction on the degree to which they conform to the institutional ecology of
fields in which they participate. At the same time, the boundary spanning practices
between fields are not completely determined by this ecology – indeed, once a
partnership field is established, both its core and boundary spanning practices will
partially govern it. Thus, boundary spanning practices between fields appear to be a
necessary but not sufficient condition of partnership formation – some extra
ingredient is needed.
This framework follows the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) of policy
dynamics (F. Baumgartner, 2006; Repetto, 2006; cf. also: Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier &
Jenkins-Smith, 1999) to propose that, in most cases, the extra element is a perceived
policy or other socially construed need – a threshold of demand that is usually
relatively unarticulated – which creates a structural opportunity from which
boundary spanning practices may begin to reconfigure relations in the larger
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institutional ecology to respond to that need. There will be a certain degree of
“readiness” for innovation. The need will often arise from exogenous changes
originating in the larger socio-technical or policy environment, such as changes in
environmental standards, which introduce opportunities for local policy
innovations. In some cases, however, the extra element comes from the surprising
creativity of individual and organizational boundary spanners to meet an existing
demand. Regardless of the source of change, however, under such cuspcatastrophic conditions, the direction of influence abruptly flips, and the boundary
spanning practices between certain fields go from being trivial and sporadic to
transformative. A new circular chain of causation comes into effect: the boundary
spanning practices among the fields and the larger institutional ecology begin to
influence one another in a self-correcting process that will tend to reduce the
discrepancy between them. A key result is that the boundary spanning practices of
the previously disparate fields becomes more organized. A phase space depiction of
this process would show boundary spanning practices beginning to coalesce into a
bounded region.
Viewed from a social or networked learning perspective, there is a process of
self-organization in which the network of organizations and their institutional fields
reconfigures itself “from within,” that is to say: innovative boundary spanning
practices and boundary objects “pull” the ecology of fields toward a partnership
structure that is more suitable to addressing the problem, while at the same time
the institutional ecology imposes certain constraints on the direction that those
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innovations can take. The present framework holds that this description applies not
only to partnership formation but to all innovation and diffusion processes
associated with policy and social learning where nascent learning among a small
group of visionary stakeholders must translate to larger-order institutional change.
A central hypothesis of this study, then, is that partnerships form through a
“sideways convergence” of boundary spanning practices among established fields
and their institutional ecology. The convergence is sideways in the sense that it is
neither completely top-down nor completely bottom-up, but rather a mixture of the
two – a mixture of structure, agency, and chance. As the boundary spanning
practices begin to take a definite shape, a kind of conversation ensues between a
new joint field of practice, a partnership of sorts, and a community of fields
composed of organizations and fields participating in that partnership. The
framework’s concept of convergence is similar to one proposed by Susan Star and
her colleagues who describe a “convergence of communities of practice and
information artifacts” in digital libraries and other large-scale information systems
(Star, et al., 2003).
The framework proposes that the central mechanism of this convergence is
the development and testing of boundary spanning practices and objects. Boundary
spanning practices produce novel patterns of interaction and boundary objects-inuse. The convergence begins once these novel forms of social interaction and
boundary objects-in-use accrue sufficient significance and value so that their
enactment draws the attention of partnering fields beyond their boundary spanning
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practitioners. This leads to the comparison of relations among practices (and
associated agents, ideas, and objects) in the partnership field and participating
fields.16 We know from the communicative aspects of social practice that these
comparisons are enacted in various ways through social interactions, technical
reflection and, more indirectly, through capital exchanges, especially in the
boundary spanning regions between participating fields where much of the social
experimentation takes place. The social learning underlying these comparisons
centers on the development of social heuristics or “matching theorems” that search
for patterns of homology between the relations of practice in participating fields and
corresponding relations of practice in the emergent partnership field. The resulting
heuristic represents something of a relational compromise between the fields, albeit
usually tilted in favor of one or the other.17
It is important to emphasize that in most cases the comparisons are not
cerebral exercises but rather enacted through social interactions and exchanges that
confer differential outcomes to innovations, akin to evolution by natural selection.
Acts of distinction effectively function as social computations that assign values to
practices and objects according to assumptions about how those practices and
objects should be organized. By acting through positive and negative
reinforcements, these meta-boundary spanning practices function as enacted

The criteria of relevance determining which practices are compared will themselves be in flux until
the new field achieves sufficient coherence.
17 The model of innovation and diffusion that is proposed here is more closely aligned with theories
of social and policy learning, especially those addressing the processes of mutual adjustment (see, for
example, Lindblom, 1959), than with contagion models (for example, the Bass Diffusion Model and its
variants).
16
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judgments that nudge disparate practices and fields closer to one another. But the
process is also iterative: initial heuristics will themselves be implicitly tested by
how well their products – i.e., patterns of distribution of outcomes – “do” (see Figure
9). For example, is the distribution of risks and benefits of a management plan fair?
More often than not, the results of competing boundary spanning practices and
boundary objects-in-use are then compared to one another according to a set of
meta-criteria, out of which a heuristic is selected, and the cycle repeats itself. The
meta-criteria driving the convergence operate at a “deep” system level and are
usually not directly accessible for reflection by social agents. However, we can
surmise, reiterating Checkland (2000), that the meta-criteria are generally speaking
concerned with balancing the “systemically desirable and culturally feasible.”
Up until now the discussion has focused on the evolution of the new joint,
partnership field. But this evolution would not even occur except for the fact that
each iteration of “heuristic judgment” induces corresponding changes in
participating fields which will tend to reinforce the innovation and diffusion of
boundary spanning practices and objects-in-use even as they are refined. The
changes in the fields may include: formal endorsements from managers or
community leaders, financial support, changes in laws, policies, procedures, and
processes that align with or otherwise support changes in the new joint field, the
development of other boundary spanning practices such as interdisciplinary
committees or planning processes in related problem domains, and direct adoption
of the boundary spanning practices and objects. Furthermore, the direction of
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influence is not one-directional. The “pull” from the nascent partnership field is
weak at first until it is able to establish itself. More fundamentally, the institutional
ecology will impose constraints on the organization of the partnership. But the
process is even more complex than that, for the two influences are interdependent.
The problem domain and policy response co-evolve:

Institutional ecology

Discrepancy

0

Demand
threshold
reached

Development and testing of
boundary spanning practices
and objects

Boundary spanning practices

time
Figure 9: Convergence Leading to the Formation of a Partnership

During much of the process, the formation of a partnership is by no means
assured – any of a number processes or events that interrupt boundary spanning
critical to the convergence will tend to hamper partnership formation – but, at a
certain critical point, the new partnership field will develop a distinctive set of
practices and objects that no longer depend entirely on external validation and
capital flows. The emergence of an indigenous system of interaction and exchange,
complete with its own identity, social heuristics, and boundaries, will mark the
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maturation of the partnership as a relatively distinct and semi-autonomous field of
practice. It should be noted, however, that even a “mature” partnership community
will continue to experience some degree of disparity between the partnership and
the larger institutional ecology. In fact, it is probably more accurate to think of
convergence as a more-or-less ongoing process, occasionally interrupted by periods
of divergence (Note that a “complete convergence,” where the correspondence
between fields is complete, implies their merger into a single, unified field). The
work of partnerships is never done.
A dynamic systems view suggests that once a partnership is established, the
periodic alignment of its core and boundary spanning practices is simply an
elaboration of this convergence. A partnership’s survival is not a foregone
conclusion: partnerships must continually renew themselves by re-establishing
their relevance vis-à-vis the community of partnering fields. In more concrete
terms, it is incumbent on a partnership to project, both through its practices and
ideologically, a vision for how the relevant fields will interact that feels salient, even
necessary, to those fields. As the framework implies, this salience is anticipated by
the partnership to the extent that the community already reflects partnership
practices. Partnership systems that survive tend to have a tautological quality
about them: a partnership remains relevant in part by routinely generating
coordination problems that call for its unique ability to address them. At the same
time, the influence which the partnership enjoys in the community of practice it
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serves depends, in turn, on the extent to which the partnership can meet the
multiple and ever-changing policy demands that impinge on that community.

Institutional ecology of fields
Multiple demands of larger sociotechnical and policy environment

C
A
A

D

C
D

F

F

The salience (“model fit”) of a
partnership depends on its
capacity to address the
multiple and ever-changing
demands that impinge on the
relevant local fields

B

B

E
E

Partnership field as a model of
field relations

Imagining and other boundary spanning practices project, for
the community’s reflection, competing versions of both the
nature of the problem and the shape of the partnership
Figure 10: Partnership Work asresponse
an Ongoing Process of Mutual Adjustment

Whether in fact the expected divergence between a partnership field and the
institutional ecology of fields is accidental or itself part of a still larger order policy
system is an empirical question that can only be answered on a case-by-case basis.
It is clear, however, that any accounts of the latter class of cases will generally
speaking have a logical typology 1 degree more complex than those of the former
class of cases.
A Typology of Boundary Spanning
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From the discussion so far, several general implications for studying the
relationships between boundary spanning, social learning, and partnership capacity
can now be summarized. Starting with the most general level, if social systems are
primarily about the management of change through communicative practices, then
these practices and their changes are organized in levels or orders. It follows that
their study should be about mapping practices and their changes the contrasts in
orders. This study will treat fields of practice as communication systems composed
of rules for organizing communicative practices. This approach treats boundary
spanning practices as communicative practices to the extent that they refer to
specific boundaries. It is therefore important to first specify the system level of
description and analysis against which changes associated with boundary spanning
will be measured. As defined in this study, “boundary spanning” refers to the
bringing together of agents, objects, and practices from different fields in new ways.
However, boundary spanning does not necessarily imply a change in the fields
themselves. Field change first requires that the new practices and objects cannot be
accommodated by the field, that is to say, that the practice in question cannot be fit
into the existing field’s grammar of practices. In addition, these “deviant” practices
must also persist long enough to become a problem. But new practices on the
boundaries may never take hold for whatever reason or will simply be added to the
existing repertoire of more superficial boundary spanning practices. With respect
to a given field, those boundary spanning practices that do not induce changes in the
field itself are of a lower order than those boundary spanning practices that do. We
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are therefore driven to devise a classification of boundary spanning practices,
objects, and identities that reflects these distinctions.18 The typology in Table 1
can be used for evaluating boundary spanning practices of partnership systems, so
long as it is clear which field is serving as the reference point. Note that the
typology is designed to capture those rarer cases of boundary spanning practices
that become core practices without changing the field in question.
Table 1: Typology of Boundary Spanning Practices

Yes If yes, is the
Can the resulting new
practice, object, or identity
be accommodated by the
existing participating fields?

No

routine practice,
object, or identity
persistent?
If no, is the
deviant practice,
object, or identity
persistent?

Yes
No
Yes

No

Does the practice bring together
practices, objects, and agents from
different fields in new ways?
Yes
No (“core
practices”)
“core practices”
N/A
“boundary encounters,
peripheries”

N/A

“boundary spanning
practices,” “mutual
adjustment practices”
(meta-boundary
spanning practices)
“boundary encounters,
peripheries”

N/A

N/A

The typology provides a starting point, but distinctions within cells still need
to be made. Most importantly, boundary spanning practices are different from
mutual adjustment (i.e., alignment) practices that integrate them and are therefore a
typologically more complex form of (“meta to”) boundary spanning. And, as already
stated, much of the classification of boundary spanning practices can only be
developed through empirical study.
Henceforth, the term “typology of boundary spanning practices” shall be taken to mean typologies
that cover boundary spanning practices as well as boundary objects and boundary spanners.

18
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Special methodological challenges arise in trying to use a typology of
boundary spanning practices to explain the formation of partnerships. Partnership
fields are like any other field to the extent that they have their own set of core and
boundary spanning practices. Any account of partnership formation must therefore
have some way of distinguishing core practices of the emergent partnership field
and the boundary spanning practices of the fields from which they evolve. A similar
problem holds for distinguishing changes in home field boundary spanning
practices that lead to core partnership practices and those that don’t. We are
particularly interested in measuring and classifying changes in the discrepancy
between the boundary spanning practices of the participating fields (and,
eventually, core practices of the partnership field) and the larger institutional
ecology. In other words, we must devise a similar typology classifying the sorts of
changes we can expect to see during partnership formation.
This approach conceptualizes partnership formation in terms of processes,
as opposed to agent-oriented practices, and relies on first specifying the system-ofreference. In other words, before we can use our typology of boundary spanning
practices, we must be able to distinguish, for any given case, the partnership field
and the fields that participate in it. We need some criteria for determining the
emergence of partnerships, for answering the question: “how do we recognize a
new partnership when we see it?” Obviously, the emergence of a legally named and
chartered entity does not, by itself, fit our definition of a partnership. Rather, the
emergence of a distinct partnership field coincides with the emergence of a novel
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and self-defined system of interaction and exchange, complete with its own
grammar of practices. In other words, we should observe a definite pattern of
interaction between the boundary spanning practices of the participating fields.
The same holds for boundary objects and boundary spanners. A pattern of
interaction is nothing more than a typology expressed in a particular form.
Therefore, if such an indigenous pattern of boundary spanning practices, objects,
and boundary spanners can be discerned, then we have clear evidence that the
boundary spanning practices of the various partnering fields are somehow
coordinated, that the boundary objects are actually being used, and boundary
spanners have a function beyond name only. We will have evidence of a
partnership.
Operationalization of Framework Concepts
Clearly, then, a general typology of partnership formation processes requires
using our general typology of boundary spanning practices in conjunction with
“local typologies” of boundary spanning practices, objects, and agents. These local
typologies provide a context with which to classify boundary spanning practices in
terms of the emergence of new joint fields of practice. Because partnerships are
conceptualized as systems that manage change through the organization of
otherwise disparate boundary spanning practices, then it follows that any boundary
spanning practices which can be fit into a local typology of boundary spanning
practices – since our local typology will presumably change over time, it may take
some searching to find a match – can be classified as a “partnership core practice”;
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otherwise, it is essentially unclassifiable, that is, merely a “boundary spanning
practice.”
But a sticky issue remains: how do we measure the discrepancy between the
institutional ecology and relevant boundary spanning practices leading up to the
emergence of the partnership, that is, before they are organized into a definite
pattern that can be measured? The short answer is: of course, we cannot. Because
the emergence of a partnership field cannot be predicted from boundary spanning
practices alone, we have no criteria to differentiate and therefore compare
boundary spanning practices of the partnership-to-be and those operating outside
of it. Nor do we have the benefit of historical hindsight, for such hindsight is
illusory: we would be confined to evaluating the correspondence of boundary
spanning practices to a typology we devise post factum, invariably reducing our
explanations of partnership formation to either “just so” stories or teleological
appeals. This problem represents an insurmountable “gap” in the methodology.
A similar problem holds for classifying the convergence of boundary
spanning practices and the larger community of practice. The framework posits
that this convergence reflects social learning leading to the emergence of a
partnership field, but testing this claim on a case-by-case basis is not
straightforward. First, as already stated, convergence by itself does not assure
partnership formation: any of a number of events or processes both internal and
external to the inchoate joint field may interrupt the convergence process. Even if a
new joint field appears, the analyst must be wary of ad hoc reasoning which
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selectively assigns changes in adjoining fields to the same local typology of practices
used to define the new joint field. This runs the risk of attributing convergence
among adjoining fields where there is none. Second, while the framework posits
that the convergence process is continuous, in practice, it is difficult to measure the
change in discrepancy using a continuous (i.e., “ratio”) level of measurement.
Instead, in most cases, the investigator must rely on comparing discrete typologies
of practices that are observed at different points over the course of time. This also
means that, for practical reasons, comparisons of structural or topological “distance”
will rest on qualitative judgment.
A typology of boundary spanning practices must similarly inform the
classification of the general types of partnership capacity and social learning that we
have already identified. As defined in our framework, Partnership Capacity I is the
particular institutional capacity of a field to organize boundary spanning practices
among interacting fields in the form of routine core practices that will tend to reflect
the mores of a community of practice. Thus, Partnership Capacity I can be measured
as a typology of boundary spanning practices, whatever its form. If “Social Learning
I” refers to the emergence of Partnership Capacity I, it follows that it can be
measured as the emergence of a definite pattern of interaction among boundary
spanning practices.
Social Learning II, the development of an institutional capacity of a
partnership to renew itself within a defined range of environmental conditions
(Partnership Capacity II), is more abstract and more difficult to measure. For one,
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its measurement will usually require longer time scales to demonstrate a
partnership’s resilience. Most simply, of course, the persistence of a partnership
over a defined period of time suggests Partnership Capacity II. But the simplicity is
deceptive, for it begs the question: if partnerships are by definition dynamic
systems, then which changes in their behavior pattern or core practices are routine
and which changes are not? How are we to distinguish normal social reproduction
of a partnership field from its entire replacement with another? Our general
methodological framework suggests at least three ways to answer this question. A
dynamic approach holds that a partnership with Partnership Capacity II will display
a “steady state” pattern over time in which the partnership being measured
oscillates around a series of states. Each state embodies a structure of boundary
spanning practices, a particular Partnership Capacity I, and is mapped as a
particular typology of boundary spanning practices. As the terms are intended to
convey, Partnership Capacity II is one degree more complex than Partnership
Capacity I, so if the latter can be measured as a typology of boundary spanning
practices, then the former can be mapped as a typology of the interactions of types
of boundary spanning practices. Although technically correct, this rather abstract
approach gives us no clear sense of how, practically speaking, to measure
Partnership Capacity II.
Another measurement strategy is to consider that Partnership Capacity II
resides at the level of the partnership system that mediates between the partnership
field and its ever-changing institutional ecology. Thus, a partnership having
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Partnership Capacity II will also tend to exhibit a pattern of interaction with its
partnering fields. It should be possible, in other words, to construct a typology of
the interaction between a partnership’s core practices and the core practices of the
field of fields, that is, the patterned interactions among fields occurring outside of
the partnership. This concept is somewhat more concrete and, in fact, builds on the
methodological strategy, outlined above, for measuring changes in discrepancy
during partnership formation. However, we still encounter the difficulty of tracking
potentially numerous changes in typologies of interactions over time. In addition,
our comparisons are complicated to the extent that the social practices and
interactions within the partnership and those of the participating fields reflect one
another.
A still more straightforward way to measure Partnership Capacity II starts
with the assumption that partnerships with PC II will tend to enjoy widespread and
consistent implementation of its multiple functions. One of the theoretical
assertions of this framework is that the mediation between the partnership and its
community of practice is indirectly accomplished through the mutual adjustment of
the partnership’s core and boundary spanning practices. One of this study’s
predictions is that a stable pattern of interaction between a partnership’s core and
boundary spanning practices will tend to produce a partnership that enjoys largescale and consistent implementation of multiple functions (PC II). That is, if we can
construct a coherent typology of alignment practices, the theory holds, we have
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evidence of Partnership Capacity II. By extension, Social Learning II will tend to be
associated with the emergence of such a local pattern of interaction.
The measurement of Partnership Capacity III is perhaps the trickiest, since
we must be able to distinguish situations where the formation or replacement of
partnerships is exogenous – driven by external processes – and situations where
that formation or replacement is endogenously driven by a deeper institutional
capacity for learning and adapting.
From our discussion on PC III, we know that a defining characteristic is the
absence of persistent institutional issues that remain unaddressed. PC III is often
achieved by replacing palliative remedies with more fundamental solutions to the
underlying issue. The theory predicts that PC III will often be associated with a
laboratory of learning where community members are encouraged to create social
technologies and then critically inquire about outstanding issues, leading to a series
of technically desirable and cultural feasible models for collective action under welldefined scenarios. If the prediction holds, we may begin to infer PC III if we observe
a definite pattern in critical reflection centered on innovating, scanning for issues,
and institutional design. Of course, we should also expect to find “native” models or
institutional designs of partnerships that suggest some capacity of a community of
stakeholders for reflexivity. Such models may assume many different forms ranging
from narratives to computer simulations.
It follows from the discussion that any partnership exhibiting Partnership
Capacity II is necessarily a general order more complex than a partnership
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exhibiting Partnership Capacity I, and by extension, one order simpler than one
exhibiting Partnership Capacity III. The logical typing of our mappings should
reflect this contrast.
We are now in a position to propose a general typology of partnership
processes which, if the underlying theory is validated, can guide their measurement.
The typology can be formulated as a series of linked decision rules for classifying
changes associated with social learning as shown in Table 2. Note that typologies
for boundary objects and boundary spanners – as well as for changes in boundary
objects and boundary spanners – are implied and follow the same general
procedure as for classifying changes in boundary spanning practices. Appendix B
summarizes the methodology as a “methodology of institutional change.”
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Table 2: Typology of Partnership Processes
Processes

Can be fit in a
local typology of
boundary
spanning
practices?

Does the change
coincide with a new
pattern of boundary
spanning practices
(Partnership Capacity
I)?

Methodological criteria
Does the change
Can be fit in a
local typology
coincide with a new
pattern of alignment
of alignment
practices?
practices (Partnership
Capacity II)?

Can be fit into a
local typology of
institutional
design practices?

Yes: Core
partnership
practice (STOP)
No
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Yes:
Partnership
alignment
practice (STOP)

Local boundary
spanning practices
SKIP

No: Boundary
spanning
practice
SKIP

Changes in
disparity between
boundary spanning
practices and
institutional
ecology

Yes: Social Learning I
(STOP)

Yes: Institutional
design practice
(STOP)
No: Boundary
spanning practice

Does the change
coincide with a new
pattern of institutional
design practices
(Partnership Capacity
III)?

No: Change in disparity
(convergence or
divergence)

SKIP

Yes: Social Learning II
(STOP)
No: Change in
disparity
(convergence or
divergence)

Yes: Social Learning III
SKIP

No: Change in
disparity (convergence
or divergence)
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
The present study partially assesses the framework by proposing and
evaluating hypotheses to two motivating research questions:
Research Question I: How do partnerships form exactly?
Hypothesis I: A socio-technical or policy need creates a structural
opportunity for boundary spanning practices to begin to influence the larger
institutional ecology. Boundary spanning practices will begin to converge with the
ecology of participating fields through an iterative process of social judgments
embedded in communicative practice and capital exchange. If the boundary objects
(innovations) are deemed both technically desirable and culturally feasible, then the
practices and ideas that produced them diffuse along with the innovations, further
reinforcing the convergence. Boundary spanners play an important role in
managing the convergence (however imperfectly) through visioning, strategic
judgments, and steering capital flows, even as they are thereby changed in the
process. The entire process is summarized as “Social Learning (SL) I” and results in
a partnership with a basic capacity (Partnership Capacity I) to address a fairly welldefined policy problem.
Research Question II: How do partnerships sustain themselves over time?
Hypothesis IIa: To survive in the face of changing policy conditions, a
partnership must learn (SL II) to engage in alignment practices that periodically
allow for the mutual adjustment of core operations and more strategic and even
constitutional concerns. This ensures that partnership goals and strategies are
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informed by local practices and conditions and facilitates the partnership’s role in
shaping the community agenda on a policy issue. Therefore: partnerships
demonstrating a pattern of alignment practices will tend to oscillate about a defined
range of “partnership states,” as measured by programs, initiatives, or other
strategic emphases.
Hypothesis IIb: Partnerships that develop the capacity (SL III) to reconfigure or
“design” alignment practices to address socio-technical and policy surprises acquire
a general capacity to learn and adapt that is enhanced with each iteration of the
social learning cycle. Partnerships demonstrating PC III are characterized by a
learning culture that promotes innovation and critical reflection of alignment
practices in experimental settings. Therefore: partnerships demonstrating a
pattern of institutional design practices will tend to persist in varying forms and
under a wide range of environmental conditions.
Methods
To assess these hypotheses and the theory and methodology underlying
them, this study carried out 4 case studies of water resource management
partnerships in the Columbia River Basin: the Counting on the Environment
Working Group (COTE WG) working in the Willamette River Basin in Oregon, the
Regional Water Providers Consortium (RWPC) based in the Portland (OR)
Metropolitan Area, the Walla Walla Watershed Alliance (WWWA) working in the
Walla Walla River Basin in south-central Washington, and what this study is calling
the Upper Deschutes River Partnership (UDRP).
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Case Selection
Cases were selected from a “sampling frame” of roughly 30 partnerships. The
primary source of data for the cases were interviews. An important case selection
criterion, then, was whether a sufficient number of interview subjects – between 5
and 10 per case – indicated they were willing to be interviewed. This criterion
introduces an additional selection bias in an already non-random sample: it is quite
conceivable that motivation to participate in the study was linked in some way with
the model’s variables, further distorting results.
Cases were to a large extent selected to enhance the study’s replication logic
as called for in explanatory case study designs (Yin, 2003). Thus, every attempt was
made to select partnerships that shared as many potentially confounding factors as
possible while focusing on the model’s major relevant variables. For Hypothesis 1
(explaining partnership formation), these include: presence of pre-existing “need,”
presence of innovative (boundary spanning) practices, technical desirability,
cultural feasibility, degree of interest and support for innovations, extent of
adoption, the exchange of capital forms to promote innovations, “structural
distance” between innovations and wider community of practice (measure of
convergence), and pattern of boundary spanning practices (measure of PC I). For
Hypothesis IIa (explaining partnership PC II), the relevant variables are: coherence
of alignment practices and presence of defined range of partnership states (measure
of PC II). And for Hypothesis IIb, the relevant variables are: coherence of
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institutional design practices and the absence of outstanding partnership issues
(measure of PC III).
To increase the likelihood of observing a range of partnership capacities and
social learning orders, partnerships were selected that ranged from relatively
“young” (COTE WG) to relatively mature (RWPC). Selection also allowed some
variance in specific policy area. Finally, the study drew on Mandell & Steelman’s
(2003) typology type of inter-organizational innovation to classify the partnerships
after they had already been selected. These variables are not considered part of the
model and potentially capture effects which the model could not anticipate. While
they complicate analysis, these variables also make it more likely that any patterns
that are detected are in fact significant. Otherwise, cases were selected which were
similar with respect to several potentially significant, complicating factors,
including: policy domain (water resource management), cultural-geographic region
(the Columbia River Basin), size and complexity (regional partnerships), and
historical incidence (contemporary). Table 3 shows the relevant “demographics” of
the 4 cases:
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Table 3: Demographics of Cases
Policy Area

Geographic Area

Scale
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Case

Years

Age (at
study)

Number
of
Partners

Interorganizational
Innovation (Mandell &
Steelman, 2007)

Counting on the
Environment WG

2009-

1

25

temporary taskforce

Regional Water
1997Providers Consortium

13

26

permanent and/or regular Water Supply
coordination

Portland
Regional
Metropolitan Area

Upper Deschutes
River Partnership

2005-

5

4

permanent and/or regular Reintroduction
coordination
Effort

Upper Deschutes
River Subbasin

Regional

Walla Walla
Watershed Alliance

2001-

9

14

Watershed
hybrid of permanent
Management
and/or regular
coordination and coalition

Walla Walla River
Basin

Regional

Ecosystem Service Willamette River
Markets
Basin

Regional

Interviewee Recruitment
Once the partnerships were selected individual subjects who are identified
others or by me as “boundary spanners” or closely involved with boundary
spanning activities were recruited to be interviewed. For this study, and as already
stated, boundary spanning is defined as bridge-building work that connects
practices, agents, objects and ideas from different social, technical, and policy
domains. For the purposes of subject recruitment, “boundary spanners” referred to
those individuals who directly or indirectly engage in boundary spanning activities.
I used snowball and convenience sampling strategies to identify recruitment
subjects. Sampling consisted of mostly telephone and some face-to-face
conversations with partnership contacts introducing myself and the research
project and asking for referrals for boundary spanners or other promising interview
subjects. These “sampling conversations” served not only as data reconnaissance
for case selection but also to identify candidates for interviews in the event that the
partnership was selected as a case. The core of data collection centers on interviews
with individual subjects. In order to ensure an adequate representation of
boundary spanning perspectives for each partnership case, subjects were recruited
and individually interviewed until testimonies begin to overlap and settle onto a
“saturation point.” Altogether, 40 subjects were formally interviewed, averaging 10
per case.
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Data Collection
Data collection consisted mostly of one-on-one, in-depth interviews with
boundary spanners from each of the cases; in a few cases, interviews were
conducted over the telephone. The interviews averaged around 90 minutes and
consisted of a series of open-ended questions about the formation of the
partnership and boundary spanning activities that have occurred since then.
Questions were designed beforehand to capture the central concepts embedded in
the theory, including: boundary spanning practices, innovation, need or demand,
convergence, core practices, and alignment practices. In addition, to help meet the
study’s aim to document the many varieties of boundary spanning, the open-ended
structure of the interview helped capture incidental information about boundary
spanning in partnership processes. The interview protocol and questions were
pilot-tested on 2 individuals working in related policy areas to test for measurement
validity. Feedback was then used to make adjustments in the protocol, questions,
and probes. Appendix A shows the final interview instrument.
Secondary data, including archival and website materials, technical
documents and memos, meeting minutes, media coverage, correspondence records,
and existing reports, were also collected and analyzed for evidence of boundary
spanning, partnership capacity, and social learning. I also carried out field trips
observing partnership activities, including public meetings.
Analysis
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Interviews were recorded, transcribed, coded, and analyzed using Atlas.gi, as
qualitative analysis software. The statements and points of view expressed by
interviewees were interpreted on an individual basis and should not be taken to
represent those of their agency, organization, or other affiliation.
Exploratory tables describing the various instances of boundary spanning
practices were populated by first classifying the partnership processes for each case
(e.g., SL I, PC I). The boundary spanning practice categories were arrived at through
a process of induction from the cases. The present framework defined boundary
spanning as any interaction between 2 or more practices, ideas, entities, and objects
associated with different fields of practice, or any process or practice that supports
such interaction. The codings were as descriptive as possible to aid in interpretation
and validation of the observations. Practices were generalized just enough to
capture similarities across cases without obscuring important distinctions. The
categorization underwent several cross-case iterations until they began to settle.
The assignment of values for the model variables comprising the hypotheses
was based on summary analyses of the case studies. Because the categories were
derived beforehand, data collection was more targeted than in the cataloguing of
boundary spanning varieties. Interview questions (see Appendix A) were designed
to capture many of the factors, while primary and secondary data were also
analyzed in accordance with the methodological framework. Still, assignment of
values relied a great deal on qualitative judgment. The outcome measures especially,
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“structural distance” and “pattern of boundary spanning practices?”, were measured
by a rather general assessment only after the case studies were written.
Finally, I held and facilitated an optional half-day SSM workshop in
September, 2010, where participants from the different partnerships collectively
reflected on boundary spanning and ways to build partnership capacity. The
workshop provided an opportunity to present preliminary findings to key
informants for face validation. But the workshop was also designed as a
collaborative research component for the study itself. Participants and I collectively
used a collaborative learning process called “Soft Systems Methodology” (SSM) to
explore and model institutional change scenarios selected by participants from 1 of
the 4 case studies. SSM is a collaborative modeling process designed to assist
stakeholders in thinking about issues associated with bringing about change in a
situation that they view as problematic. This process is more “inquiry and design”
than “strategic planning,” because while strategic planning tends to be goaloriented, SSM focuses instead on the transformation that gets stakeholders from
where they are today to where they want to be.19 SSM’s process-focus helps
stakeholders stay aware of the deep values and assumptions driving institutional
change and enables them to collectively explore how their perspectives are
themselves subject to negotiation and change. Ultimately, the objective is to arrive
at stories of change, or “holons,” which stakeholders can reflect on and compare in
order to identify and address issues associated with the sustainability of the change
SSM is not, strictly speaking concerned with implementation planning either. Rather, it strives for
more of an integration of strategic and implementation planning.

19
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effort. Issues might include: implementation being inconsistent with local customs;
change introducing contradictions between partnership functions; lack of capacity
and other inputs to carry out change.
The selection of SSM was driven by several considerations. First, SSM
coincides closely with the study’s framework. The perspective-driven methodology
starts from a design view of “human activity systems” that explicitly uses a grammar
of change (“root definition grammar”) appropriate for planning for and managing
institutional change. Indeed, the study’s system-as-process framework suggests
natural intervention points for SSM in the ladder of social learning and partnership
capacity, as Figure 11 illustrates:
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Figure 11:: Mapping SSM onto framework showing possible intervention points

Prior to the workshop, representatives of each partnership were given an
assignment to select from 1 of 3 general types of partnership processes and to
develop from that starting point a description of the current “pr
“problematic
oblematic
partnership situation.” They were then asked to develop a statement of the process
which they desired to see in their partnership
partnership,, identifying key elements of the
process, as well as evaluation criteria by which that process would be judged.
Although not made explicit to the participa
participants
nts at the time of the assignment, the 3
general types of processes corresponded in fact to SL I, PC II, and PC III. Each
participant thereby engaged with SSM at the corresponding intervention point (see
(
Figure 11). The assignment’s questions roughly corresponded to SSM’s first 3 formal
stages (Mode 1): problem structuring (technical, social, and political analysis);
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identification of major elements of vision statement (What is the desired change?,
How does the change come about?, and Why do the change?, along with criteria to
evaluate success); and finally, a rudimentary statement of the envisioned
partnership process using SSM’s root definition grammar.
Based on the information collected from the assignment, I then constructed
rich picture diagrams of the problematic situation along the root definition
statements. Appendix C shows the SSM rich pictures for each of the 4 “change
scenarios.” The rich pictures generated rich group (“plenary”) discussion that was
organized around identifying outstanding issues associated with the envisioned
process and ways to address those issues (see Appendix D). The intention was to
document these issues and proposed strategies for each scenario and then
“triangulate” these findings with the study’s findings in order to look for
associations between boundary spanning practices and partnership processes,
including strategies to address specific types of issues associated with specific types
of processes. Thus, the workshop was conceived as an instance of collaborative
learning between an academic and a group of practitioners that would
simultaneously enrich the study’s findings while also providing an opportunity to
evaluate SSM as a social learning tool.
Conclusion
Studies of boundary spanning, partnership formation and social learning
more generally, and partnership capacity are difficult not only because our
methodologies are not yet up to the task, but also because the subject matter is
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intrinsically complex. The dynamics of partnership formation, with its ever-shifting
reference points, frustrate conventional methodologies which rely on a fixed ground
against which to measure change. The same can be said for the fluid character of
partnerships once they are established. At times they appear as autonomous fields
of practice, at other times more as boundary regions between interacting fields. But
partnerships, at least the ones that tend to survive, are neither one nor the other:
rather, they are more properly understood as complex adaptive systems that
navigate the liminal state between them. According to this view, the study of
partnerships and partnership formation should focus on the management of
disparity between the boundary spanning practices occurring within the joint field
and those operating outside of it. Furthermore, we can expect that this management
will center on negotiating definitions of the nature of the management problem and
what the appropriate form of partnership is to address it.
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Chapter 4
Counting on the Environment Working Group
Background
The Counting on the Environment Working Group (COTE WG) formed in
2008 to develop a set of principles, procedures, and test-pilots for a multi-credit
ecosystem services marketplace in the Willamette River Basin of Central Oregon. An
“ecosystem service” refers to the benefits that natural ecological processes produce,
such as clean water, carbon sequestration, and stormwater recharge. An ecosystem
marketplace is any location, real or virtual, where conservation and restoration
outcomes can be bought and sold. A buyer – often it is a land user seeking to offset
or mitigate for environmental harm from economic activity – can purchase “credits”
produced by another party carrying out environmental conservation or restoration
activities elsewhere. The COTE WG consists of a group of stakeholders representing
regulatory and non-regulatory agencies, environmental interests, the state’s natural
resources industries and related businesses, municipalities, farmers, and other
landowners and users in the Willamette Valley. This group has come together to
develop and test a standardized set of crediting methodologies, protocols,
assurances, and tools that would be used to measure and account for multiple types
of ecosystem service credits in a marketplace where they could be traded. It is the
first marketplace of its kind to integrate credits spanning multiple ecological
concerns – in this case, water quality, salmon habitat, wetland, and upland prairie.
As of this writing, these policy innovations are already being field-tested in 4 pilot
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restoration projects. The COTE WG’s accomplishments to-date are truly
remarkable, considering the ambition of the policy agenda and the speed with which
they have progressed in promoting it. To appreciate the work that the COTE WG
partnership has carried out, as well as the challenges that remain to the larger
ecosystem services marketplace agenda, we have to understand the historical and
policy context in which the COTE WG formed.
The concept behind the term “ecosystem service” is a relatively modern one.
Although observers have noted some of the vital functions of natural processes
dating back to Antiquity, these functions have tended to remain a concern for
natural philosophy and later biology and ecology, but not economics. In the West,
the ideological separation of “man” and nature meant that these functions were not
assigned economic values. Nature attained economic value only through humans
transforming it. Ironically, the notion of ecosystem services has some of its earliest
roots in the dismal science’s observation that natural resources were not unlimited
(see especially, Marsh, 1864). But it wasn’t until the mid-20th century that writers
began to raise awareness of the vital functions that nature provides humans, and the
idea of “natural capital” was born (Leopold, 1949; F. Osborn, 1948; Vogt, 1948). In
1956, Sears highlighted the important role that ecosystems play in processing waste
and recycling nutrients. In 1970, at the height of the environmental movement, a
report issued by the Study of Critical Environmental Problems (SCEP), coined the
term “environmental services” to refer to a range of services that were valuable to
human societies, including: pollination, fisheries, climate control, and flood control.
106

In the subsequent decades, the notions behind environmental services were
gradually given more definite shape by scientists and environmental thinkers who
grappled with numerous problems relating to valuing “ecosystem services,” as these
services came to be called (see for example Heal, 2000). These discussions
culminated in a 4-year United Nations study carried out by 1,300 scientists
worldwide entitled Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA). The MEA formally
identified 4 broad classes of ecosystem services: provisioning of benefits (e.g., food
and water); regulating of processes (e.g., climate and disease control); supporting
functions (e.g., nutrient cycles and pollination); and finally cultural, which refers to
recreational and spiritual benefits. Since then, the MEA has provided a framework
for developing ecosystem service policies around the world, including in Oregon.
Still, various problems centering on demand, value capture, measurement,
barriers-to-entry, assurances, and accounting practices will need to be addressed.
In addition, currently the policy landscape remains fragmented with respect to
developing ecosystem service marketplaces. The disparate laws, rules, and
incentive programs spanning the sectors will need to be strategically aligned to
promote the development and smooth functioning of marketplaces (INR report,
2008). Finally, accounting practices will need to be updated to better integrate
mitigation crediting with the larger capital markets (INR report, 2008). Until these
structural changes are made, it will be difficult for ecosystem marketplaces to
establish themselves. As with most innovations in the early stages, ecosystem
service marketplaces face a chicken-and-egg credibility dilemma – the larger society
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requires these marketplaces to address some of its challenges before it will fully
embrace them, while at the same time these marketplaces require a minimal level of
buy-in and participation by the larger society in order to address those challenges.
Emergence of Policy Readiness
These issues notwithstanding, ecosystem service markets have found some
traction in Oregon. Since the 1990’s Oregon has experimented in ecosystem service
markets in the areas of carbon trading and water quality. In 1997, the Oregon
Legislature passed its landmark House Bill 3283 establishing caps on greenhouse
gas emissions and requiring power plants to make offsets on any discharges above
their allotted amount. A third party, Climate Trust, was set up to handle trades of
credits between polluters and mitigators. In 2004, Clean Water Services (CWS), a
special district agency that services water and sewage for Washington County,
procured a National Pollutant Discharge System (NPDS) permit from the EPA that
combined permits for both waste water treatment and stormwater management.
This bundling of permits has enabled CWS to take a more comprehensive and
holistic approach to water quality. The NPDS permit allows the agency to trade
“water quality credits” generated through creative and efficient solutions that
capitalize on leverage points in the larger Tualatin River Valley watershed. In one
program, CWS has worked with farmers and other landowners to sponsor the
planting of shade trees along strategically selected riparian zones that help to cool
the river and thereby offset heating pollution from the agency’s waste water
treatment facilities.
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Similar benefits have been recognized from increasing instream flow, and
once again, legislative innovation was key. The Instream Water Right Act in 1987
authorized the sale, lease, and gifting of water specifically for the purpose of keeping
more water in Oregon’s creeks and streams. The law made it possible to lease or
transfer conserved water on a temporary basis, providing agencies and
communities the flexibility to protect stream flow during periods that were
especially critical for salmon and other species. But the law also authorized the
permanent conversion of consumptive water rights into instream water rights. The
legislative act effectively created markets that could fund and underwrite these
transfers. The Oregon Water Trust (OWT) has emerged as a significant “banker” of
water rights in the state. Building on the successful model of land trusts, the OWT
strategically acquires water and instream water rights and targets their transfers in
smaller tributaries that provide a critical supporting function for salmon spawning
and rearing. In return, farmers and other water right holders receive various forms
of compensation ranging from cash and replacement feed for lost production to tax
breaks. OWT’s portfolio now includes over 160 cubic feet/second (cfs) of water
rights in 86 different streams involving transactions with over 200 landowners.
In the Deschutes River Basin, the Deschutes River Conservancy (DRC) has
expanded on the water banking model to address new hydrological findings that
show a critical link between groundwater and instream flow, particularly in the
Lower Deschutes. Changes in state water laws that required new applicants of
groundwater permits in the basin to acquire instream mitigation credits helped spur
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the creation of a market for these credits. The DRC has worked with landowners,
irrigation districts, municipalities, and the Oregon Water Resources Department
(OWRD) to generate, certify, and track these credits as offsets for groundwater
permits, leading to significant progress in meeting ODWR’s targets for instream flow
in critical stretches of the Deschutes River (INR, 2008). The Columbia Basin Water
Transactions Program (CBWTP), started in 2002, offers a similar system for
incentivizing landowners to help restore stream flow. The CBWTP, like the other
markets, is actually a partnership of a diverse set of stakeholders. Funding is
provided by the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) in cooperation with the
Northwest Power and Conservation Council (NPCC), and administered by the
National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) which reviews and ultimately
certifies proposed transactions. As in the other cases, transactions involve either
permanent acquisitions, leases, or incentives for improving efficiency and
conservation that are carried out through various programs and partnerships (INR,
2008).
Wetland mitigation banking is another policy tool used in the protection of
the country’s wetlands. Starting with the George H.W. Bush administration, both the
EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have pursued a policy of “no net
loss” of wetland. The principle means of federal enforcement was through the Clean
Water Act, Section 404, which requires any unavoidable fill of wetlands receive onsite mitigation. Since then, these agencies have partnered with state and sometimes
local governments to establish wetland mitigation banking programs to provide
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more flexible, efficient, and effective mitigation. As with other credit banking, the
idea is that a landowner or sponsor that creates, restores, and protects wetlands can
bank credits which are sold to private and public developers who in effect fund
those wetland banks. The Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT), for
instance, has a wetland mitigation banking program to offset any unavoidable
impacts from road and bridge projects. As the federal agency enforcing Section 404,
the USACE wields considerable influence on wetland mitigation banking through its
rules and guidelines that define what constitutes avoidable versus unavoidable
impact and allowable offsets to mitigate those impacts. In Oregon, the Department
of State Lands (DSL) administers the State’s wetland mitigation program in
cooperation with the USACE, assisting landowners with setting up and monitoring
banks. However, under current laws, wetland mitigation credits can only be
transferred or sold for purposes of permitting or offsetting violations. This
effectively eliminates the possibility of a third party facilitating trades and makes an
ecosystem services marketplace for wetland mitigation banking cumbersome
(LaRocco & Vickerman, 2007). Similarly, ODOT is statutorily restricted from using
gas-tax revenues for purposes other than building or improving transportation
roads and bridges (LaRocco & Vickerman, 2007). Furthermore, off-site mitigation on
which a robust marketplace depends is currently limited by state laws. DSL, for
example, cannot approve offsite mitigation banking unless all on-site mitigation
options have been deemed impractical. More generally, wetland mitigation banking
has been agency-driven. The risk-averse culture of agencies, combined with
111

statutory restrictions that constrain their actions, mean that wetland mitigation has
tended to be relegated to on-site, and the market for wetland mitigation credits
remain underdeveloped. Despite this, wetland mitigation banking programs
certainly lend credence to the idea of banking offsets and have raised awareness of
the possibilities for creating markets where these offsets could be traded.
Crystallization of an Ecosystem Services Policy Network
Emboldened by these successful experiments, a small group of community
and policy leaders emerged to propose developing a comprehensive ecosystem
service marketplace that would accommodate multiple kinds of credit to address
the diverse array of environmental problems the state now faces. A central premise
of the multi-credit ecosystem services marketplace is that such an approach enables
markets to more strategically target synergies and leverage points across ecosystem
functions. A multiple credit schema greatly simplifies the mitigation process both
for developers and for those wishing to carry out and fund conservation or
restoration. Instead of having to interact with multiple agencies, permitting
requirements, and programs, market participants would only have to interface with
a single set of rules and incentives. But perhaps even more importantly, a multicredit approach leads to a more comprehensive and integrated framework for
valuing and restoring ecosystem services, at least at the site level. Land-users who
are allowed to either “bundle” or “stack” credits of different types (e.g., water
quality, habitat, wetland, carbon) are incentivized to concentrate mitigation in those
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areas where multiple ecosystem services support one another.20 Thus, for example,
properly targeted wetland restoration can simultaneously improve flood control,
water quality, and habitat that protect biodiversity, and, more fundamentally, the
integrity and resilience of the underlying ecosystem itself.
Perhaps no organization has championed the idea of establishing a multicredit ecosystem marketplace in Oregon more than has the Willamette Partnership
(WP). Officially formed in 2004, WP is a non-profit organization with a board
comprised of local and state leaders spanning the public, private, and civil sectors all
variously concerned with, as the mission statement says, “increasing the pace,
expanding the scope, and improving the effectiveness of conservation,” starting in
the Willamette Basin. The organization’s roots date back to 1996 when Governor
John Kitzhaber convened the “Governor’s Willamette Basin Task Force” to develop
policy tools for better coordinating and managing conservation and restoration in
the Willamette River Basin. This led to the formation of the Willamette Restoration
Initiative in 1997 which was charged with developing a comprehensive strategy that
would simultaneously address water quality, flood control, fish population health,
and habitat. Four years later the “Willamette Restoration Strategy” identified high
priority areas for protection and restoration, including riparian areas, detailed
strategies for improving water quality, and created new communication channels to
better coordinate regulation at the state and federal levels.

“Bundling” refers to counting different types of credits on the same site without distinguishing
physical areas within the site. “Stacking” refers to dividing a site into distinct sub-areas where only
one type of credit is counted for each sub-area.

20
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These efforts led to some early on-the-ground successes, and, more
importantly, helped to build relationships among leaders from a diverse range of
sectors and interests, including: environmental conservation, municipalities,
natural resource industries, businesses, farming, and research. A coalition of
community and policy leaders was forged from a combination of shared experiences
with both policy failures as well as recent successes in credit markets. Although
they came from different backgrounds, these leaders began to coalesce around a
common emphasis on “ecosystem services” that helped shape both their perception
and response to the environmental degradation of the Willamette River Basin.
Building on these earlier initiatives in the Willamette Basin, and drawing on
the lessons of ongoing mitigation banking experiments, both in Oregon and
elsewhere, this coalition of leaders formed WP in 2004 for the express purpose of
researching, developing, and promoting ecosystem services markets. Presently, the
partnership includes: Clean Water Services, the Oregon Business Council,
Wildwood, Inc., Defenders of Wildlife, Willamette Riverkeeper, The Conifer Group,
the Oregon Association of Nurseries, Weyerhaeuser, the Oregon Association of
Conservation Districts, SOLV, the Network of Oregon Watershed Councils, Portland’s
Bureau of Environmental Services, local law firms, and the state’s universities. In
2005, WP was 1 of 12 recipients nationally of the EPA’s Targeted Watershed Grant
to create a water quality trading program for the Basin that initially focused on
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water temperature in support of salmon recovery.21 The original proposal had the
backing of a wide range of stakeholders, including: Governor Kulongoski, The
Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, the Oregon Association of Conservation
Districts, DEQ, and other government agencies, the major cities of the Willamette
River Basin, special utility districts, industry associations like Associated Oregon
Industries, environmental groups, the University of Oregon, and Oregon State
University. WP convened a process to develop a water quality trading market, but
with no clear sideboards to organize discussion, the group got bogged down in
disagreements and ultimately “died under its own weight,” as one of participants
described it. The same year, Clean Water Services established their water quality
trading program on the Tualatin River.
Birth of an Idea for a Multi-Credit Marketplace
Up until that point, ecosystem credit markets had largely been used to
address separate regulatory concerns, such as water quality or wetland mitigation,
but in 2006, ODOT’s Mitigation and Conservation Coordinator, Bill Warncke, rolled
out a program for his agency that would address multiple resources, including water
quality, wetlands, fish and wildlife habitat, and endangered species (Ness, 2009).
Essentially, the ODOT Banking Program proposed a currency called “Habitat Value”
which would assess the habitat value of a site based on a comprehensive evaluation
of functions supporting biodiversity. By building in “backstops” to account for
21 The regulatory driver for the program was the Department of Environmental Quality’s Total
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) requirements governing water quality in Oregon’s streams and
tributaries. One TMDL concerns temperature, which stipulates the maximum temperature that
waters are allowed to reach on any given day of the year, and is designed to protect salmon requiring
a specific stream temperature range to flourish.
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specific regulatory concerns, the Habitat Assessment Method (HAM) represented an
innovation in multiple-credit accounting. It was, among other things, one of the first
efforts of its kind in Oregon to quantify habitat value.22 The ODOT Banking
Program, taken as a whole, was also a policy innovation. Its Comprehensive
Mitigation and Conservation Strategy (CMCS) broke from traditional mitigation
banking in shifting the focus from individual sites (and acreage measurement) to the
landscape scale where more ecosystem service values could be captured. Following
this strategic approach, the program’s “Ecoprovince Priorities” identified
restoration goals for each watershed in Oregon that targeted ecologically significant
habitat and species where ODOT’s mitigation program could make the most
difference. It effectively challenged Oregon’s regulatory community to think beyond
narrow silos and minimal compliance to achieve superior environmental results.
But perhaps the most significant innovation was at the process level. The ODOT
Banking Program included an inter-agency Mitigation and Conservation Bank
Review Team (MCBRT) that was no doubt inspired by the successful inter-agency
collaboration model developed within ODOT several years before called the
Collaborative Environmental and Transportation Agreement for Streamlining
(CETAS). In a manner similar to CETAS, MCBRT folded different regulatory
processes associated with permitting and mitigation for transportation projects into

22

It is important to note the important role that research played in developing ODOT’s Habitat
Assessment Method. To calculate habitat value, HAM relies on information about the habitat-species
associations that are documented in Wildlife-Habitat Relationships in Oregon and Washington
(Johnson and O’Neil, 2001). The actual calculations involve running queries of the Interactive
Biodiversity Information System database.
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a single program that served to streamline the development and certification of
mitigation banks. By agreeing to a strategic, integrated framework upfront, the
signatory agencies could review and approve specific mitigation banking projects
with greater efficiency and effectiveness (Warncke, 2006). The collaborative model
carried the additional advantage that the program’s performance would improve as
relationships of trust between the agencies were built.
Ultimately ODOT concluded that its project impacts were not sufficient to
justify the cost of building and maintaining banks, and the program dropped the
multi-credit, functional-based approach in favor of more traditional conservation
banking (LaRocco & Vickerman, 2007). However, Ness (2009) reports that the
reasons Warncke’s proposal was ultimately dropped had less to do with pragmatic
constraints and more to with an agency culture wary of experimenting outside of
traditional regulatory approaches (Ness, 2009). This resistance was perhaps
surprising, given the agency’s success with CETAS, which had become touted as
model for inter-agency collaboration. It is therefore unlikely that the process design
was the issue; instead, resistance seems to have centered more on cultural and
substantive issues, starting with the idea of multiple-credit banking. In a sign of
things to come, the agency management was reticent to take on such path-breaking
approach without sufficient assurances that ODOT’s regulatory obligations would be
met (Ness, 2009). Mitigation banking was and continues to be viewed by many
agency staff with skepticism as a policy tool that primarily serves development
interests. Combining ecosystem service credits only compounds much of the
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uncertainty and confusion for bureaucrats consumed with managing and
communicating about risk. Their tendency is to favor precision of measurement
even at the expense of actual policy outcome. Thus, Warncke’s call to agencies to
think beyond narrow regulatory and compliance goals and to strive for
improvements in environmental outcomes represented a criticism of agency culture
more generally. As a call to change, it was probably viewed by some as a threat as
well.
While Warncke’s Habitat Banking Program proposal never materialized,
others within the emerging ecosystem service policy network took notice. The
failed proposal made its rounds through various channels, including Warncke’s
(2006) article “Oregon Innovates,” which was published on the website of The
Katoomba Group, a prominent organization promoting ecosystem marketplaces
(http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/dynamic/article.page.php?page_id
=4298&section=home&eod=1, accessed November 5, 2010). Agencies and
consultants like Parametrix who were affiliated with ODOT’s Conservation and
Mitigation Program were of course familiar with the proposal, and the ideas
contained within it made their way into discussions involving other institutional
stakeholders working on banking projects and programs, many of whom had forged
relations while working on the Willamette Basin Initiative. Within a few years,
several key policy actors in the Willamette River Basin began exploring various
forms of the multiple-credit ecosystem marketplace. Parametrix built on the
program’s methodology for calculating salmon backstops and eventually completed
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a salmon crediting methodology. The Institute for Natural Resources (INR) began a
2-year research project to examine ways to better integrate wetland and
endangered species concerns in transportation planning, while Defenders of
Wildlife began experimenting with a voluntary “Marketplace for Nature” both in the
Willamette River Basin and in Chesapeake Bay (Ness, 2009).
Soon after Warncke’s proposal, and building on the EPA Targeted Watershed
grant project, WP began to develop a concept of a “Willamette Ecosystem
Marketplace” (WEM). The Partnership staff and board led the effort, with critical
assistance from partners and stakeholders. It was an ambitious, large-scale effort.
The Mid-Willamette Valley Council of Governments acted as fiscal agent of the
project and technical assistance was provided by CH2MHill, David Evans &
Associates, Parametrix, and 4 task teams: A Synthesis Map Working Group tasked
with carrying out a more accurate delineation of conservation and restoration
priority areas; a Practitioner Working Group consisting of potential restoration
providers (sellers of credit) to help identify and implement potential banking
projects as well as develop temperature crediting protocols; a Transaction Working
Group that developed credit trading documents such as credit exchange and
registration agreements; and a Technical Team that explored ways to quantify
ecosystem service improvements from floodplain restoration. Countless other
stakeholders, including many of the same supporters of the original EPA Targeted
Watersheds grant, provided technical and in-kind assistance (Primozich, 2008).
The WEM project, by the time it was completed in 2008, could boast several
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important accomplishments, including a market appraisal identifying high priority
areas as potential markets and a “centralized market infrastructure” consisting of a
credit registry, trading platform, and supporting documents that could account for
many different kinds of credits (Primozich, 2008).
During this time, members of the Board emerged as important champions of
the concept as well, including: David Hulse of the University of Oregon, Bill Gaffi of
Clean Water Services, and Sarah Vickerman of Defenders of Wildlife. At the same
time that she was developing Defenders of Wildlife’s “Marketplace for Nature,”
Vickerman led her organization in co-sponsoring with WP a series of stakeholder
fora to formally discuss the challenges and opportunities for developing a
comprehensive marketplace. These fora, which were facilitated by INR, produced
several reports, including one Vickerman co-authored with her colleague Gina
LaRocco (LaRocco & Vickerman, 2007). Indeed, 2007 saw the circulation of several
working papers authored by some of the key figures within the policy network.
These papers amounted to a collective vetting of issues that helped to focus the
different conversations occurring within the network during this time. Of course, as
authors of these papers, these actors had a significant role in shaping the overall
policy agenda of the ecosystem services marketplace. In 2007, the Oregon Business
Summit hosted a special session on “Creating an Ecosystem Services Marketplace”
featuring prominent figures of the nascent policy network. Among others, Bill Gaffi
joined with Allen Alley, Governor Kulongoski's Deputy Chief of Staff, in calling for a
state-level effort to build an ecosystem services marketplace (Ness, 2009). All of
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these policy discussions culminated in a special report published by the INR entitled
Policy Cornerstones and Action Strategies for an Integrated Ecosystem Marketplace in
Oregon which identified the institutional building blocks of a multi-credit
marketplace and proposed several policy recommendations, including: removing
statutory obstacles, authorizing agencies to carry out adaptive management,
improving communication and coordination among agencies and programs, and
building agency cultures that embrace adaptive management (INR, 2008).
Convergence of Innovative Ideas and Policies
For regional initiatives like WEM to take hold, it must be embraced by the
state. This was especially the case here, since, as the reports made clear, the current
statutory and regulatory framework in Oregon was going to make it difficult to
establish a successful multi-credit ecosystem marketplace. History favored state
support of the WEM initiative, since the Governor’s Office had remained involved in
the developments since Kitzhaber’s “Governor’s Willamette Basin Task Force” and
continuing with the EPA’s Targeted Watersheds grant project, as well as the fora
that culminated in the INR report. In addition, the successful experiments with
environmental credit markets both in Oregon and elsewhere convinced many
lawmakers of the potential that a comprehensive multi-credit ecosystem
marketplace held for revitalizing the state’s natural resource, recreational, and
economic base. These markets seemed to hold particular promise for rural areas
that were still recovering from the collapse of the logging industry. And it was
largely with the aim of rural revitalization in mind that the Oregon Legislature
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adopted, with some modifications, the Millennium Assessment’s definition of
ecosystem services when it updated its Forest Resource Trust HB 2293 in 2007.
The convergence of local and government experiments in ecosystem service
markets accelerated in 2008 with the passage of the Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act (or “Farm Bill”). Section 2709 of the Farm Bill called for the USDA to work with
other agencies and land-using stakeholders to develop guidelines for measuring,
valuing, and monitoring ecosystem services with the express purpose of facilitating
the establishment of ecosystem service markets. It stipulated that the technical
guidelines should be used to develop measurement and reporting protocols and
registries to track credits, along with a system of verification (H.R. 2419: 2719,
2008). As a result of the Farm Bill, a new Office of Ecosystem Services and Markets
(now called the Office of Environmental Markets) was created within the U.S.
Department of Agriculture to implement Section 2719.
By 2008, therefore, there was a policy “readiness” in Oregon to begin to
transform the multi-credit ecosystem services marketplace concept into a concrete
policy. Building largely on Policy Cornerstones and Action Strategies for an
Integrated Ecosystem Marketplace in Oregon, Defenders of Wildlife proposed to
lawmakers a bill that would begin to address the issues raised in the report. The
proposal was backed by a diverse array of stakeholders, including: the Willamette
Partnership, the Oregon Forest Industries Council, the Oregon Business
Council, Ecotrust, Sustainable Northwest, Wildlands Inc., Parametrix, Clean Water
Services, and the City of Portland (Vickerman, 2009). In 2008, lawmakers began
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crafting a bill, and in July of 2009, Senate Bill 513 was signed into law by Governor
Ted Kulongoski. The bill proposes a framework within which lawmakers and
stakeholders can craft rules, regulations, policies, and practices that will lead to the
development of a comprehensive ecosystem services marketplace in Oregon
covering: water quality, habitat and biodiversity, wetlands, and carbon
sequestration. Among other things, the bill: recognizes the importance of
sustaining rural landscapes and communities, advocates combining regulatory and
market mechanisms, calls for more flexible zoning practices that maximize
ecosystem service benefits, and acknowledges the need to provide adequate
oversight to prevent “double-dipping” of credits.
Finally, SB 513 directs the Office of Sustainability Board to create a task force,
the SB 513 Working Group (SB 513 WG), to write a report and present policy
recommendations to the 2011 Legislature. The bill furthermore stipulates that SB
513 WG representatives must "be active in improving the ecological effectiveness of
ecosystem services markets." SB513 Working Group members include:
representatives of federal, state, and local agencies, environmental interests, natural
resource industries, farmers, developers and landowners (Vickerman, 2009). The
major areas the SB 513 WG is required to address are: implementation (guidance,
facilitation, and management of the marketplace); developing a methodology for
consistently quantifying ecosystem services in a practical way; establishing
consistent evaluation and accounting; clarifying government’s role both as regulator
and participants; clarifying mechanisms for bundling and stacking; and stimulating
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demand that includes voluntary or incentive-based approaches. The SB 513 WG
started meeting in the fall of 2009 with staff support provided by the Oregon
Watershed Enhancement Board (OWEB).
The legislative proposal that Defenders of Wildlife, WP, and their partners
put together that led to SB 513 was actually part of a larger effort to develop a multicredit marketplace in Oregon. These policy actors and leaders recognized that,
given the very market-driven nature of their proposal, legislation alone would not
be sufficient. Policy experimentation and development would also have to occur in
the private and civil sectors. It was in this spirit of policy innovation that the
Willamette Partnership applied for and received a Conservation Innovation Grant
from the National Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) in 2007 to develop tools
and mechanisms for landowners and regulators that would facilitate credit markets
in water quality, habitat conservation, wetland services, and carbon sequestration.
The grant also targeted building capacity to integrate these credit markets into a
comprehensive marketplace in the Willamette River Basin. With support from the
Conservation Innovation Grant, WP convened a group of stakeholders to form the
Counting on the Environment Working Group (COTE WG) in 2008 with the explicit
task of developing crediting methodologies, protocols, assurances, and tools for
quantifying multiple ecosystem services and implementing credit transactions. It
was furthermore tasked with developing marketplace pilots which would provide
valuable information on what was working or not and why. From the beginning,
then, it is clear that WP and its partners conceived of the COTE WG as aiding the
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larger effort to build a case for a comprehensive ecosystem services marketplace.
Although the COTE WG predates the SB 513 WG, the COTE WG’s work anticipates
several areas of concern which the SB 513 WG was later mandated to address,
particularly in the areas of methodology, evaluation and accounting, and bundling
and stacking credits.
This, then, is the general institutional and policy context in which the COTE
WG formed. It can be seen as a policy response to a perceived need to address the
accelerating degradation of environmental conditions in the Willamette River Basin.
This need was already framed by the long-standing discourse linking natural
resources, economic development, and quality of life, but this frame also took an
historically particular shape during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s under the idea
of “ecosystem services.” Gradually, a coalition of policy actors formed that began to
articulate a vision for a comprehensive marketplace that challenged Oregon’s
environmental governance structure. The comprehensive ecosystem service
marketplace idea built on earlier innovations, both within the state and elsewhere,
but what made it a policy innovation in its own right was its proposal to integrate
different credit markets. The innovation started as a program innovation within
ODOT, but was readily adopted by policy entrepreneurs like Vickerman, Gaffi, and
ultimately WP.
The ecosystem services policy network took shape around the state-directed
Willamette River Basin Initiative, but it was decentralized enough to encourage
innovation in thinking about, and experimenting with, ecosystem service markets
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while enjoying critical state-level support. The rich collaborative research
environment involving federal and state agencies and universities not only
produced valuable data and tools for marketplace development, but fostered a
community of practice characterized by a unique blend of political philosophies,
technical skills, interests, and policy approaches. This community has secured statelevel support for its policy agenda to establish a comprehensive ecosystem services
marketplace in Oregon, culminating in the signing of SB 513, which proposes to
change the regulatory and policy landscape in Oregon to favor such a marketplace.
But despite these policy victories, the ecosystem services marketplace
remains more an idea than a reality. Serious hurdles to implementation remain,
including a bureaucratic and policy culture wedded to procedures and silo
approaches, as well as larger socio-economic and political barriers to participation
by the private sector. The policy network finds itself at a critical juncture in its
history as it seeks to build the institutions that will support a multi-credit
marketplace on a large enough scale to make it both effective and efficient. SB 513
and the SB 513 WG represent the spearhead of this effort. But while the network is
held together by both strong and weak ties of professional and personal association,
implementation of a marketplace will require a more coherent coordination of
efforts than has been accomplished to date. One of those efforts is WP’s COTE WG.
In many ways, the COTE WG serves the policy agenda of SB 513, particularly as a
“laboratory” to research, develop, and test crediting methodologies and tools in pilot
markets which would eventually be adopted on a larger scale. This makes the COTE
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WG somewhat of a transitional entity within the ever-evolving ecosystem services
marketplace policy network, both influencing and being influenced by it.
Because the ecosystem policy network is itself still taking shape, the story of
the formation of the COTE WG is therefore a story of change on multiple levels: the
ground on which the policy actors have built relations and carried out their work
within the COTE WG continues to move. The formation of the COTE WG, then, is a
special case of social learning within social learning. This layering of changes
presents special challenges for investigating the formation of the COTE WG and
requires above all that we clearly define our levels of analysis with respect to one
another. By keeping these levels distinct, we will be in a better position to describe
and evaluate the different kinds of boundary spanning practices that have shaped
the COTE WG as well as the continuing co-evolution of the COTE WG and the larger
ecosystem services marketplace policy network. As in the other cases, how we draw
the boundaries of partnerships carries implications for our assessment of social
learning – who or what is learning and what is being learned? – and partnership
capacity.
But a similar condition holds also for the boundary spanners working both
within and outside of the COTE WG. Because the network and its vision is still
rather loosely defined, the COTE WG has had to learn to define its role within the
larger network and manage expectations accordingly. For the boundary spanners
this has meant wearing different hats at different times, and it has meant learning
when an issue was a COTE WG issue and when it was best handled in another
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context of deliberation. For the COTE WG itself, it has required the kind of
partnership capacity to keep itself together for as long as it is needed. Its
partnership capacity must be strong enough to produce some end-products but not
so strong that those products don’t serve the larger policy agenda of establishing a
multi-credit ecosystem services marketplace.
Formation of the COTE WG
From its inception in 2008, COTE WG was a project of WP and its NRCS grant.
In many ways the grant-driven nature of the COTE WG provided both much needed
structure to existing conversations and a degree of rigidity that continues to pose
challenges for policy learning going forward. The original grant ran from July 1,
2008 to June 30, 2010 and defined for the Willamette Partnership clear objectives,
deliverables, and deadlines for the process which the partnership had formulated
with its partners prior to submitting their grant proposal. The partnership was
anxious not to repeat the mistake they made with the EPA-sponsored process. In
contrast to that earlier process, the COTE WG had a well-developed problemdefinition with a clear set of objectives and deliverables which helped to
communicate expectations to stakeholder participants.
The project was ambitious: to convene a special working group of
stakeholders to develop and agree, by August 2009, to a multi-credit ecosystem
services accounting system of credit calculation methodologies, protocols,
assurances, and tools that would subsequently be tested in several markets in the
Willamette River Basin. The project identified 4 crediting areas of concern:
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salmonids, water quality (specifically, temperature), wetlands, and upland prairie.
Pilot-testing would begin in late summer of 2009 and continue for 2 years, with
results available in summer of 2011. The final version of the accounting system,
including a web-based platform, was scheduled to be rolled out to the public in early
2010. That said, the expectation was that the pilot projects and the subsequent
rollout of the accounting system in the Willamette River Valley would ultimately
lead to larger scale marketplaces, covering a larger diversity of credit types
(including carbon), in Oregon and elsewhere.
Recognizing the ambitious nature of the grant, its architects were deliberate
in designing a process that would ensure the successful completion of the objectives
on-time. Staff support was crucial throughout the process, starting with the process
design. David Primozich, then-Executive Director of WP, and Bobby Cochran, thenProject Manager of the COTE WG and Market Analyst at CWS, essentially sheparded
the process from the beginning. Both men had been actively involved in the
ecosystems services marketplace community for a number of years. Primozich had
overseen several management planning processes, including the Willamette
Subbasin Plan, before helping to found WP in 2004. Cochran had worked on credit
markets at Defenders of Wildlife before becoming market analyst at CWS. Their
general approach to the COTE WG process was to anticipate and address significant
obstacles before they materialized. The numerous judgments that went into the
design and management of the process reflected a keen awareness on the part of
Primozich, Cochran, and other members of the project team, of what was both
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practically and politically feasible. This appreciation of the policy context had been
instilled through their educational trainings and experience working with agencies
and other partners in similar market experiments and through their general
familiarity with Oregon’s environmental politics.
A legitimate concern Primozich and Cochran had was that the COTE WG
process would appear to lack genuine participation. This concern applied perhaps
especially to government agencies that were inclined to view the ecosystem services
marketplace project with skepticism and even some confusion. To alleviate these
concerns, WP invited Oregon Consensus, based at Portland State University, to assist
them in setting up the process. Oregon Consensus’s solid reputation as an impartial
facilitator and mediator helped to reassure stakeholders that the process would
remain open and fair. Debra Nudelman of Kearns & West, a consulting firm
specializing in facilitation and mediation, was subsequently hired to assist in setting
up and facilitating the process. A “Project Team” consisting of Primozich, Cochran,
Bartholomew “Mac” Martin, a water resource analyst at WP, Nudelman, her
assistant Peter Harkema, and occasionally Bill Warncke of ODOT, began meeting in
early 2008. Their first order of business was to identify the categories of
stakeholders that should be involved in the COTE WG. These categories covered a
range of natural resource agencies as well as private and civil interests. Once these
categories were developed, individual candidates were selected. In selecting
participants, the Project Team identified individuals who had both decision-making
authority in their organization and a reputation for collaborating with others. The
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team recognized that the innovative nature of the project would require a
willingness to consider other points of view and to think creatively about
integrating those perspectives and concerns in the final set of products. This was
especially the case for the regulatory agencies. The natural posture of these
agencies is to defend their jurisdictional authorities, and the ecosystem services
marketplace agenda was viewed by many as a problematic intrusion on that
authority that carried risks of its own. To assuage some of these fears, Nudelman
and the rest of the Project Team worked hard to communicate the boundaries of the
problem space (especially regulatory) that the Working Group would cover, as one
of the Working Group members reports:
There were some very early concerns by agencies, particularly in the
regulatory realm. Some of those concerns never went away. They were going
to get dragged into this collaborative process that was going to have them
give up their regulatory authority, that all of a sudden they would be
abdicating their responsibility to others. I think the facilitator – which is
another key, that they brought in an independent facilitator so they could
participate in the process – helped to really set up sideboards and
boundaries to keep that from happening.
Given the general institutional skepticism, the team recognized it was also
important that the participants were in traditional leadership positions that would
enable them to secure the level of support from their home organizations and
constituents necessary for wider scale adoption of the Working Group’s products
and recommendations. Once again, Primozich’s and Cochran’s familiarity with the
policy community gave them valuable insight into which individuals from which
organizations would work well together as a Working Group on this particular
project.
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Once the list of candidate participants was drafted, Primozich and Cochran
approached these individuals, described the NRCS grant project and its objectives,
and asked them to join the COTE WG for the 2-year commitment. Recruitment was
certainly facilitated by the fact that most of the individuals who were approached
already knew Primozich and Cochran either through previous collaborations or
associations or were at least familiar with WP’s initiative. Indeed, several Working
Group members had at one time or another served on WP’s board or on one of its
committees. Still, the recruiting process appears to have accelerated as more
reputable names signed on. As one Working Group member remarked:
The other thing they did really well was bringing in influencers, bringing in
folks who really have an influence in the natural resources arena. They
brought in names that brought in other names. I could look at the list as I
started to be involved and say, “We have Defenders Of Wildlife and the right
person at Defenders Of Wildlife involved. We have people at top levels.” You
start to look around the table and say, “They're bringing in this level of
people, we need to bring in a high level of participation.”[…] Particularly for
NOAA, I don't think NOAA ever felt comfortable being at the table. NOAA was
very concerned if they weren't at the table, that they were going to be on the
menu. I think part of what kept the regulatory agencies there is, "By God, we
want to know what is going on. They're talking about programs we regulate."
That was one of the issues was it's such a high profile that they didn't want to
not be present.
NOAA was certainly not the only agency that was hesitant. Even so, agencies are not
monolithic, and many of the same regulatory agencies that were wary of the
ambitious project nevertheless saw it as supporting many of their own initiatives to
innovate in the areas of implementation and compliance. The same Working Group
member continues:
The other regulatory agencies, [Oregon Department of] State Lands, [Oregon
Department of] Fish and Wildlife, I think those agencies are looking for new
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and innovative ways to implement their regulations. I think from their
perspective, DEQ as well, those agencies were looking at it saying, “If this is
going to help us do our job better and more cheaply, and more appropriately,
we want to be involved in this process, and we want to be sure, just like NRCS
does from the technical expertise end, we want to make sure what they're
doing is up to a certain standard.” That kept them at the table.
Initially, 25 representatives of federal, state, and local agencies as well as of specific
environmental groups, farming and industry associations, and municipalities
committed to participating in the COTE WG.23 Although some representatives have
since been replaced, the composition of the COTE WG has been quite stable.
What followed was roughly 6 months of co-designing the process with the
participants themselves. Nudelman and Harkema carried out a “convening
assessment” consisting of interviews with participants asking them to identify their
expectations, as well as potential obstacles for the process, including those related
to internal approval processes, and suggestions for addressing them. The result was
a set of “Operating Principles” which all agreed to from the outset. The thinking of
the Project Team was that by agreeing to these principles before the process got
underway, participants were more likely to feel bound by them going forward.
For the Project Team, this preparatory work was critical to improving the
likelihood of producing a set of credit accounting methodologies and tools which the
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representatives and their constituents would be willing to test. As one of the Project
Team members explains:
The other part is we spent a lot of time before we brought that Working
Group together, we spent almost six months of meeting to make sure […] that
the right – people were there. We were setting it up in the right way. It was
very clear the day that Working Group started and when it ended, exactly
what we wanted in the end, exactly how each step was going to proceed
throughout the whole piece. We spent a lot of time setting it up to the point
some people were saying “get on with it,” but I think spending that time was
really helpful.
The “Operating Principles” identified fairly specific expectations around the
decision-making process which reflected a concern with ensuring a relatively
smooth process with minimal surprises. Its statement of expectations covered a
wide range of concerns: the objectives of the process, including the signing of an
agreement of principles governing a multi-credit ecosystem services marketplace,
overall process structure, what constituted consensus, roles of participants, leadtimes for distributing agendas and decision items, meeting preparation, and
crucially, keeping home organizations and constituents informed and in the loop
throughout the process. A major risk for all the participants was that they would
invest precious time and resources only to come to the end of the process and find
that other members were unable or unwilling to sign the agreement. Indeed, the
very presence of this risk could deter others from participating, as one Working
Group member relates:
Some entities just work glacially, and so one of the threats is that at some
point the bulk of the group just says, “It's not going to be implemented in a
way that warrants the time and money I'm spending involved in this study.”
[…] I'm soft funded so I go down on my own time and it's very difficult for me
to justify that time when I have all this grant funding that is paying for other
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work that is not being done. It's not like any money so much as: if stuff isn't
happening it's not a priority, and if I'm having to go to five meetings because
Army Corp of Engineers wants to do something but can't figure out how to do
it internally, it's really difficult.
To address this, the Project Team and Nudelman made sure that the participants
understood their obligations for participating. They recognized that the ambitious
nature of the project required clear commitments upfront.
The Project Team modeled their process structure after the largely
successful WEM by creating several supporting bodies to the Working Group that
represented various inputs: a Stakeholder Coordinating Team; a Policy Group
consisting of organizational leaders; a Practitioner Review Team consisting of likely
buyers and sellers of credits to provide feedback on the usability of the accounting
system and its tools; and a Technology Development Team to assist in the
development and implementation of the ecosystem services marketplace. Figure 12
illustrates the structure of the COTE WG process as it was laid out:

Figure 12: COTE WG Process Structure (Source: http://willamettepartnership.org/ongoing-projectsand-activities/wp_nrcs_project2pager-11-06-08-_2_.pdf, accessed 10/26/10)

Although not obvious from the figure, arguably the most important
component of the process was, and continues to be, the Stakeholder Coordinating
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Team. It was tasked with assisting the Project Team in ensuring that the process
moved forward by facilitating communication between the Project Team and the
overall Working Group. This has enabled the Project Team to anticipate issues
before they became a significant problem. The (Stakeholder) Coordinating Team
gave input on the process design itself before the larger Working Group convened.
Since then, it has provided valuable feedback to the Project Team on agenda items
and documents for upcoming meetings as well as on how the Working Group
members felt about how the process was going. The individuals that comprise the
Coordinating Team continue to act as two-way filters of information and
perspectives between the Project Team and Working Group which requires them to
make judgments about what types of communications and actions are appropriate
and when. According to one Project Team member:
We [Project Team] would meet between meetings, two to three weeks in
advance of a Working Group meeting, provide them [Coordinating Team]
with a draft agenda, draft technical materials, and say, “Is this enough? Is this
too much information?”... That Coordinating Team I think provided a key
function of bridging the communications as well as just really being that
sounding board where, “This is really strategically what we're thinking,
keeping in mind all of the time frames and what we need to accomplish, given
that this is what we're thinking in terms of framing up this meeting or that
meeting,” and using them as, “Does that sound right? Does that make sense?
Will that be enough? Are we pushing people too hard? Can we push a little
harder? What can we do, if we really need to get here, can we meet
independently with this group, that group, because we know they're going to
have concerns about X, Y or Z topic?”
In assembling the Coordinating Team, the Project Team made a point of inviting
individuals like Cathy Macdonald of the Nature Conservancy and Yvonne Vallette of
EPA who were comfortable in both the technical and policy worlds and who were
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recognized for their collaborative leadership. As one Project Team member
explains, these traits applied to all the Working Group members, but perhaps
especially to those on the Coordinating Team:
…In starting our process we identified those people we considered first key
gatekeepers to various constituents. As it turns out, this should not be
surprising. Those gatekeepers are also those people that have vast technical
capabilities, but can also operate very easily in the policy world. We created
what we called our Coordinating Team. Those are people who do both, who
have to manage, by necessity of the work they do, the technical world with
the policy world. Those gatekeepers were essential to the process. Those are
the people who are the true boundary spanners, the people who can operate
really effectively in both worlds.
The Operating Principles included expectations regarding what
representation entailed. The grant-driven nature of the project meant that
stakeholder participation and therefore representation was more selective. For this
reason, participants were asked to only represent their organization and
constituents. But arguably the most controversial aspect of process design was the
timeline. Many if not most of the agencies and organizations felt that it was going to
be very difficult to achieve the stated objectives within 2 years, and there was
sufficient skepticism during the initial meetings to nearly derail the process even
before it had started. Sensing that participants were beginning to question the
project’s feasibility, one of the project leads responded quickly by enlisting the help
of one of the Working Group members who was widely respected as a collaborative
leader:
I turned to one of our gatekeepers, one of the people that was well respected
by the various constituents that were there, and asked that person to bring
us back home, why we were articulating, why we were doing the thing we
said we were going to do. It wasn't because we got a grant and we said we'd
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do it so we better do it. It was because there was a real, clear need that
everybody at the table had agreed to. There was one gatekeeper who had the
ability to articulate that in a way that made a lot of sense. That person got up,
at my request, when it looked like people were saying “Yes but, yes but, yes
but…” I turned to this person and said, “Will you please just lay it out there
why we're here? Why we have to do what it is we're saying we're doing?”
She did. It was just like all the hot air went out of the room and people said,
“Okay, we think it's going to be a lot of work and hard, but I'm willing to give
it a shot.”
It is likely that the project lead’s recognition and skillful handling of the issue –
asking an influential policy leader to articulate the reasons for the COTE WG –
helped maintain group cohesion at an early stage in the process when that cohesion
was still quite vulnerable.
Innovation of Boundary Objects
With the “Operating Principles” in place, the Project Team set to work in the
fall of 2008 to develop credit calculation methodologies, protocols, and tools for
each of the 4 banking areas (salmonid, water quality, wetlands, and upland prairie).
The Working Group convened the first of 5 workshops in late November of 2008 to
begin discussing how to develop an integrated ecosystem marketplace. To
supplement and inform these discussions, the Project Team convened focus groups
consisting of Working Group members and other stakeholders who had technical
and regulatory expertise in each of the 4 areas. The primary objective of the focus
groups was to build on existing approaches and tools while attending to the specific
challenges of a multi-credit platform. During the course of these discussions, which
spanned roughly 8 months, the Project Team, Working Group, and focus groups
confronted numerous issues, including determining criteria for baseline
138

assessments and weighting of credit indicators to account for liabilities and risks
related to “temporal loss” of credit values.
The Project Team was able to build on recent innovations in credit
calculation methodologies and supporting technologies in the areas of credit
registry and project planning and management which provided much-needed
legitimacy in the final project products. For credit calculation of wetlands
improvements, the Project Team ultimately settled on DSL’s Oregon Rapid Wetlands
Assessment Protocol (ORWAP), which combines acreage and functional assessment
methodologies and was by the fall of 2008 nearing completion. For water
temperature, the team adopted DEQ’s Shadelator, a credit calculator that quantifies
water temperature reduction from shade restoration projects. The team could also
draw on the “Synthesis Map” from the WEM project as a resource to identify high
value shade restoration projects.
Developing methodologies and tools for salmonid and prairie was in some
ways more challenging since there was less innovation on which to build. The focus
groups and Project Team had to consider how the various aspects of banking for
salmonid and prairie should be integrated across regulatory (e.g., salmon recovery
plans) and ultimately ecological concerns. This entailed learning to talk across
disciplinary and even linguistic boundaries. Minutes from one of the salmonid focus
group meetings captures this dilemma with respect to developing an agreed-uponset of criteria for selecting bank sites:
One thing ODOT did was develop conceptual guidance for the limiting factors
in the watershed. Some limiting factors are overall viability of the population,
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conductivity and disease. One concern is that everyone does not speak the
same language and don’t define limiting factors in the same way which may
make them hard [to] determine (meeting minutes from February 23, 2009).
Assuming a common framework could be established, inputs to the tools –
baselines and limiting factors like population viability – would require information
about the specific ecological context of a given site. In the case of salmon, this
information is distributed in various databases, GIS maps, and fishery histories
among different agencies and organizations ranging from the federal level (e.g.,
NOAA) down to the local (e.g., watershed councils). All of the tools, but perhaps
especially the salmonid and the prairie tools, were going to require a level of
information-, but also knowledge-, sharing between agencies and other stakeholders
that had not previously existed.
Ultimately, the Project Team drew heavily on ODOT’s and Parametrix’s work
and developed a Salmon Credit Calculation Method that proposed a functions-based
methodology (covering 6 functions) that would assign or “release” credits,
expressed in habitat-weighted linear feet, for restoration and conservation actions
such as habitat improvement and floodplain restoration that benefitted salmonid
species. The Prairie Credit Calculation Method measures credits in functional acres
of upland prairie based on a weighting methodology that accounts for multiple
factors, including a site’s contextual value. This “prairie calculator” could then be
used to release credits for actions that improved the habitat and survivability of
listed species such as the Fender’s Blue Butterfly and Willamette Daisy.
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The development of these credit calculation tools for pilot-testing entailed
numerous technical and policy judgments that had to be negotiated among the
Working Group members, focus group members, and the Project Team, as one the
participants explains:
We had to take some shortcuts. I don't think they created any fatal flaws but
maybe has handicapped us a little bit. But I still think that's probably just a
relic of us having to do this at such a fast pace. I think we had some
interesting alignments between the agencies on some of the policy questions.
There were some contradictions in policy that had to be discussed. Some of
them still need to be discussed.
Indeed, numerous issues with the salmon and prairie tools remain which can only
be addressed in real-world policy experiments.
Testing Innovations
The significant level of uncertainty and risk associated with measuring and
accounting for credits called for an iterative approach to tool development and
testing. Versions of the tools were first tested in the Spring of 2009 in various test
sites which were selected by the Project Team, the Coordinating Team, and the
larger Working Group in consultation with the focus groups. Preliminary results
from these tests were fed back to the each of the focus groups for comments and
suggestions which were then incorporated by the Working Group to refine
additional field-testing in May. Results of this second round of field tests were then
fed back to the Working Group to inform their decision on a package agreement in
August. The Project Team and Working Group identified sites that fit the basic
criteria of high value restoration, willing participants, minimal regulatory conflicts,
and available resources for carrying out the projects. Ultimately, 2 credit projects –
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Delta Ponds and Gales Creek – and one debit project – an ODOT project at Dairy
Creek Bridge – were selected.
The iterative process spanned multiple meetings over a period of 8 months
in which the Project Team would confer with the focus groups and identify areas
requiring follow-up. Time between meetings would be spent collecting data,
answering information requests, clarifying agency policies, and sharing information,
findings, and perspectives with constituents and home organizations. One Working
Group member reflects on the importance of these informal exchanges:
Even outside of our structured meetings in the Working Group, a great deal
of behind the scenes discussions happened. It was good. Lots of the time it
was done as preparatory work or follow-up work so that we could try to
figure out a way to address these in a constructive way in order to move on
to the next step.
Time that participants spent debriefing constituents and home organizations
also provided an opportunity to field concerns and other relevant information that
they could then relay back to the Working Group process. This required exercising
some judgment about what was relevant to share and to whom, as one participant
explains:
It's a two way communication. You needed the Working Group
representatives to meet with their stakeholder groups, but also to bring what
they were hearing back to help problem-solve and address the concerns that
were arising and that may have arisen. I think that communication happened
fairly efficiently and well throughout the process. Representatives would say
“It's a great idea.” [or] “We're never going to be able to support that. It's just
not going to work. We can't be responsible for long term management of a
piece of property without some sort of assurances of what that might look
like.” Each group, I felt, did a good job of bringing those concerns back to the
table. It was a key component of saying “This is where the conversation
happens. It has to happen here at the Working Group table.”
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The sheer number and diversity of stakeholder interactions and inputs happening
both within and external to the formal process posed a management challenge to
the Project Team. Sometimes there was miscommunication between steps, for
example, in reporting out from the focus groups to the Working Group:
I like the idea of the focus groups because they would be much smaller. They
would be four, or six, or eight people. There is an opportunity to bear down
more on specific parts of issues and return to a topic and work over a topic
more than the big [Working] group. Did the information get translated back
to the group? Not always. There is always translating. There are always
transcription errors and translating errors, particularly if you don't have that
background: “I think I heard you say this. I wrote it down and you didn't
correct me. Then I transcribed it and I said it to the group.” There's a little
loss there. Maybe it's all inherent in the process.
With so many parallel processes occurring it was easy for the process to get
side-tracked or stalled at a particular step. One important process strategy the
Project Team employed was a system of provisional “agreements in principal”
which served to anchor progress at decisive steps along the way, not unlike the
anchoring strategy familiar to rock climbers. Yet, the iterative nature of the process
also meant periodically revisiting agreements to solve larger issues, with the
ultimate goal of developing a comprehensive crediting package:
You do have all the technical information to support a decision but also the
non-substantive input, the policy overlays and process overlays that weigh
into whether you have all of the information, or sufficient information to
move forward. At some level we did utilize “agreements in principle.”
Getting to a point you made a decision that was good enough for now,
pending how, recognizing once you have an agreement on this piece and this
piece, and this piece, once you pull it all back together, it still needs to work
for everybody. At some level we took a piece-by-piece agreement: “Is this
good enough for now? Is this good enough for now?” Then when you got to
the final agreement, pulled it all back together and said, “Does the package
still work?”
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Obtaining Institutional Support for an Ecosystem Credit Accounting System
A major objective for WP and for the Project Team was securing statements
of support from Working Group members and their organizational leadership for a
package proposal. By the summer of 2009, the Project Team had assembled its
“Ecosystem Credit Accounting System” (ECAS), a system of protocols, assurances,
and tools, including templates for contracts and procedural documentation, that
would enable ecosystem services credits to be traded in 4 different types of
currencies corresponding to: salmonid habitat, water quality (water temperature),
wetlands, and upland prairie habitat. Obtaining statements of support from the
institutional stakeholders was crucial for several reasons. In a more immediate and
practical sense, these statements of support removed any legal and administrative
obstacles to pilot-testing the system on a meaningful scale. But they also continue to
lend the ECAS a certain institutional legitimacy during the current pilot-testing
phase when the policy innovation is vulnerable to skepticism and loss of
momentum. On August 4, 2009, 25 members of the Working Signed an “Agreement
in Concept” supporting the ECAS and its field-testing. A similar “Agreement in
Principle” was signed by the corresponding organizational leadership in October of
2009.
As statements of support, in contrast to an official ratification of the ECAS,
the agreements provided signatories sufficient exemption from any liabilities or
obligations to make them feel comfortable signing, as one of the agency
representatives explains:
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It's also helped that we haven't said, “We're going to agree to it all and do
everything on this either,” because it's still a pilot and we're still developing
it. Even though all along I said, “I'm working on this and do everything, but if
all of a sudden a red flag pops up and we can't work with this, and Willamette
Partnership isn't willing to change it so we can work with it, we can still walk
away.”
The signing of these agreements represented a significant step forward in the
development of an integrated ecosystem services marketplace. The formal process
leading up to the agreements lasted less than a year; yet a significant amount of
social learning occurred from the time the Working Group first convened until the
agreements were signed and pilot markets launched. The social learning occurred
at the technical, policy, and social levels, as new tools and policies were developed
and new social relations of trust were built. In many important ways, the social
learning within the COTE WG process simply built on the social learning within the
larger policy network that preceded it. Nevertheless, these agreements were far
from assured at the outset and would not have been successfully negotiated without
the considerable effort on the part of the participants and the Project Team to
challenge themselves and each other to consider other points of view while critically
seeking integrative solutions. This boundary spanning took various forms within
and outside of the formal process, but ultimately it centered on patiently balancing
active listening and critical judgment within a context of policy experimentation and
learning.
The COTE WG has not been an unqualified success, however. Four agencies –
NOAA, USDA, ODFW, and the City of Portland initially did not sign the agreements
(although ODFW ultimately did), and there were disagreements that arose along the
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way that remain unresolved. The points of contention in part reflect the immense
challenges of assembling an integrated credit accounting system. At the same time,
they may also shed light on the important ways boundary spanning facilitates social
learning. By critically examining where miscommunication occurred, we may come
to better appreciate those practices that serve to enhance communication and
coordination of social learning across technical, policy, and social boundaries.
Boundary Spanning and Social Learning in the COTE WG
What follows is an account of the social learning that has taken place as COTE
WG stakeholders have worked to forge an agreement around an integrated
ecosystem services accounting system, with particular emphasis on the various
ways in which stakeholders have attempted to bridge differences in viewpoints,
practices, policies, and ultimately language. Following the present framework, we
should expect to find evidence of social learning where boundary spanning practices
begin to take a definite shape. Boundary spanning is defined within the framework
as any practice or process that facilitates the interaction of actors, ideas, and
practices from different fields of practice, as well as the interaction itself. If we
furthermore define social learning as the progressive organization of boundary
spanning practices for a particular purpose, then we find evidence of several
instances of social learning associated with the COTE WG process: the process
design, the formation of group norms of interaction, the ECAS and associated
innovations, and finally, the framing and organization of the larger policy network.
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Taking the first instance of social learning, the formal organization of the
COTE WG process itself, we note that the structure and “operating principles” had to
be negotiated and agreed to among the stakeholders before commencing the
process. The Project Team certainly spearheaded the effort, guided by the diverse
experiences its members brought from previous processes, but the Working Group
ultimately had to agree to and abide by it. In cases where substitutes of
representatives were later added, the Project Team and Working Group trained
these substitutes to abide by the process structure as it was already laid out.
But the COTE WG’s process design and “Operating Principles” provided only
a general guideline with which to organize the process and in fact do not account for
the precise pattern of interactions that were observed. The COTE WG process in fact
consisted of a number of moving parts: the Working Group itself, the Project Team,
the smaller Coordinating Team, the Policy Group consisting of the organizational
heads, the focus groups, the Technology Development Team, and the Practitioner
Review Team. In addition, the stakeholder communities that were represented or
consulted also figure as “participants” in the process. Within each of these groups,
boundary spanning played an important role in bringing together stakeholders from
different disciplinary, professional, policy, and institutional backgrounds. In turn,
these groups have played various roles within the larger COTE WG process, and the
success of that process has depended on the effective communication of information
and coordination of actions across these groups.
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This communication and coordination was not trivial. Often roles and
responsibilities overlapped between groups or other ambiguities had to be
addressed. Certainly communication within and between groups was complicated
by language barriers that had to be overcome. As one Working Group participant
observes:
Even though it [the COTE WG process] was innovative, it did create some
potential for hiccups. The folks that had participated in the technical side
were not always represented, or were not – they were represented but they
weren't – a full participant in the Working Group. Sometimes the flow of
communication within the agencies, or within the organizations between
those folks that were sitting on the Working Group and making those policy
decisions were different than those representing the technical side.
Miscommunication happened sometimes within those. If there was a way to
fix it, I don't know. I can't fix it within even my own agency.
Participants often had to rely on a combination of technical, policy, and political
judgments to decide what issues to raise and when, as well as what solutions to
propose and when. To use a musical analogy, the process was improvised as much
as it was orchestrated. One aspect of the informal nature of the negotiations has
been the lobbying and positioning leading up to important decisions. As a Project
Team member relates, Working Group members often talk to one another to gauge
the level of support before casting an official proposal or vote:
As you know, the jungle telegraph tends to inform that process in a much
more effective way than any formal process does. Individuals talking with
one another…people calling each other. They say, “I’m really concerned about
this. At this meeting I want outcome ZYZ. Are you with me?” That stuff
happens on a regular basis.
These conversations involved a certain degree of political judgment that had
to be learned in a new context of engagement. This learning happened as a matter
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of course in negotiating the ECAS. Parallel to this negotiation has been what Kolb
and Williams (2003) refer to as the “shadow negotiation” of the relationships
between the parties in which various claims to competencies, roles, responsibilities,
and even identities are sorted out. The informal negotiation of these tacit rules of
engagement, which usually entails building trust, is necessary for any social
interaction between different points of view to be sustained over time. To the
extent that we observe new patterns of interaction among the COTE WG members
and their affiliated communities emerging outside of the formal process context we
may infer some sort of social learning.
Thus, a major social learning outcome of the COTE WG process has been the
strengthening of both personal and institutional bonds of trust among participants
of the COTE WG process. One of the participants points out that WP has perhaps
been the most direct beneficiary of the process:
I feel like the [COE] Working Group was just the vehicle, it was the base that
got the [Willamette] Partnership to do what they needed to do. I think about
the Working Group as that was a tool, that was all of us coming around the
table, but the product, the thing we're all proud of is the Partnership. The
Working Group was great. The Partnership is what it's all about. You're right,
most anything I talk about here is the group came together and did the
Partnership work. Which is different than the group existing for itself, which
is probably different than you'll find with Deschutes and Walla Walla. They
exist because they're putting projects on the ground. We existed to get the
Partnership projects going and send them off on their merry way.
But the growth in trust resulting from the COTE WG has extended beyond the
organizational boundary of WP. This trust has grown as stakeholders have learned
about each other’s interests but also about the constraints under which they work.
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This has, in turn, required each participant to learn how to listen and ask questions,
as described so well by 2 COTE WG members:
I may not be comfortable with something but I didn't have a solution. I have
faith in the people that were leading the project. It's kind of going back to the
trust thing where I knew they weren't trying to do things that were going to
further push us back in terms of environmental improvement. You needed
that flexibility in the Working Group to say, “I'm not comfortable with this,
but I also see the benefit to it. It might not be that I understand it right now
so I'm going to wait and see.” You can't do that all the time. There definitely
needed to be the same flexibility in the Working Group. This is uncomfortable
stuff. It's something new not a lot of people have worked in. You're talking
about offsetting or mitigating impacts to the environment that could be
permanent. It's a scary space to be in. […] When I started working in this
area, I really had to change my thought processes and how I approached
these things. You can have a healthy level of skepticism but when you're
doing the boundary spanning stuff, you really have to get beyond your typical
thinking or break down those barriers you might already have that are just
part of who you are, your experience, that type of thing… (105, 176, 208).
It's them getting to know me, me getting to know them personally and
professionally, but also just amongst them I think some of the folks they don't
deal with on a regular basis, they may have crossed paths before, but now
they're interacting with them on a more frequent basis. I think that it
definitely has helped relationships and also understanding other agencies’
authorities and regulations, more knowledge. If you understand where
somebody is coming from, you may not agree with them, but you at least
understand. That has definitely helped a lot more with that understanding
and knowledge of us as individuals, as members, but also of our agencies.
It is clear from the testimonies of participants that a vital ingredient for
building trust has been the capacity and willingness of participants to challenge
demands made of them, so long as it was done in a respectful manner. Indeed, this
pushback not only provided others with useful information about the speaker’s
constraints, but it also seemed to communicate a sign of respect in its own right. An
observer of the process explains:
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I think they really succeeded in building credibility with each other in that
way, in their interests, or their approach of working to address each other's
interests while pushing back on each other…It wasn't soft in any way. People
feel passionate and strongly about these issues. It wasn't that people gave up
and just said, “You can have your way.” They pushed on each other and
created a more resilient solution for that reason and respected each other all
the more because of that.
This increase in trust spurred further disclosure of information about the
institutional terrain which led to insights into how to improve inter-organizational
coordination around multi-credit accounting. Interviews revealed that both the
Policy Advisory Group and the Coordinating Team, because they are somewhat
smaller and have met more often, have forged particularly strong working
relationships.
The Coordinating Team emerged as arguably the hub around which the
process revolved. It is in the Coordinating Team, more than any other group, where
the intersection of technical and policy questions is first discussed. As a result, it has
played a key role bridging the work of the Project Team and the larger Working
Group. As already noted, the Project Team has relied heavily on the Coordinating
Team to vet ideas, proposals, and agendas before presenting them to the larger
Working Group. This has enabled the Project Team to anticipate issues ahead of key
meetings or decision-points, helping to move the process along in a smoother and
more constructive manner:
The biggest threat is either in my opinion a key agency either withdrawing,
whether it's officially or not, they stop showing up or raising issues late in the
game as opposed to early on. Some of that has been managed. The
(Willamette) Partnership has tried to call up people, tie up loose ends, make
more of an effort to say “You weren't able to come to this last meeting; you
didn't respond to these emails…” They pick up the telephone, or they shoot
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you another email trying to get the information from you, whether it's
verbally “Hey, let me explain to you what is going on with this...” or “We
really need you to read this stuff.” So more that one-on-one follow-up if they
feel it's important that we need a particular agency's position and
engagement.
Indeed, much of the “offline work” between and outside of meetings was carried out
by the Project Team and WP staff. To this point, staff support helped ensure timely
and consistent follow-through that was crucial in maintaining a steady level of
participation and progress:
You'd almost need a diagram to see how it all played out between the small
Coordination Team to the Working Group, then to the various focus groups to
see how the flow of information came together. Luckily for participants like
myself, the Willamette Partnership was the one that was keeping all these
balls in the air at the same time. If we had relied on government to do this, it
wouldn't happen. It would definitely have dropped a few balls. This was
interesting in the fact that the Willamette Partnership had a specific motive
with regard to meeting a timeline.
This staff support has made participation in what was already a risky and
challenging process easier for representatives who are typically strapped for time
and resources. Interview comments suggest that Working Group participants
greatly appreciate it:
They would report back and before every meeting. Willamette Partnership
would send out a packet of information that people would read through and
tell what deliverables there would be, or what to read, or what to be
prepared for. Then there would be follow-up afterward with meeting notes,
an opportunity to comment on things. Then what the next steps were. They
were very communicative throughout the process.
The (Willamette) Partnership did a lot of behind-the-scenes work. A lot of us,
we can make the time to show up to a meeting, review some documents, but
most of the true footwork was done by Willamette Partnership and their
facilitator and their staff. Which really helped a lot of us that are more
challenged with time and resources to devote it. We can review some
information, show up and provide our input, tell them what we can do, what
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we can't do, suggestions in a day meeting. But again, writing up strawman
documents, coming up to […] meet the logistics of the program, the
Willamette Partnership did most of that.
I found it one of the few enjoyable processes to have gone through. I enjoyed
working with everyone, including the Willamette Partnership, but also
appreciate how much thought they put into the process and what it took to
really get the job done. They did a lot of work. In essence that made my
participation much easier. I didn't feel as though the work they had done was
leading me in any particular direction. You have to have a certain level of
information in order to move on. They did the work to bring that information
to the table for folks. It was a lot of work.
Interviewees also reported that the facilitation provided by Nudelman and Harkema
helped to ensure that they stayed on topic and discussion moved forward in a
constructive manner.
Project staff members have participated in nearly all the meetings of the
Working Group and the sub-groups, which has facilitated “scanning” for and
addressing contradictions or surprises in a consistent manner. Crucially, they have
maintained a big picture perspective which has enabled them to prioritize issues
and assign them to the appropriate context for discussion. But it is also clear that
the relative cohesiveness of the policy network facilitated scanning for and
addressing issues before they became more difficult. This monitoring system
became more effective as relations formed in the COTE WG process:
You'll have Working Group members step up and say, “I'll go talk to this
person,” or “I'll go engage this group.” You have Working Group members
flagging issues, or questions we're getting from the broader stakeholder
communities. If the wetland mitigation banking community is having an
issue with how we're doing things, [Oregon] Department of State Lands and
the [U.S. Army] Corps will let us know that and will invite us to work through
those issues with them. I think the group kind of does it organically. There's
not a system for doing it. We all have tight enough relationship that
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communication is pretty quick and fast. It's a nice part about Oregon, you
can pick up the phone, or you see people around town pretty regularly.
An important source of surprise was the “policy drift” that sometimes developed
between the representatives and their home base. This occurred either as a result
of significant personnel turnover or representatives failing to adequately keep their
constituents or relevant decision-makers in their home organizations in the loop:
People have been good within the group, but not necessarily so good
reaching out internally in their organization, and I think it's because we built
up all these good relationships there. They don't have those internal
relationships, which is really difficult, especially for the larger agencies.
There's going to be a difference between John and Joe, even though they
work for the same agency, have similar experiences. So trying to manage
that to me was one of the challenges in keeping people part of the team and
not letting things go on so long when you didn't hear from them […] “Did this
thing die?
The risk of “policy drift” appears to have been greater for the larger agencies than it
has been for the more activist organizations that were involved. For a non-profit
advocacy group like Defenders of Wildlife, it is expected that representatives will
function as both advocates and leaders of their communities. They therefore carry a
certain amount of boundary spanning authority. Representatives of government
agencies are subject to a more traditional hierarchy of decision-making. Agencies'
predominant defensive or "risk-averse" posture means that more experimental
policymaking on their boundaries of competence and jurisdiction are, paradoxically,
both less of a priority and a source of concern. More often than not, the initial
interest of a government agency entering into such boundary spanning projects is to
maintain rather than span those boundaries that would threaten its turf or even
154

existence. Complicating matters, agencies often find themselves understaffed with
respect to meeting their core obligations.
To be adopted, the ECAS required of course the institutional support of
organizational management and leadership. Primozich and Cochran would
frequently make visits with the representative to their home base to bring
stakeholders and vital decision-makers up to date on the Working Group’s progress
and to field any concerns. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the final agreement would
have been endorsed by most of the organizational leadership involved in the COTE
WG without Working Group members boundary spanning “across” with peers and
“up” with authorities and influencers in their home fields, as a representative of a
federal agency recounts:
I was at the table but I certainly wasn't just representing myself or just my
specific part of the program. The tasks and the framework the Willamette
Partnership wanted to address was wider than that. That meant I had to do a
fair amount of coordination and communication with the folks up in Seattle
that had those program areas. I think the same thing happened with National
Marine Fisheries Service [NOAA] in that it served as a catalyst to get the
conversation going further up the chain that then allowed, when those upper
management representatives came to other forums, for the discussion to
continue to happen. Yes, it just helped to open the door and keep the door
open on the possibilities.
Interviews revealed that this education and outreach gradually evolved into an
informal communication strategy that specified roles for each of the components of
the COTE WG process:
The model was set up such that representatives briefed their own interest in
the public face. The Working Group itself, all of the representatives never did
a public forum, or never went to a Farm Bureau meeting to present
something. I think the collegiality and the fact that folks felt comfortable in
the Working Group was probably transmitted and communicated to the
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various stakeholder groups. I would say that David [Primozich] and Bobby
[Cochran] presented a good, acceptable, and representative public face of the
Working Group in reaching out to those different stakeholder groups. They
really did the work of spanning those potential gaps.
In addition, the pilot projects have facilitated this education and outreach by
providing a concrete context to involve implementation-stakeholders in testing the
ECAS.
Often, instances of lateral boundary spanning within an agency or
organization have spurred additional policy conversations and experimentations
across organizational and community boundaries. These secondary, tertiary, and
additional degrees of boundary spanning have taken place in a variety of contexts
ranging from informal conversations to conferences and collaborative projects, such
as the collaboration between the EPA and USACE in developing a more functionsbased approach to stream mitigation and mitigation banking. More generally, the
ECAS and pilots have helped to provide a context for policy discussion and learning.
Several Working Group members reported feeling that they could communicate
with more confidence and clarity what a multi-credit ecosystem services
marketplace might look like.
In some ways, the more important forms of lateral boundary spanning have
occurred within coalitions of partially-overlapping interests. The trust and
openness within these coalitions has provided a safe entry point for the COTE WG
innovations to be discussed and diffused over a wider network of weaker
institutional ties. The boundary spanning appears to have consisted of discovering
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and acting on interdependencies in those ties. As the representative of one federal
agency explains:
Within this larger group there was smaller factions that have alignment. I
think that is where the boundary spanning occurred such as we are in close
affiliation also with Oregon Department of Environmental Quality. They have
some influence over other resource agencies that are more on the
development side, such as Department of Forestry, or Agriculture. In that
regard the boundary spanning occurred within these areas of overlap. I
think if I draw it out it might be easier to visualize, but it was how you are
able to influence.
The diffusion of innovations emanating from the COTE WG to these other
contexts was certainly facilitated by the existence of a relatively close-knit
professional and personal network of actors working in fields related in some way
to ecosystem services markets. An environmental activist involved in the COTE WG
process describes an environmental policymaking community in Oregon where
people and organizations know one another well enough to routinely call meetings
held to discuss issues and projects as they arise:
Oregon seems to be a fairly tight-knit community in terms of keeping each
other apprised of what is happening. Sometimes it's just one on-onemeetings. [Environmental organization] for instance will just request a
meeting with Oregon Department of Ag[riculture], ODFW, and say, “We'd like
to meet with you to tell you about these projects that we're working on,” and
generate interest and momentum in that manner. Everything we're involved
in from my organization's perspective, which includes the Counting On The
Environment and the [Willamette] Partnership, is incredibly collaborative.
At the same time it is clear that the COTE WG process has forged new relationships
and forms of collaboration which have, if anything, increased the “readiness” of the
larger policy network for its innovations.
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Primozich and Cochran seemed to have recognized that the accounting
protocols, tools, and supporting framework being developed ultimately had to be
validated by a community of market participants. This validation corresponds to
what Rugkåsa et al. (2007) refers to as “downward boundary-spanning,” in which
innovations are communicated to the community of users for testing and refinement
to ensure that those innovations are compatible with the local context of
implementation. Of course, this downward boundary spanning to some extent
occurred naturally within the putatively technical groups since the Project Team
had originally recruited individuals who were either likely end-users themselves or
were familiar with the technical and policy context within which the credit
accounting methods and tools would be used. Moreover, “downward boundary
spanning” seems to have been designed into the process in at least two important
ways. As already mentioned, the pilot projects have enabled a community of users
to test the implementation of the ECAS, while the Practitioner Review Team has
given valuable feedback to the Working Group on the usability of its prototype
methods and tools. In addition, the various efforts that the Working Group and
Project Team members made to reach out to and update home organizations and
constituent communities were important instances of downward boundary
spanning.
Finally, there is little doubt that the success of the process depended to a
great extent on the personalities and charisma of Primozich and Cochran:
A big part of it is the personal passion of the people. A lot of it is personalitybased. You have two guys leading this process who it's really hard to say “no”
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to. They're so excited and so convinced this is going to work. Part of it is
their investment and involvement and excitement about it.
Their clear commitment, persuasive message, and dogged determination helped win
over skeptics and convince Working Members and their constituents that a multicredit Ecosystem Credit Accounting System was not only important but achievable.
It is also clear that, from the start, Primozich and Cochran could also draw on the
support of influential collaborative leaders such as Sarah Vickerman and Bill Gaffee
who helped them make their case to other COTE WG members. As this confidence
was built, COTE WG participants became champions of the project as well, setting
into motion the diffusion process described above. A key Working Group member
summarizes this process:
It's a snowball effect. You start to get this core group of people having these
conversations and all of a sudden an entirely different dialog, Senate Bill 513,
or what we're doing in agriculture, with the Forest Service in forestry, you
just start to trigger it. If you have the right people in the room, they're going
to leave and go back to their agency, and when the right chance comes for an
agenda item, or a speaker, or a conversation at the table, if they're good and
take advantage of it, you start to feed that information into a bunch of
different agencies. I think it's feeding, I would say it's feeding even better
now than it was when the group was active, which is again why we had some
of the challenges with getting folks to sign on at the end. I think since then,
now that this thing is going, there's a lot more conversations going on than
there were before because they're piloting, because there is another working
group that has been established. It just moves that dialog down the
road…You've got this whole set of 26 people running around saying, “We're
not going to have a conversation about ecosystem services unless it involves
what we came out of the Working Group with.” That is how we ended up
with Bobby [Cochran] and David [Primozich] on the Senate Bill 513
committee. People said, “You can't have a conversation without having these
guys there.” That is how you now have people like Sarah Vickerman, who are
speaking to groups at the state and national level about what is going on with
the Willamette Partnership. That group has ended and it's vested itself back
into its own communities to get the word out about what happened and what
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has been developed. It's not formally the group itself. It's the members
divesting themselves back into their own communities.
Testimonies of COTE WG participants reveals that policy actors have been quite
skilled at capitalizing on the success of the COTE WG process to build a case for a
multi-credit ecosystem marketplace. They will refer to the ECAS as a serious
proposal endorsed by the major stakeholders in the policy area. They also point to
the pilot projects to underscore the feasibility of their proposal. In doing so, so they
seek to convert the social and political capital of their products and backing
signatures– capital which will be greatly enhanced if the pilots are deemed
successful – into institutional legitimacy which will ultimately lead to expanded
funding and development:
The other thing we have been trying to do all along is try to make this thing
sort of work in other places. When it initially started it was very, very, very
focused on the Willamette. Bobby [Cochran] and David [Primozich] both
have realized that in order to make this thing work, both from a funding
perspective and other things, they have to move broadly. They have first
been expanding other areas in this state. Then in the region we've been
working with partners to try to expand it across the country, both using our
network with Nature Serve and other Natural Heritage programs, but also
with the federal government related to their creation of their new ecosystem
services office [Office of Environmental Markets] in USDA.
From the inception they brought together the right people. They had the
right agencies, the right organizations. They can now say, and they
consistently say, “We have 26 or 28 organizations that have signed off and
endorsed this thing.” You walk that off to other folks and they say, “Wow,”
like I did when I sat down at the table: “You've got some players here.”
They've got players who have signed off. So you walk to a Conservation
District. Or you go to another state, or you go to Eastern Oregon and say,
“Here is what we did and who supported it.” They have a lot of street
credibility from that. They message it well. I told them at one point in time
the same thing I told you: there are only three entities in the country I know
of who are even going down this road. They say that constantly: “We're one
of only three in the country. We're doing it this way.” They've got this
marketing down. They message appropriately. At the end of the day, a snake
160

oil salesman can do the same thing. If they have a bad product, you know
pretty quickly. At the core of it they have a quality product. They have tested
it. They invested a lot of money. They went for a lot of grants to actually get
the right product. You can't just BS your way through marketing and get
people to do something if you don't have a good product to deliver.
Furthermore, it is clear that the COTE WG process is a vehicle for a nascent coalition
of policy actors to promote a multi-credit ecosystem services marketplace. A
Working Group member and prominent actor in this policy coalition relates how she
has drawn on WP and the COTE WG process to tout the promises of an integrated
ecosystem services marketplace:
They have enough notoriety that, for example, I spoke […] on a panel for
ecosystem services a couple of week ago. […] As a result of that conversation,
[U.S.] Forest Service had a National Leadership review a couple of weeks ago
and added “ecosystem services” as an agenda item. I don't think they would
have had it on their agenda before. I think a lot of that level got raised as
well. We've had Willamette Partnership come and speak to our technical
advisory committee, which is made up of Ag groups, state and federal
agencies, so we can get them more informed about the process. They have
done a good enough job that a number of us are using them to spread the
word about ecosystem services to our constituents.
Another instance, then, of social learning is occurring at the larger policy
network level and centers on reframing environmental restoration and
conservation in terms of integrating ecosystem services. The COTE WG process
established a new working framework on which subsequent policy conversations
and experiments are already building. Several Working Group participants
separately used the metaphor of class level to allude to this policy learning:
For example we have Senate Bill 513 Working Group. It has about five
members of the Working Group [Coordinating Team] also on the 513 Group.
They have so much experience with these markets, having gone through the
Counting On The Environment process, that when they talk at the [Senate
Bill] Working Group, they're talking at a level way past 101 on that stuff. I
161

think that is a result of their experience. They can bring that experience with
them to various other conversations. When people start talking about
alternative methodologies, or verification, or registration, you have this core
group of people that say, “We have been through this. This is what makes
sense. What do you think? Do other people think that?”
While this reframing of policy conversations was catalyzed by the COTE WG
process, it is more properly understood as being coincident with the emergence of
the ecosystem services marketplace policy network itself. Along with the reframing
has been a corresponding reorganization of policy fields with distinct collaborations
and role definitions. Testimony from participants suggests that the COTE WG
process has contributed significantly to this reorganization by enabling the
stakeholders to negotiate their respective spheres of competence, influence, and
authority in the new context of a multi-credit ecosystem services marketplace:
There's different decisions and different parts of this where different people
are on first. In that sense the [Working] Group is fairly deferential in some
ways for a given decision about really who is lead on it. There wasn't any
formal piece, it just happened as people got to know each other. In some
ways the boundary spanning was knowing when to step back and let
someone else make a decision.
The crystallization of new norms of engagement has extended beyond the
COTE WG to encompass various formal and informal contexts of policy
development. The collaborative experiments in stream mitigation banking between
USACE and EPA is just one example of Working Group members and other
stakeholders taking their own initiatives to test notions of what is both feasible and
desirable in ecosystem service markets:
You see some of those conversations spilling over into how to go about doing
mitigation better for road projects or other things. I think you see,
particularly among [U.S.] Army Corps, EPA, and [Oregon Department of]
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State Lands representatives, a tight knit subgroup forming there, which is
nice to see. How that has evolved, I think it had the wetlands crowd coming
into the first meeting, the upland broader conservation crowd, you had the
water quality crowd, and then the fish streams crowd coming together.
When we started off it was like, “In wetlands it's like this; in Endangered
Species it's like this; in water quality we do it this way.” How that changed is:
“How do we take what our individual mandates are and put it into one that is
a much broader focus and shift as we started going onto making the one?”
You started seeing people talking in those terms.
I think the nice thing that has come out of this is other entities can see where
their role is. While we're struggling with how does this actually look in the
real world, OSU is now stepping up and saying, “We're going to do a study on
how we get those aggregators together, how we set up ecosystem service
districts. We see this concept and we like it, but we see a really big hole with
people who can be the go-between between the buyer and the seller.”
They're stepping in and they're going to apply for a grant to really research
that and figure out how it works. They wouldn't be having that conversation
if they hadn't been part of the Working Group before.
Nowhere is the influence of the COTE WG on the larger policy network more
apparent than in the SB 513 Working Group, whose primary concerns center on
developing overarching policy goals of an integrated ecosystem services
marketplace, clarifying the role of government, and identifying legislative
opportunities. The membership overlap is striking, with 15 of the 26 Working
Group members also participating in the SB 513 WG process. Moreover, the 513 WG
is in many ways formulating the policy implications of the ECAS developed by the
COTE WG. While the SB 513 WG was a legislative creation formally unrelated to the
COTE WG, interviews revealed that key policy actors, including Sarah Vickerman,
had a hand in ensuring that the two working groups would complement each other’s
work, as one of the boundary spanners participating in both working groups notes:
Fifteen of them [COTE WG members] have ended up on the Senate Bill 513
Working Group which is helping to implement what the Working Group was
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doing, so it's helping to scale up, setting the policies, setting the statutes,
setting the framework in place to do the vision these guys had. That was not
on purpose. It wasn't like the Working Group said, “OK now we have to form
a policy group.” The policy group with the governor and the legislature were
formed totally independently of this working group, although Sarah
[Vickerman] was stitching it together nicely.[…] It [COTE WG process]
changed the dynamics of our policy conversation; our subsequent policy
conversation is much better and much richer because many of us went
through that first dialog with the Willamette Partnership.
The social learning of the larger policy network is arguably concentrated in
the alignment practices between the Coordinating Team’s work (particularly the
pilot projects) and the SB 513 WG’s higher-level policy work. The communication
and coordination between the two working groups enables policymaking to be
grounded in the practices and tools being developed while the final
recommendations of the Coordinating Team in 2011 will be informed by the SB 513
WG’s own policy findings. A key policy actor explains that this coordination
improves the likelihood that the ECAS and associated tools will be adopted:
Every member of the (SB 513) Interagency Review Team is on the Working
Group. In fact all of them are on the Coordinating Team. They are the key
implementers of this process. If we move into the Counting On The
Environment process as state policy, they will be the implementers. They're
not going to inform the implementers; they will implement.
The efforts underway to develop an integrated ecosystem services
marketplace simultaneously entails building an adaptive policy network of actors
capable of asking and answering relevant questions bearing on the adaptive
management of such a marketplace. This same actor describes how the
policymaking around ecosystem services markets is decentralized, with numerous
“working hypotheses” being tested in various policy experiments:
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I think the Working Group's innovations have given people the confidence
they can do it. I think as other people start to do it, they will put together
these processes and these protocols in a different way, which I think is
healthy and appropriate for the development of nascent market activity here.
I think it's important that we try multiple working hypotheses. It's probably a
much better route than a command and control system at this point. How
this spreads, I think there's a lot of people who are interested in not
necessarily replication but building on the work that has been done here. I
don't know. It will be interesting to see in the next couple of years what
groups in the Pacific Northwest and other parts of the country begin to work
toward this.
Just as important as the formulation of those working hypotheses has been
the development of roles and responsibilities that organizes the social learning. On
a very general level, at least, it would appear that much of the learning around
operations and implementation of an integrated ecosystem services marketplace is
clustered around the COTE WG and its members while many of the strategic and
even constitutional questions are being primarily addressed by the SB 513 WG.
Finally, the COTE WG Coordinating Team facilitates a kind of conversation between
operational, strategic, and even constitutional concerns, at least through 2011, when
the COTE WG officially dissolves. After that, it is less clear how social and policy
learning will be coordinated. However, WP has emerged as a leading candidate to
act as a third-party manager of a multi-credit ecosystem services marketplace, at
least on a regional level (LaRocco & Vickerman, 2007).
All that said, the road to social learning in the larger policy network has been
uneven and is far from complete. Institutional change comes slowly and is often met
with great resistance. For one thing, the cultures and practices of many agencies,
including NOAA and DSL, remain biased against the kind of off-site mitigation
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envisioned in a robust ecosystem services marketplace. As one participant
observes, the transformation of attitudes and relationships at the Working Group
level have not necessarily translated to larger-scale changes in institutional policy,
culture, or relations:
I think the agencies have gone so far as when they're talking about ecosystem
services, they're going to use this model [Ecosystem Credit Accounting
System]. Yes, from that perspective when we're talking specifically in that
realm, the Senate Bill 513 Working Group used the exact same model the
Willamette Partnership did and the exact same facilitator. The downside is I
don't think it stretched to the other natural resource conversations that are
going on. Those conversations, it is still operating the way it used to operate
where you fight over regulations, state regulations versus federal. I think in a
year or two you'll start to see it feed into other conversations as well. I don't
know if it has quite yet.
One of the surprises that the COTE WG has had to confront has been resistance from
mitigation bankers who are concerned that the new credit accounting rules would
result in losses to some of the investments they have made in restoration and
conservation. In particular, many farmers view an ecosystem services marketplace
as an additional layer of regulatory intrusion that creates more risks than it does
opportunities. In the end, the USDA representative in the Working Group, Dave
Wilkinson, did not sign the Agreement in Concept endorsing the ECAS. In
retrospect, this resistance from bankers is perhaps less surprising, given the
difficulty that the Project Team and the Working Group had in reaching out to
landowners in general, and farmers in particular, as one of the Working Group
members observes:
When we talk about ecosystem services, whether it's this group or the Senate
Bill 513 Working Group, I think the voice that isn't as effectively heard is the
voice of the people they're planning to do this work on their land. In part this
166

group needed to form around the regulation, and they needed to form
around the technical, setting up the right systems. I think they ran into a
challenge that when you set up the right systems, [when] you don't
necessarily have those strong agricultural producers on board, you're going
to run into some challenges. At the end, in part maybe because they didn't
build that as well up front, at the end they had challenges with Department of
Agriculture not wanting to sign off on the agreement.
The USDA represents a large constituency of landowners whose participation or at
least support will be critical to the success of any integrated ecosystem services
marketplace. WP has been able to funnel some EPA funding to work with the NRCS
to reach out to farmers and educate them on the proposed crediting protocols and
tools. But farmers, like many landowners and developers, remain wary. Despite the
sincere attempts by WP and the COTE WG to provide clarity around a concrete
proposal, numerous questions about accounting and assurances remain which can
only be addressed through policy trial-and-error. This creates somewhat of a
chicken-and-egg dilemma for those seeking to foster a wider adoption of the new
accounting approach.

The COTE WG faces several important hurdles to wider adoption of its ECAS.
Of course, as mentioned, much will depend on the outcome of the pilot projects.
Pilot results will be used by the Working Group to modify the ECAS as needed.
Gaining the support of farmers, developers, and other landowners will depend on
the ability of the Working Group to address ease-of-use, liabilities, and other
concerns in those pilots and in the modified accounting system. In addition, some
interviewees felt that promoters of the new approach will need to do a better job of
reaching out to the developers and other landowners who would buy credits to
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offset planned impacts. As already noted, much of this education and outreach will
center on downward boundary-spanning.
In addition, COTE WG stakeholders will need to continue to work with
agencies like NOAA that remain skeptical of an experimental accounting system’s
ability to help it meet its minimal regulatory requirements. Where many
landowners and bankers see precision, some regulatory agencies perceive a liability
stemming from rigidity. Discussing the problem he sees with the salmon tool, one
agency representative notes the difficulty in developing precise accounting of
ecosystem services that change over time:
Streams are really dynamic. Maybe you were there and it was a wet year, or a
dry year. There were floods. You thought you measured everything but you
didn’t measure that well. I thought there was a bias toward this analytical
static classification approach and not something that would make a leap to
something that would be more relevant to me, something that would go after
a scale idea in a different way, or interconnectivity ideas in a different way
that would be simpler and a little more dynamic, somehow not as labor
intensive, not as transactionally intensive, but I wasn’t successful in
supporting that. “Let’s analyze it to death” kind of carried the day. The thing
they came up with was much more analytical.
The representative’s comments also reflect a frustration that, from their point of
view, the development of the salmon tool was merely building on Parametrix’s
earlier work rather being open to new approaches:
That was an approach that seemed to me that had already been tried and
hadn’t really worked out. We had our small work group and that was
reintroduced and hashed over again. It wasn’t productive. Instead of it being
a real opportunity to try some new ideas it was, “We’re going to rehash this;
can we get some support?”
Indeed, several Working Group participants who were interviewed felt that the
COTE WG process was in some ways driven by WP’s own agenda. But the more
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common sentiment was that WP and the Project Team had done an excellent job of
creating a fair, inclusive, and open process:
I think the Willamette Partnership has been very careful to try to be inclusive
as we continue to work on things and not to run the risk of imposing their
will without input, or something that would be contrary to another agency's
policies or rules.
I'd have to commend, back to the Willamette Partnership and their
facilitators, trying to keep things on a professional level, and keep things
moving, and making sure they maintained a high respect and professional
atmosphere with all of us. If somebody had something to say, they were given
the opportunity to convey that to the group.
Sometimes when you have those collaborative groups come together, you
have groups that are at different places in the process. You have people that
are versed in this stuff every day. They get it. It's easy. They understand it.
You have other people that are still trying to get their head around the
concept. I think that they did have to do some shift through the process in
how they were going to approach some things because of that feedback. They
were very adaptive throughout the process, which I thought is critical
because then people feel like they're listened to. […] I thought they did a good
job of that.
Summarizing this discussion of social learning in the COTE WG, the formal
process design and “Operating Principals” which the Project Team and the Working
Group members developed certainly provided a framework that organized
interactions among a diverse set of stakeholders. In this respect, they are direct
evidence of social learning. Second, alongside the formal rules of engagement,
Working Group members and other stakeholders participating in the process had to
collectively negotiate more tacit rules governing interactions both within and
outside of formal meetings and discussions. Gradually, the participants have
developed a sense of judgment about what topics are appropriate to raise in which
context and when. This judgment is itself dependent on there being a certain degree
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of trust that communication is relatively undistorted by hidden agendas, that
information and perspectives are being shared as claimed.
And finally, we find evidence of social learning in the formation of a policy
network organizing itself around the development and management of an
integrated ecosystem services marketplace. Perhaps the most concrete evidence for
this is the development of the Ecosystem Credit Accounting System. The crediting
methodologies, protocols, assurances, and models that comprise the ECAS can be
thought of as boundary objects, that is: social-technical innovations that embody
and reinforce new patterns of social interaction bringing together different fields of
practice, in this case: the buyers and sellers of novel credits and the intermediaries
that facilitate, credentialize, and monitor their exchange. Furthermore, the ECAS
has provided a new framework with which to organize subsequent policy
conversations and experimentation, particularly the pilot projects and the SB 513
Working Group’s ongoing policy formulations. Nevertheless, our description of
social learning at the network level would be incomplete without considering how
this reframing has itself both precipitated, and been facilitated by, a corresponding
reorganization of institutional roles and relations. As policy conversations and
experiments have assumed greater focus, problem areas have become more clearly
defined, and institutional actors are stepping in to address them. The “division of
policy labor” is certainly more improvised than it is scripted, since the statutory and
other policy reference points on which this division depends continue to evolve.
Yet, a picture is already emerging of a new joint field of practice at the policy system
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level, complete with its roster of players and processes, which will influence the
negotiation of roles and responsibilities going forward.
Now that we have documented the major instances of boundary spanning
and social learning in the COTE WG process, we are confronted with a problem
about how to classify them. The complication arises from the fact that it appears
that the emergence of the COTE WG coincides with the emergence of the larger
policy network. Our theory of convergence starts with boundary spanning practices
and an institutional ecology and proceeds to map their convergence; they are inputs
of the model. But in the case of the COTE WG, the 2 convergence processes – one
centered on the emergence of the COTE WG and the other centered on the
emergence of the policy network to which it belongs – are related. We have, in other
words, no clear baseline against which to measure convergence. Our case study
concerns the COTE WG so our account of its formation must take care not to include
processes strictly associated with the formation of the larger policy network.
Otherwise, we falsify our explanation by treating processes of different orders as if
they belonged to the same order. To take one example: should we interpret the
observed convergence of policy thinking and practices between the COTE WG and
the SB 513 WG as evidence of the formation of an as-yet-not-fully formed “COTE WG
partnership” or as evidence of the formation of a regional ecosystem services policy
network to which both working groups belong, as just 2 of many “working
hypotheses,” as one of the interviewees characterized it? In the first interpretation,
the boundary spanning between the groups amounts to Social Learning I (i.e.,
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formation of a particular joint field of practice), whereas in the second, the
boundary spanning practices are the objects of selection and organization of a still
more complex instance of Social Learning I.
This dilemma points to a limitation in the methodological framework.
According to it, social learning can only be classified “after the fact,” as it were, that
is, in terms of the partnership capacity that it produced. Once we can ascertain a
pattern of boundary spanning practices, we have a stable system-level-of-reference
against which to classify social learning and the boundary spanning practices
associated with it. The problem in this case is that until the convergences are
complete we have no clear criteria for assigning boundary spanning and social
learning to the various bins in our general typologies. Still, while we may not be able
to definitively classify the boundary spanning practices and social learning
associated with the COTE WG process, a preliminary assessment of the increasing
capacity of both the COTE WG and the ecosystem services policy community to
organize their respective boundary spanning may nevertheless shed some light on
the 2 related social learning processes.
Assessing Partnership Capacity of the COTE WG and Larger Policy Network
From the standpoint of Mandell and Steelman‘s (2003) typology of
interorganizational processes, the COTE WG is a temporary taskforce operating
within a larger network structure. In the more limited sense of the taskforce, it
would appear that the COTE WG is accomplishing its stated objectives to produce
and test an integrated ecosystem credit accounting system. To do so, it has had to
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organize a process that coordinates diverse activities, perspectives, and objects of
knowledge such as models and other tools. In addition to the formal process design,
there is evidence that norms of engagement have already begun to form among the
Working Group members and “supporting actors.” But because the COTE WG is not
yet completed as of this writing, it is not possible to determine whether in fact the
COTE WG has the capacity to complete its task, that is, has Partnership Capacity
Type I. It is the temporary nature of taskforces like the COTE WG that their PC I
status can only be assessed after the fact. Their transitory and problem-focused
nature also means that they can never have any higher level of partnership capacity.
But we have also seen how the COTE WG process has spawned new
institutional ties of trust and cooperation that extend beyond the formal process and
which will be critical to the successful implementation of its products. The larger
network structure is still taking shape, as policy actors continue to define the
problem domain and their respective roles and responsibilities within it. The ECAS
and pilot projects are giving policy deliberations a sharper focus, and it is clear that
the innovations associated with the ECAS have already begun to influence larger
conversations and experimentations. As this influence increases, the COTE WG
process has accrued a certain degree of cache which Working Group members are
beginning to strategically employ for their own projects and programs.
However, WP and the COTE WG have in a certain important sense been a
victim of their own success, for while the process’ cache has facilitated diffusion of
its innovations to wider policy circles, this diffusion has in some ways begun to
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dilute that cache as elements of the ECAS have been applied to contexts somewhat
at odds with their original intention. One of the project leads points out the
dilemma of promoting the adoption of COTE WG’s innovations while protecting the
“brand” of COTE WG:
As soon as we got our agreement, one of the initial threats to it actually is
people would pick different pieces of the whole package of metrics and
processes and call it "Counting On The Environment," or hint that it might
have been subject to this Agreement. We were very narrow with the scope of
what we asked people to agree to. So when people picked different pieces of
it, it started making some of the agencies nervous. At the same time, it's kind
of the reality if you have an innovation and it's better than something else,
people want to try and bring that. The balance is saying, “We want the
innovation disseminated as widely as possible. We do think it's better.
People should be using it.” But at the same time being true to that agreement
to test it, and also to protect the brand of the Counting On The Environment
standard of if you say "Counting On The Environment," it means something
explicit…
In addition to concerns over legitimacy, there has also been the concern that if
marketplace experiments were not made subject to some kind of standardizing
process, it would be difficult to achieve the kind of scales needed for marketplaces
to work. As one of its members relates, the SB 513 Working Group was formed in
large part to prevent this fragmentation of policy learning:
What [the SB 513 Working Group] did was encourage agencies and
organizations to work together as they build these markets for ecosystem
services. The premise behind it is, “We're really concerned that there is a lot
of momentum gaining around these markets.” We were worried agencies
were going to get hold of something and run with it without consulting
everyone else that has been working on this for a long time in the state.
To the extent that boundary spanning facilitates standardization of innovations, we
may presume it plays a central role in the SB 513 Working Group’s work.
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Our framework proposes that innovations of a joint or partnership field can
be thought of as boundary objects that hold value to the extent that the boundary
spanning practices they embody are valued by a larger community of practice. The
implication is that PC I partnerships have established some system of capital
exchange in which forms of capital, be they “local” or “non-local,” are converted into
alternative forms in a way that generates value. Given this, the struggles of the
policy network to regulate the uses of its innovations suggests that the network has
not quite stabilized as a partnership field. This conclusion is supported by the
simple observation that, to date, no wide-scale integrated ecosystem services
marketplace has been established in the Willamette Valley or in Oregon. Certainly
the successful establishment of such a marketplace would require a multi-sector
partnership having what the current framework classifies as PC I.
Conclusion and Recommendations
When we compare the social learning occurring within the formal COTE WG
process and the social learning associated with the reframing and reorganization of
larger policy fields, we find at least some evidence of convergence in which the
institutional relations are beginning to mirror one another. The SB 513 WG process
has adopted many elements of the COTE WG process, including Nudelman’s
facilitation, and there is significant overlap in the membership between the 2
groups. Even more important than the convergence of formal processes has been
the convergence of informal processes and relations. For one, the COTE WG process
has strengthened ties between certain agencies that have spawned collaborative
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efforts like the EPA and USACE’s joint work on developing a functions-based
instream mitigation program. We also find evidence of the kind of capital exchange
that the framework theorizes drives such convergence. The NRCS grant provided
the seed financial capital to fund the COTE WG process which, in turn, generated
social capital in the form of trust, teamwork, and boundary spanning competencies.
These competencies were ultimately embodied in a set of agreements, processes,
and tools which have generated, among other things, the political capital to
influence larger policy and legislative processes to favor the diffusion of these
innovations. Finally, policy actors have shown a willingness and an ability to tap
into the institutional legitimacy of the COTE WG process and its products – a
legitimacy which will be enhanced by the successful conclusion of the pilot projects
– to secure additional funding for the development and expansion of integrated
ecosystem services markets both in the Willamette Valley and beyond.
Nevertheless, the co-emergence of the 2 joint fields of practice complicates
our analysis of the formation of the COTE WG. Some of the boundary spanning we
observe that are associated with the mutual adjustment of the COTE WG and policy
efforts in other contexts may or may not, properly speaking, be a part of the
formation of the COTE WG. Until the larger ecosystem services policy network is
established, classification of these boundary spanning processes remains tentative
at best.
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Table 4 summarizes the various boundary spanning practices that were
observed in the COTE WG process. The table’s structure follows the methodological
criteria contained in Table 2: Typology of Partnership Processes.”
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Table 4: Boundary Spanning Practices in COTE WG
Boundary Spanning Practices

Change in Field
Interactions

Specific
contexts of
boundary
spanning

All the storming,
forming, and
norming of the
COTEWG
1

Actively listening to partner peers
Assigning opportunities to a partner lead
Assigning problems to a partner lead
Associating with partners out of work context

1

Building personal relations

1

Classifying problems by strategic objectives
Classifying problems by task group

1

Collaborating on other projects

1

Converting capital to promote innovations

1

Coordinating external communications

1

Coordinating the convergence
Defining boundary spanning norms

1

Defining boundary spanning roles

1

Defining boundary spanning values

1

Defining institutional accountabilities

1

Defining institutional roles

1

Deliberating with partners in new contexts

1

Deliberating with partnership stakeholders in other
contexts
Designing process

1
1

Disclosing interests

1
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Pattern
(PC I)?
Undetermined

Education

1

Extending favors to partners
Facilitation

1

Framing innovations in terms of need

1

Framing need in terms of innovations

1

Influencing across policy sub-networks

1

Innovating (paradigmatic boundary spanning)

1

Integrating boundary objects/innovations
(standardization)
Making government rules and regulations

1
1

Managing process (budget, conflicts, surprises, time)

1

Outreach

1

Pilot-testing innovations

1

Pitching to decision-makers

1

Prioritizing problems

1

Protecting brand/integrity of innovations

1

Respectfully pushing back (disclosing constraints)

1

Ritually enacting boundary spanning
Scanning environment and reporting issues

1

Seeking input from relevant constituents

1

Seeking input from relevant decision-makers

1

Sharing risks

1

Staff collaborating across organizations
Staging group decisions (lobbying, building
readiness, gauging support, vote counting, timing)
Strategically aligning partnering organizations
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1

Task-mastering

1

Testing ideas/Vetting

1

Translating across technical/disciplinary boundaries

1

Translating between task groups

1

As far as the larger policy network is concerned, we find evidence of Social
Learning I (SL I) as the network continues to develop a community of practice
around an integrated ecosystems services marketplace. To do so, it will need to
expand the original vision of the NRCS grant to articulate a coherent statement of
values and principles that will organize otherwise disparate conversations and
experiments under a unifying framework. Constitutional questions, however,
cannot be addressed separate from these conversations and experiments but rather
through them in an iterative process of convergence. For example, the seemingly
pedestrian question of public financing of banking activities carries implications for
the role of the state in such marketplaces. Similarly, the crediting tools leave many
questions unanswered, such as how to assess baselines and compensate for such
things as “temporal loss.” The innovations associated with the ECAS are challenging
state policy and even law. In turn, the policy responses of the SB 513 WG and others
are redrawing the boundaries for subsequent marketplace experiments.
The convergence of the COTE WG innovations and the larger policy
community that must occur in order to establish a multi-credit ecosystem services
marketplace is to a large extent driven and mediated by exchanges occurring
between the COTE WG Coordinating Team and the SB 513 WG. It is in these
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exchanges of findings and recommendations, conversations, and questions that
much of the mutual adjustment between local experimentation and policy and
statutory framing is taking place. WP and the COTE WG have also begun converting
the institutional legitimacy and success of the COTE WG process into alternative
“currencies,” including grants, which are used to promote the continued
development and adoption of their innovations. But it is also clear that policy actors
are also taking initiatives of their own to drive the ecosystem services marketplace
agenda, sometimes in directions somewhat at odds with the intentions of its original
architects. Concerns voiced by prominent leaders in the policy network over the
misuse of the “COTE WG brand” are more than about a name. The stakes involved
center on nothing less than the organization and standardization of a new joint field
of practice on which an integrated ecosystem services marketplace will depend.
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Chapter 5
Regional Water Providers Consortium
Background
The Portland Metropolitan region (2002) covers an area of 462 square miles
spanning the states of Oregon and Washington, 7 counties, as well as 23
municipalities, including Beaverton and Hillsboro on the west side of the Willamette
River, Gresham on the east side of the river, the City of Portland spanning the river,
and Vancouver, WA on the north side of the Columbia River. As of 2010, the
population of the metropolitan area was over 2.2 million (Portland State Population
Research Center). The Bull Run watershed, draining from the Cascades to the east,
supplies much of the region’s drinking water, and is renowned for its pristine water
quality. Perceived threats to this quality has at times been a catalyst for intense
citizen mobilization that has led to numerous legislative acts over the past century
to protect the watershed from timber harvests and other activities that might
negatively impact that quality. These efforts culminated in 1996 and 2001 in the
Bull Run Act which features a unique agreement between the City of Portland and
the U.S. Forest Service to cooperate in the management of the watershed and its
resources. But the region is blessed with a diverse range of water sources, including
the Tualatin and Trask rivers to the west and the Clackamas River to the east. There
are numerous ground water sources, as well, including the Columbia South Shore
Well Field, an aquifer located under the confluence of the Willamette and Columbia
Rivers that is Oregon’s largest supply of municipal ground water. As of 1996, there
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were roughly 26 surface and groundwater sources being tapped, including the 4
major ones. These supply sources provided an estimated delivery capacity of 413.8
million gallons per day (mgd) with an estimated usable storage capacity of 11.4
billion gallons. At the time, regional water supply was sufficient to meet the region’s
peak-day demand of roughly 370 mgd (Water Providers of the Portland
Metropolitan Area, 1996).

Figure 13: Actual and Potential Drinking Water Sources of the Portland Metropolitan Area in 2004
(Source: Regional Water Providers Consortium)

Perhaps in part because of this supply abundance, by the late 1980’s, water
supply in the region was largely feudalistic and fragmented. There were roughly 65
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water suppliers, including 27 major ones, comprised of cities, public utility districts
(PUDS), and other special water districts, serving, at the time, a regional population
of 1.5 million people. Figure 14 is a map of the major water providers, as of 2010.

Figure 14: Water Providers in the Portland Metropolitan Area in 2010 (Source: Regional Water
Providers Consortium)

Each was governed by a body of officials ranging in form from city councils and
commissions to boards that were elected by local rate-payers. Water suppliers
owned and operated facilities largely independent of one another, even though
many bought Bull Run water from the City of Portland as wholesale customers.
Political scientists have noted that politics has become local, and certainly by the
1980’s, water had become framed as a local issue in the Portland Metropolitan
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region. Rate payers, citizen activists, neighborhood associations, and advocacy
organizations like “Citizens for Safe Water,” “Citizens Interested in Bull Run,” and
“Friends of the Reservoirs” demanded local control of water sources, and suppliers
defended their turf vigorously against encroachment, real or perceived.
In many respects, the localism was a form of resistance to what was widely
perceived by many surrounding communities and suburbs to be Portland’s
unjustified dominance within the region. Portland had been the center of political
and economic power in the region for decades, which created a fair amount of
resentment in surrounding communities that felt beholden to Portland’s demands in
a wide range of policy areas. This general condition of dependence certainly framed
water politics and likely colored the interactions between the Portland Water
Bureau (PWB) and the many cities and districts that bought Bull Run water from it.
Over the years, Portland had come to regard itself as the rightful owner of the
coveted source. Portland began selling water through wholesale contracts as early
as the 1920’s. The first formal 25-year contracts were signed in the 1970’s, and
many wholesale customers complained that the terms were often onerous. On a
more interpersonal level, several interviews with current and former water
provider officials and staff reported that directors of the Bureau had for a long time
treated their counterparts with an air of arrogance and disrespect. Many of the
more public stories recounting Portland’s treatment of wholesale customers had
become political fodder for advocates calling for greater local control of water
supply. “Citizens for Safe Water,” for instance, ran a R. Gregory Nokes’ article from
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the Oregonian recounting Tualatin Valley Water District Board President Jim
Duggan’s recollection of one such run-in with the City of Portland:
Duggan said, for example, that former Mayor Frank Ivancie once dropped a
proposed contract in front of his Beaverton counterpart, demanding "Take it
or leave it.” (The Oregonian, September 13, 1999).
With privileged access to Bull Run water, widely considered the best quality water
in the region, the City of Portland appears to have had little motivation to negotiate
the terms of the contracts.
But the increasing resentment among the surrounding cities and districts
also reflects shifting expectations that coincided with an increase in the economic
and political influence of surrounding communities. Demographically, the suburbs
were by then growing faster than Portland, introducing changes in the political
dynamics within the region. These demographic movements also brought with
them shifting tastes that increased demand for local control over water sources.
While many water suppliers were still buying Bull Run water from Portland by the
late 1980’s, there was a growing drive to tap alternative local sources, largely in an
effort to alleviate their dependence on Portland.
The precise form that this localism assumed, however, varied between the
two sides of the river. The east side, especially Clackamas County, was plagued by
feudal disputes that fragmented water supply. Starting in the late 1980’s, several
municipalities split off from the Clackamas River Water District (CRWD) to escape
what they viewed as excessive rates and general mistreatment by the CRWD. The
schisms resulted in several new water suppliers, including Oak Lodge Water District
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(OLWD), Happy Valley, Demascus, and Gladstone, the latter 3 of which would later
form Sunrise Water Authority (SWA). A legacy of this revolt was the addition of a
fourth intake and treatment plant on the Clackamas River, with 4 intakes all within
only a few miles of one another. In 1997, SWA joined with Oak Lodge WD to form
the North Clackamas County Water Commission which also expanded service to the
City of Gladstone. But even after these consolidations, today there are 5 surface
water intakes on the Clackamas associated with: the City of Estacada, Clackamas
River Water, North Clackamas County Water Commission, South Fork Water Board
(Oregon City and West Linn), and the City of Lake Oswego.
The west side was a different story. Companies like Intel and Nike provided
not only a stronger economic base but supported a culture of relative affluence that
struck a markedly different tone with respect to water. Residents in Washington
County, especially, were willing and able to pay a premium for good drinking water.
It appears that this affluence, combined with resentment toward dependence on
Portland’s Bull Run source, provided a political opportunity for sub-regional
cooperation among water suppliers on the west-side. As the region’s second-largest
water agency, the Tualatin Valley Water District (TVWD), based in Beaverton,
emerged during this period as a leader in the sub-regional effort, which also
included Forest Grove, Hillsboro, Tigard, Tualatin, and Wilsonville, to diversify
water supply. A centerpiece of this effort was a campaign to tap the Willamette
River for drinking water. TVWD sponsored water quality studies attempting to
alleviate public concerns that water treatment would not be sufficient to address
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human health risks stemming from decades of industrial and municipal pollution of
the river. The campaign drew stiff resistance from Portland and Metro, both of
which eventually rejected the Willamette source option in a regional vote on the
matter in 1995. Nevertheless, it appears to have galvanized sub-regional
cooperation on the west-side. The Joint Water Commission (JWC) was an
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) originally formed by the cities of Hillsboro and
Forest Grove in 1976. Motivated in part to prevent forfeiture of its 130 mgd state
water right to the Willamette River, the TVWD joined the JWC in 1994. Then-TVWD
manager Jesse Lowman spearheaded an effort to find partners to develop a
Willamette source, and the Cities of Beaverton and Tigard subsequently joined the
JWC. The resulting alliance eventually developed sources from the Tualatin, Trask,
and Willamette Rivers.
The campaign to diversify water supply on the west-side, while rooted in a
sub-regional resistance to Portland dominance, ironically planted the seeds of a
regional cooperation in water supply between the City of Portland and local water
suppliers. For one, the JWC provided a kind of model for the formation of the
Regional Water Providers Consortium (RWPC). On a more substantive level, the
Willamette source controversy influenced the way policy discussions around
regional water supply were framed. The campaign to source the Willamette helped
raise awareness around the region’s vulnerabilities stemming from what its
proponents considered to be excessive dependence on Bull Run water. But it also
helped establish the conditions for its formation, in part by supporting the TVWD as
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a counterweight to the PWB’s regional dominance in water supply. Although the
water quality studies of the Willamette were criticized by some – many of the
studies were carried out by firms like Montgomery Watson Americas Inc. that were
likely to benefit from contracts to develop a treatment plant – they convinced
enough rate-payers, outside of Portland at least, that there were credible options to
buying Bull Run water. The respective bargaining positions of the various water
providers were beginning to shift. Just as importantly, regional water supply was
being reframed to emphasize diversification of sources rather than enhancement of
the Bull Run source. And rooted as this reframing was in the local and sub-regional
resistance to Portland hegemony, the diversification of water sources began to carry
political connotations around gaining independence from Portland. A discourse of
“regional water supply” was beginning to form that was premised on the strength of
local and sub-regional partners. Thus, while a nascent sense of regional cooperation
in water supply was beginning to emerge, many factors limiting the extent of that
cooperation were already in place.
The sheer number of water providers in the metropolitan area presented an
immense challenge, but there were also barriers that prevented mergers of water
providers. Some of them were legal. Mergers required the approval of the Oregon
legislature and the Boundary Commission, and this process could be cumbersome.
Although Portland did absorb several water districts as it expanded eastward
during the 1980’s, many cities were also reticent to annex abutting districts, for fear
of losing their flexibility in tapping water funds for other needs. An additional
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barrier to regionalization of water supply was the preponderant participation of
municipalities in water supply. Municipal administration of water supply and
treatment, by its nature, tends to politicize water, greatly complicating any efforts to
integrate water supply planning and management on a regional scale. This is the
case even in Portland, where the commission-form of government is designed to
limit more provincial political influences. Finally, the proliferation of surface and
ground water sources greatly added to the technical complexities of water supply in
the region. When one considers the interaction of technical and political
interdependencies, the complexity of the problem represented a formidable barrier
for regional water supply planning and management.
Against this backdrop came the regulatory and demand drivers that pushed
the region’s suppliers to consider working more closely together. Updates and
stepped-up enforcement of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act in
the mid-1980’s began to put pressure on cities and districts to upgrade water supply
(including storage and transmission) facilities. Many of the water providers,
especially the smaller ones, were not likely to be able to afford the upgrades. But
even Portland was going to need sufficient rate-payer and voter buy-in to finance
any improvements to the Bull Run system, including building a filtration plant
and/or 3rd dam. Another regulatory driver was the updating of Oregon’s statewide
land use planning law (SB 100) granting Metro the authority to do water planning
and administer water provision. Many local water providers, particularly the
special utility districts, viewed the authorization as a direct threat to their existence,
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but many constituents also feared tax levies. At the state level, the Oregon Water
Resources Department (OWRD) was, by the 1980’s, beginning to impose greater
restrictions on obtaining and extending unexercised water rights, signaling to cities
and districts that they were going to have to learn to do more with less. The
Portland Metropolitan region was beginning to experience significant growth,
increasing demand for water even as additional supplies were becoming less readily
available. By the late 1980’s there was a growing sense of urgency within the
region’s water supply community to coordinate planning and management before it
faced a water supply crisis. The preponderance of common threats helped the
community coalesce around a sense of shared fate even as any regional identity
remained subordinated to local and sub-regional interests. Ironically, the increasing
strength of local providers gave them sufficient confidence to overcome their
concerns for Portland dominance, at least enough, to start thinking about regional
cooperation.
Formation of the RWPC
Spanning River Spanning Visions
By the late 1980’s there was therefore growing awareness, even readiness,
for the need for better regional coordination in water supply planning and
management. Given its historical prominence, it was natural that the actual
initiative should originate in Portland. City Commissioner Mike Lindberg’s hiring, in
1980 of Ed Tenny as Administrator of the PWB in some ways served as the spark
that set this readiness into motion.
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It was Tenny, more than any other person, who first formulated a vision for
what a regional coordination of water supply might look like. By accounts, he
envisioned something like a regional water supply authority that would own and
operate a water supply system on a regional level. Although precedents could be
found in institutional experiments like the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California, the San Diego Water Authority, and, later in Colorado, the Metro Water
Conservation, Inc., they were relatively scarce, particularly in Oregon. Building the
vision would mean overcoming significant institutional and public skepticism.
Tenny recognized along with Lindberg the importance of improving
Portland’s relationships with Portland’s wholesale customers and set to work
reaching out to local providers with a new tone of mutual respect. His outreach
efforts were significant. He made numerous visits to his counterparts like Lowman
and Charles Harrison, General Manager of the Clackamas River Water District
(CRWD), as well as with mayors and other elected officials, slowly establishing
bonds of trust and even friendship. These relationship-building efforts by Tenny
and his successor Mike Rosenburger established important conditions for the
formation of the RWPC, especially in raising the profile of district managers whom
city managers traditionally tended to dismiss. There were a number of personal
bonds that proved especially important. Tenny soon became acquainted with Gene
Seibel, a charismatic figure who helped build the TVWD up from the Wolf Creek and
Metzger Water Districts and who later served as President of the AWWA. Seibel’s
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involvement proved important for promoting regional water supply thinking, as a
former manager observes:
Seibel created TVWD and was a really insightful big picture guy. He was
perfectly capable of setting aside his self interest and saying, “I think this is a
better way of thinking about the region, whether it puts us out of business or
not.” He was really the only one that was. He was such a leader from the
wholesale customer group that he could bring people along. We made a fair
amount of progress for a while largely because of that.
Tenny also began working with Gary Cramer, who headed what is now Clean Water
Services (CWS),and Dale Jutila, who worked at the PWB before heading the CRWD.
These men, especially Seibel, Cramer, and Jutila, all shared Tenny’s vision, and their
friendships began to link water supply policy on both sides of the Willamette River.
In addition to these executive officers, it appears that middle managers
played a key role in promoting regional coordination in water supply planning and
management. This included facility engineers and operators like Van Burris, Water
Plan Superintendent for the JWC, who was especially influential in convincing his
counterparts in Clackamas County to join the effort. Removed as they were from
the political vagaries of water politics and ensconced instead in the daily operations
of the system, these engineers and operators, more than most others, could see the
need for greater regional coordination. Indeed, not only were they familiar with the
daily conditions of local operation, they were more likely to move around the
system throughout their careers assuming positions and responsibilities that
spanned the many aspects of the regional system. Along the way, they built a social
network of professional and personal relations, and their loyalties tended to reside
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with the system, as opposed to a particular administration, professionally but also
personally.
Nevertheless, the ambitious nature of regional coordination required
someone of sufficient stature and visibility like Tenny to launch it, and Tenny, Seibel,
Lowman, and Jutila were especially instrumental in getting local water suppliers to
come to the table. Lowman and Seibel, in fact, had participated a few years earlier in
the negotiations between the JWC and PWB to build a 60” gravity-fed pipeline
connecting the Bull Run system to Washington County. The Washington County
Supply Line Project, completed in 1983, set an important precedent for regional
cooperation, and showed some skeptics, at least, that Portland could be a reliable
partner in water supply. On the east side, Jutila was a factor in getting the eastside
providers to come to the table by, among other things, reassuring them it wasn't just
a Portland ploy to continue dominating regional water supply. Jutila saw that his
board was at least receptive to the idea of more regional planning and then pitched
it to them. They also presented the idea to some of their neighbors like Sandy.
Thus, board members of local providers such as the Clackamas County Water
Providers Board of Commissioners were also important in some cases in backing
the efforts of Jutila and others. But it seems fair to say that middle-managers like
Van Burris helped pave the way for these lobbying efforts through their own version
of lobbying, although there is no evidence the lobbying was coordinated.
Summarizing, it would appear that the collaborative leadership of especially
Tenny, Seibel, Jutila, and later Rosenberger was critical in building support for the
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idea among the region’s water provider managers. Much of this leadership, it
appears, depended in turn on the persuasiveness and charisma of these individuals.
But it seems also likely that as the social network of managers developed from a
network of loose professional ties to stronger bonds of trust and even friendship,
the commitment among managers for regional cooperation increased, which in turn,
increased the effectiveness of their message to recruit other managers.
These early conversations coincided with a policy discourse centered on
“integrated water resource planning” (IWRP) that was beginning to influence the
larger water policy world. The concept of IWRP states that water resources are
multidimensional, encompassing physical processes on multiple temporal and
spatial scales. Its calls for addressing water demand through a combination of
proactive measures, including conservation, that head off the need for more
expensive solutions. More robust notions seek to integrate physical processes with
economic and social processes. The American Waterworks Association (AWWA)
and its research foundation arm AWWARF were carrying out studies of IWRP
around the same time as these early conversations, and many of its strongest
proponents were active in the influential Pacific Northwest Section (PNWS) of the
AWWA, including Jutila and Seibel. As the region struggled to address the looming
water supply shortage, many of these leaders saw IWRP as a framework with which
to organize discussions of greater regional cooperation. Still, at the time, IWRP was
a largely untested concept, at least on the scale envisioned by Tenny and others –
conducting an IWRP in the Portland metropolitan region would be a true policy
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experiment. Eventually, these informal conversations assumed a more formal
shape. The PWB organized a series of meetings around 1990 to discuss developing
a regional water supply plan using an IWRP approach. The meetings were
facilitated by Tenny and Jutila, among others. This group of managers eventually put
together an IGA between 27 of the region’s water providers to form a Regional
Water Providers Advisory Group (shortened to RPAG), charged with commissioning,
funding, and producing a regional water supply plan. Interviews with observers of
the process at the time also suggest that elected officials of the various
municipalities and districts were eventually able to secure the support of Metro
through such channels as the influential Metropolitan Policy Advisory Council
(MPAC). Metro signed the IGA to join the management of the RWSP.
Integrated Water Resource Planning Process
The planning process fell into two phases. The first phase, completed in
1992, consisted of carrying out a regional inventory of water source options and
estimating future demand. But when the RWPAG suggested that the Willamette
River might serve as a source option for drinking water, the public and political
backlash was significant, particularly among Portland residents and organizations
like “Citizens for Safe Water” that feared compromising the quality associated with
the Bull Run drinking water. The Willamette source option bore the hallmarks of
the TVWD and the JWC and represented a compromise of sorts with the PWB, but
the ensuing controversy nearly split the uneasy partnership within the RWPAG. In
the end, local political pressure, from Portland and Metro especially, moved RPAG to
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drop explicit reference to the Willamette River as a source option. The backlash was
so strong, in fact, that the Portland City Council eventually adopted an ordinance –
passed with the future Consortium IGA – that identified Bull Run as the City’s
primary source. It was the first of several political controversies over water supply
sourcing that would eventually temper the ambitions of policy actors promoting a
regional water supply authority.
The second phase of the IWRP began in 1991 with the development of a
Regional Water Supply Plan (RWSP) to supply the region’s water until 2050. The
plan was ultimately adopted in 1996 by the 27 major water providers in the
Portland Metropolitan Area, and Metro was also a signatory. Overseen by a steering
committee co-chaired by Rosenburger and then-Hillsboro city manager Tim Erwert,
the planning process itself seems to have strengthened ties among the different
water providers. The regional source water and demand studies were jointly
commissioned and paid for by the water providers comprising the RWPAG. The
studies were ambitious in scope and cost, costing the participating water providers
$2.2 million in capital or donated staff-time. The planning process therefore
entailed a significant degree of risk-sharing among the water providers, as a
participant of the process recalls:
I think some of the unique aspects of that was it was all trust-building. It was
all about involvement, and stakeholder involvement. They all had a stake.
They were all paying. They all had a say in how these studies were going to
be done. We went through this bidding process and we used a scope for a
regional water supply plan to come up with a budget. You really didn't have a
clue how much this was going to cost.
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The successful completion of these studies, on-time and on-budget, therefore
represented an important early success in collaboration and bolstered the water
providers’ confidence in their capacity to work together on a significant scale.
But the planning process was also important for producing a staff
infrastructure centered on staff time donated by the PWB that would provide an
important model for the future Consortium. Lorna Stickel, a former Multnomah
County planner who was hired by the PWB in 1990, led a small team of staff,
organized around a RWPAG Subcommittee, in managing the contracting and
reporting. It was through this core staff work – first in the context of RWPAG and
later under the Consortium – that the PWB was able to establish itself as an
organizational, if not visionary, leader in regional water supply planning.
Designing an Implementing Entity
The Regional Water Providers Consortium (RWPC) was formed largely from
the recognition within the RWPAG that there was a need for a body to implement
the RWSP. This decision marked a decisive movement away from the conventional
one-off planning that had characterized much of planning and closer to adaptive
management that takes into account the changing social, economic, and political
contexts of implementation. Erwert was one of the members to propose the need to
form a more durable planning and management entity. Furthermore, managers like
Erwert were concerned the implementation of the ratified plan would entail
numerous political decisions that the RWSP could not anticipate. After some
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discussion among the managers, it was decided that such a group would require the
participation of elected leaders representing the various cities and utility districts.
While placing elected officials on the Consortium board fostered conditions
for a decision-making body that could lead in regional water supply policy, such
leadership never really materialized. One of the visionaries involved in the early
design of the RWPC argues that elected officials were brought into the design
discussions too soon, before its architects had had the chance to develop a more
detailed proposal to which the officials could respond. Without a robust proposal
framing discussions that identified sideboards and relevant issues, the resulting
uncertainty led water suppliers and their legal counsels to raise issues about all
sorts of possible transgressions, real or imagined. According to him, the talks got
lost in the weeds of turf politics:
You can't get elected officials involved in things like that. You have to give
them a package they can react to one way or another. Elected officials are
terrible at making sausage. They're great at eating it, but you don't ever let
them make it.
As a result, we find evidence that, from the very start, the board of elected
officials felt more beholden to their local constituents than they did to any vision
behind the RWSP. Thus, the IGA reflects a preoccupation with ensuring equality and
fairness among the providers. An internal document that was circulated to the
respective boards of elected officials of the various water suppliers outlined the
reasons for joining the RWPC. In it one can discern an “expansionary” frame
emphasizing the mutual benefits of joining while playing down any references to
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potential costs or risks. As one of the PWB staff members involved in the formation
explains:
The thought was that the Consortium could help when it was asked. It was
agreed upon that the things they were going to do were beneficial, not
getting in people's ways. The idea was that sub-regional efforts were
probably much more likely.
It was especially important to its architects that the RWPC not appear as an
instrument of the PWB and Portland to dominant the other water providers. This
preoccupation with equality and fairness, or at least with maintaining the
appearance of equality and fairness, tended to limit the vision of the RWPC to
procedural matters and program outputs that could be more easily verified, as
opposed to regional outcomes that were both more difficult to assess and fraught
with political risk. The staff member continues:
Because every time you go to a council or a government and say, “Pass this,”
an IGA under ORS190 is very much the same as a contract so it gets the same
kind of scrutiny. All of them have their legal people, whether they're
consultant legal or their in-house staff look at these. We knew we couldn't do
this unless it was all identical; they had to be the same. That took months to
get through that process.
The architects of the RWPC appear to have been driven to a large extent by
political pragmatism, taking pains to make the IGA palatable to local constituents in
order give the RWPC the best chance of being adopted. This pragmatism extended
to the language of its resolution, which used the weaker term “endorsement” rather
than “adoption,” which would have been more binding and, its designers feared,
therefore more difficult to pass. This decision seemed to be driven by a recognition,
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resignation even, that regional water supply planning and management was going to
continue to be driven by local interests.
In some ways, this was an accurate assessment of the state of metropolitan
water policy at the time, and it would appear that the realistic approach taken by the
early architects of Portland’s regional water supply planning and management
helped increase the likelihood that the RWSP would be accepted and implemented.
Indeed, it appears that many of the smaller providers saw the RWPC as perhaps
their best opportunity to limit Portland’s regional dominance. As a manager of a
water district on the east side points out:
Portland is perceived as the big gorilla in the room that nobody wants to
wake up. That may even have been part of the initial reason for various
members to join and participate, if for no other reason than to neutralize
Portland.
An IGA was drawn up specifying a board of elected officials representing the
participating water providers, along with an executive committee, a technical
committee, and a technical subcommittee. A separate staffing IGA was also drawn
up specifying that the City of Portland would provide staffing for Consortium
functions. Over the course of 1996 and early 1997, the IGA was endorsed by 26 of
the 27 entities on the Oregon side of the metropolitan region. The exception was
Troutdale, which decided its wells gave it sufficient ground water supply to obviate
participation in regional coordination and the risks (real or perceived) that that
entailed. Concerned about the potential conflicts between Oregon’s and
Washington’s water laws and policies, the Washington state entities of the
metropolitan region, Clark County PUD and the City of Vancouver, opted not to join.
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State boundaries proved too significant. Regardless, the RWPC obtained the
minimum signatories to enact the IGA by early 1997. With a self-funding and
administrative mechanism in place, the RWPC began its fiscal year on July 1, 1997.
Boundary Spanning and Social Learning in the RWPC
Final Push for a Regional Water Supply Authority
Although many of the institutional conditions that limited the RWPC’s scope
and reach were already in place by the time it formed, the election and appointment
of Eric Sten as Commissioner of the PWB in 1996 paved the way for one more push
to make the Consortium a robust regional water authority. Tenny was introduced to
Sten through a mutual friend in Washington, D.C. and asked Sten for political
backing in the effort to regionalize water supply. Sten was initially enthusiastic, and
soon started working on a vision of a regional water supply agency that would own
and manage the Bull Run system to meet the region’s water needs. Sten’s
expectation was that local water providers would be willing to help fund the
agency’s expansion of the Bull Run system, including construction of a 3rd dam, in
exchange for the coveted water, but he seems to have underestimated the political
volatility of water supply. For one, local providers and their rate-payers equated an
expansion of the Bull Run system with increased economic and political dependence
on Portland. During this time, in fact, the TVWD and its partners continued their
campaign to build a water treatment plant on the Willamette River. The TVWD
hired Kevin Hanway, a former lobbyist, in 1996 to spearhead the campaign, and he
eventually organized local water providers interested in sourcing the Willamette
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into a group called the Willamette Water Supply Agency. Tenny, who was by then
working as a consultant, actively supported the idea, helping the TVWD get a pilot
plant to determine whether the treated water would meet safe drinking water
standards. Lowman also became an outspoken advocate for the proposed
treatment plant. Testifying before the TVWD board in July, 1999, he argued that the
plant represented "a window of opportunity to solidify Tualatin Valley Water
District's role as a leader in the industry in this area" (Oregonian, September 13,
1999). Eventually, the TVWD and the Cities of Tigard, Tualatin, and Wilsonville
approved plans for a $92 million state-of-the-art treatment plant on the Willamette
River. When Sten, backed by Portland-based advocacy groups like “Citizens for Safe
Water,” challenged the city councils’ decisions, the Consortium found itself in an
awkward position. Many of its members were irked by what they saw as Sten’s
heavy-handed approach. The matter went before voters in ballot measures in
Tigard, Tualatin, and Wilsonville. As one Consortium board member recalls, it was a
tense time for the RWPC as it waited to see which way the public would vote:
I think really what happened was everyone was waiting to see if Portland
and Eric [Sten] could really control water politically. If you can control it
politically, you can functionally and physically control it…The hard part is
getting everyone to agree with what you want to do. The technical, physical
part is easy. I think everyone was holding their breath to see what was going
to happen. Once we saw them fail, we all spoke in Wilsonville's favor: “This is
Wilsonville's choice; it's not Portland's choice.” Once we saw the people
really able to overcome Eric's involvement, then we thought “Okay, there is
some sense about this.”
The referenda on the Willamette treatment plan were also a referendum on Sten’s
vision for a regional water supply agency. When Wilsonville voters approved the
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bond measure to build the plant, many observers, including those within the
Consortium, sensed that the political tide on regional water supply was shifting
decisively to local control. Not surprisingly, it was a pivotal moment for the
Consortium as well, as the board member continues:
That [referendum] came a breath away from disintegrating the whole
Consortium. The Consortium looked at it as the City of Portland trying to
dictate who is going to drink what water and when. It doesn't sound like that
big of a deal in real life. In politics it was a huge deal. It was a huge loss for
Eric Sten when Wilsonville voted and in fact did build a plant. It was a huge
loss politically for Eric. He thought he had the power politically to stop it. He
didn't. That came very close, a lot closer than a lot of people think…
Framing Regional Water Supply in Local Terms
Emboldened by their victory at the polls and sensing a political opportunity,
12 of the local 27 water supply agencies – Beaverton, Gresham, Portland, Tigard,
Tualatin, Clackamas River Water District, Clean Water Services, Rockwood Water
District, Powell Valley Road Water District, Sunrise Water Authority, Tualatin Valley
Water District and the West Slope Water District – came forward to propose a
variant of Sten’s vision: instead of jointly owning and managing the Bull Run
system, the region’s water providers could pool their diverse water rights into a
regional agency. Since these water rights covered not only Bull Run, but also the
Clackamas, Tualatin, Trask, and Willamette rivers, such a proposal effectively
diversified water supply for the region as a whole. Sten came out in favor of the
proposal, and the group of agencies soon organized under what they called a
“Regional Drinking Water Supply Initiative,” which included several public hearings
on developing criteria for the proposed regional agency. But here too, it seems Sten
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underestimated the political backlash, this time from his own constituencies, many
of whom wanted to protect their Bull Run drinking water from being pooled with
other sources, especially the Willamette. Others balked at the notion, at the time
still only in development, that the proposed agency’s board might be appointed
rather than elected. Sten’s political capital was further diminished when
Rosenberger became embroiled in an accounting scandal at the Bureau that
ultimately forced him to resign in 2001. Around this time, many wholesale
contracts also came up for renewal, and these one-on-one negotiations, which
spanned a 4-year period between 2002 and 2006, tended to distract attention from
bigger picture issues. The vision of a regional water supply agency soon lost
political momentum and was never realized.
It would seem, then, that the fierce localism of water supply politics in the
Portland Metropolitan region posed boundaries that proved daunting enough, at
least, to frustrate plans for a robust regional water supply agency. But this
assessment is only half of an explanation, since it begs the question: what boundary
spanning did take place that helped to shape the RWPC into the partnership that it
did become? Part of the answer can be found in the constitutional design of the
Consortium, where we find that an abiding concern for nominal equity and
consensus imposed certain limitations on the organization’s ability to experiment
and innovate. Instead of creating a regional water supply agency, the IGA preserved
the independent authorities of local providers to carry out their own planning and
management of water supply. Significantly, local providers retained their full
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authority to own and operate their facilities; no such authority has been given to the
Consortium or similar entity. Furthermore, the IGA states that each board member
receives one vote. The one-member-one vote rule has helped to mitigate undue
influence that Portland or even the TVWD (the second largest provider in the
region) might otherwise have while giving smaller providers a significant degree of
leverage, both individually and as a coalition, to influence regional water supply
policy. In addition, the IGA lays out a dues structure that assigns dues based on
current and projected demand for water.24 Both of these measures have the effect
of instituting a policy of equity and fairness among the providers. Other clauses
were written in as well – pushed by the provider’s respective lawyers – to protect
providers against liabilities from activities. This had the effect of reducing risksharing and therefore the need for trust.
Convergence of expectations
On a less formal though equally important level, the board members have
embraced a consensus-based culture. Although majority rules are observed if
necessary, every effort is made to achieve consensus on decisions. Over time, this
has meant that the Consortium tends to avoid especially contentious issues.
Initially, this meant Consortium officials avoided issues that would divide their
constituencies. But as the Consortium evolved and its members developed bonds of
friendship and trust, their “local” interests and identities became increasingly tied to
the fates of one another and to the Consortium as a whole. Board members also
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The growth portion of the dues structure was removed in an IGA amendment in 2004.
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recognized early on that they were more likely to influence larger regional and state
policy questions if they could present a united front. It would appear, at any rate,
that the RWPC slowly built a reputation as a regional water supply planning and
advisory group that Metro and the state could refer to on issues ranging from
planning to compliance. For these agencies, the RWPC vastly simplified their work
by reducing the number of stakeholders and associated transaction costs. The
convergence of expectations and roles has been driven as much as by the politics of
perception as by reality. As one Consortium staff person points out:
[Metro] come[s] to us when there's issues involved with the latest round of
urban reserves, and cost of service, so we have become the go-to group of
entities when these collective things come forward. We gained a boatload of
goodwill and points with the state, with the State Water Resource
Department, DEQ. […] Nonetheless, the fact you do these things gains you
this aura of “the whole of you is greater than the sum of the parts.” Whether
this is perceived or real doesn't matter. It is the perception that really makes
the difference.
Given the ever-present threat that Metro’s water planning authority represents, the
favors of Metro and the state have only reinforced the Consortium’s dependence on
maintaining its image as an effective and consensus-based organization. In a sense,
the RWPC has had to allay the concerns of 2 opposing interests: on one hand, it has
to demonstrate to Metro and the state that it is an effective regional water supply
planning organization, while, on the other, deferring to local control. Seen in this
light, and given the public nature of its meetings, the Consortium’s consensus
culture can be understood as an institutional strategy to keep internal differences
away from the public eye. In 2004, the same year it updated its 5-year Strategic
Plan, it made a constitutional change to its IGA that significantly reduced the scope
207

of its dispute mediation section to cover only internal organizational disputes. The
change communicated a clear policy that the Consortium was no longer going to be
in the business of engaging in larger public controversies. Over time, then, the RWPC
has evolved into a kind of clearinghouse and forum for convening local water
providers to share information and discuss issues relevant to them, as opposed to a
policymaking body that would lead the region’s water providers with a strong vision
for regional water supply and management.
Consortium’s Legacy
This is not to downplay the Consortium’s significance. After all, local water
providers did not previously have such a place to meet to share information and
perspectives on any regular basis. The Phase I source water-, regional demand-, and
Portland conservation studies were the first of their kind for the region and led to
what was probably the country’s first IWRP on that scale. Since then, the
Consortium has commissioned numerous studies, including: conservation impact
assessments, an update of the RWSP, 2 regional transmission and storage studies,
the development of a source water protection participation strategy, and even
assessments of water supply and demand impacts from climate change. More
generally, the Consortium’s growing resource of studies, models, and monitoring all
have vastly increased the metropolitan area’s ability to plan for water supply issues
before they materialize. The Consortium regularly updates both its RWSP and its 5year strategic plan, ensuring that the region’s water providers stay abreast of and
respond to developments as they arise.
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But it’s also clear that boundary spanning played a role in helping the
Consortium navigate the treacherous waters of regional water politics. The RWPC
developed and adopted a public involvement plan that, following the IWRP
framework, was largely driven by an interest in balancing water supply concerns
with questions of demand. The region’s water suppliers recognized that improving
conservation and efficiency was going to require broad public participation.
Questions of water demand turned out to be much less contentious than questions
of supply which consequently made boundary spanning between the water
providers easier. They also recognized the potential cost efficiencies of pooling
their resources to reach the region’s media market. Here, outreach efforts have
been more robust and more successful. The Consortium has successfully sponsored
focus groups and surveys, and partnered with businesses and local media in both
identifying their target market and shaping their messages and programs to fit that
market. Their successful media campaign “Conserve H₂0,” for example, has helped
raise the public’s awareness of the importance of conservation. Through the
Consortium, water providers are able to leverage participation in these otherwise
expensive media campaigns.
Water suppliers have also discovered an opportunity for collaborating in the
area of emergency supply planning. The Consortium carried out a study on regional
system interconnections, transmission, and in-town storage which revealed
vulnerabilities from disruptions in local and regional supply caused by earthquakes,
terrorist attacks, or other emergencies. Just as importantly, the study showed a
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political readiness to consider a regional response to the problem, suggesting that
the public was more willing to think as a region to address acute supply crises. Here
was a water supply issue that seemed less controversial which the Consortium
could address. And, as with conservation media campaigns, the RWPC discovered
there were efficiencies in pooling resources. For instance, the RWPC has secured 2
Urban Area Security Initiative (USAI) grants, 1 of which funded the purchase of
several portable emergency distribution systems. Eight such systems were brought
online in 2008. And building on its 2000 Regional Transmission and Storage
Strategy, the Consortium completed a more detailed GIS-based assessment of
regional transmission and interconnection that was funded by a grant totaling over
$90,000.
Given the existing political legitimacy of the issues and the cost-efficiencies of
regional coordination, it is perhaps no surprise that water conservation outreach
and emergency supply planning remain the Consortium’s 2 most important
programs. The conservation program, which was formed after folding the
Columbia/Willamette Conservation Coalition into the Consortium in 2000, has been
the most successful and popular program among the members. Directed by a
Consortium Conservation (Sub-)Committee, the program has grown to around
$400,000 in annual expenditures out of a total budget of around $700,000,
consuming over 60% of the annual budget with 2 dedicated FTE staff positions, as of
2010. Similarly, an Emergency Planning (Sub-) Committee formed in 2001 to
oversee the Consortium’s emergency planning program, eventually producing a
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Regional Emergency Water Distribution Plan that outlines strategies and
agreements for coordination among water suppliers and regional emergency
managers. Together, these programs have enhanced the capacity of the
Consortium’s members to not only respond to problems but also to discover and
capitalize on opportunities.
The Consortium, then, has become largely a value-added to the region’s
providers rather than the other way around, much as the original lobbying
documents had framed it. In fact, these programs are a major reason why providers
continue to participate in the Consortium. As a manager of a smaller water district
on the east-side explains:
I see people really accepting the fact that this regional entity has value. This
is something we want to participate in. They always say when you're doing
something good, you don't have to shove it down people's throats; they'll
steal it. When people began to accept this organism as their own, you know
you have arrived.
Water providers continue to enjoy the flexibility to adopt the Consortium’s
programs, modeling tools, and other innovations as they see fit. An important
feature is a flexible dues structure that accommodates the specific scope, capacities,
and needs of each member. For example, the City of Newberg pays just enough dues
to participate in the conservation portion of the Consortium’s activities. While this
flexibility appeals to the individual water providers, it also means that participation
in the Consortium is somewhat inconsistent. This, in turn, impedes the adoption of
certain innovations which, in a kind of Catch-22, rely on larger-scale implementation
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to be successful. For instance, some of the Consortium’s integrated forecasting and
planning tools like “Confluence” remain largely unused.
As a value-added entity, the Consortium has also proved to be a fairly
effective lobbying arm for local providers when needed. The Consortium has
worked with outside agencies and the state legislature on various issues, as for
example, when the state proposed changes to the way providers could impose
System Development Charges for connecting to local water systems. Many of these
lobbying initiatives have been successful. The RWPC helped pass legislation to
better regulate pesticide use and disposal. Consortium members also participated
in a statewide commission to build a state-bonding capacity for districts. However,
there are also indications its influence is limited. For many of the state’s lawmakers,
for example, the Consortium remains a somewhat obscure entity. In fact, it seems
the smaller and more homogeneous Oregon Water Utility Council (OWUC) has been
a more effective lobbying arm in many cases. Still, when one considers the fact that
many of the Consortium’s members also serve on the OWUC, the Oregon Water
Resources IWRS Policy Advisory committee, and other trade organizations, its
influence becomes more significant. In fact, members of the Consortium’s
Emergency Planning Sub-Committee were instrumental in developing the Oregon
Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network (ORWARN), which provides a
statewide framework for inter-agency coordination in emergencies.
The RWPC has built relationships of trust and communication at all levels of
governance that has undoubtedly led to some significant institutional changes in
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regional water supply as well. For one thing, the Consortium seems to have
stimulated the formation of numerous sub-regional agreements. Consortium’s
influence is especially evident on the eastside, where various capital projects point
to increased risk-sharing and collaboration. Mt. Scott and Damascus, for instance,
have formed a joint water authority, while the Clackamas River Water Providers
Consortium is modeled in many respects after the RWPC. In some cases, the
Consortium has defined the specific policy context for sub-regional cooperation. A
framework for sub-regional interties is currently informing the cooperation
between Gresham and Rockwood on a major ground water project that will include
jointly held and managed wells. These developments would have been unthinkable
let alone doable before the Consortium formed. As a representative of one of the 2
agencies observes: “Ten years ago we wouldn't have sat at the same table.”
The RWPC has similarly influenced experimentation at larger levels of
governance which serve to reinforce its innovations. Currently Metro relies on the
RWPC to help meet its chartered requirements for a Regional Framework Plan,
particularly with regard to water supply and storage. At the state level, the OWRD
has adopted the Consortium’s Conservation Program as a policy standard for the
industry. The OWRD's Division 86 planning requirement calls for water providers
to produce a water management and conservation plan that is largely modeled on
the Consortium’s program as a condition for extending unexercised water rights. In
addition, the OWRD has largely used the Consortium’s RWSP as a template for its
own planning efforts.
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Beyond the state, the RWPC has enjoyed less direct but nevertheless
significant influence. Its architects, including Rosenburger, Jutila, and Seibel, have
used their professional and social networks to actively promote the Consortium’s
approach as a general model for regional water supply management. Stickel has
been approached by her counterparts in other regions to be interviewed or present
on the Consortium’s work. Many of the groups showing interest in the Consortium
have been concentrated in the west, such as the Cascade Water Alliance, the Seattle
Public Utilities, and the Puget Sound Water Forum in the Seattle area. Cities and
water providers from San Francisco, Sacramento, and Denver have also approached
the Consortium. But the RWPC has attracted national attention as well, whether
through associations like the AWWA, or through more personal ties. After leaving
the PWB, Rosenburger joined CH2MHill and eventually transferred to Atlanta,
where he invited Stickel to give a presentation to city officials and water providers.
These presenters reported that other regions and entities were often interested in
different aspects of the Consortium’s approach. Many have wanted to explore
emulating the constitutional innovation of including a board of elected officials.
Others have taken more of an interest in the Consortium’s programs, offering, for
instance, to buy TV ads associated with its “Conserve H₂O” media campaign. These
institutional reinforcements essentially generate value in the policy innovations that
encourage their diffusion and enhance overall credibility in the Consortium. In
some cases, they have emboldened the Consortium to further promote itself and its
innovations. For example, when the PWB rewrote its wholesale contracts in 2006, it
214

added a stipulation that wholesalers serving over 1500 customers submit a water
conservation plan. Participation in the Consortium’s Conservation Program
partially met this new requirement; thus, the change in the wholesale contract
boilerplate effectively solidified continued support for one of the Consortium’s most
important programs.
But these boundary encounters with the larger water supply community
have also served to reinforce a particular identity for the Consortium’s members.
The very act of talking about and presenting on the Consortium – particularly after
being invited to do so – instills in both the presenters and in the audience a certain
level of awareness that is crafted through an ever-evolving narrative. The narrative
itself – the story of the Consortium – takes shape gradually as presenters hone their
message and as audiences hone their expectations of what they will hear,
particularly to the extent that these audiences have been linked through various
social and policy networks. Events and developments that occur between these
storytelling encounters surely influence the path the narrative takes; so long as
there is a Consortium, the story of the Consortium never really ends. Nevertheless,
there is good reason to suspect that these encounters have had an effect on narrator
and audience alike. Furthermore, to the extent that we observe a convergence of the
Consortium and the Portland Metropolitan Region around a particular vision for
regional water supply planning and management, we may surmise that these
storytelling encounters played a role in that convergence.
Tinkering at the Edges
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The evolution of the RWPC structure also reflects a growing dependence on
staff that suggests the subordination of visionary leadership to program
development. Initially, policy directions were made by the Board for staff
development before heading to the Executive Committee for consideration. Often,
the Executive Committee would comment on drafts of plans or program
recommendations for further refinement by the staff, until the Executive Committee
was satisfied and passed its recommendations onto the Board for final approval.
Thus, staff has always played a fairly important role. As the Consortium was being
formed, staff members, particularly Stickel, worked to flesh out the various
implications of the RWSP by articulating outstanding questions – such as how would
the Consortium finance itself? – and identifying the kind of information that was
needed to answer them. But this role has expanded as institutional trust among the
water providers translated into trust in staff. As one staff person explains, it has
become somewhat difficult to get adequate direction from the Board:
In fact, sometimes it's like pulling teeth to get [to] staff direction. And as you
build your trust over time, they [Consortium Board] generally think you're
going to do a good job as staff in presenting stuff to them for further action
and whatnot. So sometimes after a while you don't get as much input.
The Board does continue to provide general direction on important matters like
strategic planning, the annual work plan, and the budget, and its meetings now
regularly include proposing a set of topics for future discussion and deliberation.
The Executive Committee will work, in turn, with the various sub-committees to
schedule agency staff, elected officials, consultants, and other sources from outside
the Consortium to present on a given topic before the Board. Thus, Consortium staff
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influence should not be overstated. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that their role
has expanded since the partnership’s inception, placing greater reliance on
boundary spanning among staff.
Especially, the cost-sharing agreement in the Staff IGA requires pooling dues
among the water providers to compensate staff, many of whom are partially
administered by different entities and staff policies. PWB personnel, for instance,
enjoy more benefits than do staff affiliated with some other providers, raising issues
of equity within the Consortium. Key staff members like Stickel and Rebecca Geisen,
who manages the Consortium’s Emergency Preparedness Program, have also had to
learn to wear multiple hats as they divide their loyalties, attention, and energies
among different organizational roles. It takes a good deal of boundary spanning
skills to negotiate these differences without raising issues of conflicts of interest, as
one Consortium staff person explains:
I think over time the consortium staff in general, all of us, have established a
trust relationship with all of the entities, more so with some than others at
various times. […] We're very careful about what staff we select. It's not that
there has been a huge turnover but the fact we have been able to grow the
staff and have staff that recognizes that we're working for a many-headed
master and it requires a certain degree of skill and finesse to do that.
As the water providers have learned to trust the Consortium staff more, they have
given them more leeway to develop policies and programs, increasing their
influence on the organization as a whole.
Even so, lessons of trust and respect have to be continuously relearned as
both the Consortium and its members experience staff-turnover, changes in political
leadership, policy shifts, and other changes. The RWPC has at least provided an
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institutional context for regular negotiation as issues arise. This context has not
only fostered interpersonal and interorganizational ties but also, as one board
member relates, the political skills necessary for reaching and implementing
agreements:
When we need to, we make a few calls out and around and line up the votes.
Some people get a little annoyed with that but that's just good politics. You
have to know where the votes are when you go to the meetings. […] We know
who has ties. For example, if there's a particular district or manager that is
having difficulty with a budget issue, we know who they're friends with and
we know who can talk sense to them. And so we just make a few calls. You
can call it what you want. Some days we just call in a few favors. It's just like,
“Look, we've got to get this budget passed, and we're just not going to do
anything different.” We just take care of that. We have to. Conservation is
not a hit-and-miss program. You can't advertise and you can't promote
conservation one year, skip a year or two, promote it for a year, skip a year or
two. It's a consistent message. You can't just take time off and think you're
going to gain back the ground that you lost. You just can't do that.

Even with relatively stable entities, Consortium members may interact with several
points of contact ranging from board members and managers to technical and
program staff that don’t necessarily communicate consistently with one another.
For Consortium staff, this means continuously reassessing the terms of social,
professional, and political relationships, which requires, in turn, the ability and
willingness to appreciate other points of view, as one Consortium staff person
observes:
You better have thick skin. […] You'd better not be too defensive because it's
a fairly good size group of people and they do shift over time. […] I have
become tolerant. I wasn't always that way in my career. I would say the
other thing is not having your own agenda, and being honest without being
too opinionated. […] I think one of the characteristics I and several people I
work with have that I think puts you in pretty good stead to be able to deal
with this kind of difficult organization is that you tend to try and look on the
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good side of everything and not ascribe evil motives to people. I know this
may sound like pop psychology but these are lessons I have learned over
decades. It's always put me in good stead.
Several Consortium members that were interviewed spoke especially highly of
Stickel’s ability to negotiate the shifting and complex partnership terrain:
Lorna [Stickel] is really politically savvy. She may not agree with everything
the politicians have to say, but she's smart enough to know which ones to
work and which ones to not. There's a couple of people you have to have on
your side. You need the president of the board. You need a couple members
of the technical committee and a couple of key board members. Once you
have those, they can take care of the rest of the business. They just align
themselves with the right people. You make sure you know politically what
the program is, what these people are interested in. […] So politically you
have to be smart enough to figure out early on what is going to fly and what's
not. That's the key thing, if you happen to know a couple of people you can
call – “I'm thinking about A or B, what do you think?” – in an hour you can
find out if it's going to fly or not and where the votes are. […] And like I said
Lorna is really good at that.
She gets something in her sights, she knows generally she has consensus.
She has the ability, whether it be by intimidation or whatever it takes, to get
the ones that are lying out there that really don't know what they want to do,
she's got a real way of convincing them this is for the good. […] She's got that
knack that she's really smart but everybody respects her. Some are afraid of
her. I'm not afraid of her at all, and I would say most of the managers aren't.
But there are some that are. I would say everybody that knows Lorna
respects Lorna. She puts out work like you wouldn't believe. She's just a
machine at putting out work. It's quality work. It's not just throwing papers
in the air. It's good stuff. I'd say of anybody she's the star.
The increasing reliance on staff more generally is reflected in the
Consortium’s emphasis on its programs as opposed to framing regional water
supply issues. Participation also reflects this growing reliance on staff. In the early
heady years, the Consortium enjoyed the participation of top management.
However, interviews and meeting minutes show that top management participation
at both the Executive- and Technical Committee levels has steadily decreased, while
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Board meetings have decreased in frequency from quarterly to every 4 months. The
attrition of top management reflects the decreasing relevance of the RWPC in
directing new policy. Instead, the Consortium has largely become a program
institution tinkering with policy innovations at the edges of program development
and implementation.
With this evolution we see a corresponding shift in boundary spanning.
Early on, it appears that the boundary spanning at the top management level was
significant. But the early involvement of elected officials introduced a degree of
risk-aversion and turf mentality that tended to blunt more ambitious efforts by
managers to develop a robust regional water supply system. This isn’t to say that
top managers were more inclined than staff or elected officials to think in terms of
regional interests. As already stated, most top managers also tended to be
protective of their independence as well as their jobs, and relations between
managers were strained before the Consortium formed, particularly on the east side
of the Willamette River. Still, there are indications that top managers were starting
to build relations of trust during the RWSP process. But those bonds were always
vulnerable to the political vagaries of the officials and administrations for whom
these managers worked. Nevertheless, to this day, general and district managers
provide an important “vertical” boundary spanning function by filtering policy
deliberations that occur at the Executive, Technical, and sub-committee levels and
relaying only the information and perspectives that they judge will help inform
decision-making. As a general manager of one of the smaller districts relates:
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If there is something I think is a hot issue that my board member is going to
vote on, then I see it as my responsibility to prep them and give them the
benefit of my thinking and a breadth of the discussion that went on so when
they get to the [Board] meeting that evening, they're prepared.
To the extent that top management represent the link between operational and
bigger picture concerns, the subsequent atrophy of their support and participation
has left a vacuum of the kind of collaborative leadership needed to articulate a
strong vision that would shape regional water supply policy. The attrition of top
management within the Consortium is perhaps most significant among the
municipalities, where water must compete with many other priorities. Without top
management participation in the Consortium, these cities are unlikely to lead on
water supply policy. Furthermore, poor or inconsistent top management
participation means that utility districts that focus on water may find it difficult to
collaborate with their municipal counterparts lacking a similar focus. As a result,
the Consortium has been relegated to relatively narrow programmatic and other
operational concerns, where the boundary spanning of staff, middle-managers, and
occasionally elected officials then become important. For example, the Boring and
Sunrise water districts recently faced budgetary constraints that threatened their
ability to pay their membership dues to the Consortium. In a series of negotiations
that speaks to the personal and institutional loyalties within the Consortium, the
remaining members offered to cover the dues of Boring by using contingency
funds.25

25 The loss of dues from the financially strapped Sunrise WA was much greater, and the Board voted
to increase their own dues rather than cut the funds out of the budget and reduce activities. The
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Partnership Capacity of the RWPC
The RWPC could properly be classified as “Permanent and/or regular
coordination” under Mandell and Steelman‘s (2003) typology of interorganizational
innovations. The IGA and Staff IGA provide a formal framework for collaboration
around regional water supply planning and, to a lesser degree, management.
Membership is limited to water supply authorities operating within the Portland
Metropolitan Region, and members pay dues according to a dues structure that
accounts for different capacities and needs. The partnership’s scope is restricted to
a defined range of programmatic and strategic concerns, and membership
commitment and risk-sharing is correspondingly limited. Most of the coordination
is centered on planning, information-sharing, capacity-building, and development of
Consortium programs, while each member retains full control over their respective
operations, including implementation of any Consortium programs or other
initiatives.
As we saw in the cases of the COTE WG and the UDRP, Mandell and
Steelman’s typology is useful in gauging the scope of the RWPC’s partnership, but it
leaves us with little sense for the resilience of that partnership. The IGA and Staff
IGA that structure the RWPC are clearly interorganizational innovations, as is the
IWRP framework that guides its water supply planning. Beyond this, it is clear that
the RWPC has provided an institutional – that is to say, normative – context for

Board provided an Ex-Officio status to both Boring WD and Sunrise WA for the time they were not
able to pay their dues. The Sunrise WA returned to full status one year later when a 4-part payment
plan was approved (Lorna Stickel, personal communication).
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engagement across technical, policy, and social boundaries concerned with water
supply planning and management. Within a few fairly well-defined policy areas
anyway – regional water supply planning, including aquifer storage and recovery
and interconnections and transmission, conservation education and outreach, and
emergency planning – boundary spanning among the region’s water supply agencies
has become fairly routine. Not only is there a well-defined process for decisionmaking, but a host of often-tacit rules of engagement and attendant social
technologies ranging from phone trees to planning models help to reduce the
uncertainties associated with the interaction of different and often conflicting
actors, ideas, and practices. These rules of engagement are composed of normative
and ideological expectations about what the proper roles of various agencies,
elected officials, managers, and staff are in specific contexts of interaction, both
within and between public meetings. Together these rules form an institutional
system for responding to various classes of problems, whether it concerns system
supply vulnerabilities, the inability of one of its members to pay their dues, or a
legislative threat emanating from Salem. Arguably the most fundamental rule of the
partnership operates through a culture of consensus and goodwill that steers the
Consortium away from problems it deems to be too divisive.
Having surmised that the RWPC meets the minimal conditions for PC I, it is
natural to ask whether its institutional capacity rises to the level of PC II? Here the
answer is less clear. On the one hand, the Consortium carries out a number of
distinct functions centered on regional water supply planning, conservation
223

education and outreach, and emergency planning. However, the integration of these
functions remains limited. The RWPC Strategic Plan, renewed every 5 years, does
address specific links between the major programs. And the work flows between
the various committees and the Board allow for boundary spanning across
operational, strategic, and even constitutional levels. These structural and
programmatic elements are key ingredients for PC II. But as effective as the RWPC’s
programs have become, the lack of a compelling vision driving the Consortium
means that these programs remain largely separate from one another. More
generally, the implementation of the Consortium’s initiatives and programs is
largely left to the discretion of the individual agencies. One water supply manager
from Washington County who participates in the Consortium expresses a sentiment
expressed by many of his colleagues that the Consortium today has limited influence
in shaping regional agenda on water supply:
When we did the original [regional] Water Supply Plan, we made sure that
our water sources were in it. But since that time, if I'm honest with you, we
are still doing our own thing, and it [the Consortium]’s not driving an agenda.
The Tualatin Basin Water Supply Project is not talked about in the
Consortium. We're not doing that. So to be honest, I don't know what is
driving the agenda. I don't think it's implementing it either.

While some flexibility on implementation is critical to assure local adoption
of the partnership’s innovations, too much freedom leads to uneven and largely
uncoordinated implementation. The alignment of partnership and community
practices can only occur if there is a definite context of implementation that can lend
both technical and cultural salience to those innovations. A context of
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implementation grounds the innovations in a community of practice and makes the
various partnership functions accountable to one another. For instance, a problem
which the RWPC has yet to completely address is: how to reconcile conservation
objectives with agencies’ revenue models that depend on provisioning water to
wholesale and rate-paying customers? And because water supply systems are
owned and operated by separate agencies and rate-paying communities,
inefficiencies associated with transaction, opportunity, and related costs between
these agencies translate to rates and taxes that a unified regional constituency
would probably not tolerate for long. Some observers point to the Scoggins Damraising project on the Tualatin River, estimated to cost $ 1 billion, as an example of a
mega-project born from system-wide inefficiencies and missed opportunities. A
general manager of one of the smaller water districts summarizes the dilemma that
arises when a partnership empowers the individual members to the point of
compromising the partnership itself. He points out, among other things, that an
information clearinghouse is arguably only useful if there is a visionary framework
to translate that information into a plan for collective action:
I'm speculating here, I haven't fleshed this out in my mind: there may even be
this notion that I can go in and get this information, access this information,
participate, but then I can take my bone back to my corner. “I don't want to
be bothered by you unless I ask for it. I have the resources now to fend for
myself, to keep the big state away from me,” kind of thing. If you mean
boundary in that context, that is something we haven't yet solved because
like five water entities pulling out of one river, the river is oversubscribed.
Here Clackamas River water sits with excess capacity and people are talking
about building new treatment plants. What is wrong with this picture?
You've got Portland having a pretty good source. There are a lot of wells and
stuff. Tualatin Valley is talking about building a larger storage facility because
they don't want to pay what Portland wants to charge for it. Rather than sit
225

down and figure out how we collaborate and do all these other things, “we're
just going to do our own.” We haven't crossed that bridge as successfully as
we should be, in my opinion. Some of that is because of the success of the
Consortium. […] In the sense that the Consortium does allow you to get all
this information and this data. The thing I was talking about, if you're not the
big fish, that allows you to take your bone to your corner. You don't have to
come out and play with everybody. […] It's like great strengths make great
weaknesses. I don't think we have actually thought about the other side of
the coin in the sense that because we're doing such a good job here, it may be
the laws of physics. You don't want to mess with this because it will screw
this one up and vice-versa.
The decentralized structure of the RWPC to some extent has empowered the
individual agencies, particularly the smaller ones, but the partnership itself is
neither inclined to grapple – nor capable of grappling – with coordination problems
of greater complexity than the individual functions which it provides. As a result, it
remains vulnerable to changes in socio-technical or policy conditions that currently
allow these inconsistencies and inefficiencies to go largely unnoticed. For example,
the region’s relatively abundant water supply has, to date anyway, tended to
mitigate impacts from missed opportunities or system-supply vulnerabilities, at
least in the short-term. As one district manager observes:
We always like to talk, in order for something big to happen there has to be a
crash. Then we do stuff in America. We never do anything in advance of
anything. We wait until it destructs; then we say “We have to go do
something!” There wasn't that here, which may explain why we don't have a
regional water supply authority.
Another cause and effect of the Consortium’s limited partnership capacity is
its heavy reliance on staff, which has been evident from the RWPC’s inception. It
seems the boundary spanning of the staff, especially Stickel, has been crucial in
making sure that the decision-makers have access to information, models, and
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perspectives needed to make decisions. Perhaps more importantly, staff help to
identify gaps in data and knowledge which may inform policy discussions and
learning at the executive and board levels. But this reliance also makes the RWPC
vulnerable to staff-turnover, as several Consortium member representatives
discussed in connection with Stickel’s impending retirement in 2011. The Board
and even Executive Committee have come to entrust in Stickel and her staff the
capacity to make decisions which require a combination of technical and political
judgments only experience can give. This investment has evolved into a particular
operational strategy for adapting to changes at various levels of resolution. Indeed,
perhaps the most important operational strategy concerns the set of largely
unwritten rules determining which changes or issues belong to which level. Over
time, Stickel and her staff have internalized this strategy, enabling the smooth
functioning of the organization. Given the reliance of the Consortium’s operations
on staff, there is the risk that the loss of that trust from staff-turnover will cause the
organization to lose some of its flexibility, in effect “freezing up” its operations.
Finally, the Consortium consensus culture has helped it stay together in
many ways. Clearly, the boundary spanning among its members to gauge which
battles or issues are worth taking up as a consortium versus as individual providers
has helped it stay together. But there is the real risk that deeper conflicts will
resurface and become unavoidable or that the Consortium will drift from its
constituencies as their positions evolve. As a result, the region remains vulnerable
to surprises, especially “long emergencies” like another economic crisis or climate
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change, that impact water supply. Indeed, the renegotiation of 25-year contracts
currently underway risks bringing simmering differences to the surface. In some
instances, the renegotiations have provided an occasion for constituencies to openly
question whether their district should remain in the Consortium. Many cite the
familiar issue of local control over water supply, but some observers argue that a
more fundamental issue is poor regional management of existing water supplies.
Indeed, perhaps most insidious of the long emergencies is the inefficiency in water
supply which threatens the region’s economic development and quality of life. The
silence around regional management issues – indeed, its almost complete lacuna in
public debate – reflects the subordinate status of regional water supply policy and
supports the conclusion that the RWPC’s role in those policy deliberations has been
more accommodating than visionary.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In conclusion, then, it would appear that the RWPC has limited Partnership
Capacity Type II. The Consortium carries out a number of distinct functions
centered on regional water supply planning, conservation education and outreach,
and emergency planning. Within each of these policy areas, the RWPC has developed
policies, programs, and tools that represent true innovations in regional water
supply cooperation. The Consortium has provided a forum for sharing technical
information and resources that have enhanced the capacities of its individual
members. Perhaps most significantly, this forum has cultivated bonds of trust and
goodwill that carry direct and indirect implications for regional water supply.
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Certainly the region as a whole is more informed and better prepared to address
regional supply issues because of the Consortium, particularly with respect to acute
crises or emergencies. In addition, these bonds have translated in some cases into
policy experiments with sub-regional development, ownership, and operation of
water supply.
But in many ways, the Consortium has reinforced norms of conflict avoidance
among the region’s water providers that has tended to vitiate regional policymaking
in water supply. The absence of a compelling vision of regional water supply means
that ownerships, authorities, and responsibilities remain largely uncoordinated.
Along the same lines, the lack of risk-sharing in the Consortium’s institutional
design and operations reflects (and reinforces) persistent turf mentality and
distrust. As a result, the Consortium’s programs and functions remain to a great
extent disconnected from one another, while implementation is uneven. Additional
signs of limited partnership capacity include missed opportunities, persistent
system-wide inefficiencies, and organizational vulnerability to staff-turnover.
There is, in another words, little evidence to suggest that the Consortium and its
members have established strategies for adjusting core practices so that programs
talk to one another and strategic plans both anticipate and inform local water
provider actions. We don’t find much evidence of a unique pattern in alignment
practices that would indicate PC II.
Let us now summarize our assessment of the RWPC’s capacity to manage
institutional processes of varying degrees of complexity. Table 5 summarizes the
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various boundary spanning practices that were observed in the RWPC process. The
table’s structure follows the methodological criteria contained in Table 2: Typology
of Partnership Processes.”
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Table 5: Boundary Spanning Practices in the RWPC
Boundary Spanning
Practices

Specific
contexts
of
boundary
spanning

Actively listening to
partner peers
Assigning opportunities to
a partner lead
Assigning problems to a
partner lead
Associating with partners
out of work context
Building personal relations
Classifying problems by
strategic objectives
Classifying problems by
task group
Collaborating on other
projects
Converting capital to
promote innovations
Coordinating external
communications
Coordinating the
convergence
Defining boundary
spanning norms
Defining boundary
spanning roles
Defining boundary
spanning values
Defining institutional
accountabilities
Defining institutional roles

Change in
Field
Interactions
All the
storming,
forming, &
norming of
the RWPC
1

Pattern
(PC I)?
Yes

Core
Practices

Operations
&
implementation
1

Change in
Core
(”Alignment”)
Practices

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

Deliberating with partners
in new contexts
Deliberating with
partnership stakeholders
in other contexts
Designing
process

1

Disclosing interests

1

1

1

1
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1

Pattern
(PC II)?
No
(STOP)

Education
Extending favors to
partners
Facilitation
Framing innovations in
terms of need
Framing need in terms of
innovations
Influencing across policy
sub-networks
Innovating (paradigmatic
boundary spanning)
Integrating boundary
objects/innovations
(standardization)
Making
government rules
and regulations
Managing process (budget,
conflicts, surprises, time)
Outreach

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1

Pilot-testing innovations
Pitching to decisionmakers
Prioritizing problems
Protecting brand/integrity
of innovations
Respectfully pushing back
(disclosing constraints)
Ritually enacting boundary
spanning
Scanning environment and
reporting issues
Seeking input from
relevant constituents
Seeking input from
relevant decision-makers
Sharing risks
Staff collaborating across
organizations
Staging group decisions
(lobbying, building
readiness, gauging
Strategically
aligning
partnering organizations

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
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1

1

1

1

Task-mastering

1

1

1

Testing ideas/Vetting

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Translating across
technical/disciplinary
boundaries between task
Translating
groups

1
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If the RWPC were to address some of the outstanding issues that have been
identified here, it would need to present a visionary framework that translates those
issues into actionable items for the Consortium of water providers. This would
require, in turn, building a culture that not only tolerates but welcomes frank
discussion of deeper policy differences among its members. By surfacing these
deeper differences, members may collectively develop a framework that places
those differences in a particular context for collective action. System-wide
inefficiencies and other costs would be “discovered,” while other differences may
lose their relevance. Programs and initiatives would build more naturally on one
another, while implementation would be simultaneously coordinated and
appropriate to local context. The social learning to achieve PC II is not trivial. It
would require expanding ownership of the region’s water supply problem –
whatever form that ownership may take – to a more encompassing entity. As we
have seen, such an expansion would hinge on significant political will and visionary
leadership.
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Chapter 6
Upper Deschutes River Partnership
Background
A Brief History of the Deschutes River Basin
The Deschutes River Basin covers a vast area of 10,700 square miles in
central Oregon. The drainage is set off to the west by the Cascade Mountains, to the
south by lava plateaus, and to the east by the Ochoco Mountains and plateau
between the Deschutes and John Day Rivers, and heading north to its confluence
with the Columbia River approximately 170 air miles from the headwaters of the
Deschutes River. The Basin features a wide variety of climatic and ecological zones,
ranging from wetland and mountain forest to sage and juniper rangeland and high
desert. A significant part of this climatic and ecological diversity stems in fact from
the basin’s geology. Most notably, on the west side, which includes the Deschutes
River mainstem, porous volcanic soil and lava tubes help to absorb snowmelt and
runoffs into the vast aquifer which gives rise to springs and drainages that naturally
replenish river flows. Historically, the result was a remarkably stable flow regime.
On the east side, in contrast, particularly in the canyons that feed into the Crooked
River, the Cascade rain shadow and more impermeable basalt rock combine to
create more variable flows from season to season and year to year (NWPCC, 2004).
The Basin has been home to human settlements for thousands of years,
including ancestors of the Warm Springs and Wasco Tribes who subsisted on
Chinook and sockeye salmon, steelhead trout, and resident fish. White settlers
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brought with them beaver trading and livestock grazing that began to significantly
impact the landscape and ecology, particularly in riparian and wetland areas. By the
late 1800’s, agriculture, forestry, and urbanization were impacting flow regimes,
water quality, and habitat on which many species, including salmon and steelhead,
depended. In some cases, historic floodplains, which afforded critical ecosystem
services such as groundwater recharge and habitat connectivity, were lost while
other areas flooded. Perhaps most significantly, irrigation diversions and eventually
reservoirs were created to meet water demand from irrigation and municipal use
that reduced flows to the point where some of the reaches became seasonally
dewatered. By 1914, filings for water use rights in the Upper Deschutes River north
of Bend amounted to 40 times the river’s annual flow (NWPCC, 2004).
Hydroelectric dam projects, which started in the early 1900’s to meet the region’s
power needs, threatened fish passage for anadromous fish, as did of course
diversions, culverts, and other structures associated with logging, road construction,
and development. Finally, water quality in some reaches became degraded.
Reductions in river flows and riparian shade increased temperatures while
pollution from municipal waste, agricultural run-off, and other economic activities
contaminated streams and lakes. By the mid-1990’s, a number of sections of the
Basin were in violation of state water quality standards for temperature, dissolved
oxygen, and phosphorous (Moore et al., 1995a).
The cumulative impact on anadromous fish populations was significant.
Already by 1880, Oregon Fish Commissioners were reporting that salmon
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populations in the Deschutes River had dwindled to the point that Warm Springs
Indians were forced to travel to the Clackamas River for their winter supply of fish
(NWPCC, 2004). The licensing and construction in the 1950’s and early 1960’s of
the Pelton-Round Butte Dam complex on the confluence of the Deschutes, Crooked,
and Metolius Rivers by Portland General Electric (PGE) created Lake Billy Chinook
and, with it, fish passage problems on an unprecedented scale which were never
completely overcome. This project, combined with USACE projects that
straightened channels in Wychus Creek and other critical reaches, hastened the
demise of wild salmon and steelhead populations in the Basin. In 1999, the summer
steelhead was listed as Threatened (the resident bull trout was listed as Threatened
in 1998).
In the 1980’s, the Basin began to experience an influx of visitors and new
residents who were attracted to the region’s natural beauty and recreational
opportunities. Much of the influx has been concentrated in the middle to upper
reaches of the Deschutes River Basin. Until recently anyway, Deschutes County,
which includes the city of Bend, led the state in population growth for many years,
increasing by over 53% between 1990 and 2000 (NWPCC, 2004). In 2009 the
county’s population was estimated to be almost 159,000, compared with just under
75,000, 20 years earlier (NWPCC, 2004). Jefferson and Crook Counties have
similarly experienced tremendous demographic growth. In contrast, between 1990
and 2000, Sherman and Wasco Counties farther north grew by only 0.8% and 9.7%,
respectively. Indeed, the story of water in the Basin has more recently been driven
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by urbanization in and around the cities of Madras, Redmond, Sisters, and Bend
which has changed land use patterns, the economy, and the political culture of the
Basin. In this south-central part of the Basin, the lumber industry has been replaced
to a great extent by construction, retail, and service industries like tourism, while
irrigation district land is being converted to municipal development, bringing
increased pressure on ground water resources. On the eastern side of the Basin, by
contrast, the cattle industry and agriculture continue to be important sources of
employment, although here too we find evidence of social change, as cities like
Prineville are becoming suburbs or even bedroom communities to larger cities like
Bend and Redmond.
Birth of the Idea of a Basin-wide Entity
The resulting geographic, demographic, economic, and urban contrasts have
given rise to cultural and political differences through which water conflicts have
been framed and negotiated. Irrigation districts and communities farther north
must contend with water shortages and related issues stemming at least in part
from consumption by Basin water-users upstream of them. The natural scarcity of
water farther east, particularly in the Crooked River Subbasin, has been exacerbated
by the growing socioeconomic rift between the increasingly affluent and urbane
Deschutes County and the more rural (although increasingly suburban),
conservative, and poorer Crook County. These socioeconomic, political, and cultural
differences translate to contrasting and often conflicting attitudes about water
resources and how to manage them within the Basin.
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These differences have proved daunting in the absence of a unifying
institutional water resource management framework. While about 50% of the Basin
is owned by the federal government (primarily USFS and BLM), fully 42% is private,
while most of the remainder is owned and managed by the Confederated Tribes of
Warm Springs Reservation (CTWSR). As with many basins, the Deschutes River
Basin is comprised of a diverse set of stakeholders ranging from federal, state, and
local agencies, counties and municipalities, and special districts, to landowners,
businesses, utilities, environmental interests, and the CTWSR, each with their own
set of interests, authorities, and obligations. Treaty rights of the CTWSR, for
instance, include use rights of water and fisheries that extend far beyond their
reservation, making the CTWSR a key stakeholder in the management of the
Deschutes River Watershed (Moore et al., 1995b). They have played an active role
in the Northwest Power and Conservation Council’s (NWPCC) Columbia River Fish
Management Plan, including the NWPCC’s Deschutes Subbasin Plan (NWPCC, 2004).
Perhaps most relevant to the current case study, the CTWSR are co-licensees with
PGE of 2 of the 3 dams of the Pelton-Round Butte Dam Complex and were central to
the negotiation over relicensing in 2001 (Moore, et al., 1995b).
The CTWSR have also formed partnerships with environmental groups and
government agencies to develop management plans that identify and monitor water
resource problems within the Basin. In 1995, the CTWSR co-published a report with
the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) entitled Restoring Oregon’s Deschutes River
that carried out a fairly comprehensive survey of the planning processes and
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institutions in the Basin that were engaged in addressing resource management
problems in the Basin. 26 The report’s authors concluded that:
…there is presently no single organization within the Deschutes River Basin
that provides an arena in which all of the region’s stakeholders can discuss
management of the Deschutes River and the other natural resources in the
Basin. None of the existing institutions has the regulatory authority, financial
resources, or institutional capacity to plan and manage the natural resources
in the Basin on an ecosystem basis (Moore, et al., 1995, p. 116).
The authors called for a “Basinwide entity” which would combine legal, fiscal,
institutional, and ultimately social capacity to develop and implement a
comprehensive adaptive management plan, and they concluded that an interstate
compact was probably the most appropriate institutional structure, particularly
given the need to coordinate the otherwise sovereign interests of the federal
government and the CTWSR (Moore, et al., 1995b).
Although an interstate compact has not materialized, Restoring Oregon’s
Deschutes River nevertheless laid out a strategic framework that has since informed
watershed management in the Basin. Perhaps most importantly, the EDF and
CTWSR argued that the issues of water quantity, water quality, and fishery health
were intertwined and needed to be addressed in a strategic and integrated fashion.
It proposed that the Basin-wide entity adopt market-driven policy mechanisms that

The planning processes and institutions that were operating in the Basin in 1995 included: The
Deschutes Basin Resources Committee, and advisory group to the City of Bend and the Deschutes
County Board of Commissioners; the Deschutes Mitigation and Enhancement Committee, charged
with reviewing ODFW’s mitigation and enhancement plans for the Central Oregon Irrigation
District’s hydroelectric project; the Deschutes Basin Alliance, an intergovernmental organization
formed by, and largely to serve the interests of, the 7 irrigation districts in the Upper Deschutes
Subbasin; the Deschutes Provincial Committee, part of President Clinton’s Forest Plan for the Pacific
Northwest, two separate Wild and Scenic planning processes, one for the Deschutes River and one for
the Metolius River.
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would expand opportunities for the private sector to more efficiently and effectively
participate in environmental restoration and protection. Such mechanisms
included: voluntary leases of irrigated land and transfers of water to restore
instream flows, incentives for water conservation, an exchange to trade pollutiondischarge permits or “credits,” and user fees to finance environmental restoration.
The report added that the science and policymaking around water quantity was
more developed and should receive greater initial emphasis until water quality
science and management, particularly concerning non-point source pollution, was
developed enough to support market-driven policy mechanisms. Many of the
report’s recommendations were ultimately realized in the Basin’s water
transactions programs that were implemented in the 2000’s, including the Oregon
Water Resource Commission’s (OWRC) Deschutes Ground Water Mitigation
Program and the Bonneville Power Administration’s Columbia Basin Water
Transactions Program (CBWTP).
The report owes much of its influence to the pioneering work of its authors,
including Zach Willey, a prominent economist who was then working at the EDF.
Willey collaborated with policy thinkers such as Jim Noteboom, then an attorney for
the CTWSR and a partner in the Bend-based law firm Karnopp, Petersen, Noteboom,
Hubel, Hansen & Arnett, Gail Achterman, an environmental lawyer who specialized
in natural resources and environmental law at the Stoel Rives law firm, and Bruce
Aylward, a world-renowned water economist who was recruited from Washington,
D.C. This group of innovative thinkers – starting with Willey and Noteboom, who
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were later joined by Achterman and Aylward around 2000 – began working on a
policy and legal framework that would incorporate voluntary, market-based policy
mechanisms to begin to address the Basin’s water quantity, quality, and fisheries
issues (Gail Achterman, personal correspondence, August 10, 2010). Willey and
Noteboom, along with Jim Manion of the CTWSR and Ron Nelson formerly with the
Central Oregon Irrigation District (COID), were especially pivotal in the formation,
in 1996, of the Deschutes River Conservancy (DRC), a non-profit organization set up
to handle water transactions for the express purpose of restoring instream flows in
the Deschutes River Basin. In many ways, the DRC grew out of the report’s
recommendations, and to this day its instream restoration strategy centers on water
leases, transfers, and conservation projects. Indeed, the DRC was a response to the
report’s call to form a working group that would identify and evaluate pilot water
leasing projects, and which would eventually evolve into a Basin-wide entity. As a
DRC staff member explains:
What we used to do was we would do pilot projects. We'd say, “What
happens if we save some water, we put it back in and get the state to certify?
Is that okay? Did anybody get hurt? What is our comfort level with that?”
Most of the things I described to DRC in the early phases as being research
and development.
Willey and his colleagues built on a task force comprised of the Basin’s 7
irrigation districts (the “Deschutes Basin Alliance”), the Oregon Water Resources
Congress, the BLM, the CTWSR, and the EDF to form the “Deschutes Basin Working
Group,” which subsequently received legislative authorization in 1996 to become
the DRC. Thus, it appears that the DRC was conceived by its founders very much
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with the Basin-wide entity in mind: a consensus-based, multi-stakeholder
organization that would concentrate on restoring instream flows through a Basinwide approach that remained at least attentive to the economic and social issues
related to water quality, habitat, and fishery health. This broader strategic approach
was shared by the DRC’s diverse board members like business leader Mike Hollern
and Stuart Shelk. The DRC’s board ties with the EDF and CTWSR, but also with BPA,
PGE, Bonneville Environmental Foundation (BEF) and the National Forest
Foundation (NFF) would later prove important in securing funding and support for
building a strategic partnership around a specific initiative.
Incremental Policy Experiments with Vision
More generally, the growing awareness of the Deschutes River Basin
watershed during the 1990’s helped to spur regional thinking and provided fertile
ground for the emergence of strategic partnerships. An important groundwater
study of the Basin carried out by the USGS and the OWRD in the late 1990’s revealed
that surface water flows were directly linked to the aquifer and aquifer discharge.
The study’s findings, famously captured and circulated in local newspapers and
other publications as the “blue whale” hydrograph – so-named because its shape
resembles a blue-whale – helped to raise awareness of the watershed-scale
processes. This awareness was given a new level of urgency when the OWRC,
obligated by the amended Scenic Waterway Act to regulate the impacts of new
groundwater use on the Lower Deschutes River, imposed a moratorium on new
groundwater permits. The study and ensuing moratorium effectively linked
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previously disparate issues ranging from fisheries to real estate development and
spurred various interests to begin to think of themselves as common stakeholders
in a broader watershed community. One important result was the OWRC’s
Deschutes Ground Water Mitigation Program (DGWMP), adopted in 2002, which
enabled developers and other landowners to secure temporary or permanent
groundwater permits by purchasing mitigation credits through an approved
mitigation bank such as the DRC that would finance water transfers, aquifer
recharge, storage release, and water conservation projects. In addition to the
DGWMP, several Columbia Basin-wide initiatives coincided to further stimulate
water banking in the Deschutes. In 2002, the Columbia Basin Water Transactions
Program enabled the BPA and the NWPCC to redirect previously unavailable money
through the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to fund water transactions while
the amended Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act
(“Northwest Power Act”) authorized funding instream restoration.
Achterman, then ED of the DRC, and her colleagues saw an opportunity in the
different interests of irrigators, municipalities, and environmentalists to create a
marketplace for buying and selling water credits that would meet those otherwise
competing interests. Achterman’s own outreach efforts with landowners and other
stakeholders helped to build readiness for participating in conservation and
restoration efforts that would support a water transactions program (Gail
Achterman, personal correspondence, August 10, 2010). As a DRC staff member

244

explains, the solution certainly had a technical aspect to it, but it ultimately
depended on the alignment of policy, social, and political concerns:
I don't know if we would have formed a bank, or had water existing without
the city's role. The districts would have never agreed to set up a bank simply
for river restoration. They ultimately were willing to set up a bank to provide
water to cities. Then we put the two concepts together. Essentially we have
two buyers for the bank. One is a restoration buyer that doesn't want to have
any other consumptive use. It just wants to retire water rights to increase
flows. We have another that wants to have a new consumptive use. They're
mitigation buyers who are very important. In fact the restoration efforts
really ride on the coattails of mitigation. Mitigation is what really drives
district boards to participate.
In addition, the NWPCC’s Deschutes Subbasin planning process, part of the
NWPCC’s Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, certainly has helped to
move the disparate conversations about Basin-wide management closer to a
concrete regional agenda. Undertaken in 2001, and subsequently reviewed every 3
years, the process convened a Deschutes Coordinating Group (DCG) that brought
together stakeholders representing environmental groups, businesses, watershed
councils, cities, counties, soil and water conservation districts, irrigation districts,
hydropower operators, and state and federal natural resource management
agencies (NWPCC, 2004). Moreover, the DRC served as the DCG’s fiscal agent,
underscoring the important role it has played in fostering Basin-wide management.
It was from the Deschutes Subbasin planning process that the Deschutes
Water Alliance (DWA) was formed in 2004 to plan for long-term watershed
management that would balance the needs of fisheries, agriculture, and
municipalities. In many respects, the DWA share with the DRC many of the
attributes of “Basinwide entity” first envisioned by the EDF and the CTWSR in their
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Restoring Oregon’s Deschutes River, suggesting that the Basin’s policy thinkers were
in some sense experimenting with different institutional structures to realize their
vision. The DWA in many ways grew out of the earlier task force: its current
organizational membership – the Deschutes Basin Board of Control (formerly
“Deschutes Basin Alliance”), CTWSR, DRC, and the Central Oregon Cities
Organization – overlaps strikingly with that of the former task force. As one DRC
staff member recalls:
One of the things that the DRC has really had to do a lot to implement the
water part of this proposal we worked on is to attempt to create something
we're now calling the Deschutes Water Alliance. It's an expansion on the
concept of the DRC board, which has representation from both private and
public stakeholders. When it gets to the public side, its representation is
limited because it's not trying to represent every county and every city, every
irrigation district, every public entity. It's trying to have a representative
sample of those even at the state and federal levels as well…We felt we
needed an additional forum where everybody's voice was at the table, all
seven irrigation districts and all eight cities, three counties, plus three state
agencies. For the moment we have left the federal agencies off knowing there
has to be engagement with them, but the purpose was mainly to see if there
was a way to get all these jurisdictions to come more on the same page with
the notion of: “How do we manage water more efficiently and more
effectively for mutual benefit in the basin?”, instead of the traditional way it
has been, which is each jurisdiction simply has its blinders and takes care of
its own. With a resource like water, it's all connected. You can't do something
in one area without affecting another.
In addition, the DRC has since transferred its water mitigation bank to the DWA.
Still, these institutional efforts to build a “Basin-wide entity” have been met
with persistent resistance from more parochial interests and concerns,
underscoring an ongoing tension between regionalist and more local approaches to
planning and management. As already discussed, this tension has taken particular
historical and geographical shape related to the urbanization of the Upper (and
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Middle) Deschutes River Subbasins. The primary interest blocs that comprise the
DWA – environmental, agricultural, and municipal – have much to gain from
regional cooperation in water resource management. Still, the DWA has struggled
to hold together its alliance. Irrigation districts, for instance, remain wary of ceding
their autonomy with respect to water use rights as their land and revenue base is
lost to urban development, particularly since the economic downturn. And there
are important internal differences, as, for example, in the competing claims and
interests of irrigators and irrigation districts. The upper basin’s senior water right
holders tend to hold land that is considered agriculturally less productive than their
junior counterparts farther north. The DRC has struggled to get senior water rights
holders to free up some of their water to irrigators to the north and thereby free up
reservoir water to better manage seasonal fluctuations in instream flows. Cities
such as Bend and Prineville also compete with one another for groundwater and
differ in their economic and environmental policy priorities. These differences have
been complicated by lingering scientific uncertainties about the physical, biological,
and ecological factors contributing to watershed “health,” legal uncertainties related
to the implications of Oregon’s water laws on water transactions, and institutional
uncertainties related to monitoring and compliance. As one DRC staff member
summarizes:
…it's all about the hydrology of the area and how the water is moving.
There's a whole technical side of looking at what happens when you move
the water right somewhere else. What are the impacts? Have you injured
anybody and looked at your return flows? Ultimately, based on a scientific
assessment, what should you be able to protect instream if you're moving
water to land for instream purpose? There was a lot of technical work there
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that goes into having the (Oregon) Water Resources Department feel
comfortable that its interpretations of the statute were not going to get them
into trouble. You've noticed an evolution of their thinking. Things we did in
the beginning, some of them they say, “We reserve the right to get smarter.”
The DWA tried to address a number of these concerns in a series of reports it
presented at a “Water Summit” in 2006. In 2007, it convened a “Deschutes Basin
Water Management Consensus Process” with the aim of finally developing a
comprehensive Basin-wide plan under which various water management efforts
would be coordinated. As noted in a summary from one of the early meetings:
Ultimately, there was consensus that while numerous tools exist for
addressing water management and restoration issues in the basin, these
tools aren’t integrated into an overall coordinated plan that is supported by
all. Even if the group were to commit to address specific problems as they
arose, as suggested by some, it wouldn’t have any context, in terms of an
agreed-on goal or goals, for doing so (Meeting Notes, 1/23/07).
By 2010, the DWA was struggling to hold a quorum, much less promulgate a unified
management plan for the Basin.
The DWA is not the only partnership whose trials illustrate the challenges of
developing a Basin-wide approach. During the first 5 or 6 years of its existence, the
DRC struggled to work with the various soil and water conservation districts, which
tended to view the DRC’s attempts to work with landowners and irrigators as
infringements on their domain. The DGWMP has similarly struggled to enjoy
broader support and participation. In 2005, the program was held up in appeals
court until its champions, including Martha Pagel of the water law practice group
Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, were able to get the program approved by the
Oregon Legislature later that year. Even so, a February 2008 report evaluating the
248

public’s perception of the program found that a cumbersome groundwater
permitting process, uneven enforcement, and a lack of information about the
program were negatively impacting participation in the program (Lieberherr,
2008). The DRC and its partners have worked with the OWRD to streamline water
rights transfers, but, as with many instances of administrative rule-making, these
changes have come about incrementally through collaborations on multiple
mitigation projects over a period of years. As one DRC staff member recalls:
Our job was not to create new policy but for the first time test existing
statutes and rules at the state level that had really never been tested. The
conserved water statute [authorizing the Allocation of Conserved Water
Program] went on the books in 1987 along with the Instream Water (Right)
Act. The first conservation projects didn't happen for ten years. Nobody had
really used this. Nobody even really knew how to use it. The laws were way
ahead of the social norms and the cultural acceptance, so nothing really
happened. Fifteen years later we're generating an enormous number of
project opportunities. We had to go through Oregon Water Resources
Department and say, “We have this conservation project. We have done this.
What are you going to do? What do we actually get? How does this work?
How does this really work?” That was the policy. It became more perfecting,
or some rule-making. They had the rule-making advisory committees. A
number of those were happening when I joined. It was really an
interpretation of, “How are we going to do this?” A lot of that happened in
the early days.
As part of implementation of an interstate compact, the NWPCC’s Deschutes
Subbasin Plan required federal agencies including the BPA to develop management
plans that adhered to it. Thus, the Deschutes Subbasin planning process was an
important context for the relicensing of the Pelton-Round Butte Dam Complex in
2001. Five years earlier, in 1996, PGE and CTWSR filed competing intents to renew
the Pelton-Round Butte Dam license. What followed draws a striking contrast to a
similar conflict that unfolded farther south in the Klamath Basin around the same
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time. In the latter case, the conflict between the Klamath Tribes, PGE, irrigators,
environmentalists, municipalities, and other stakeholders escalated into litigation,
threats of violence, and community division. But in the Deschutes River Basin, it
appears that the presence of local alliances, such as the aforementioned task force,
the Deschutes Basin Working Group, and eventually the DRC, had at least a
mitigating effect on the conflict between PGE and the CTWSR.27 Their presence
indicates that the Basin was already developing cross-cutting social and institutional
ties between the major interest blocs (and sectors) that in all likelihood facilitated
the formation of a partnership between PGE and CTWSR. The two parties
negotiated a settlement agreement to share the license in 2004, which FERC
approved the following year.
A key stipulation of the license agreement requires the dam complex to
address impacts to salmon and steelhead by restoring fish passage that connects
populations to their historic runs upstream of Lake Billy Chinook. Although the
license strictly speaking confines liabilities to the dams’ design and operation, the
legitimacy of the license, and of the partnership underlying it, became tied to the
successful reintroduction of salmon and steelhead in the Middle and Upper
Deschutes Subbasin. Reintroducing the populations after a greater-than-40 year
absence was going to require a comprehensive campaign to simultaneously address
fish passage, instream flow, water quality, and habitat. To support the effort, PGE
and the CTWSR established a Pelton-Round Butte Fund totaling $21.5 million to be
It is worth noting that the competing intents to renew the license were filed the same year that the
DRC was legislatively authorized.
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awarded through 2020 to support water rights leases and transfers and habitat
improvements to fish migration, spawning, and rearing grounds. The fund added to
a funding stream that included the CBWTP, the DGWMP, and various OWEB
programs. This funding served to reinforce Basin-wide partnerships like the DRC
and DWA while infusing into these partnerships a new emphasis on salmon and
steelhead reintroduction. Moreover, the funding stream was beginning to catalyze
the formation of partnerships specifically organized around the reintroduction
effort.
Contingent Shaping of the Reintroduction Narrative
By the mid-2000’s, then, the institutional context of the Deschutes River
Basin was such that, while no Basin-wide entity or framework was in place to
organize regional watershed management, there were a number of umbrella
organizations, the DWA and DRC in particular, that provided a social network of
personal and institutional ties which could be mobilized around more specific
opportunities, usually on a more local or subbasin level. In the context of
diminishing rural economic opportunities and increasing state and federal fiscal
constraints, alternative funding streams such as the Pelton-Round Butte Fund were
beginning to exert greater influence on local watershed efforts through granting
criteria that established parameters on the purpose and scope of efforts and
redirected resources through matching contribution initiatives.
Thus, for example, in 2006, the BEF entered into a partnership agreement
with the Upper Deschutes and Crooked River watershed councils committing
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$300,000 to implement and coordinate a 10-year Model Watershed Program (MWP)
focusing on restoration and monitoring of three subbasins: the lower Crooked
River, Whychus Creek, and Lake Creek. The latter 2 watersheds are considered
especially important for the successful reintroduction of steelhead and Chinook
salmon, while Lake Creek, a reach of the Metolius River, itself a tributary of the
Deschutes River, was also one of only two reaches in Oregon that historically
supported sockeye salmon (the “Suttle Lake sockeye”).
But the BEF MWP was by no means the only partnership entity. In fact,
urbanization and immigration to the Basin brought with them an explosion in the
number of local, regional, and national non-profit and private organizations working
on issues tied in one way or another to water. The prevalence of organizations,
many of them advocacy in their orientation, exacerbated the lack of regional
coordination and presented challenges for organizing higher-level partnerships, as
more entities competed for overlapping funding streams. For example, the Upper
Deschutes River Coalition (UDRC) consists primarily of landowners and
neighborhood associations who focus their efforts on management of, and raising
awareness around, wildfires and habitat in the subbasin. It emphasizes that the
reintroduction efforts should not be at the expense of private property, real estate,
and rural economic development interests. In the context of the struggles to define
the Basin’s management priorities, the UDRC represents an alternative perspective
to the dominant reintroduction narrative. Over the past few years the UDRC has
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also received funding from OWEB, as well as from BLM, the Central Oregon
Irrigation District, and the NFF, among others.
The emergence of these partnerships – and, by extension, the policy context
that favored their formation – was neither purely grassroots nor manipulated by
higher-level policy actors. Instead, it appears that policy actors and coalitions
across multiple levels of governance engaged in a kind of mutual adjustment of
ideas and practices as policy-relevant events and conversations, many of them
exogenous to the process, unfolded. One such catalyzing event was the relicensing
of the Pelton-Round Butte Dam complex. The competing intents by PGE and CTWSR
and the resulting mitigation mandates could, by themselves, have had the effect of
further splintering the Basin community, as happened in the Klamath Falls Basin.
But the subsequent Pelton Round-Butte Fund dedicating $21.5 million to water
rights and habitat improvements was a seismic event that expanded opportunities
for collaboration and helped to recast watershed management in the Upper
Deschutes in terms of salmon and steelhead reintroduction. As one of the partners
of the Upper Deschutes River Partnership puts it:
When the re-licensing settlement agreement was signed with the Warm
Springs Tribe, General Electric, and all of the folks that were involved in the
re-licensing, it became clear at that time that there was going to be significant
funding associated, and that being habitat funding associated with the
reintroduction effort. That is what really galvanized what you see as the
Partnership today. That is what it was. Simply the availability of funding and
that's kind of a crass statement, but for us, again, the funding helps us
accomplish conservation that we wouldn't otherwise be able to do.
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We may well ask whether the relicensing accelerated the conversations and
experiments about basin-wide (or at least subbasin-wide) management or whether
those conversations and experiments helped to frame the relicensing in the larger
context of salmon and steelhead reintroduction. The 2001 relicensing of the PeltonRound Butte dam complex coincided with the NWPCC Subbasin Planning Process
and, more generally, with a heightened awareness of the plight of wild Pacific
salmon and an increased interest in finding local and collaborative ways, as
championed by Gov. Kitzhaber in his Oregon Plan and similar initiatives, to address
the state’s growing environmental issues. On the other hand, the case will be made
that boundary spanners, initially working through a partnership between the EDF
and the CTWSR and later through mediating organizations like the DRC and DWA,
saw the concurrence of the Subbasin Planning Process and the dam relicensing as an
opportunity to join 2 policy discourses, one centered on the substantive issue of
salmon recovery and the other stemming from the results-based environmental
governance movement that was by then emerging. Gradually a new policy agenda
emerged proposing to reintroduce salmon and steelhead in the Upper Deschutes
River Subbasin through local, consensus-based and market-driven solutions. The
new policy context defined a specific need – the reintroduction of salmon and
steelhead in the Upper Deschutes Subbasin – which favored innovative partnerships
that could coordinate restoration of instream flow, water quality, and habitat on a
watershed scale. But the development of this policy context was not strictly agentdriven. Historical records and informant testimony captured in interviews reveals
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that these boundary spanning individuals and organizations changed in the process
of shaping the policy context. The engagement of funders, organizations, and
constituents in novel contexts like the DRC, DWA, the dam relicensing, and the
Subbasin Planning Processes was transformative for the participants. For
approximately 10 years, between circa 1995 and 2005, policy conversations and
experiments facilitated the gradual alignment of expectations so that, by the time
the Pelton Round-Butte Fund was formed, organizations like the DRC which had
participated in those conversations and experiments, were in a position to respond.
But the convergence of innovative policy practices and funding environment
didn’t stop there. In the absence of a strong regional policy framework, there was
more room for local boundary spanners to define the specific shape of these
partnerships and indeed to influence the policy context itself in ways that have
tended to reinforce the direction of social learning in the Upper Deschutes Subbasin.
The 10-year Model Watershed agreement between BEF and the 2 watershed
councils is a case in point. Furthermore, there is some evidence suggesting that as
partnership experiments like it produce promising results, they are spurring the
formation of partnerships with a similar strategic focus and approach. In 2007,
OWEB launched a Special Investment Partnership (SIP) Program that resulted in a
SIP agreement between OWEB, The Upper Deschutes Watershed Council (UDWC),
the Crooked River Watershed Council (CRWC), DRC, and the Deschutes Land Trust
(DLT) that committed $4 million in dedicated funds over 2 years toward the
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restoration of the Whychus Creek watershed.28 Early successes in the
reintroduction efforts have already attracted attention and additional funding to the
partners. As we shall see, these funding initiatives and ensuing media and
institutional attention have tended to reinforce the collaboration between and
among these organizations and their partners working on reintroduction-related
issues in the Upper Deschutes Subbasin. At the same time, many issues like rural
economic development, which are of course part of the watershed story, have
tended to lose visibility to the extent that they remain removed, in policy discourses
anyway, from reintroduction efforts.
But these partnership experiments have also impacted the funding
environment that supports them. In some very significant ways, both the Deschutes
MWP and Deschutes SIP have become models for their sponsors as they look to
reproduce their success in other basins. There has been, in other words, a kind of
convergence of innovative partnership practices in the Upper Deschutes River
Subbasin and a more “global” institutional ecology of watershed management.
Furthermore, this convergence has operated through, and on, a vast network of
policy actors that has enabled divergent practices to be compared and progressively
aligned to one another. In the process, the network itself has changed. Thus, the
implementation of their respective partnership agreements has recast the
relationship between, for example, the BEF and OWEB at the same time that the
links between the partnering entities have acquired a new dimension. This study
The DLT uses a strategy of land acquisition for conservation purposes that is modeled after water
trusts like the DRC and Oregon Water Trust (OWT).
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proposes to use the informal label “Upper Deschutes River Partnership” (UDRP) to
refer to this new dimension of coordination centered on the reintroduction of
salmon and steelhead in the Upper Deschutes River Subbasin.29 Figure 15 is a map
of the Upper Deschutes Subbasin area where the UDRD has focused their work.

Figure 15: Upper Deschutes River Basin (Source: OWEB)

The moniker is intended as an analytic construct to help make sense of a particular
set of partnership processes. It should be noted that informants in interviews never

I use the term “Upper Deschutes” to refer to the drainage area upstream of Pelton-Round Butte
Dam complex and Lake Billy Chinook. In many literatures, this area is further divided into the Middle
Deschutes Subbasin, typically defined as the drainage area between Lake Billy Chinook and Bend, and
Upper Deschutes Subbasin, typically defined as the drainage area generally south of Bend.

29
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referred to an “Upper Deschutes Partnership,” per say, although informants would
sometimes refer to “the partnership” when discussing collaborations around the
reintroduction effort. However, the term is meant to suggest that there are
partnership processes that transcend the specific partnership agreements (and
perhaps the awareness of policy actors) that nevertheless animate and give a
definite shape to the imagination and practices of a cluster of policy actors working
in the Upper Deschutes Subbasin. The “Upper Deschutes Story” of the salmon and
steelhead reintroduction is being recounted with greater frequency and with
greater institutional salience, and there is evidence to suggest that actors are
capitalizing on it to create new opportunities for themselves and their partners.
There seems to be something like an “Upper Deschutes River Partnership,” which
has achieved a currency in certain policy circles. But the convergence into a
coherent Upper Deschutes River Partnership is by no means complete or assured.
In many ways, we find evidence of the same sorts of struggles to balance different
interests and needs under a common Subbasin management vision framework as
we do in the larger Basin. Unless or until the larger Basin community’s narrative
achieves greater coherence, the fates of the two stories will probably be tied to one
another.
Formation of the Upper Deschutes River Partnership
A Programmatic Context Emerges
The twin convergence of innovative policy practices and policy context – one
at the Basin level and one at the Subbasin level – is in many respects encapsulated in
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the story of the Deschutes Land Trust’s “Back to Home Waters Program.” Like the
DRC, the DLT had board ties with both PGE and CTWSR, as well as with other
important entities involved in the negotiations, including ODFW, and thus served as
an informal, albeit important, mediating organization during the dispute over
competing intents to renew the dam complex license. Led by its charismatic and
visionary Executive Director, Brad Chalfant, the DLT launched a program in 2001
called “Back to Home Waters,” whose name evoked the image of salmon and
steelhead returning to their historic spawning and rearing grounds. The
development of the program coincided with both the relicensing negotiations
between PGE and the CTWSR and the NWPCC’s Deschutes Subbasin Planning
Process. The DLT’s ties to both processes meant that it was influenced by them. But
conversations leading up to the Back to Home Waters program actually preceded
both the Deschutes Subbasin Plan in 2001 and the settlement agreement in 2004,
which suggests that the DLT became an important programmatic context for getting
the reintroduction of salmon and steelhead on the Basin’s policy agenda. Indeed, as
one DLT staff person relates, the DLT’s involvement in the development of this
agenda dates back to the mid-1990’s when, anticipating the dam complex
relicensing, the CTWSR and EDF articulated an alternative vision in their Restoring
the Oregon Deschutes River that soon led to the formation of the DRC. Policy
entrepreneurs behind the vision became keenly aware that the relicensing and
Deschutes Subbasin Planning Processes represented a unique opportunity to
leverage mitigation obligations on BPA, PGE, and others for funding their work:
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Those efforts began in probably 1995 with the knowledge that those dams
would need to be re-licensed. At that point in time, shortly thereafter a
number of the groups that are now involved in the partnership began
working either in a focused way, which was the case with us, or […] they
were dabbling in reintroduction or focused on it. I think the Land Trust was
probably more focused on it. We were more involved in the actual licensing
issues. Early on in about 2000 saw the potential for bringing all of these
groups together. At the time we didn't have a concept of what all these
groups meant. But bringing everyone together to focus on this
reintroduction effort, and the opportunities we thought it would bring in
terms of accomplishing conservation and restoration work. […] So we
initiated in 2001, sort of formally, as formal as anything we do in terms of our
conservation work, a program we call “Back To Home Waters,” which is
exactly that: it's conserving habitat and restoring habitat to support the
reintroduction of salmon and steelhead.
Although Back to Home Waters was ostensibly a DLT program, one can discern the
influence, if not the direct hand, of the CTWSR, EDF, and DRC in the development of
the program.
Chalfant hired Brad Nye to head the program in 2001. Here too, social ties
played an important role. Nye had worked previously with the CTWSR and served
on the Upper Deschutes Watershed Council (UDWC), while his wife, Lisa Nye, had
served as the DRC’s first Executive Director. Although the DLT had worked
sporadically with both the DRC and UDWC, the Back to Home Waters program
catalyzed their working relationships with one another and with close funding
partners around a new focus on salmon and steelhead reintroduction. Until then,
many of the young organizations that were just starting to work in the Basin
struggled to find a niche around which to organize their efforts. By all accounts, this
appears to have been the case for the DRC, DLT, and the UDWC. The lack of strategic
focus meant that programs tended to overlap among the organizations. For
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example, all 3 organizations carried out various kinds of restoration work. As a
result of this programmatic overlap, the organizations tended to regard each other
as competitors for limited funding. A DRC staff person recalls:
I also noticed that we had a Land Trust that viewed itself in various sundry
ways. It protected land. It did habitat restoration on its land. They each had
water rights. They had water. They were an organization that did
conservation in a specific but also general way. They talked about themselves
in a more general way. I noticed watershed councils were very technical and
very interested, and very good at habitat restoration. I looked at the DRC,
which had been a very innovative and creative organization. People
described my predecessors as basically innovating. Throwing stuff against
the wall, what would stick, what wouldn't? We did carbon sequestration, we
were going to do water leasing, water banking. We had all sorts of innovative
concepts. It was much more of a research and development group, which had
developed a couple of solid programs. […] We had overlapping programs, not
fully but enough.
The Back to Home Waters program started to change that. The first project,
started in 2000, was the land purchase and conservation easement centered on
Camp Polk Meadow on Whychus Creek that was partially funded by PGE’s Habitat
Restoration Fund. In what would become a model for future work, the Land Trust
proceeded to lease and permanently transfer water rights to both the DRC and the
Oregon Water Trust for instream flow. It’s clear that from the very start the DLT
envisioned the Back To Home Waters program as the basis for building a strategic
partnership around land conservation, restoring instream flow, and habitat
restoration. The DLT staff person continues:
An example of that is our Camp Polk property we purchased in 2000. We did
a water transaction on it, as we mentioned, to get water into the stream
knowing that was important with the DRC. From the time we bought the
property we were looking for someone to restore it…
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But finding the right partners to carry out the actual habitat restoration initially
proved difficult:
...that was a challenge I faced in the Back To Waters thing. I had talked to
facilitators back in 2001 about "This is what we want to do; how should we
do it?" The obstacle then was the list of partners we were looking at was
very imposing. There was probably 20 or 30 groups. The challenge was how
"Do we get a core group?"
Coordination would in some senses be easier with fewer partners, but it would also
be important for the partnership to be sufficiently representative of relevant
interests. The UDWC, like most watershed councils, specializes in watershed
restoration projects, such as removing culverts, stabilizing streambanks, restoring
channels and wetlands, and improving habitat. The UDWC seemed a likely
candidate, given its charter and its local ties to both the DLT and the DRC, but it
lacked sufficient capacity. The PGE Habitat Restoration Fund, and later the PeltonRound Butte Fund, provided critical support to build that capacity. The Camp Polk
Meadow project on Whychus Creek established a model of coordination – the DLT
purchasing land, the DRC leasing or transferring water rights, and the UDWC
carrying out the restoration – that would eventually form the framework for a
strategic partnership between the 3 organizations.
From New Friendships Comes a New Partnership
The simultaneous hiring of key managers at all 3 organizations also shifted
the interpersonal dynamics and catalyzed the development of the partnership. In
2001, the same year Brad Nye started heading the Back to Waters Program at the
DLT, the UDWC brought on board Ryan Houston to lead the organization as its
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Executive Director, while Tod Heisler succeeded Achterman as the DRC’s new ED 3
years later in 2004.30 As new hires, the 3 men were less tied to the historical politics
of the organizations and more inclined to view the reintroduction efforts with a
fresh set of eyes. As one of them recalls:
The writing was on the wall that the fish would be coming back at some
point. With that was a historic opportunity that many places in the West
never get to work with. So for people interested in rivers, watershed, and
fisheries, the chance to restore populations of fish that have been gone for
almost half a century, it's really exciting. It's career changing kind of work.
With that we also knew, and this is the self interest side I think is important,
we also knew there would be a ton of opportunity for each organization to
better implement its mission, be more successful because there would be
more money available. There would be funders, partners. People would see
this historic opportunity and want to be part of it. We basically said – and
these were informal coffee/beer kind of conversations between Land Trust,
DRC, Watershed Counsel where we said – “We've been fighting for a long
time. Thankfully some of us are new so we don't carry the baggage of
fighting as much. We carry some of that baggage but not as much of it. This
opportunity is coming and if we don't get ourselves together, and grow up,
and be professional, and work out our differences, we are going to squander
this opportunity.”
Accounts differ on the degree of “fighting” between the organizations that
preceded the new hires. Regardless, personality appears have been a factor, since in
many ways the strategic partnership grew out of these informal meetings between 5
individuals: Chalfant, Houston, Heisler, and Scott McCaulou, DRC’s Program
Director. Many testify that Tod Heisler, especially, was inclined to see the benefits
of a strategic partnership, in part due to the organization he represented, but this
proclivity also stems in part from his own personality, as several colleagues report:
I also think Tod thinks more on a partnership level than the rest of us,
probably by his personal nature but also by the nature of the way they do
30

Achterman left the DRC in July, 2003 and Aylward served as interim ED until Heisler’s hire in 2004.
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their business. He's got a lot of different partners. He understands the need
to work together expanding that sort of energy.
My relatively brief time here interacting with Tod Heisler with the DRC, he's
pretty broad-visioned and probably looked at “How can we bring this
together? What different strengths do different organizations have to do
that?” I would expect he would have been…there was a lot of behind-thescenes stuff; I think he's a pretty big player.
The timing of the intersections of the arcs of these men’s careers probably also
favored institutional change, since all of them were relatively young or still building
their careers.
In 2002, the DRC and UDWC moved into the same office complex in Bend.
The close physical proximity of staff facilitated the kind of impromptu exchanges on
which deeper relationships of trust are built. As the trust grew, so did the social
learning: communication became more open, revealing problems that had not been
apparent before. As staff members of both organizations recount, it became
apparent that the 2 organizations shared many interests and even functions, but
that this overlap was haphazard and even counterproductive:
About the same time in 2002 the Watershed Council and DRC decided to
move in together and share this office. Things started to change. We started
to say, “We have to work together. We have to figure this out. This
competitive nature, this stepping on toes, this jockeying for position…is not
smart. We're all trying to do the same thing; we're competing with each
other.” That was the context.
We also had this Deschutes, DRR, Deschutes Repair and Restoration effort.
We had a program, one of our key program people who sat right next door,
we're all in the same building. It took me a little while to figure out there was
social coordination in the office, everybody liked each other. There was some
professional engagement, but very little of it was very meaningful.
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It is also undoubtedly the case that the physical proximity placed a greater premium
on nurturing the social relationships since any issues in those relationships had
more immediate consequences for the parties involved. At any rate, interviews
reveal that Heisler and Houston started having conversations in 2003 exploring
ways to work together in a more strategic and coordinated fashion. One of them
recalls:
We put forward the notion, and the timing of this was critical, we knew that
through the re-licensing of the Pelton Roundbutte, there was now an
obligation by the Tribes and by PGE to mediate. They were spending a huge
amount of money on a fish passage facility up there at their dam. They were
also investing $20-$25 million that was spread out over 10 to 15 years on
habitat development and restoration for the reintroduction of steelhead and
salmon. We knew those were about to happen. Those were about to be
funded. I put forward the idea that we're going to be so much better off if we
go together, if we look like, if we're playing together, if we have a joint
strategy. We know the outcomes we're seeking. We understand the roles
each of our institutions play. We can put that forward as an initiative rather
than us going in with our projects, our dots on the map. Our project over
here, this project over here, which ultimately looked like competitive efforts
where we're disassociated and with our own blinders on we put our own
projects through a project window. I said, “We have to look at this not as a
project window but as an opportunity to drive a major initiative with funding
that is about to come on. Basically we can make the pie much bigger by
telling a much bigger story and having a much larger vision, and still being
able to drill it down to the pieces.”
In many ways, Houston served as a natural catalyst of the initial meetings,
since he had by then fostered closer working relationships with both the DRC and
the DLT through various restoration projects and was therefore in a position to set
up meetings between Heisler, McCaulou, Chalfant and Nye. The first meetings were
somewhat awkward, as one of the participants recalls:
It was [the 5 men] literally just sitting around figuring that stuff out. It was
just classic. They say you never want to see laws or sausage made; you don't
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want to see partnerships being formed. It was a lot of talking about things
and figuring things out, saying, “Your organization currently does this. What
you're doing is really offensive to us because it treads on our territory. We
need you to stop doing that.” It was that kind of thing.
For all their enthusiasm and vision, relatively unshackled by historical baggage,
these boundary spanners still had to work through many issues related to
institutional differences and conflicts between the organizations and constituents
they represented. Despite the significant programmatic overlap, the organizations
differed in their histories, missions, and operations. The DLT was a privately funded
advocacy organization answerable to a distinct interest group concerned with land
conservation and preservation. In contrast, both the DRC and the UDWC had been
formed to represent a broad range of stakeholders to tackle the many controversial
and context-sensitive aspects of water and watershed management. Almost by their
very nature, they tended to be more process-oriented than the DLT, which only
needed to answer to their private community of members and funders. The DRC
and UDWC often found the DLT’s independent streak frustrating, as, for example,
when the DLT decided its administrative independence was more important than
any potential cost-savings associated with moving into the same building with the
other 2 organizations.
But the rub ran in multiple directions. The DLT, for instance, perceived the
DRC as too “development-friendly” in its water transactions program, and it argued
that many of those transactions had the unintended effect of reducing restoration
opportunities by precipitating the breakup and development of streamside
farmland. In addition, the DRC had served as a funding entity distributing federal
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appropriation and other dollars to various conservation and restoration projects
that were, in many cases, carried out by the DRC itself. This created an ambiguous
relationship between the UDWC and the DRC, which functioned alternately as both
funder and competitor to it.
But, despite these significant differences in both the missions and
approaches of the organizations, the staff tended to share a common vision around
restoring and conserving the basin’s natural resources and wildlife, as a staff person
at the DLT recalls:
We all work differently. The Land Trust is a privately funded and much more
private entity. The [Upper Deschutes] Watershed Counsel has, on its board,
county commissions and those sorts of things. Their thing is to pick across
the social and political landscape to get broad representation. We try to do
that too but it's not anything formal. We want the most effective board we
can have. The DRC is similar to the Watershed Counsel in terms of that they
need to have a board comprised of various interests. In that sense the
organizations are different but on a staff level we pretty much do the same
sort of thing. […] On a staff level we all speak the same language; we all have
the same interests conservation-wise in most cases.
Another key factor in overcoming these differences appears to have been the
somewhat serendipitous confluence of motivations drawing the parties to the
negotiating table. All 3 relatively young organizations were struggling to define
their missions and build their capacities, and this soul-searching was catalyzed by
the arrival of new staff in management positions. Houston had already approached
the BEF to fund the DRWC efforts to restore the Whychus Creek in what would have
been Oregon’s first Model Watershed Program, but the BEF decided the DRWC did
not have sufficient capacity. Nye had approached some professional facilitators to
put together a partnership of organizations to carry out the Back to Home Waters
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Program and got a similar response. And finally, Heisler soon found himself
struggling to explain to his finance department and board why the DRC carried
unused funds. This, in turn, stimulated some critical reflection, and Heisler came to
the conclusion that the problem was a lack of social capital in the DRC’s relations
with key stakeholders, especially the irrigators, which prevented successful
completion of many of their projects.
Thus, when the men finally sat down to discuss ways to work more
effectively together, each was already motivated to do so and was thinking of ways
their organization might benefit from such a partnership. As already stated, the
early meetings were not always pleasant. But it was perhaps precisely this frank
communication – combined with a demonstrated intention to listen and learn from
one another – that fostered enough trust among the managers to take some chances
in changing their own organizations. Thus, for example, Heisler recognized that the
DRC would actually be more effective if it transferred much of its restoration work
to the UDWC. As one of the participants of those early discussions recounts:
Each organization had to do a little bit of reflection on itself and decide,
“What is my niche? What do I really want to do given that I am now
somewhat accountable to these other parties? I need to pay attention to what
these other people think.” The DRC shifted some of their programs, and they
canceled one of their programs that is a program that we do. It had been an
overlap. In the nonprofit world overlap means competition. It had been an
overlap and to their credit they said, “We're not the best ones to do this. You
guys are. We're going to cancel our program.” They not only canceled their
program, but they gave us some of the money they had in their program
because they wanted to invest in us being successful. There were things like
that where the boundary spanner in that case might be someone like Tod
(Heisler), who recognized it's in his own organization’s long term interests
and the watershed’s long term interests for him to cancel a program and give
money to someone else. I think it's pretty cool in terms of that situation
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where he saw 10 or 12 chess moves ahead and knew it was a good thing to
do, even though the short term meant, “cancel program and give up money.”
Heisler set to work reorienting the DRC from a largely research and development
organization that funded pilot projects ranging from carbon sequestration trading to
habitat restoration to one focused primarily on restoring instream flow. At the same
time, he envisioned the DRC “outsourcing” much of its work on water quality and
habitat restoration through strategic partnerships. And because a consensus view
was by then emerging that instream flow was an important determinant of water
quality, Heisler could still make the case that the DRC had not abandoned its core
concern for water quality. Heisler approached his board on the matter and
proposed to add a key criterion – is there genuine stakeholder buy-in? – for
selecting projects and programs. By modifying the DRC’s project filter, Heisler
proceeded to change his organization’s boundary condition. What is striking is that
Heisler not only articulated a problem, but he proposed a solution which the board
could then deliberate on. When the board approved the strategic change, new
opportunities for collaboration emerged. As a DRC staff member recalls:
All the time was spent by our staff and us saying, “How do we now take
things we piloted and scale them? Can we get the agreements? When we do,
this will turn absolutely around and we will have too many projects chasing
too few dollars.” That is where we are today.
Convergence on Multiple Governance Levels
It remained for the managers to make their case to their respective boards,
and initially there was pushback from some of the board members. At least initially,
the ongoing negotiations around the relicensing and Subbasin Planning processes
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created a context of tension if not distrust for the boards, particularly given the
DRC’s and DLT’s historical affiliations with the CTWSR and PGE, respectively. More
generally, there was a natural inclination for the boards to want to protect their
respective programs and interests, as one of the managers recalls:
There were plenty of side conversations and back conversations expressing
frustration, and “Why do we have to give up this much? Can't they give up
more?” All that negotiating kind of stuff. In the end, when we said – “Historic
opportunity, we don't want to blow it by bickering with each other. We have
to come together; in order to come together we have to give up a little” – I
think they got that.
It is to the credit of the organization’s boards that they were willing and able to
reflect on their core purposes and cede some of their functions and potential
funding streams to better realize them. This was especially the case for the multistakeholder boards of the DRC and UDWC, where social learning within the
organizations had gradually produced board members who were more inclined to
think in terms of relationships and collaboration. A staff member of the DRC
explains:
We have board members who go to Salem on a regular basis. They're on
opposite sides of the issues lobbying hard for the legislature to create new
policy statute where they're in absolute and utter complete disagreement.
They come to our board and now they actually behave themselves and they
know their job is not to go in and try to grandstand, or make a point on
principle, or try to persuade somebody to go down some narrow path. Their
job is to listen to other people and to say, “Am I okay? Is this a way I think is
an acceptable way for us to resolve, work on a long standing issue?” That
turns a whole different way of viewing things. It's been remarkably
successful. It's allowed us to do what I was saying before, which was to take
non-agreement, the whole too many dollars chasing too few real projects –
it's allowed us to reach the larger universe, a larger bounds of agreement,
which then enables implementation at a larger scale.
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Furthermore, as the managers continued to meet with one another, their messages
gradually became more consistent and reinforcing. As one of the managers
remembers:
I think what we all did, quite honestly, is we all were staff at our
organizations, we all had to sell this stuff to our board. I saw how Tod sold
some of his. I saw how I presented some of mine. I didn't see much of how
the [partnering organization] presented theirs, but presumably everybody
had to sell it and market it in a way that fit with their constituency. I think
what I remember Tod saying is, “We're here for the whole, and in order for
us to be successful, our partners need to be successful. This is a program that
has kind of been a ball-and-chain for us. It's kind of been a pain-in-the-butt,
so it's appropriate for us to cancel it.” If it was their best program, their
favorite program, they probably wouldn't have done it. They were somewhat
relieved to be done with it. I think for all of us the main thing that we shared
with our boards was all of our boards are committed to collaboration, in
spirit. In practice it's always challenging because you have personalities,
baggage, politics and all that. I think when you stand in front of your board
and you say, “I'm working with several organizations, we're going to gain a
lot but we have to give up a little,” any board is going to go along with that.
They have to. That's their job is to rise above it in that environment. Frankly
I think a lot of people were tired of the bickering. It's kind of embarrassing
from a professional standpoint. It's just silly. Why should the water people
be arguing with the fish people? We're all on the same team. I think
everybody had that in the back of their mind: “Come on guys, this is pretty
ridiculous.” It all sort of came together and gelled. I think the driving force
was that opportunity and the fact that everybody knew they would be better
off if they joined.
The partnership required of course internal changes in the organizations that
introduced a fair amount of stress and uncertainty for staff as well. The manager
leading the partnership effort had to learn how to communicate these changes to
staff, making judgments about what to communicate to whom and when. It entailed
the development of a particular set of skills for boundary spanning downward from
high-level strategy to day-to-day operations.
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These talks coincided in 2003 with the DLT’s capital campaign to raise $3
million to purchase a 1,240 acre forest tract from Weyerhauser Industries that was
one of the last tracts along a critical reach of the Metolius River still in private hands.
The capital campaign mobilized critical matching support from the NFWF, OWEB,
and the Orvis Company, among others, and enabled the DLT to exercise their
purchase option just before it expired later that year. The resulting Metolius
Preserve created an opportunity for the DLT, DRC, and its partners to begin largescale monitoring and restoration work to prepare for the reintroduction of salmon
and steelhead. Here too, capacity became an issue, and it took some time for the
DLT to convince the UDWC to take on such a large project. But once again, the
nascent ties among the organization’s new management proved pivotal in moving
the organization’s board toward a partnership, as one of the DLT staffers explains:
I know we went to their board meeting and suggested they adopt the
Metolius River as part of their jurisdiction because of its importance. We did
things like that. We never really pulled the partnership together. I can show
you. I worked on it with Ryan (Houston). I think I probably presented to his
board flow charts of what is “Back To Home Waters” and how do we all fit
into it?
The “Back to Home Waters” Program provided a programmatic context for the
development of the partnership between the 3 organizations, both providing
opportunities to test ideas as well as to formulate new ones to discuss. For Heisler,
a key concern of outsourcing overlapping functions was ensuring the UDWC and the
CRWC had the capacity they needed to carry out the restoration functions that the
DRC was now ceding to them. The partners saw an opportunity to extend DRC’s role
as fiscal agent by formalizing administrative and funding agreements with each of
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the watershed councils that would essentially “seed” the capacity for writing grants
to sustain their own capacity over time. One of the partners explains that the DRC
and the watershed councils developed individual MOU’s that reflected the unique
objectives and conditions of each relationship while serving a larger strategic
objective:
It starts with all of our highest level objectives of our mission to restore flow
and improve water quality, which really requires restoration at a high level
in the watershed. You break those higher level objectives down to these
pieces. You see it's the integration of them that gets you there. That is level
one, the partnership. And then you can now go into each segment and see a
whole other universe. My universe is very different from Ryan's and very
different from the Land Trust’s.
As the partnership grew, the reconfiguration of relationships at the staff level
translated to broader institutional changes at the board levels. For board members,
each successful iteration of the partnership gave them more political cover to span
their own boundaries at higher governance levels. An UDWC staffer explains:
I think that because in the “Deschutes Partnership” we started working
together and we started reconciling some of the competitive issues and
things like that between the partners that existed in the late 90s and early
2000, I think what that did to the next tier of people, those stakeholders,
communities of interest, I think what it did was it sort of released them from
taking sides. The Land Trust connected into its network, DRC its network,
the Watershed Counsel its network. If the Land Trust, DRC, and Watershed
Counsel were bickering with each other, inevitably those networks that were
connected into those boards and were sort of staunch supporters of that
organization kind of took sides, but kind of had to. They were like “I'm a
founding board member of X organization, and so this organization is right.”
Once the bickering went away and we said, “We're working together,” I think
that went away. The relationship between that outer network and the core
organizations, I think improved. Then I think when you step outside the
nonprofits and you have those folks out in that network, I would assume
their relationships evolved a little bit. There was no longer this allegiance
situation.
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It is noteworthy that improving board relations coincided with both the successful
relicensing negotiations between PGE and the CTWSR and the NWPCC’s Subbasin
Planning processes. This study did not examine the precise causal relationship, if
any, between the 3 processes. However, we have evidence to suggest a convergence
occurring between staff and board level relations and practices; it is reasonable to
suspect that a similar convergence was occurring between the boards and these
higher level negotiations. However and whenever it started, the warming of
relations between the major interest blocs, once these networks were connected,
appears to have been self-reinforcing.
The convergence accelerated in 2004 when the partnership work between
the 3 organizations got the attention of Todd Reeve at BEF. As already mentioned,
Houston had already unsuccessfully approached the BEF about selecting Whychus
Creek as a Model Watershed. But in the intervening 2 or 3 years, 2 critical
developments now improved the chances for such a Model Watershed: first, it was
by then apparent that a relicensing settlement agreement between PGE and the
CTWSR was going to feature a significant initiative (and funding streams) to
reintroduce salmon and steelhead to the Middle- and Upper Deschutes River
Subbasin; and second, the UDWC could point to an incipient, grassroots partnership
with the DRC, DLT, and CRWC that was already resulting in significant restoration
projects in reaches like Whychus Creek and the Metolius River tributary. Later that
year, Reeve told Houston and Heisler that he thought that the partnership was ready
to apply to form a BEF Model Watershed. In an important instance of boundary
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spanning, Houston invited the CRWC to join in the application, and Jason Dedrick,
ED of the CRWC, set to work planning how to include the Crooked River Subbasin in
the Model Watershed Program.
It is clear from interviews that a grant deadline for receiving 10 years of
support to carry out a comprehensive watershed scale restoration spurred the
partners to accelerate their strategic planning and partnership development, as one
of the partners recalls:
In a way what it all came down to was we needed a deadline to kind of get
our act together. It's one thing to talk about working together, it's another
thing to actually work together. […] Then what happened is they [BEF] saw
the reintroduction of the fish happening. They saw this partnership forming,
and BEF started saying, “Maybe this is right.” They started saying, “We think
it's time for you guys to apply.”[…] What we had to do at that point was
produce something and what BEF said to us is, “As part of your application
we want to see a ten-year plan of work for what you guys are doing
collectively.” We looked at each other and said, “There is our deadline.” We
developed what we call the Watershed Restoration Matrices, which were
basically a ten-year work plan for what we would do collectively in Whychus
Creek. That is really what got it rolling was that deadline to apply for BEF.
Reeve’s decision to encourage the partners to apply amounted to a moment of
selection – a validation of a set of still-unnamed boundary spanning practices – that
nudged the partnership in a specific evolutionary direction. But BEF’s influence did
not stop there. To help the organizations prepare for applying, Reeve offered to
facilitate capacity-building workshops for the partners to develop their strategic
restoration and monitoring plan for the Crooked River and Whychus Creek
watersheds. In addition, Mary Vass of the NFF, who was already looking for
partnership opportunities in the Deschutes National Forest, took an interest in the
partnership and offered to help co-facilitate the process. Reeve and Vass came
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down to Bend and facilitated planning meetings over roughly 6 months. The result
was by all accounts a strong application that had thought through and addressed
many of the technical, institutional, and social capacity issues that often frustrate
implementation. In 2005, the 2 watershed councils signed an MOU with BEF
committing a minimum of $250,000 over 10 years to monitor restoration of the
Crooked River and Whychus Creek watersheds.
The offer by Reeve and Vass to come down and assist the partnering
organizations in preparation for applying to BEF’s Model Watershed Program
reflects a remarkable appreciation for addressing capacity issues before committing
funding. But it is also remarkable for the convergence that it facilitated. A
significant socio-technical innovation that came out of the application process was a
series of matrices that organized the roles, actions, and responsibilities of the
organizations around a set of concrete and measurable outcomes concerned with
instream flow, water quality, habitat restoration, and education and outreach.
Working backward from outcomes enabled the organizational partners to more
strategically coordinate their activities and functions over time. In that sense, the
matrices served more as a framework than it did an action plan to guide the
selection, design, and implementation of projects as opportunities or problems
arose. As one of the partners explains:
“What are we actually going to do and how do we spend our money?” That is
what requires us mostly to come back together. Different opportunities, and
things are always changing because we have project concepts, big pipeline of
stuff. The question is: “What is coming up for whom? How does it fit?” In
those conversations sometimes what will happen is we'll see, “You really
have that going now; we ought to ramp up our activity. We're going to focus
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some more time now that we know you're that ready. Maybe there was some
critical dependency that that landowner needed to be brought on.” When
that landowner came on, that was going to create an opportunity for Ryan's
group to do some habitat restoration on that property. That would be a
classic example.
This approach provided the partners with the kind of flexibility required to carry
out a 10-year restoration and monitoring plan, while the emphasis on outcomes
gave monitoring a central role in the adaptive management of the watersheds.
It also flipped the problem of capacity on its head: by dividing up the various
roles and responsibilities to achieve a desired outcome, the capacities of the
partners ultimately came to depend on, rather than subtract from, one another, as 2
of the partners explain:
We basically said in those restoration matrices: “We are not so concerned
about how many trees we plant, or how many widgets we build. We're
concerned about the long term ecological outcome.” We don't want to
measure activities, which are sort of really measures of busyness: “I planted
a million trees.” “Great, you're really busy. Did you actually accomplish
anything? Did you have an ecological outcome? Did those million trees
actually change whatever? Bird habitat, or bird populations, or whatever?”
That focus on ecological outcomes was, and still is, a core theme. That, at
least from the audiences we talk to, they see that as an innovation. I don't
know if it really is; it's really simple. […] But when we go to funders and say,
“We have this 10-year program of work, it's loose, it gets edited all the time,
it's not perfect, but it's focused on outcomes, and in order to achieve those
outcomes, all of us need to be effective,” […] they say, “That's incredible, no
one has ever done that.”
Basically what we said is, “The collection of activities is very ecologically
significant and they drive these outcomes. Aren't these the ones you want to
see? Fish habitat? Fish passage? More water in the streams? Us protecting
this area from development encroachment? Isn't this what we're all about?
Yes.” Then it became less about “this project is better than that project,” or
“should we be trying to go through this exercise of prioritization of all these
activities to see which should come first and which is ecologically more
important?” Get away from that and say, “Together they're very ecologically
significant.” Now we can overlie opportunity. First you have strategy; then
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you have opportunity. “Where are you ready to move?” […] We're at cultural,
social, and political agreement. “Where does that exist?” You go to those
places.
While the development of the matrices was certainly a collaborative process,
one can detect the guiding vision of Heisler, particularly in its emphasis on
prioritizing and sequencing projects according to the level of support they enjoyed
from landowners and other key stakeholders. This approach was consistent with
the strategic planning Heisler was doing for his own organization. For Heisler, the
way to expand capacity was to secure the social and political agreements that would
expand the number of projects that could be feasibly implemented. The DLT and the
2 watershed councils enjoyed ties to many important stakeholders, particularly
landowners. The DRC’s strategic partnership with the other 3 organizations
expanded its opportunities accordingly.
At the same time, it is also clear that Reeve and Vass provided critical input
and support as the partnership prepared their MWP application. Knowingly or
unknowingly, Reeve and Vass acted as policy entrepreneurs working to give a local
partnership innovation a particular shape that conformed to the program’s broad
parameters, essentially outlining the relevant problem domain and the generally
appropriate policy response. As one participant of those meetings remarks:
I think Todd Reeve in particular spent a lot of time thinking about the
partnership. Mary Vass was helpful in facilitating things and putting stuff on
board. I think Todd is very well equipped in terms of thinking about "OK,
what is the dynamic here?" So, yeah, […] they were a good team.
And yet, to the extent that the partnership, particularly the Back to Home Waters
program, influenced larger policy conversations and processes, it is reasonable to
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suspect that some alignment of expectations and practices between the partnership
and BEF was already in place before the formal application was submitted. In other
words, it is likely that BEF was to some extent, at least, conditioned to look for
partnerships bearing some resemblance to the partnership that was forming
between the 3 original organizations. At any rate, it is clear that the BES-and-NFFfacilitated application process hastened this convergence.
Nevertheless, the convergence took time and, for a while, was by no means
assured, as there were plenty of controversies to work through. One of them was
naming the partnership. Discussions about naming a partnership carries with it
implications for ownership. Ownership itself is premised on a unified vision that is
held together through bonds of both trust and mutual accountability. In the absence
of self-governance, partnerships are prone to one or more partners exploiting the
partnership brand for their own benefit, often to the detriment of the others.31
Interviews of UDRP stakeholders reveal in fact that discussions over the naming of
the partnership were often fraught with concerns over ownership, suggesting that
those bonds of trust and mutual accounting were not yet developed. Over the
course of the Polk Meadows and Metolius Preserve campaigns, the Back to Home
Waters program had become associated in people’s minds with both the DLT and
the broader partnership, causing consternation among some of the partnering
stakeholders. Several interviewees involved in the negotiations over what to call the
partnership recalled questioning whether the partnership effort was really worth it.
31 The dilemma is not unlike those described by the Prisoner’s Dilemma and Tragedy of the
Commons.
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But the common refrain that emerged from the interviews was that early funding
provided critical feedback to the managers, staff, and boards that the process was
indeed worth the effort. As one DLT staff member relates:
When something like SIP funding comes up and you all of a sudden get a
dedicated funding source because of the existence of it, and then you see
these more positive day-to-day interactions, you start to think, "Hey" – and I
did say this to my board at the last board meeting – I said, "I'm glad […] some
folks on our board were pushing saying, ‘Hey, we need to do this.’ They got a
little reward out of that.
As the last quote suggests, board members encouraged managers to continue with
the deliberations when they may have felt like giving up. Interviews with those
involved in the early formation of the partnership also revealed that Heisler was
especially important in reminding parties that they were better off working together
than apart. Regardless, with the exception of the CRWC, what started out in large
part as a staff- and management-driven initiative came to be owned by the
respective boards, whose buy-in was critical for investing staff resources and time
in the process and for making the structural changes necessary to implement the
partnership’s strategic plans. In contrast, however, the CRWC’s board questioned
whether the partnership benefitted them. One of the board members recalls the
lack of buy-in to the partnership idea:
Originally when the Partnership first started in this BEF foundation, our
director at the time seemed to have worked with the Partnership to come up
with our plan. Then when the board saw the plan, they were like, ”What?
This is awful.” We've had to come from that point.
This resistance is rooted in a complex interaction of organizational, historical, and
ultimately social processes that continue to carry implications for the partnership’s
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capacity, as will be discussed below. Regardless, ultimately Dedrick’s successor,
Max Nielsen-Pincus, was able to put together a strategic plan which the board would
endorse.
Shaping Policy Readiness for their Innovations
The initial BEF award also encouraged the partnering organizations to
present their framework and plan to funders and partners who were beginning to
line up behind the salmon and steelhead initiative. The partnership recognized that,
in order to succeed in their Model Watershed plan, they were going to need to
partner with others in a variety of areas ranging from skilled and unskilled “boots
on the ground” to data collection and knowledge-sharing on the various reaches of
the Crooked River and Whychus Creek watersheds. Here, the organizational
affiliations with funders proved especially helpful. They reached out to the CTWSR,
ODFW, and the Deschutes National Forest, among others. But although prospective
partners lauded the partnership’s strategic approach, they did not adopt the
matrices as part of their own work perhaps as some of its creators would otherwise
have hoped.

In the context of a fragmented policy landscape dotted by silos, innovative
approaches that integrate previously disparate perspectives and practices often
struggle to achieve wider-scale adoption. This appears to have been the case here,
even though the matrices enjoyed institutional sponsorship by BES and were
generally warmly received. The lack of a regional management framework into
which a partnership initiative like theirs could plug themselves meant that there
281

was as yet no developed community of practice to adopt it, even with local
modifications. The boundary spanners promoting their product seemed to have
been aware of this contextual constraint, and matched their expectations
accordingly. If anything, according to one of them, by not trying to push their matrix
approach too hard, the partners were at least able to avoid active resistance to it.
Given their pragmatic focus on outcomes, the partners were less concerned that the
matrix was not broadly adopted:
There was sort of this acceptance on both parties that those outside parties
could look in on our program of work, or matrices and say, “That looks good,
good stuff. “ They didn't own it, and we didn't try to force them to own it. […]
We said, “Good enough, these things don't have to be perfect. We'll just keep
working. We'll just keep doing it.” That comes back to that philosophy focus
on the outcomes. We need enough process to get to the outcomes, but we
don't need a God-awful amount of process that gets in the way of our
outcomes.
The partnering organizations also recognized that they now had a product
they could present to various funders to expand the scope of their work to
reintroduce salmon and steelhead in the Upper Deschutes River Subbasin. They
worked on their message and developed an effective PowerPoint presentation to
hone that message to prospective funders. Wittingly or unwittingly, these policy
actors developed a novel set of communication practices that were boundary
spanning in their own right:
From my standpoint these outcomes, these measurable outcomes drive
everything. Instead of selling tasks, we were going to sell the outcomes in the
strategic process. Then we had people who take responsibility, in some cases
it was a joint responsibility, most of them were joint responsibilities. We got
to this level and created a PowerPoint. We created a four-page color printout
that distilled all of this into the executive summary-type piece: “This is what
we're all about, why we've come together.” We started to shop that.
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What was perhaps most innovative about their message was that they often came
unsolicited to funders and defined the problem for them using a language of
outcomes and proceeded to propose a well-developed strategy for meeting their
objectives. They challenged funders to stop evaluating proposals strictly through
project windows and instead work backward from desired outcomes. In doing so,
they started to upend the entire review process:
We all joined as a team and said, “Our job is not to bicker about whose job is
more important. Or job is to get projects out that fit our strategy that […]
we’re confident will drive our outcomes.” All of a sudden this review thing
was turned on its head: it was essentially a self-governing effort among the
partners where our incentive was to drive the maximum number of projects
to capitalize on as many opportunities as we could. Basically all of them in
our minds were equal: “We're not going to argue about whose is more
important. They're all important. If this one is ready, let's do it. We can
follow later with a project.” That was an interesting evolution.
After their BEF award, the partnership drew on the DRC and DLT’s connections and
approached PGE and CTWSR. One of the partners describes how they approached
them:
For me, I guess I really categorize it as: it's one thing to talk about; it's
another thing to actually have a tangible product. That BEF application was
the first product. Once we did that we realized there are other people
interested in this. […] We were able to take that application and shop it to
other people. We took it to the Pelton Roundbutte Fund, which is run by PGE
and the Tribes. That is a special funding application dedicated to supporting
reintroduction. We basically said to them, “We know you guys are going to
spend about $5 million at this next funding cycle on reintroduction-related
projects. Here in Whychus Creek, our three nonprofits, we are the primary
people doing work. Here is our ten-year plan-of-work. This looks like the
obvious thing for you to invest in.” We started shopping it.
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Each funding success seemed to embolden the partnership to reach out to other
funders. As one of the partners explains, it wasn’t always easy to bring the parties
together and transition into a working partnership, but each grant success provided
critical feedback to the partners that they were onto something worthwhile. This
soon led to a virtuous funding cycle in which funding increased both the confidence
and credibility of the partnership, which attracted, in turn, more institutional
interest and funding. The partner continues:
What happened was one would join, the next would join, the next would join.
I was looking at the list the other day and it's actually up to about 12 funders
who have all said, “We like what you're doing.” At that point we started
getting the positive feedback loop that was saying, “This works.” In the end
we kept seeing these rewards. We said, “We have to stick with this.” That is
what I think it has been, there has been this cost/reward kind of thing, but
the reward has outweighed the cost significantly. So it's this constant process
of having that feedback.
The early 2 successes with BEF and the Pelton-Round Butte Fund encouraged the
partners to approach OWEB in 2006. As one of them explains, the partners brought
their innovative approach to the table, framing the reintroduction problem as a
coordination problem requiring a partnership response guided by outcomes rather
than by project outputs:
At some point the reviewers realized we were completely driving the boat.
We would sit down and say, “Here is our strategy, here are the projects. Here
is why we're doing them.” The questions change. […] It moved completely
away from OWEB's normal process of this microanalyses at a project level,
which in many cases is not relevant or very difficult to do.
OWEB was so impressed with the partnership’s approach that they decided to form
a separate funding program called “Special Investment Partnership” that was largely
modeled on the strategic approach taken by the partnership. Indeed, as an officer of
284

OWEB explains, the partnership actually worked with OWEB to put together the
basic approach that would drive the program:
The things they have done that are unique in the Deschutes is to create a
whole upper basin vision, and to explicitly sit down with their partners and
say, “What do we envision this place, the upper Deschutes, to look like in the
future? What are our various roles in achieving that?” That form of coherent
visioning around the reintroduction of anadromous fish into the Upper
Deschutes Basin has put them in a position where they could come to us and
say, “Look, we have a vision for the future. We would like you to invest in that
vision.” Very few groups put themselves in that place where, “If this kind of
funding is available, here's what we have to match with it and here is the
outcome.” They were organized in a way that resonated; they were able to
speak directly to the core mission of the agency for investment. They worked
with us to enhance the idea of targeted investments, which led to them
becoming a Special Investment Partnership that we're quite proud of.
In 2008, OWEB awarded its first SIP award to the partnership, committing $ 4
million for the 2007-2009 biennium. The Deschutes SIP subsequently received an
additional $ 4 million for the 2009-2011 biennium.
It should be noted that, despite the significant support that OWEB’s SIP
program provides the UDRP, the partnership is not a creature of the state. On the
contrary, in the programmatic outlines one can detect many instances where the
program was designed with the UDRP in mind. On a general programmatic level,
OWEB’s SIP aims to build the capacity of partnerships that have already formed, or
are forming, “on the ground.” As a December 2007 OWEB memo states:
OWEB’s contribution will be critical, not only to funding the effort, but also to
attracting the other support and catalyzing the action necessary for
achievement of the objectives. In particular, a SIP investment will tend to
launch important efforts that otherwise have been stalled or delayed (OWEB
memo, December, 2007).
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Among the criteria used to assess eligibility for SIP funding, partnerships must
demonstrate a minimal level of “ripeness:”
To receive a funding allocation from the Board, a Partnership: (a) needs to
be ready to form and begin functioning to finalize objectives and a work plan;
(b) must have a likely time frame for implementation and completion that is
reasonable and fits OWEB’s needs; and (c) must be at the point
developmentally where it both needs and can take advantage of the OWEB
funding commitment to further the project (OWEB Memo, December, 2007)
But while OWEB appears to have been influenced to some extent by the
UPRP, it is also clear that these selection criteria were very much driven by the
agency’s own practical and political considerations, including minimizing – or at
least appearing to minimize – state government’s involvement in local watershed
management. In the context of the state’s budgetary woes and uncertainties, state
agencies and programs like OWEB that are funded by legislative appropriations
from the Oregon State Lottery Fund are under pressure to fund those projects and
programs that are more likely to please lawmakers. Typically this translates into
higher-visibility projects that show immediate results but do not necessarily
address long-term problems. Partly to address this systemic bias toward band-aid
solutions, OWEB developed a SIP program that would dedicate a portion of its
funding to facilitate partnerships to work in areas where “the ecological impact,
significance of the issues addressed, and the anticipated outcome(s) are large”
(OWEB memo, December, 2007). The memo also reflects the agency’s
preoccupation with high-visibility projects, but this preoccupation appears to be
driven by an appreciation of the local as well as state-level political conditions of
sustaining partnership work, arguing that such projects can capture the public’s
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imagination and raise awareness around watershed enhancement more generally.
It goes on to note that partnerships with “robust” funding sources not only provide
opportunities for funding leverage, but that they are more likely to see programs
and projects through to their completion. Moreover, the SIP program requires
awardees to include a comprehensive monitoring system to ensure that periodic
assessments of progress can be used to modify implementation as needed.
The alignment of principles behind the UDRP and OWEB’s SIP program is
evident in these policy promulgations. For example, the program’s section criteria
reflect an abiding concern with implementation and outcomes. In addition to
“ecological significance” and organizational “ripeness,” OWEB’s SIP program seeks
projects that take a “triple bottom line” approach balancing ecological, economic,
and social concerns. The same theme was taken up by the DRC 10 years previously.
Some of the alignment can surely be explained by situating this theme within the
larger outcome-based environmental governance movement sweeping national and
international environmental policy since the 1990’s. But there is at least one
instance in the OWEB memo that suggests the agency was adopting a lesson already
learned from the DRC’s work in the Upper Deschutes Basin: the memo notes that
feasible projects produce “benefits that sustain themselves over time because
they’ve become a part of local custom and culture” (OWEB memo, December, 2007).
One can almost hear Heisler’s admonition to secure real social commitment from
implementing stakeholders prior to funding projects.

287

OWEB’s SIP program marks the emergence of the UDRP as a legitimate
institutional process with programmatic corollaries. This matching of
programmatic criteria and partnership attributes resulted from a mutual
adjustment of boundary spanning practices and policy-environmental “demands”
that took place in a variety of formal and less formal contexts, but included
facilitated workshops, discussions, conversations, presentations, RFP’s, grantwriting, and, of course, awards. These policy deliberations operated through a
social network of relations, many of which could be described as communities of
practice in their own right. Thus, for example, OWEB participated in many of the
conversations in the public and private funding community that took place in the
1990’s and onward that began to emphasize “environmental performance” and
ways to measure it (thereby improving programmatic performance). OWEB
therefore was already beginning to develop a “search image” of partnerships it
wanted to invest in. Gradually, this image assumed a more concrete shape in
conversations with other funders like BPE and PGE. And, as the state agency
charged with funding and supporting the state’s watershed councils, it doubtlessly
followed the UDRP with interest as it began to make its round of proposals to these
funders. Interviews of participants of the early meetings between OWEB and the
partners suggest that the original intention was to explore funding the UDRP. But as
they continued to talk, the conversation moved to a higher level of program design.
The partnership solicitation for support and the development of an OWEB
partnership program became part of one and the same process.
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The emergence of the UDRP was fed by outreach and funding efforts in
another sense: for the very act of going out and presenting to audiences had the
effect of solidifying a sense of partnership identity that became more defined as the
conversations and messages evolved. In encounters with others we come to know
ourselves, and this appears to have been the case here as well. Over time, the
partners became more self-aware of the partnership “as a unit,” as one of the
presenting partners describes it. Moreover, as their identity developed, the
partnership became more efficient at finding and acting on funding opportunities by
quickly relaying relevant messages and tasks to the appropriate partner:
I think because we have had to actually do funding proposals together, and
basically do work together, whether we have to present as a unit to the
OWEB board, or we have to present a funding application as a unit to the
BEF, what we then basically do is we have a loose but effective system where
we pretty quickly say, “Who is going to be the lead on this thing?” It's
typically a self-nomination process where somebody says, “I'm the best lead
because it's most up my alley. I know this person well; I will follow up on it.”
Then it's that person’s job to basically be the lead, communicate to the
partnership, and bring them in that direction.
The development of partnership identity entailed the development of boundary
conditions for an emergent joint field of practice, which enabled the partnership to
begin to scan its environment for – and respond to – problems and opportunities of
relevance to it.
Boundary Spanning and Social Learning in the UDRP
The emergence of the UDRP was not a single event but rather a process of
convergence that spanned roughly 5 years from 2003 until 2008 with the funding of
OWEB’s SIP. This account does not include the many years leading up to the “Back
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to Home Waters” program when policy actors and communities strove to build their
vision of a Basin-wide watershed management entity. Their efforts provided the
conditions that favored partnership formation at the Subbasin level. The social
learning that went into building the UDRP has already been documented, but it is
worth summarizing the previous discussion. First, we can observe a convergence
on 2 levels, one at the Subbasin level and the other at the Basin level. At the
Subbasin level, the “Back to Home Waters” program appears to have been the
original unit of selection for early funders, especially BEF. Furthermore, there is
evidence that funders came to adopt criteria that drew on valuable lessons that the
partners had learned from their previous work in the Upper Deschutes Subbasin. At
the same time, the partners showed a willingness and ability to learn from and
accommodate funders and other interests, as illustrated in the capacity-building
workshops that were jointly facilitated by BEF and NFF. The partnership also
astutely did not push their matrix approach on other potential partners, recognizing
that there was no Basin-wide framework in place to adopt it. At the Basin level, we
note that the boards of the partners generally – with the possible exception of the
Crooked River Watershed Council, which is discussed more below – came to throw
their support behind the partnership. From this observation, and from interview
testimony on the subject, we may infer – albeit cautiously – some alignment of
perspectives and interests among the major Basin actors that operate in the outer
layers of the partnership. Some of this alignment was surely prepared by the initial
experimentation by the DRC with federally appropriated restoration funds and later
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accelerated by the positive turn of events in the Pelton-Round Butte Dam relicensing
negotiations as well as in the NWPCC Deschutes Subbasin Planning Process. But
there is also evidence to suggest that the formative partnership work in the Back to
Home Waters Program and subsequent campaigns helped push the salmon and
steelhead reintroduction to the forefront of the watershed agenda in the larger
Deschutes River Basin. The partners used their extensive social network of
members and affiliations to promote their agenda, as one of them recounts:
…When fish were being released, we brought people out. We got the news
reporters out here. We did all the stuff. We organized a big thing at Camp
Polk. The people releasing fish, the Tribes [CTWSR] and ODFW, they didn't
necessarily want, not that they didn't want, but their goal is not to do
outreach about it. I think by all of us being out there and talking to the
community about it, we have been by far the main source of information
about this. Then I think all of a sudden other people are starting to realize
what is happening. I think from any way you view it, just from any press and
any press interest in this has largely been initiated by either the Partnership
as a partnership or by the individual partners talking about the Partnership,
talking about our work. We used to struggle to get people aware of it. We had
coverage in the Oregonian, we had articles in the New York Times. Now the
local community is pretty knowledgeable about it. I think that probably runs
throughout those outer layers, that folks are aware of this and dealing with.
Other conservation groups are making that a priority. Certainly the National
Forest Foundation has launched their national campaign on Wychuse Creek
and Metolius. I don't think that would have happened without us having
raised the profile of reintroduction to where it is.
The convergence of policy conversations and practices at these 2 levels –
facilitated by boundary spanning across social networks – helped pave the way for
larger institutional support for the UDRP. The development of OWEB’s SIP program
marks, in some ways, the completion of this convergence, as the UDRP became a
template of sorts for a state-funded watershed partnership program that now
includes the Sandy River Basin Partnership.
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Evidence for the formation of a partnership we are conveniently calling
“UDRP” can also be found in the routinization of boundary spanning practices
between the 4 organizations. That is, we can observe a differentiation of roles,
actions, and responsibilities that reflects deeper coordination across organizational
boundaries. The partnership agreements have given the partnership a definite
structure – a “prism,” as one of the partners calls it – that drives the questions – e.g.,
“does the restoration project enjoy landowner support?” – and their collective
response to them. Because they are driven by higher-level strategic objectives, the
partners are able to make adjustments ranging from project design to project
sequencing as conditions change. A DLT staffer illustrates this coordination with an
example of work being conducted along McKay Creek:
We have pretty much weekly discussions on strategy for McKay Creek
making sure there is a restoration strategy there before I go in and do land
conservation because I want to make sure what I do and my agreement with
the landowner is going to allow for the type of restoration that is going to
need to be done and that it's going to sequence well with what the DRC might
be doing in terms of water rights and how it works with the agricultural
components and demands. That is a big change. I don't know that it's due
entirely to the Partnership or if it's the evolving nature of our work and
communications. I would attribute quite a bit of that to us having taken the
step of being partners formally and saying, “This is how we're going to
approach it.” I think that has been a huge change in the way all of us do
business.
The strategic approach enables partners like OWEB to outsource the project
development function to the partnership itself. As a self-governing entity, it is able
to develop, evaluate, fund, implement, and monitor projects that attend to the evershifting requirements of the local context. For funders, especially government
agencies, this model is of course convenient from a practical standpoint, since it
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reduces the number of entities with which they must interact. But it also insulates
them somewhat from the politics of funding and managing individual projects.
The coordination extends beyond outsourcing to communication to the
larger community. As already mentioned, the partnering organizations have shown
a capacity to not only track down and effectively respond to RFPs, but they have also
created funding opportunities through carefully crafted strategic proposals to
prospective funders and partners. The UDRP is creating, in other words, its own
system of capital exchange that rewards partnership work modeled after it. Beyond
that, the partners have developed a communication strategy to ensure that the
messages they convey to various audiences, whether they concern project reporting
or big picture visioning, are aligned or at least do not conflict:
To keep ourselves straight when we communicate, whether it's in a
newsletter, a fund-raising letter, our annual report, we're all clear about how
we talk about what we do so as to be honest. "We participate in a partnership
that produces these outcomes. What we do is this portion of it." So we remain
honest to each other about what we're claiming and how we communicate
that to our constituencies.
Respondents in interviews also refer to instances, including referenda, where the
Partnership managed to either maintain consensus on or avoid altogether
contentious issues facing the Basin community. In the face of outside political
pressures, this is no small feat.
Another evidence for social learning concerns the demonstrated capacity of
the organizations to mobilize their resources and messaging to support one of the
partners when it confers little or no direct benefit, or even imposes a cost, to the
others. This was the case when, in 2008, the partners learned that Trout Unlimited
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(TU) was preparing to launch a reintroduction campaign of their own in the Basin.
While TU’s programs overlapped the most with the UDWC, the other partners
nevertheless helped provide a united front both in confronting and ultimately
negotiating with TU. As a result of those meetings, the partnership was able to
develop a common understanding with TU that the 2 different campaigns would
support, rather than simply compete with, one another. Interviews of the managers
of the partnering organizations suggest that DRC and DLT rallied behind the UDWC
mostly out of a sense of loyalty as opposed to any narrower strategic interest. Such
gestures of loyalty are investments in the relationships rather than in a particular
cause and suggest that the partnership has salience for the partners themselves.
Partnership Capacity of the UDRP
The UDRP can be properly classified as “permanent and/or regular
coordination,” using Mandell and Steelman‘s (2003) typology of interorganizational
innovations. The Partnership is organized around a well-defined purpose involving
material commitments from each organization that are delineated in formal
agreements; nevertheless, financial, political, and institutional risks to each
organization are largely confined by those partnership agreements. The UDRP does
evince many of the characteristics of Mandell and Steelman’s definition of a
“coalition” to the extent that the coordination of activities and actions is well
developed. However, the material and political commitments, and therefore risks,
for each organization are more restricted in scale and closer to those associated
with “permanent and/or regular coordination.” This classification is made while
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bearing mind instances, albeit sporadic, where partners made some risks above and
beyond what would be expected in “permanent and/or regular coordination.”
While this classification is a start, it leaves us with little sense for the capacity
of the UDRP to manage changes of varying orders. As an interorganizational
innovation, is there any evidence to suggest that the UDRP has any significant
influence in defining watershed management problems for the larger Basin
community in ways that maintain its own relevance? In other words, does it have
the capacity to both serve and lead the Basin community on watershed management
issues? Beyond that, what evidence is there that would suggest the Partnership can
reinvent itself to meet policy problems that are for all intents and purposes
surprises?
The case has already been made that the UDRP meets the minimal definition
of a partnership having, using the present framework, Partnership Capacity Type I.
It has demonstrated a capacity to organize boundary spanning practices around a
specific purpose and set of objectives centered on the reintroduction of salmon and
steelhead in the Upper Deschutes Subbasin. The successful return of adult Chinook
salmon to the Upper Deschutes River in 2010 was an historic milestone both for the
Basin and for the Partnership. And we can observe an alignment of perspectives,
interests, and practices between the UDRP and the larger institutional context.
Indeed, the UDRP has become a model for partnerships in other basins. The
Partnership received the Department of the Interior’s Cooperative Conservation
Award in 2007. The state of Oregon has also recognized the innovative nature of the
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Partnership as it prepares its Integrated Water Resource Strategy. OWEB is even
funding the partners to help tell their story to a broader audience, with the ultimate
aim of leveraging additional funding. In addition, private foundations like the NFF
and the Ford Family Foundation have drawn on the UDRP model to explore
partnership-building in places like the Deschutes National Forest near Sisters as
well as in the John Day Basin. Members of the UDRP report being approached by
some of these groups to share their lessons and perspectives. So long as this
broader institutional support holds, the UDRP has a good chance of remaining
viable.
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the Partnership is vulnerable.
For one, interviews with staff and board members revealed that many of the rules of
interaction that guide day-to-day operations of the Partnership remain unspoken
and inaccessible. The boundary spanning competencies that enable the Partnership
to function – for instance, making on-the-spot decisions about which funding
opportunities to pursue and who should take the lead – are largely embodied in the
practices of the founders and certain segments of the staff and board that are more
intensely involved in the Partnership’s affairs. Until these core practices and rules
are more fully inculcated in each of the partnering organizations, the Partnership is
vulnerable to personnel changes, particularly at the management level. In addition,
while the Partnership has grown in operations over the past several years from
roughly $3 million in outlays annually to over $10 million, it is likely to encounter
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significant challenges to scaling up further until those partnership practices are
institutionalized.
More significantly, a deeper examination of the Partnership reveals fissures
between the CRWC and the rest of the Partnership that reflect social tensions
between the Crooked River and Upper Deschutes Subbasin communities. This is not
surprising since, watershed councils by their very nature are bound to represent the
community they serve. In the present case, the conflicting perspectives and
interests of the 2 subbasin communities manifest themselves in conflicts over
priorities and practices within the Partnership.
An issue of contention is the prioritization of fish, farmland, and rural
development, more generally. Many in the Crooked River Subbasin are concerned
that the emphasis on the reintroduction of salmon and steelhead is directing
attention away from the issue of rural and community development. Until recently,
anyway, the combination of land and water use restrictions along with various
incentives has shifted the economic equation against full-time farming and in favor
of specialty and hobby farms, recreation, and real estate development. A former
rancher, himself a recent transplant, is struck by the changes in lower Crooked River
Subbasin over the past 40 years, estimating there are now “probably only 2
legitimate, true agricultural land owners on the whole valley.” For him, it comes
down to simple economics:
One thing is your land use, how they're zoned. That has a huge effect on what
you're going to do with your property. In fact it's probably one of the major
ones if you're close to Prineville or whether it gets into your land planning.
That's probably a major thing that happens. Like I said before, it's plain old
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economics. You're not going to survive on a 200-acre farm raising 40 head of
cows. That's just plain old hard facts whether you like it or not.
The former rancher adds that these changes also present opportunities under the
right circumstances:
…All of a sudden this land here may not be sold as a little farm, but it might
be sold as a nice recreational area too down the line. And I think you're
seeing a lot of that now. I lease my duck-hunting out. I think you'll see a lot of
that. I would love to see this [Crooked] river – now that we've got the
regulations, if it's going to be so regulated – let's have some Chinook salmon
in it and some steelhead and go for it.
The changes in relationship to the land carry consequences for the
institutional and community context, as more traditional agricultural interests must
vie with competing interests for a political voice in local watershed management.
Traditional agricultural agencies and entities like the Farm Service Agency, NRCS,
soil and water conservation districts, county extension agencies, and irrigation
districts struggle to develop relationships with immigrating landowners no longer
dependent on agricultural production. At the same time, entities like the DRC
seeking to do projects in the Crooked River Subbasin have met resistance from
landowners and communities that remain distrustful of outside intervention. As
one resident of Prineville remarks: “People here don't like people from Bend telling
them how they should do stuff.” She recalls the controversy that ensued, before the
Partnership was formed, when the DRC tried to purchase some prime agricultural
land for a permanent water transfer. Many in Crook County balked at what they
saw as a threat to their agricultural interests. For the DRC the lesson was to work
through local partners like the CRWC. Nevertheless, the experience stirred a
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wariness in many local residents about any outside initiatives, especially those
coming from Bend, that has mitigated the influence that the Partnership has had in
the Crooked River Subbasin. In fact, interviews with ranchers, residents, and policy
actors in the subbasin reiterated the general sentiment that the Partnership had
very little salience for them.
Caught somewhat in the middle of this struggle has been the CRWC, which, as
a receiver of OWEB and SIP funds, has emerged as a significant player in the
Crooked River Subbasin. In many ways, the CRWC is an organizational site for this
institutional struggle, and its capacity depends to a large extent on its capacity to
span the economic, political, social, and ultimately cultural boundaries of distinct
communities of practice. Here, the diagnosis is somewhat troubling. Staff turnover
has been an issue. The CRWC has had 4 ED’s in about as many years. To the extent
that the ED is the locus of boundary spanning – on multiple levels, including
between staff and board, between the UDRP and the Crooked River Subbasin
community, and ultimately between different interest blocs – this turnover reflects a
deficient organizational capacity for articulating and leveraging differences for a
larger purpose. Instead of expanding opportunities, these differences have to a
great extent deteriorated into power struggles. Perhaps the observation most
relevant to this discussion concerns the degree to which the UDRP has been out of
step with the CRWC board. As already mentioned, the board initially rejected
Dedrick’s proposal to join the Partnership. When Dedrick finally left, subsequent
ED’s were naturally less invested in the Partnership. There was one with whom the
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partners felt they could work, but the CRWC board quickly concluded he was not a
match and let him go after only 6 months. More recently, the CRWC hired new staff,
including an ED, Craig Carr, and moved out of the building they shared with county
agencies and other entities, complicating efforts by the CRWC to find its footing in
its own community. As one of the board members observes:
We had our first Watershed Counsel meeting [since the move]. They were
there and I went: "who are those people?" They're our employees. I thought,
“Since we're not all in the same building, we need to learn what each other
are doing just here, let alone the Partnership.”
The limited boundary spanning capacity of the CRWC carries implications for
the Partnership capacity of the UDRP. Most obviously, a partnership is only has
strong as its members, as the DRC has discovered in trying to carry out water
transactions on the Crooked River. Several managers also reported that, not
surprisingly, partnership work has been frustrated by the turnover in the CRWC ED
position. But the relationship between the capacities of a partnership and its
constituent parts is not necessarily linear. In this case, the DRC and the larger UDRP
face a kind of paradox in building the capacity of the CRWC to the extent that its
legitimacy, and therefore effectiveness, in the eyes of the local community depends
on the autonomy and even influence it enjoys with respect to the Partnership.
Indeed, the CRWC brings with it certain technical and local knowledge as well as
social capital that could be valuable assets to the UDRP. For instance, the CRWC’s
institutional and perhaps cultural inclination to look at the land as opposed to just
the water gives it an important perspective on watershed management that is
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sometimes lost in the greater Basin’s focus on salmon and steelhead reintroduction,
as the board member explains:
We believe the beginning of getting more water in the stream is by working
from ridge-top to ridge-top. That involves removing invasive juniper. We
like to work on upland projects and that is where a lot of our expertise and a
lot of our knowledge, and a lot of our interest is in this Watershed Council.
That is different than what the other two groups are doing. That can be good
but I don't think we want to lose that focus by being brought into the
Partnership. We want to have that focus and be part of the Partnership.

To a great extent, the strength of the Partnership will depend on the extent to which
the CRWC is able to maintain a focus that is appropriate to their basin and
community context. This means giving the CRWC a greater voice within the
Partnership. The board member continues:
I don't know what we do with Upper Deschutes [Watershed Council] – they
do the same kinds of things we do over there – besides getting expertise, and
they primarily just work on instream stuff. A lot of our expertise is in the
uplands and they don't seem to work in the uplands. It doesn't seem they
come to us and ask us, “How should we control juniper in our county?” If
they did that, I think board members would appreciate that. There's no
interaction.
That lack of interaction translates to missed opportunities for mutual learning. For
instance, the CRWC has not taken full advantage of the UDWC’s expertise in
monitoring. Of course, the board member is quick to point out that, before there is
any productive interaction between the CRWC and the other partners, it will first
need to establish its bearing with respect to its own subbasin community. But it
would seem that even here the Partnership can make a difference by following the
DRC’s lead and reaching out to the CRWC, especially the board, for more input in
developing reintroduction priorities and strategies. Such a gesture would, at least
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initially, probably be more significant for what it communicated about the
relationship between the 2 subbasin communities than it would be for any technical
or policy learning that resulted from it.
Contemplating such a change in partnership stance brings our attention to
another potential limitation in the UDRP’s institutional capacity: its dependence on
reintroduction funding. The grant-driven nature of the Partnership limits its
resilience in several ways. Perhaps most superficially, it is vulnerable to any
unexpected disruptions in funding streams linked to the reintroduction efforts. This
would perhaps not pose such a risk if the Partnership had the capacity to link into
alternative policy narratives and associated funding. But the UDRP is in a certain
sense a victim of its own success: each funding success has spurred the Partnership
to invest its limited resources and time in the refinement of the reintroduction
partnership niche, a niche which it has helped to shape in its own image. The
convergence of practices and viewpoints has been such that funders and grantees
have become mutually invested in the “the UDRP story” and in the enactment of
their respective roles in that story. On the one hand, the UDRP has been a
convenient policy vehicle for institutional supporters and funders like OWEB that
are looking to invest in community-based efforts without having to incur the
political risks or transaction costs that attend the messy work of partnershipbuilding and maintenance. These institutional sponsors rely on the cultural-political
and technical legitimacy of the Partnership for the political cover to outsource that
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work to the Partnership itself.32 For their part, the partners are, with each funding
success, incentivized to maintain their story as an effective, self-governing and
egalitarian partnership. And as the financial investments grow, so too do the
political, institutional, and psycho-emotional investments. This is particularly the
case for multi-year contracts like those envisioned in the SIP and MWP. For all the
strengths of these programs, the ever-present confirmation bias which guides each
reporting and review tends to become more compelling over time, for sponsor and
beneficiary alike.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In conclusion, then, it would appear that the UDRP has Partnership Capacity
Type I. Its matrices and system of decision-making allow for some flexibility in
addressing changes in funding and project opportunities and priorities. But its
strategic concern – the reintroduction of salmon and steelhead – is fairly narrow in
scope. We need only look to the controversy surrounding the naming of the
Partnership to appreciate that the Partnership’s capacity to organize around a
bigger story has been limited from the start, as one of its founders admits:
…We have always asked, “Do we create an alliance, a formal alliance with a
brand that we all fit under?” That has never really worked. The fact is we
work together. We have an overlapping enough mission that we all outsource
to each other. That is really a model that's working.

This outsourcing has the empowering effect of “seeding” an indigenous system of capital exchange
whereby the partners themselves judge the merits (whether technical or cultural-political) of
projects and project sequences based on criteria they devised, assigning social value, in essence, to
various local innovations. The problem being raised here, however, is: how to ensure that the
judgments embodied in project-vetting reflect the values of community they are supposed to serve?

32

303

This is not to say that the reintroduction story is not big or that the scope the
Partnership took on was not ambitious: the Partnership was and remains
innovative. It is simply to say that the innovation we are calling the UDRP addresses
only a small part of the story of Deschutes River Basin.
But even staying within the restricted scope of salmon and steelhead
reintroduction, to the extent that institutional funding and support depends on the
partners maintaining appearances of both consensus and effectiveness, the UDRP’s
capacity for honest discussions about deeper differences, particularly between the
Upper Deschutes and Crooked River subbasins, remains underdeveloped. So far, at
least, the UDRP does not demonstrate a general inclination or capacity to ensure
that its objectives are aligned with those of the “larger community of implementers.”
The DRC’s emphasis on obtaining social agreements before initiating projects is a
step in the right direction, but we do not find a pattern of (meta-)boundary spanning
practices linking everyday practice with strategic and even “constitutional”
questions that would give a robust indication of Partnership Capacity Type II.
Instead, we find evidence that the partners often get stuck, not in the weeds, but in
the clouds:
What we struggle with is that is where people's fears and apprehensions
come out. Inevitably high-level ends up talking about big-picture fundraising, it talks about big strategy and organizational identity, things like that.
It sort of re-opens some of those sensitivities. And because we're not talking
about details, it's very easy for people to bring their fears to the table and you
could have four people around the table, each one is thinking you're talking
about a different thing because you're not actually talking about something
specific.
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Lacking a larger narrative to frame strategic discussions, these discussions tend to
devolve into disagreement over distractive or even false issues. Until this problem is
addressed, it seems likely that the Partnership will be vulnerable to deeper Basin
issues, including the question of where the reintroduction of salmon and steelhead
fits in the larger management agenda. Unless it can influence, if not lead, the
discussion on such deeper questions, the UDRP will be mostly subject to the
vagaries of socio-economic and political change.
We are now in a position to say something about the capacity of the UDRP
and larger policy network to manage changes of various orders. Table 6 summarizes
the various boundary spanning practices that were observed in the UDRP process.
The table’s structure follows the methodological criteria contained in Table 2:
Typology of Partnership Processes.”
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Table 6: Boundary Spanning Practices in UDRP
Boundary Spanning
Practices

Specific
contexts
of
boundary
spanning

Change in
Field
Interactions

Core
Practices

Change in
Core
(”Alignment”)
Practices

Operations
and
implementation
1

1

Assigning opportunities to
a partner lead

1

1

Assigning problems to a
partner lead

1

1

Actively listening to
partner peers

All the
storming,
forming, &
norming of
the UDRP
1

Pattern
(PC I)?
Yes

Associating with partners
out of work context

1

1

Building personal relations

1

1

1

Classifying problems by
strategic objectives

1

1

1

Collaborating on other
projects

1

1

Converting capital to
promote innovations

1

1

Coordinating external
communications

1

1

Coordinating the
convergence

1

Defining boundary
spanning norms

1

Classifying problems by
task group

1
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1

Pattern
(PC II)?
No
(STOP)

Defining boundary
spanning roles

1

Defining boundary
spanning values

1

1

Defining institutional
accountabilities

1

1

Defining institutional roles

1

1

Deliberating with partners
in new contexts

1

1

Deliberating with
partnership stakeholders
in other contexts

1

1

1

Designing process

1

Disclosing interests

1

1

1

Education

1

1

Extending favors to
partners

1

Facilitation

1

Framing innovations in
terms of need

1

Framing need in terms of
innovations

1

1

Influencing across policy
sub-networks

1

Innovating (paradigmatic
boundary spanning)
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Integrating boundary
objects/innovations
(standardization)
Making government rules
and regulations
Managing process (budget,
conflicts, surprises, time)

1

Outreach

1

Pilot-testing innovations

1

1

Pitching to decisionmakers

1

1

Prioritizing problems

1

1

1

1

1

Protecting brand/integrity
of innovations
Respectfully pushing back
(disclosing constraints)

Ritually enacting boundary
spanning
Scanning environment and
reporting issues

1

Seeking input from
relevant constituents

1

1

Seeking input from
relevant decision-makers

1

1

Sharing risks

1

1

Staff collaborating across
organizations
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1

Staging group decisions
(lobbying, building
readiness, gauging
support, votealigning
counting,
Strategically

1

1

1

partnering organizations
Task-mastering

Testing ideas/Vetting

Translating across
technical/disciplinary
boundaries

1

1

1

Translating between task
groups
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1

For the partnership to obtain deeper resilience, the kind described by
Partnership Capacity Type II, it will have to help create a story of a different order,
one that imagines the Basin after the successful reintroduction of salmon and
steelhead, one that integrates reintroduction objectives with until-now either
disconnected or competing community concerns such as upland restoration and
forest health, agriculture, recreation, energy, service sector growth, and rural, urban
and suburban development. Such a story would enable the partnership to navigate
the complex web of networks and partnerships that comprise the social fabric of the
Deschutes River Basin without losing its coherence. In the current state of affairs,
the partners struggle to juggle their various commitments without working at crosspurposes. The converging fates of the Upper Deschutes and Crooked River
subbasins will tend to lend greater importance to boundary spanning within
organizations like the CRWC as well as place demands on partnerships to develop
strategies to move between different levels of governance. By extension, the DWA
and the region face a similar dilemma with respect to the state’s Integrated Water
Resource Strategy initiative: innovate or become obsolete. It is perhaps the central
dilemma of the “Networked Society.
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Chapter 7
Walla Walla Watershed Alliance
Background
The Walla Walla River Basin spans 2 states, Washington and Oregon,
draining west and north from the Blue Mountains in the eastern Cascades to form
the Walla Walla River which is joined by its tributary the Touchet River before its
confluence with the Columbia River (see Figure 16). “Walla Walla,” is a Cayuse
Indian name meaning “many small waters,” which is an apt description of the
valley’s many small springs, streams, and tributaries that feed the Walla Walla River.
The Cayuse, Umatilla, and Walla Walla Tribes subsisted in the Basin for centuries
before white settlers began arriving in the early 1800’s. Agricultural settlements
brought with them irrigation diversions and, soon after, the establishment of “water
rights” as early as the 1860’s. Among the larger settlements, the City of Walla Walla
experienced a population boom associated with the Idaho Gold Rush and soon
became the largest city in the Washington Territory (Siemann & Martin, 2007). In
1855, the 3 Tribes signed a treaty with the United States ceding more than 6.4
million acres of land, including the entire Walla Walla River Basin. In the treaty, the
Tribes retained a piece of land in the Umatilla Basin in Northeast Oregon as the
Umatilla Indian Reservation while retaining rights to fish, hunt, and gather
throughout their historic territory. The Tribes subsequently became known as the
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (CTUIR).
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Rapid settlement dramatically increased diversions, resulting in chronic
water shortages and conflict. Already by the 1880’s, the amount of water
appropriated by water rights on the Walla Walla River exceeded the total flow at
certain times in the year, resulting in a seasonally dewatered river. The scarce
supply and persistent conflicts led to an increasing number of court adjudications of
water rights, culminating in the state of Washington filing suit against Oregon in
1936 for what it deemed transgressions against its citizen’s water rights. The
Supreme Court found in favor of Oregon, ruling that Oregon could divert all of the
water from the Walla Walla River mainstem. The case divided farming communities
across the state line, while disputes over water rights divided communities within
state lines. Moreover, the Treaty of 1855 and subsequent white settlement had
sown the seeds of deep antipathy and distrust between farmers and the Tribes. The
Tribes’ isolation on the Umatilla Indian Reservation only added to their sense of
alienation from the Walla Walla Basin community. Thus, already by the middle of
the last century, the Basin had a history of water shortage and conflict going back
almost 100 years, and the many cross-cutting boundaries were its legacy.
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Washington
Oregon

Figure 16: Map of the Walla Walla River Basin (Source: Curtis, 1997)

Complicating the water shortage and conflicts was the progressive depletion
of fish populations and related species. Historically, the Walla Walla River
supported significant populations of spring Chinook salmon and summer steelhead
as well as resident bull and rainbow trout. Smaller numbers of fall Chinook, chum,
and Coho salmon were also likely present. But the combination of seasonal
dewatering and reduced fish passage from numerous activities, including irrigation
diversions, is believed to have extirpated the Basin’s salmon runs by 1925 (Siemann
& Martin, 2007). The slew of federal environmental laws in the late 1960’s and early
1970’s ushered in state-level regulation as well. On the Washington side of the
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Basin, for instance, the Department of Ecology (“Ecology”) established the Water
Resources Program Rule which seasonally closed most streams and rivers and
limited future water withdrawals (Siemann & Martin, 2007). The U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Service (USFWS) listed the bull trout as Threatened under the Endangered
Species Act (ESA) in June 1998, and in March 1999, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NOAA) listed the Middle Columbia River summer steelhead as Threatened
under the ESA. In January 2000, the USFWS served a notice-of-intent-to-sue 3
irrigation districts – the Hudson Bay District Improvement Company and the Walla
Walla River Irrigation District on the Oregon side, and the Gardena Farms Irrigation
District #13 on the Washington side – for potential violations of the ESA stemming
from their water delivery operations. The potential consequences for the irrigation
districts and farmers were significant: stiff fines, forfeiture of water rights, and even
incarceration. And given the Basin’s heavy reliance on agriculture, the injunction
had ripple effects that spared practically no one living in the Basin.
Formation of the Walla Walla Watershed Alliance
The federal injunction, by its very scope, spurred boundary spanning across
the state line. Before the notice was served, the irrigation districts had been
working relatively independently of one another. The social and political division
across the state line had historical roots in the 1936 Supreme Court ruling, but
irrigation districts, by their nature, also tended to operate as autonomous entities.
By some accounts irrigation districts on the Oregon side were less conservative
politically, but the recent influx of relatively sophisticated wine growers from
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California had begun to soften the distrust of outsiders which had characterized the
valley’s communities. Reactionary and progressive elements within the agricultural
community combined in their response to the common threat represented by the
USFWS injunction. Initially led by conservative leaders like Dick DuCharme, they
formed a legal defense fund that sought to fight the injunction. As one of the
participants of the early meeting of farmers recalls, the palpable threat to people’s
livelihoods mobilized the irrigation communities on both sides of the state line:
It is pretty easy to rally people around that because the threat was we were
just going to lose our water. Anyone who is serious about their water, which
is anybody who owns a water right or holds a water right, you're serious
about it. That part was really easy to get together. I think, if I remember
correctly, everybody threw $100 in the pot and we started this fund. There
were probably 35, 40 people at the original meetings.
On the plaintiff side, the notice-of-intent was actually served by the USFWS along
with a coalition of state, regional, and national environmental groups, including the
Washington Environment Council (WEC) and the Center for Environmental Law and
Policy (CELP), led by environmental lawyer Rob Caldwell.33 Given the Basin’s
historical and cultural context, the USFWS injunction was incendiary and, indeed,
lines were already being drawn in the sand. But surprisingly to many Basin
observers and even residents, instead of litigation, the various parties eventually
opted to negotiate a settlement agreement that resulted in new commitments to
protect both water and water rights. The story behind this shift is a story of

Other environmental groups involved in the injunction included: American River, WaterWatch of
Oregon, Friends of the Earth, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Pacific Coast Federation of
Fisherman’s Associations, Trout Unlimited, and EarthJustice.
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boundary spanning which laid the groundwork for a more collaborative approach in
the Basin, including formation of the Walla Walla Watershed Alliance.
A Bi-State Friendship
Throughout this story, we find evidence of moderating forces working to deescalate tensions, often working on both sides simultaneously. Within the irrigation
community, the budding friendship of 2 community leaders, Bob Rupar of Nelson
Irrigation and Ron Brown of the Walla Walla River Irrigation District on the Oregon
side, proved especially important. Both men are, according to interviewees, highly
regarded within their respective communities both for their technical and business
acumen as well as for their personal integrity, as several excerpts from interviews
attest:
Bob was really important with his background in irrigated ag[riculture] and
just his overall business acumen. He's a very articulate guy and well
connected.
Ron was someone very caught in the middle of the water crisis and a good
spokesman for the issue just because he lived it every day. He and his family
get their living from irrigated agriculture. The fact orcharding being their
main source of income, they couldn't go a year without water. They would
lose all their trees and have to start from scratch across all their farms they
operate. I think he was really passionate and knowledgeable to be able to
speak to federal agencies, to speak to elected officials and bring together a
boarder coalition.
There's a high level of credibility with the people that are involved amongst
their peers. We were very fortunate that the people that came together have
a very high level of integrity, respect, low egos, and just a sense in the
community that “If Bob says this is an important thing to do, I'm going to
trust Bob. There must be something – I trust his judgment – there must be
something about this that is good.”
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Both men, it seems, also hold a great deal of faith in the ability of local communities
to come together to creatively solve their own problems. This twin faith in technical
innovation and collaboration had cultural roots in the Walla Walla River valley, but
was now being given new expression in the context of the USFWS injunction. Rupar
and Brown felt that, by partnering with community stakeholders on improving
efficiencies and other measures, the irrigation districts could reduce diversions
while retaining most of the irrigation districts’ water rights. Testimony from one
observer familiar with the early discussions suggest that the Alliance was born
largely from an urge on the part of irrigators to avoid not only litigation but future
regulatory intervention. This impulse gave the Alliance a somewhat defensive
posture that was consistent with the independent character of the agricultural
communities from which it emerged:
Bob and Ron, in looking at this, it was a mechanism in their minds to be able
to take control here locally and try to establish a reputation where we were
doing the right things to help deflect the agencies’ more punitive measures
they might take. It was really a defensive-oriented: “If we're actively thinking
through these issues, working with the stakeholders, it's going to work. We'll
be able to make progress. That will allow us to have more ability to manage
our own water problems and not have the agencies be so actively involved.”
Building Trust between Farmers and Environmentalists
While the idea of local management may assume a natural, almost inevitable,
quality to it in retrospect, at the time of the injunction, a negotiated settlement was
far from assured. In fact, the moderation of political views within the irrigator’s
legal defense fund depended on serendipitous convergence of several historical
developments. For one, the steady shift in agriculture away from water-intensive,
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lower margin crops like alfalfa to more profitable wine production, which requires
less water, created an incentive for farmers to conserve water. As already
mentioned, this shift to wine production also tended to bring with it a somewhat
more progressive group of farmers, many of them veterans of California’s water
conflicts, who were more inclined to experiment with new methods and
technologies.
Second, the overall political climate of environmental policy was already
shifting to favor more creative and collaborative approaches over litigation.
Around the same time as the injunction, Klamath Falls was emerging as a cautionary
tale of the destructive effects of litigation. There, farmers tried to fight the ESA and
lost while the Klamath Basin community experienced heart-wrenching conflicts.
Neighboring Methow Valley had a similar tale to tell, where a Notice of Violation was
served to the Methow Valley Irrigation District in late December 2001 that resulted
in drawn-out court battle with the Department of Ecology. But neighboring Umatilla
Basin was a study in contrast. There, the CTUIR had begun cooperating with
irrigators, agencies, and other stakeholders in managing the basin’s water
resources. Early on, Walla Walla’s irrigators invited Senator Gordon Smith down to
discuss their options. Interviews with irrigators who were present reveal that Smith
told an assembled group of farmers and irrigators that ESA was probably here to
stay for the foreseeable future and that they would be better off learning to work
with, rather than against, it. Moreover, Smith pointed out, as co-managers of salmon
resources and holders of rights to half the fish as well as holders of federal water
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rights, the CTUIR were major stakeholders in the ESA issue. No agreement would
stand without their participation. Smith pointed to neighboring Umatilla Basin as
evidence that such collaboration was indeed possible.
Boundary spanners also worked to moderate views on the other side of the
USFWS injunction. Local environmental interests, most notably Kooskooski
Commons and its founders Judith Johnson and Kevin Scribner, were not part of the
injunction, but they were familiar enough with the shifting political winds in the
Basin to sense that farmers were at least ready to consider ways to collaborate to
address the ESA listings, and they conveyed this to their regional and national
environmental counterparts that were party to the suit. Johnson’s and Scribner’s
role was important, for, as one irrigator points out, without their fingers on the local
community’s pulse, these larger environmental organizations were not themselves
in a position to sense the opportunity for collaboration.
He [Scribner] had the ear of some of the people from Washington Center for
the Environment if I understand it right, at that time was an umbrella group
that a lot of different environmental groups basically were kind of under the
umbrella of that and Kevin was kind of plugged into those people. […]Where
some areas you are not lucky enough to have a Kevin Scribner out there
because if they don't know your area, and they're coming in the big boys
from Seattle and there is no connection here at all, then they immediately
jump over anything that might be a reasonable approach to this thing and go
right to a lawsuit. And so somehow Kevin got engaged and he's a very
friendly guy and very gregarious, [but] very unlikely a guy like him and I
would ever have any reason to talk to each other. And then all of a sudden
we did. Then he finds out maybe I'm not that bad a guy. And I find out he's
not that bad a guy. He's pretty easy to engage with. […] He did a real good job
I think in liaising with the environmental people so that they had a level of
comfort here. Because we were talking, and they were saying, “Hey, this is
pretty interesting that we can even talk to you guys.”
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As the quote suggests, personalities played a role too. In addition to Scribner, Rupar
and Brown demonstrated a willingness to consider alternatives points of view that
may have led to their friendship. Several interviewees also testified to Caldwell’s
penchant for developing “out-of-the-box” solutions to water management problems.
He was therefore already inclined to think in terms of collaborative solutions. Lisa
Pelly, who was affiliated with the Washington Environmental Council and enjoys
considerable legitimacy in the eyes of state and even national environmental
interests, also eventually championed a negotiated settlement.
Johnson and Scribner in some ways facilitated the first cautious steps toward
negotiation by setting up the first meeting between regulators and
environmentalists and farmers. One of the interviewees recounts the often-told
story of the first meeting, pointing out how close the injunction came to becoming a
lawsuit:
They met at [Ron Brown’s] boardroom, his business, apple-packing business.
They sat around a table and alternated, the outside environmentalist with the
local guys. They had this big basket of juicy apples at the table. What the
farmers were able to tell the environmentalists was: “Work with this, if you
don't, you're going to lose your best partner in all of this to make things
happen.” They actually had an injunction letter in their briefcase. They set it
down and said, “We will work with you.” That was a significant moment.
They didn't do that out of a vacuum but they were encouraged to do that, the
guys from outside the basin.
Indeed, the bringers of the suit were encouraged to consider negotiation over
litigation for a number of reasons. The decline in federal dollars for regulatory
enforcement compelled federal and state agencies to begin collaborating with local
communities in both the planning and management of watersheds. For
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environmental groups and even Native American tribes, litigation had served as an
effective policy tool for bringing development, agricultural, and other interests to
the table, but cases like the Klamath Basin also showed them that it was not a longterm solution. The alternatives to negotiation were not appealing for either party.
Caldwell and the USFWS were struck by the “sincerity” of the farmers and
decided that it was worth giving this proposal a chance, thus commencing
negotiations that would ultimately lead to what would be called the “Settlement
Agreement.” It seems likely that the reputation of Caldwell and Pelly helped allay
fears among environmental interests at least enough to buy time to reach a
settlement agreement. In addition, Gail Achterman, who was at that time a lawyer
for Stoel Rives, attended one of the meetings and, according to one farmer who was
present, helped convince the USFWS solicitor to grant the farmers a chance to come
up with a local solution.
A “Final Amended Civil Penalty Settlement Agreement” between USFWS, the
irrigation districts, and the city of Walla Walla, which was brought in to address its
intake on Mill Creek (among other things), was reached in June 2000, restoring 1820 cubic feet per second (cfs) of flow to the Walla Walla River on the Oregon side
and 15 cfs on the Washington side. The agreement included a commitment from
farmers and irrigators to take long-term measures to reduce withdrawal, including
improving irrigation efficiencies, piping canals, and drilling new wells. In all, the
districts gave up roughly 30% of their water rights. Most significantly, the reduced
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allocations were transferred back to the river as instream water rights through the
Oregon Conserved Water Program and the Washington Water Trust Program.
Formation of the Walla Walla Watershed Alliance
Reaching out to the Tribes
The Settlement Agreement set an important precedent in granting more
flexibility to local water users and managers to comply with state and federal laws.
But while the agreement succeeded in averting a lawsuit, several important issues
remained that threatened to surface again if they were not addressed. For one,
inconsistencies in state statues caused “protected” instream water rights on the
Oregon side to be usurped by senior water rights holders on the Washington side.
At the same time, smaller irrigators and farmers on the Washington side who relied
on spring branches were beginning to suffer shortages as a result of Oregon
irrigators returning more water to the Walla Walla mainstem. But the Settlement
Agreement also exacerbated existing divisions within irrigation communities, as a
staff person from the WWBWC explains:
The irrigation districts were dealing with a lot of controversy. They had
patrons on their district saying, “Why aren't you serving me all of my water
rights like you have been doing for the last 50 or 70 years?” There were
threats of lawsuits within the district. “You can't reduce my water right,” yet
the board members are saying, “The federal agencies could shut off all our
water if we don't give them some.” There was this internal dispute going on
within the districts. Then this external dispute of irrigation districts and
individual irrigators down in Washington were joking they were having the
best water availability they'd ever seen. Here is this water being left instream
at this huge sacrifice of dollars where people are making their systems more
efficient as they matched state and federal grant money, and the water is
going downstream and getting used by others.
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Finally, the CTUIR were not included in the agreement and were therefore
not fully vested partners in its implementation. Early in the negotiations, Caldwell
reiterated Senator Smith’s admonition to the farmers that they reach out to the
Tribes to be partners in any agreement. But it was perhaps Scribner, more than
anyone else, who helped start a conversation between the farmers and the Tribes.
Scribner had ties with the CTUIR through his work with Kooskooskie Commons, but
he also had connections to the farming community through his acquaintance with
Rupar’s son-in-law John Warinner, a geologist. The 2 men recognized that the
USFWS injunction was the symptom of a much larger problem and therefore
required a more comprehensive solution. They decided it may be time to try get
farmers and the Tribes to work together to come up with a more comprehensive
solution.
Later that year, Rupar invited Scribner to Thanksgiving dinner. The
invitation itself was a significant gesture, and afforded the two men an opportunity
to get to know one another and discuss water issues in a more informal setting.
Scribner suggested that the farmers approach the Tribes to be partners in an
alternative solution to litigation. He offered Kooskooskie Common’s “open space
technology” – a facilitated forum to explore and learn about different perspectives
through storytelling – as a resource to help start the conversation. Rupar was
initially skeptical. But one of the stakeholders working with Rupar reports that
Scribner left a positive enough impression that Rupar was at least willing to listen:
It happened in a social setting where Bob and Kevin have dinner at Bob's
house. Bob was very skeptical of environmentalists. We were talking a
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couple days later. He said, “Man, I enjoy this guy. He's got some really
interesting thoughts.” The relationships I think were in some ways
nonexistent because there hadn't been communication. They were not
particularly positive. There was more skepticism but when there were actual
discussions and people got to know each other more on a – it was away from
a meeting kind-of-a-structure – I think that also helped.
As the trust between them grew, Scribner eventually helped Rupar (and Brown)
reach the same conclusion: the USFWS injunction had been more than just about
irrigation and fish. Unless the Basin’s major stakeholders came together to address
more systemic problems related to the Basin’s water shortage, future injunctions
were all but certain. Rupar, Warinner, and Brown started to organize a group of
farmers to invite the Tribes to talk about partnering in the management of Walla
Walla’s “Many Small Waters.”
To be sure, it took some time and effort for the men to convince their fellow
farmers to reach out to the CTUIR; after all, they had to overcome centuries-long
prejudices and histories of water conflict. As in most cases where moderating forces
work to move stakeholders closer to a center, it appears that much depended on the
individual reputation of these men. Caldwell and Pelly faced a similar dilemma
talking with their environmental colleagues, as did Scribner and Johnson in
approaching the Tribes. But it appears that many elements within these separate
interest blocs were beginning to feel it was time to start talking to one another to at
least explore ways to proactively address the Basin’s chronic water shortage and
fish issues. The convergence was also aided by the motivation, shared by the
farmers and the Tribes, at least, to minimize further state and federal intrusion. Still,
it took some time for the new partners to adequately define the nature and scope of
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the management problem to begin to imagine what their partnership might look
like. The founders were themselves changed by their conversations with other
stakeholders and, of course, the organization naturally evolved in the course of
reaching out and recruiting members.
It was in this context that Kooskooskie Commons organized the first in a
series of “confluences,” as the open-space community circles were called, between
the farmers and CTUIR. Scribner was unable to attend the first meeting, which was
held at the CTUIR. Caldwell, however, did help prepare the farmers for the meeting,
while Scribner helped prepare the Tribes. A great deal of thought went into the
design of the meetings. It was symbolically important, for instance, that the farmers
reached out to the Tribes; it was similarly significant that the Tribes offered to host
the first meeting at the Umatilla Indian Reservation. One of the irrigators recounts
that first emotional meeting between two worlds:
There were twelve of us that went down and they sat around their Tribal
Trustee deal and they were pretty stiff, and we were pretty stiff, and nobody
– it was pretty tense, actually. […] There were some four generation of
farmers there and all the way down. […] It was a good cross section of the
farm community. And somehow we just started talking about the situation
and the Tribes immediately, they responded to this because they said
basically, you know, they didn't trust the federal government any more than
we did. They trusted it even less because [of] the Treaty of 1855 and how the
ceded land deal, and how they lost the water, their land, the whole entire
thing. And they said basically “We really sympathize with your plight because
we think the government is going to try to screw you too.” So then all of a
sudden we're talking, it actually became a – believe it or not – a tear-jerking
experience for everybody that was at that. Because we discovered right there
that not only from the environmentalists' standpoint but from the farmers'
standpoint and the tribal standpoint that we basically all wanted the same
thing. We're all for the fish. We're all for the environment. We're all for the
economy. We're all for farming. We're all for preserving the culture. There
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wasn't anybody who had any difference there. And so all of a sudden it was
kind of like “We don't know” at that point in time because it's so shocking.
But by the end of that first meeting the parties had discovered something
extraordinary: their interests were tied to one another.
Birth of the Walla Walla Way
That first meeting set the tone for subsequent confluences, which
Kooskooskie Commons helped facilitate. Interviewees also reported that Caldwell
was instrumental in coaching the parties to concentrate on the “75%” of values that
they agreed on – preserving the natural resources for generations, protecting family
farming, and so on – while avoiding the “25%” where the differences were too wide
to negotiate, at least until more trust was built. The confluences were not limited to
the farmers, irrigation districts and Tribes, but instead sought to include all relevant
stakeholders in the basin that were tied to water and water use, including: the City
of Walla Walla, which is also a significant water user; the Walla Walla County
Conservation District, which provided important technical assistance to farmers;
and the Walla Walla County Commission. During these confluences, individuals like
Mark Wagoner of Gardena Farms Irrigation District, Pat McConnell, a Walla Walla
County Conservation District Supervisor, and Commissioner Greg Tompkins
continued to work to bring other constituents on board. But the confluences were
not the only settings where boundaries were spanned. Other formal and less formal
settings were also important, as a board member recalls:
The Tribes invited Bob [Rupar] early on to come to their Root Fest[ival] and
Bob and Sid went over there, and I think Ron [Brown] was involved in that.
And then up at the [Walla Walla] Community College early on, the
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Community College invited the Tribes to come in and they had a ceremonial
day, I think even, or maybe it was a half-day, and we were all there.

On the Tribes side, Kat Brigham emerged as an important collaborative leader. An
elected Councilmember of the CTUIR, Brigham was, like many, initially skeptical.
But, as a fellow Alliance board member attests, Brigham eventually came to embrace
collaboration, particularly after her positive experience working in the Umatilla
River Basin:
I think Kat, a very well-spoken tribal board member – who had participated
in very heated discussions over fish management in the U.S. versus Canada
fish management discussions regarding anadromous fish but also in
negotiations between the Tribes in Oregon – [with] her experience with that,
she's a great negotiator but also realized the irrigation community are her
neighbors and she was able to keep that in mind and work across boundaries
to find common ground.
Once she overcame her own skepticism, Brigham’s next challenge was to bring other
members of the Tribal community on board. Her efforts were helped by the positive
precedence set in the Umatilla River Basin. Moreover, according to interviews, many
Tribal members were moved by the farmers’ overtures and were willing to give
talks a chance.
These confluences planted the seed of what would become known as the
“Walla Walla Way,” a set of principles centered on community self-determination
that balances the triple-bottom-line of environment, economy, and culture. In
December 2001, the Walla Walla Watershed Alliance (WWWA or “Alliance”) was
incorporated as a bi-state 501(c)3. The WWWA was formally created by Rupar and
Brown with the initial intention of helping with the implementation of the
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Settlement Agreement, but it’s also clear that the men’s vision for the Alliance was
broader in scope. Their interest in local control, basin-wide thinking, and a more
balanced approach to the management of water and fish resources overlapped with
those of the CTUIR. And, inspired by Johnson and Scribner, they imagined a forum
modeled after Kooskooskie Commons’ community circles through which common
values and interests could be found. On May 8th, 2002, the Alliance hosted a
gathering of prominent community members, including representatives of the
irrigation districts, the CTUIR, and local businesses and governments, and, in a
signing ceremony, made a “Walla Walla Promise:”
On this day, March 8, 2002, the undersigned pledge to work together, within
the forum of the Walla Walla Watershed Alliance, to restore and maintain the
ecological, cultural, and economic health of the Walla Walla Basin. We make
this commitment on behalf of the future for the next seven generations and
beyond. A promise made, to ourselves and to our children, is a promise kept
(Ruckelshaus Center, 2007).
Signatories included Lisa Pelly and Megan Clubb, a prominent member of the
business community whose family-owned bank Baker Boyer, had been in operation
in the valley for 140 years. The involvement of such a broad swath of community
stakeholders signaled a truly comprehensive approach to water. Old wounds and
rifts were being mended as a new vision for the Basin began to take shape. What
started as a legal defense fund to fight a federal injunction was evolving into a
community-based watershed management partnership.
Convergence around the Walla Walla Way
Critical to this convergence was the progressive investment of key
collaborative leaders and their constituents in the collaborative process. Much of
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this investment was rooted in the friendships that were formed. As one board
member puts it:
At least here in Walla Walla it seems the success is built on the relationships
that are built. I don't know if it's like that everywhere, but the more time you
spend with someone, the more likely you are to develop an understanding of
what is important to them. It comes down to family in a lot of cases. You
heard Kat [Brigham] at the meeting the other day say “I'm a grandma again!”
That is the level at which these people relate. They didn't initially, but after
you spend years and years working for it, you become very familiar with
what is going on in people's personal lives. I think this is key.
Representatives like Rupar, Brown, and Brigham started out primarily as advocates
for their respective communities, but in the process of building new relationships,
their own views began to change and new identities began to form. As their
thinking began to align, these community leaders came to view the process not
simply in terms of advocacy but also in terms of discovering and realizing joint
benefits.
But the convergence in thinking was no doubt also aided by more official
planning processes that were partially informed by these early conversations. On
the Washington side, work on the Walla Walla Watershed Plan began in 2000 and
was overseen by Ecology’s Watershed Improvement Area (WIA)-32 Planning Unit in
accordance with the Washington State Watershed Management Act. While the
Planning Unit was carrying out its various assessments of water quality, flow, and
storage, it also partnered with the WWWA, the Walla Walla Basin Watershed
Council (WWBWC), and other entities to form the Bi-State Habitat Conservation
Coordinating Committee charged with developing a Habitat Conservation Plan
(HCP) for the entire Walla Walla Basin that would address incidental take of
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federally listed fish. The WRIA 32 Planning Unit also partnered with the WWBWC on
a Walla Walla Subbasin Plan, sponsored by the Northwest Power and Conservation
Council, to address habitat impacts from hydropower facilities on the Columbia and
Snake rivers. Finally, the Snake River Salmon Recovery Plan, working under the
Washington State Governor’s Salmon Recovery Office, prepared a recovery plan for
the Walla Walla and Middle Snake River basins to address a variety of issues ranging
from hydropower to hatcheries and habitat. On the Oregon side, the Oregon
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) worked closely with the WWBWC in
developing its water quality plan for the basin. In addition, the Oregon Plan for
Salmon and Watershed, administered through the Oregon Watershed Enhancement
Board (OWEB), has sponsored numerous projects in the Basin. One example is the
Hudson Bay Aquifer-Spring Restoration Project, where the Alliance partnered with
the WWBWC, the Hudson Bay District Improvement Company (HBDIC), the CTUIR,
Oregon and Washington state agencies, OSU, and technical consultants to test active
recharge strategies. In that project, a monitoring team was set up that included a
sub-group to examine the specific interaction of groundwater levels, flow, and fish
runs. Among other things, the WWBWC worked with local landowners to use their
wells as data points.
These processes stimulated discussion among the Basin’s disparate
stakeholders about basin-wide management and helped build personal and
institutional ties across technical, policy, and social community boundaries. Some
observers bemoaned the lack of coordination between these various planning
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efforts (Siemann & Martin, 2007). Nevertheless, in 2006 the Walla Walla Watershed
Plan completed its Detailed Implementation Plan which guided subsequent funding
and work on both the Walla Walla Subbasin Plan and the Snake River Salmon
Recovery Plan. The HCP similarly brought in the counties to funnel federal
appropriation dollars to address irrigation inefficiencies and fish passage issues.
According to interviews, in most of these planning efforts, the Alliance played an
important role in bringing together funders, regulators, local government,
implementing entities, and other partners to identify and address the Basin’s issues
in a fair and balanced way.
The planning processes also stimulated awareness of the need to reform
existing state water statues to allow for more effective coordination of water
management across the state line. Hydrological models of the Basin, especially,
showed complex and dynamic dependencies between ground and surface water
levels that spanned the two states. The research of the WWBWC’s hydrologists
Warinner, Bob Bower, and their colleagues has been important in this regard. These
studies and discussions raised critical awareness of watershed-scale processes and
pointed to the need to approach management on the same scale. But the planning
processes were, according to participants who were interviewed, also characterized
by a good deal of advocacy science, as different interests presented studies that
tended to support their point of view. For many of these participants, the HCP and
WIA-32 processes underscored the need for stakeholders to learn about the deeper
interests and values behind each other’s stated positions. The hope was that by
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doing so, stakeholders might discover both the opportunities and limits for
collaboration. Of course, in the course of learning about and relating to others,
stakeholders themselves would be transformed, sometimes shifting the cost-benefit
calculation in subtle but profound ways.
Lawyers and Policy Entrepreneurs
The story of the Alliance’s formation is to a great extent a story of “happy
confluences” of like-minded individuals with the talent, resources, and institutional
capacity to stitch together an innovative institutional process to address the Basin’s
water issues. In no small way, these confluences were made possible by social
networks spanning multiple sectors and governance levels. A key part of this story
centers on the initiative of outsiders whose own policy interests came to be aligned
with those of the Alliance and its partners. After the Settlement Agreement was
reached, Caldwell joined the law firm Gordon Thomas Honeywell LLP based in
Tacoma, Washington, where Dan Evans was already working. Evans had significant
public service experience, having worked as state director for Democratic Senator
Patty Murray before working for various congressional representatives in
Washington, D.C. James Waldo was (and is) a partner in the firm with over 20 years
of experience in negotiating regional agreements over contentious natural resource
issues. Waldo, a lifelong Republican, was also serving as then-Governor Gary
Locke’s Water Policy Advisor from 2001-2004 and developed a reputation for
working effectively across the aisle. He was also a graduate of Whitman College in
Walla Walla and was therefore already familiar with the basin community. At the
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time Caldwell joined Gordon Thomas Honeywell, Waldo was heading up a group
within the firm that was experimenting with alternatives to litigation for addressing
natural resource disputes. Waldo pulled Evans and Caldwell into the group. The
firm’s group began functioning as an important node in a social and policy network
of innovative thinkers, many of them environmental lawyers including Gail
Achterman, who had been having informal conversations for a while about the need
to move beyond the traditional regulatory approach to a “next-generation” of policy
tools that was science-and performance-driven, flexible, streamlined, and
economical.
Another member of this network of thinkers was Jay Manning, with whom
Evans had collaborated in several important contexts. Manning was Chairman of the
Board of the WEC when the USFWS injunction was served, and was part of the
decision to withhold the lawsuit. Evans had worked with Manning during Manning’s
years at WEC. In fact, together, Manning and Evans studied the Puget Sound for
ways to do mitigation that was smarter, faster, and cheaper. Their proposals
included an incentives-based mechanism for developers to help pay for the
mitigation. Manning championed this approach as Christine Gregoire’s assistant
Attorney General for Natural Resources. In addition to mitigation banking, a second
area of policy innovation that the group worked in was reforming Washington’s
onerous and complex water laws. A central problem with the statutes was a
relinquishment clause that stipulated water users would lose the portion of their
water rights that were not put to “beneficial use.” The clause effectively created a
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disincentive to conserve water. To make matters worse, water rights holders who
were otherwise motivated to make management changes were disinclined to work
with Ecology for fear – a fear borne out by experiences with the Washington State
Department of Fish & Wildlife’s Cooperative Compliance Program – that any
additional unused rights would be discovered (Siemann & Martin, 2007; Weber, et
al., 2007).
Given their experience with the Walla Walla Basin, Manning, Evans, Caldwell,
and their associates recognized that the Basin offered an opportunity to develop and
test an innovative approach for managing water on a watershed scale. But the
motivation was also economic: the group within Gordon Thomas Honeywell was
particularly interested in developing a business model for the firm that was based
on providing advocacy, capacity-building, and earmarks services to clients. Caldwell
and the firm approached the Alliance and proposed to work with it to obtain the
kinds of funding and legislative reforms they needed to realize their vision for local
and flexible management of water. In 2003, Governor Locke visited Walla Walla in
the first of many tours of prominent political leaders which the still-forming
partnership of stakeholders, guided by Kooskooski Commons, would lead. As a
result of that visit, Waldo was able to procure a state appropriation to support the
inter-state aquifer recharge study.
Manning’s “Challenge”
Gregoire’s election in 2004 and her subsequent appointment of Manning to
the Director of Department of Ecology (“Ecology”) created another political
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opportunity to work on water management reform in the Walla Walla Basin.
Manning was already familiar with confluences from his work with the EDF. And
during one of his visits to the Walla Walla Community College’s Center for Enology
and Viticulture, he had been impressed by the unusual alliance of stakeholders that
were working together to meet the Basin’s multiple water needs. According to
interviews, early in his tenure, Manning met with senior staff Hedia Adelsman and
Walla Walla’s widely respected water master Bill Neve, who strongly encouraged
Manning to go down and visit the Basin as Director of Ecology. Thus, it appears that
senior staff who were well acquainted with conditions on the ground helped push
for more senior-level boundary spanning. At the same time, members of the
Alliance and their constituents were beginning to recognize the need to include
Ecology in the confluence discussions they were holding. As Washington’s lead
agency for enforcing state and federal water rights, standards, and laws, it was clear
that Ecology would need to be part of any long-term Basin management agreement.
Manning made several visits, typically for about 2 days, spaced 6 to 9 months apart.
The visits proved to be pivotal for building trust between Ecology and the
Basin as well as for developing a strategy for collaboration. Local watershed
managers, led by the Alliance, explained to Manning that if they could be extended
some flexibility in the water laws, then they could find a long-term water
management solution that addressed the needs of farmers, fish, the Tribes,
municipalities, and the Basin as a whole. Impressed by what he saw, Manning
subsequently invited key members of the Alliance up to Olympia, where he made his
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by-now famous proposal: Walla Walla would be granted flexibility in administering
state water laws provided 2 conditions were met: first, that water quality and flow
was sufficiently restored to the Walla Walla River to support fish; and second, that
any conflicts that came up would be peacefully resolved within the community.
After receiving a positive response from this smaller circle of leaders, Manning
issued his challenge to the Basin community at a public hearing in Walla Walla on
January 25, 2006:
Do you want to push on the edges of the existing law and regulatory system
for water? [Or, do you want to do] something far more radical than that,
which is, let’s forget about the existing system of laws and regulations and
let’s replace it with an approach that is unique to this basin. And you
decide—you come up on a year-to-year basis based on that year’s
precipitation. […] We’re going to maintain this flow in this wet year, we’re
going to maintain this flow in this medium precipitation year, and this lower
flow in a dry year. We’re going to maintain that flow for fish, for recreation,
for other instream values. And the rest of the water, we’re going to manage
amongst us users (Ruckelshaus Center, 2007).
The proposal by Manning was a significant moment in the evolution of the WWWA,
for it provided a state-sanctioned template for a watershed management
partnership – encapsulated in the phrase “Flow from Flexibility” – around which the
stakeholders could organize. The convergence of boundary spanning practices and
the larger policy community took an important step forward.
Piloting a Vision
To accomplish such an ambitious policy agenda, the WWWA decided it had to
secure funding to carry out studies and pilot projects, including monitoring projects,
that would help build additional support for the bold initiative. Even before
Manning issued his challenge, Evans and Scribner went to Washington D.C. to meet
336

with Senator Murray, a Democrat, and Representative George Nethercutt, a
Republican, to seek financial and political support to explore basin-scale
management that addressed the Basin’s diverse needs. Interviews with participants
of those meetings indicate that the lawmakers, in turn, wanted to be sure that there
was a “critical mass of support” for the Alliance before they backed it. By organizing
presentations and tours of the basin, Evans and Scribner were able to eventually
show that the partnership had the backing not only of the Tribes, farmers, and
environmentalists, but also of local governments, industries, and businesses. The
lawmakers threw their support behind it. Nethercutt, especially, was taken with the
initiative and secured a couple key early appropriations, including a $500,000 block
grant through the National Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) designed to
foster policy innovation. With this funding the Alliance partnered with the WWBWC
in a bi-state effort, led by Warinner, to carry out aquifer recharge and monitoring
studies. The partnership between the Alliance and the WWBWC, which also
included the HBDIC aquifer recharge project, helped to raise awareness around
shallow aquifer recharge across the state line. The NRCS project was a policy
innovation in and of itself, with the Alliance funneling federal but also Washington
state funds to a project that was implemented by an organization on the Oregon
side.
But funding did come with strings attached, including procedural
requirements associated with receiving and distributing federal money. These
requirements introduced, in turn, potential legal and ethical liabilities for the
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partnership. The Alliance’s community role as fiscal agent and grant administrator
also carried with it political risks. The early years were a time for the Alliance to
define who they were both within their community and to the outside world.
Initially, many local organizations and interests were skeptical of the group, and
there was some resentment that came up when occasionally the Alliance, in its effort
to promote itself to the outside world, took credit for accomplishments which other
groups felt was not theirs to take. And to the extent that the Alliance implemented
projects of its own, the Alliance was also seen by watershed councils and other
implementing entities as a competitor for funds.
It took time and some mistakes, but eventually the Alliance built trust with
local partners. Specific measures, like holding public meetings and sharing meeting
minutes, helped. The community reputation of its board members also helped. But
just as importantly, as the Alliance started bringing major funding into the basin, it
became clear that the group was a net asset to the Basin, particularly to the extent
that it distributed this funding to local groups. Indeed, this “pilot project phase” was
important in several respects. Mistakes associated with project and fiscal
controversies spurred the Alliance to shift its focus away from implementing
projects to its core strengths: raising awareness and raising funds. It is not a
coincidence that the Alliance started shifting away from project management and
implementation just as the Basin community was completing its Detailed
Implementation Plan as part of its Walla Walla Watershed Plan. A 2007 report by
the Ruckelshaus Center and Martin Consulting Service notes that a number of the
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Basin’s significant policy actors, including the Alliance, were considering ways to
change their missions and strategies to better align with the major planning efforts
(Siemann & Martin, 2007). And even though the Alliance eventually abandoned
ownership of individual projects, the projects raised awareness of the Basin’s
hydrology and fish biology while testing innovative methods for restoring fish
passage and stream flow. Finally, the projects themselves not only cultivated
particular working relations, but they also served as models for future collaboration.
Branding the Walla Walla Way
Eventually, the Alliance became in many respects the public face of the Basin
community. For one, it drew on its board’s formidable political ties to host highprofile visits by powerful officials and representatives. Typically stakeholders from
the major interests were invited to meet dignitaries and share their stories and
perspectives. Often, visitors came away with the impression of an otherwise diverse
community united by a common vision. The description by an Alliance member of
Representative Nethercutt’s visit illustrates how a personal connection was used to
first invite the dignitary, how he was prepped beforehand, and how the organizers
used the open space forum to allow the official to experience “the Walla Walla Way”
firsthand. The experience often left a lasting impression; in Nethercutt’s case, it
brought significant funding:
We invited Congressman Nethercutt – the connections to George
[Nethercutt] were through the Rupar family. My friend John Warinner and
Ron [Brown] were briefing George on what to expect, but also who is going to
enter into our space. One of the requirements of being in open space is a
dedication to keep the space open. We informed him, “You can't just come in
and glad-hand, drop some wisdom and jet. You have to come in and listen to
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us.” He came into the circle – I ended up talking to one of his staffers later
and we were reminiscing about it. They just didn't know what they were
going to discover there. They didn't know if they were coming in to get
lynched – we put George in the circle, then just went around, everybody
saying why they were there and – which is one of the patterns of open space
– by the time it got around to George, it couldn't have been scripted any
better. It wasn't farmers over here and others over there. It was a mosaic of
perspectives, and people being hopeful and optimistic. He said, “I just can't
believe this.” He got to experience that firsthand and then became a
champion of the Walla Walla efforts firsthand back in D.C.
By acting as the greeter and convener of outside visits and tours, the Alliance
assumed a kind of gate-keeper role in both directions. As far as the Basin community
was concerned, the Alliance came to represent the access point to political and
financial capital. To the larger policy world, the Alliance came to stand for a unique
set of values and processes captured in the evocative phrase, “the Walla Walla Way.”
To a great extent, the development of the Alliance centered on the cultivation of “the
Walla Walla Way” brand.
Successful tours led to new opportunities to tell the Walla Walla story to a
larger audience. In June, 2005 the Chair of President Bush’s Council for
Environmental Quality visited the Basin and was so impressed that he nominated
the Walla Walla effort to be 1 of 32 select case studies to participate in Bush’s
Collaborative Conservation Initiative. Brigham, Brown, Scribner, and Cathy
Schaeffer, who was then Watershed Planning Director for Walla Walla County,
formed the core of the group. At the first conference in St. Louis in August, the
presentation given by the group made a lasting impression on attendees and put the
Walla Walla on the national map of environmental collaboration. In many ways this
group formed the core of the Alliance as it became the public face not only for the
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Alliance but for the other collaborative processes already underway in the Basin.
Local groups could see that they were going to have to work with the Alliance in
order to be successful or risk alienation and de-funding. Similarly, partnership
initiatives with the Alliance imprimatur gave elected officials and other institutional
sponsors the political cover to support them. Eventually, the Alliance found its role,
namely: as a voice and advocate for a unique vision of basin-wide management
premised on the principles of local control and flexibility, innovation, the triplebottom line, and a fair and open process.
While the Alliance’s standing within the Basin rested on its unique ability to
secure outside support, its standing with the larger policy world depended on
holding together a coalition that could claim to represent the diverse interests of the
Basin community. The many tours of high profile officials and leaders ritually
underscored this claim. More generally, it seems that in many ways the Cooperative
Conservation group and the Alliance’s larger connections – and the confidence they
enjoyed from political leaders – gave the Basin’s planning processes a degree of
autonomy that was rather unique. In contrast to other watershed planning
processes in Washington, Ecology’s Planning Unit overseeing WAI-32 decided early
on to reserve voting rights for only local representatives while relegating state and
federal regulators to the role of observer (Siemann & Martin, 2007). In 2007, the
Walla Walla Basin became 1 of the first 5 Watershed Innovation Zones (“Walla Walla
Valley Innovation Partnership Zone”) sponsored by the state that brought $4.7
million to the Basin over the 2007-09 biennium. The planning process itself was
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inclusive throughout, from problem exploration and plan formulation to
implementation. The final plan consequently came to enjoy broad-based support.
Realizing its Vision
But arguably the Alliance’s most influential role to date has been sheparding
the development of the pact between Ecology and the Basin, which came to be called
the Walla Walla Water Management Initiative (“Water Management Initiative”).
Responding to Manning’s challenge, the Alliance started the work of elaborating a
basic vision of a Walla Walla Watershed Management Partnership”(WWWMP) into a
concrete institutional design. But even here, the Alliance benefitted from assistance.
Gordon Thomas Honeywell, especially Caldwell, was critical in providing the
Alliance the capacity to advocate for legislative reform and appropriation, as was
Manning. But there is good reason to suspect that these policy entrepreneurs had a
hand in the conceptual development of the WWWMP as well. Another important
institutional champion was Bill Ruckelshaus. His Ruckelshaus Center provided
technical assistance in researching and developing the proposal for the WWWMP
(cf. Ruckelshaus Center, 2007; Siemann & Martin, 2007 ). Federal and state support
was also important. The support of Senator Murray and Representative Nethercutt
was of course crucial. At the state level, the Basin was fortunate enough to be
represented by a delegation of 3 strong leaders in the Washington legislature: Mike
Hewitt, Democratic Senate Minority Leader; Bill Grant, the #3 Republican in the
House, and Maureen Walsh, a moderate House Republican. Grant, especially,
became a champion of the Alliance and the Water Management Initiative and here,
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too, serendipitous connections played an important role, as an Alliance board
member explains:
He had a lot of respect for the people who were involved in the Alliance
locally and was friends with most of us and really understood it. He was a
producer too. He wasn't an irrigated producer but he was a farmer. That was
a good thing too.
Grant, a popular bipartisan leader, died during the legislative session that included
the WWWMP bill, which only solidified support for the legislation.
But arguably no individual put more thought or effort into developing the
WWWMP than did Cathy Shaeffer. Shaeffer drew on the Ruckelshaus reports and
other sources and assembled a WWWMP proposal for a “local and flexible water
management program” that enabled the multiple watershed managers to work
together through a bi-state “governance structure with clear authority and function”
to meet local, state, and federal water policy goals (Adelsman, 2008). It called for a
board to oversee the WWWMP, a “Policy Advisory Group,” and a “Water Resources
Panel” of technical experts. Ecology would participate in the latter two groups while
sharing oversight responsibilities with the WWWMP board. In addition, the
proposal outlines “Flow from Flexibility” pilot projects to test a more flexible and
local management regime whereby water users creatively change water usage
without going through conventional Ecology review and permitting. In this way,
water users can voluntarily participate in various conservation and management
strategies that restore flow while preserving groundwater and aquifer storage, all
without jeopardizing their water rights from relinquishment or other rule. Finally,
the proposal describes a “Walla Walla Water Bank” that would accept and protect
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agreements by water users to return water to the river on a temporary or
permanent basis as a result of conservation and management activities. It imagined
the Water Bank eventually handling a full range of both public and private water
transactions and markets. The institutional design of the WWWMP reflects an
abiding faith in the ability of local and voluntary policy mechanisms to address
stubborn socio-technical and policy complexities where, the proposal argued,
interstate compacts and other mechanisms would either be too expensive or likely
fail (Adelsman, 2008).
Initially, the proposal was met with a great deal of skepticism by some of the
watershed managers who suspected the WWWMP was an instrument of one
interest bloc or another or who felt that their roles, jurisdictions, and funding were
threatened. One particularly contentious issue centered on exempt wells, which are
wells that can draw water without a permit. An attempt within the proposal to
restrict exempt wells met with stiff resistance from developers, builders, and other
real estate interests. But relationships between Alliance members and between their
constituencies had strengthened to the point that differences could be aired and
compromises found. Those who could help resolve differences, like Commissioner
Tompkins, were either members of or affiliated with the Alliance in some way,
making it more likely that compromises would be found. Furthermore, the major
interests that were represented by the Alliance were able to provide a unified
message endorsing the proposal that tended to be reinforced as that message made
its way through different channels, as one of the board members explains:
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So as we were forming that [WWWMP] and I'm explaining to the
conservation district supervisors, "This is not a grab by the county, or anyone
else," well, so Greg Tompkins, who is a county commissioner is in his county
commission meeting saying "Well guys, this really would be a good idea
because of this and this and this and this." And "yes, we'd lose some county
funding that is doing this, but it would make this process way more efficient,
and the conservation district is on board.”… And without the county, the
district, and 15 other entities supportive of it, it would have never happened.
If any one of us -- if Greg Tompkins, who is a county commissioner would
have called a legislator and said "Hey, this is going to be bad for the county"
or if I would have called a legislator and said "this is going to be bad for the
district," you know it potentially would have derailed that whole deal.
The proposal also underwent a public involvement process, and Shaeffer and
her colleagues were able to incorporate comments and ideas into the final proposal.
They subsequently translated the proposal into a legislative outline and presented it
to Washington’s House of Representatives for consideration in the fall of 2008. The
House introduced a variant of the proposal as HB 1580 which was unanimously
approved – a feat unto itself in the context of an economic crisis and polarized
political climate – and signed into law by Governor Gregoire in 2009. The pilot
program (codified as RCW 90.92) amounted to a social contract between Walla
Walla and Ecology that the Basin’s watershed managers had 10 years to meet water
quality and flow standards through a local partnership program they deemed
appropriate. Among its responsibilities, the program’s governing body would
manage and resolve its water disputes internally. If Ecology found that sufficient
progress toward the program’s goals was not being met, ESA injunctions and other
actions could be imposed. The USFWS injunction continues to hang over the Basin
like a distant storm cloud.
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As a legislatively authorized partnership, the WWWMP represented the
institutionalization of the Alliance’s Walla Walla Promise. It carried with it the
added legitimacy of including Ecology as a partner in local watershed management.
The WWWMP was of course not merely a creature of the Alliance: it was driven as
much by the other major planning actors and processes, including the Detailed
Implementation Plan, as it was by the Alliance’s own agenda. It’s more accurate to
say that the Alliance principles and practices converged with ideas and practices of
other policy actors through a process of mutual adjustment to form the WWWMP.
Success begets success. The 2009 legislative triumph solidified the
reputation of the Alliance and the “Walla Walla Way” brand both within and outside
of the Basin. The same year, Walla Walla Community College (WWCC) President Dr.
Steven VanAusdale, County Commissioner Greg Tompkins, and Rupar were able to
secure additional funding to expand and operate the renamed WWCC William A.
Grant Water and Environmental Center. The speed with which they were able to
secure funding for the center – about $8.5 million total plus $500,000 /year
operating budget – particularly in the context of an economic and budgetary crisis,
speaks to the prestige of the Alliance's work. Indeed, during one of the Alliance’s
board meeting in the spring of 2009, VanAusdale reported that state officials
wanted to explore turning the Water and Environmental Center into a state center
for water policy research and development (personal observation, June 10, 2010).
In late 2010, the center was the recipient of Governor Gregoire’s Workforce and
Economic Development Best Practices Award.
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The Alliance’s Choice
These achievements ironically brought with them an existential challenge for
the Alliance, as its role championing the concept of a local watershed management
partnership became less clear now that the WWWMP and the Water and
Environmental Center were realities. For some board members, including some of
its founders, the Alliance had clearly fulfilled its mission. For others, the Alliance
still had an important role to play in bringing awareness, funding, and political
support for the local watershed management efforts, particularly the WWWMP.
Coinciding with these discussions, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and
CTUIR were finalizing a list of alternatives for a Stream Flow Enhancement Project
on the upper reach of the Walla Walla that seeks to restore salmon runs without
jeopardizing water rights of irrigators and other water users. At the time, the USACE
seemed to favor a more expensive source water pump exchange option that
envisioned pumping Columbia River water to irrigators to replace bypasses of their
diversions on the Walla Walla. Cost estimates had steadily climbed and, by June
2010, had reached $400 million. The latest price tag was beginning to reveal fissures
in priorities among the Alliance’s members. From interviews, coupled with personal
observation of the June 10 board meeting, it appeared that several representatives
of the agricultural and business communities were beginning to balk at the price tag,
saying it ran counter to their philosophy of private sector innovation and small
government. But while the CTUIR were also frustrated with the glacial pace with
which the USACE moved, they reiterated that the project should go forward, even if
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the pump exchange option was ultimately selected. The return of salmon was
paramount. For the CTUIR, the Stream Flow Enhancement Project needed an
organization like the Alliance to use its considerable political influence to secure
support for the project. The Stream Flow Enhancement Project was beginning to
acquire notoriety in the Basin, and discussion of the Alliance’s future was being
increasingly framed in its terms.
Mike Bireley, the Alliance’s ED, guided the Alliance Board through a decisionmaking process that lasted 6 months and at least 4 board meetings. Bireley wanted
to ensure that the board members understood what their options and implications
were before they made their decision, rather than after. Essentially, the board
members had to decide to either step up the Alliance’s visibility as the Basin’s water
policy leader or ramp down operations and assume more of a supportive role, either
loosely or just individually. On June 10, 2010, the board met to discuss a proposal to
dissolve the 501(c)3 structure. Proposers of the motion contended that the recent
establishment of the WWWMP obviated the need for the Alliance, particularly as a
legal body subject to liability. They felt that the administrative strictures were
hamstringing the members from doing what they do best, which was to lobby for
outside support. Several, including Ron Brown, pointed to increasing personal and
business commitments that made it difficult for them to continue participating in
the Alliance. Yet, Brigham, among others, pointed to the need for the Alliance in
significant efforts like the Stream Flow Enhancement Project. The discussion that
ensued, while perhaps not always comfortable, reflected a kind of frankness that is
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evident in groups bound by trust and goodwill (personal observation, June 10,
2010). At one point, Clubb pointed out that the Alliance’s true value was that it
offered a unique forum where diverse stakeholders could continue to meet, build
relationships, share perspectives, and learn from one another. The meeting
concluded with an adoption of a motion to formally dissolve the Alliance’s 501(c)3
status while retaining its function as both a lobbying arm and forum for discussing
local watershed management in the Basin.
Boundary Spanning and Social Learning in the WWWA
The codification of the Walla Walla Promise signaled the emergence of the
WWWA. But for such processes of social learning to translate to wider institutional
and social change (and to prevent “drift” of leaders from their communities), it is
critical for collaborative leaders to continue to communicate and share their
learning with their constituents, not so much to bring them aboard as to bring the
wider communities into greater alignment with one another. In such processes,
social learning is iterative: boundary spanners “report back” their learning to
stimulate conversations and social learning within their respective communities,
and this learning is then communicated back to the partnership to be mixed and
integrated with the learning reported back by fellow boundary spanners, and the
cycle repeats. The theory suggests that the social, technical, and policy agreement
between the group and the larger community(ies) will tend to increase with each
iteration.
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We see this in the way early conversations between Rupar, Brown, Caldwell,
Scribner, Brigham, Clubb, and others transformed the participants themselves. And
ultimately each major interest bloc – whether they be farmers and irrigators, the
Tribes, environmentalists, regulators, municipalities, or other stakeholder group –
made concessions, not only within the context of the Water Management Initiative,
but within the contexts of the other planning processes as well. This speaks both to
the ability of the founding members to learn from one another, but also to
communicate that learning to their constituents even as they relayed important
information and perspectives back to the group. This ability depended, in turn, on
the emergence of a particular group culture within the Alliance centered on frank
and respectful communication. As one board member says:
We got to the point in relationships where we were able to have really
serious, robust conversations on issues that were challenging but there was
enough positive emotional bank account built – there was enough positive
there – that even though you might cause some damage, people understood
we have differences by this time. It was just part of the deal.
In many ways the Alliance’s members came to embody the Walla Walla Promise
they made. Given the politically volatile context in which it formed, it is doubtful that
the Alliance would have lasted long if it hadn’t.
There was probably some path dependence to the evolution of the Alliance as
well: specific relationships like the friendship between Scribner and Warinner led to
personal and professional introductions that not only opened or foreclosed
opportunities but also shaped subsequent thinking. As with other cases of
partnership building, the partnership effect of the WWWA was certainly significant,
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as each member placed their indelible print on the organization’s mission and
practices. But there were also important “affiliates” who helped cultivate and
develop the Alliance. Caldwell, working in conjunction with a close circle of water
policy entrepreneurs, actively supported the deliberations that ultimately led to the
WWWMP and the fulfillment, in many respects, of the vision which he and his
colleagues had been developing. For Caldwell, Manning, and others, the Walla Walla
Basin presented a unique opportunity to test their ideas – and business model – in a
specific policy context. These individuals also used their considerable political
capital to secure funding and support for the Alliance and its initiatives.
In the case of Manning, the story of his challenge to the Basin is particularly
illustrative of convergence. Interviews reveal that Manning in fact proposed his
challenge to a close circle of stakeholders (including Alliance members) in Olympia
before making his public challenge to the Basin community in early 2006. By first
discussing his challenge with a group of Basin leaders, Manning increased the
likelihood that his proposal would be well received. But it also afforded the Basin
leaders a chance to influence Manning’s proposal and therefore the direction of
convergence between state regulators and the Basin community. Caldwell and
others similarly helped the Alliance pitch their message to the larger policy world.
In the process, the partners learned to cultivate an image of themselves and to
derive political and economic capital from the resulting “Walla Walla Way” brand.
After all, by the time Manning made his now-famous speech, the Alliance had
already garnered significant national attention as a Cooperative Conservation
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Awardee. In the end, Ecology’s challenge to the Basin was as much the Alliance’s as
the Alliance’s Water Management Initiative was Ecology’s. The timing of the
Alliance’s shift to a more strategic role in the Basin – which coincided with the WRIA
32 Planning Unit’s Detailed Implementation Plan and with an increased awareness
among the Basin’s major watershed managers to more strategically align their
priorities, resources, and efforts – suggests that similar instances of convergence
between the Alliance and the larger community were occurring in other, and
partially overlapping, planning and policy deliberations as well. Indeed, interviews
of policy actors that participated in the concurrent planning processes depict a
policy community of partially overlapping networks, as a prominent member of the
Alliance explains:
There was a few of us that crossed in to different groups. I wasn't part of the
watershed but being part of the irrigation district, I had twofold going on. I
had not only what was happening with the Alliance so I could bring whatever
was happening in the district side with negotiations basically on a plan we
had to work out before we did the HCP. And so I was connected by a lot of
knowledge. And so being on different groups then, I brought some stuff to the
table. I was probably the most connected of everybody because of the
irrigation district that was being sued by U.S. Fish and Wildlife. There was a
few other people though too. Hudson Bay (District Improvement Company),
Ray Williams was connected then through the watershed. And so he was
giving them information. Cathy [Shaeffer] was eventually part of the HCP,
and she was connected by being the head of the watershed group on the
Washington side. So we had these people that were kind of interconnected
with what was going on and so people were getting to hear different sides of
the story and bringing it together.
Given the centrality of the Alliance in the Basin’s network structure, it is likely that it
became a locus of convergence in water policy thinking and practice. For all its
innovation, then, the Water Management Initiative had been thoroughly vetted.
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The social learning reflected in the legislative authorization of the WWWMP
can be interpreted in at least 2 ways, depending on our level of analysis. On one
hand, the “Flow from Flexibility” that drives the WWWMP can be seen as a kind of
codification of the “Walla Walla Promise” around which the Alliance first organized.
In this respect, the WWWMP can be seen as a triumphant institutionalization of the
Alliance’s boundary spanning vision. However, some of the elements that comprise
the WWWMP, particularly the water bank and the envisioned water transactions
market, cannot be readily attributed to the Alliance, but rather to other actors and
initiatives. More fundamentally, as a manager and implementer of projects, the
WWWMP fulfills a role that the Alliance has progressively abandoned over the past
5 years. To be sure, there was significant overlap between the two boards (at least
until the Alliance dissolved its board in June 2010), suggesting some degree of
shared governance. But the shared governance between Ecology and the WWWMP
carries legislative authority and is more significant, particularly since the Alliance
was dissolved. Any discussion of the boundary spanning and social learning
associated with the WWWMP should be told in a story that is larger than our story
of the Alliance.
The dissolution of the Alliance as a 501(c)3 is, however, part of our story, for
it demonstrates a willingness and capacity of the partnership to adapt its form to
fulfill different functions as the policy environment demands. The question remains
whether the Alliance is acquiring a general capacity to learn (i.e., Social Learning III).
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In fact, there is no evidence to suggest this. Instead, the Alliance’s recent decision to
dissolve its 501(c)3 structure was largely driven by specific operational conditions,
especially the lack of inclination or resources to commit the time, money, and risks
that were required to operate a 501(c)3.
There is some evidence to suggest the Alliance has been able to adjust its
operations in response to specific policy triggers, including the Detailed
Implementation Plan, WWWMP, and even the Stream Flow Enhancement Project.
Yet, the changes we observe in the WWWA do not even merit classification of Social
Learning II, for we have no evidence – yet, anyway – that the alignment of the
Alliance and larger Basin community is stable, that is: that the alignment practices
follow a particular pattern. The Alliance’s innovative ideas and practices have not
been widely adopted by the larger Basin, particularly along some of the tributaries
and upper reaches of the Walla Walla River. Indeed, interviews with stakeholders
suggest that the Alliance is in many ways less known within the Basin than outside
of it. There is still a significant need to raise awareness and reach out to
stakeholders to participate in the WWWMP, the HCP, and similar initiatives that the
Alliance has sponsored.
Partnership Capacity of the WWWA
Using Mandell and Steelman’s (2003) typology, the WWWA was, until its
dissolution, a kind of hybrid of “permanent and/or regular coordination” and a
“coalition.” Its formal organization and dedication of time, staff, facilities, and other
resources were attributes of permanent and/or regular coordination. However, its
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purpose – to help build a local watershed management regime in the Walla Walla
Basin – was ambitious and called for long-term commitment from its members. The
partnership also entailed a significant amount of resource- and risk-sharing.34 It is
interesting to speculate that the seeds of the Alliance’s struggle to define itself over
the years may have been planted in its incorporation as an organizational hybrid of
two different and somewhat conflicting interorganizational innovations.
Analysis of the boundary spanning and social learning processes suggest that
the WWWA possesses Partnership Capacity Type I. Its boundary spanning ideas and
practices have assumed a definite shape over the years, culminating in the Walla
Walla Promise and, to a great extent, the WMI. But last year, the Alliance dissolved
itself as a 501(c)3, opting to assume a more low-profile role in supporting existing
efforts, particularly the WWWMP. The challenge for the Basin is to develop a unified
watershed management framework that will enable large-scale adoption of the
policy innovations that have been developed. Studies of the collaborative capacity of
the Basin suggest a greater readiness among farmers to work with agencies and
other partners to adopt innovative management practices, like fish screens on
diversions, compared to neighboring basins (Weber, et al., 2007). Still, efforts to
improve fish passage in the Walla Walla Basin have fallen short of program and
policy goals.
Similarly, in the case of the Stream Flow Enhancement Project, the pump
exchange project alternative would appear to solve many water flow problems all at
Bob Rupar and Ron Brown seeded the Alliance with their own money, not to mention a
considerable amount of time and effort that went into building the partnership and its initiatives.
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once, and this makes it attractive to many stakeholders who have since grown wary
of the burdens of local governance, particularly in enforcing against their neighbors.
But it’s largely a technical and expensive fix, one that may not address more
entrenched problems. As one Alliance board member observes, the Stream Flow
Enhancement Project is a test of the innovative spirit that has driven the Alliance’s
vision. For him, the kind of questions the Alliance asks of the project reflects its own
level of thinking. It’s one thing to question the costs or accounting of the USACE
pump exchange option; it’s quite another to question whether it should be an
engineered solution that is overseen by a federal agency like the USACE to begin
with:
Are they [the Alliance and its partners] evidencing an interest and capacity to
see this big water project in a larger spirit as a chance to innovate? Because
we're going to come to these boundaries.[…] If we need a project on this scale
– and what people are saying is, “We do,” but then they balk at the price tag
for it, but then they say "Well, is the price tag because it is now being
countenanced as a public works project that is going to be managed by the
federal government?" – Well, should we stop at that? Should that be our sole
question, or can there be another way to get the project done? Does it have to
be that federal agency? Can it be a public/private partnership? Can it be
private money? There's a will of the Alliance to ask those questions and we
already have of the Corps [USACE].
Whichever Preferred Alternative is finally selected on the project, it will reflect on
the commitment of the Alliance to ask the harder questions, or at least on the
Alliance’s capacity to influence how major management issues are framed. We will
then be in a better position to ascertain the extent to which the Alliance’s capacity
rises to the level of PC II.
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Finally, a more indirect measure of the Alliance’s partnership capacity,
although not derived from the current methodological framework, is the return of
salmon. The CTUIR, working in partnership with the USFWS, began releasing adult
spring Chinook salmon in 2000, with the first successful adult returns beginning in
2004. Since then, the number of returning salmon has increased from roughly 200
to over 1,100 (Walla Walla Watershed Management Partnership, 2010). The
recovery was enough to enable the CTUIR to open, from June 18 through June 21,
2010, their first fishery of spring Chinook salmon in almost a century. The returns
have held a great deal of significance for the Tribes, but also for the entire Basin,
which held its second annual “Return to the River” celebration at the Water and
Environmental Center on August 28, 2010. The site of that celebration, it should be
added, underscores the Center’s increasing importance as a hub of social learning
for the larger Walla Walla Basin.
Conclusion and Recommendations
The convergence of perspectives and practices that led to the formation of
the WWWA and finally the WWWMP was by no means a foregone conclusion at the
outset. When the USFS served its notice-to-sue the 3 irrigation districts in 2000 over
potential ESA violations, the Basin had already experienced a long and bitter history
of water conflicts that divided communities and states. The Walla Walla River was
over-appropriated while the Basin community lacked the social, political, and
economic capital to sufficiently address its many water-related issues. Yet, despite
its apparent similarity to the bi-state conflict that was developing in the Klamath
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River Basin around the same time, the Walla Walla Basin took a different path. The
two “cases” are not independent, since it is clear from interviews and other
testimonies that the Klamath conflict emerged fairly quickly as a cautionary tale for
other Northwest basins, including the Walla Walla. Neighboring Umatilla Basin, in
contrast, served as an inspiration. Nevertheless, interviews with residents suggest
the innovative spirit of the Walla Walla River Basin may have played a role in
encouraging boundary spanning across the public and private sectors. The second
regional cultural characteristic that interviewees identified is the tendency of folks
in the Basin to deliberate more before taking decisions. This more thoughtful
approach, paired with the painful lessons of the Klamath and neighboring Methow
and Yakima valleys, may partly explain why stakeholders, faced with the ESA
injunctions, opted for a different approach.
Still, our case study does not concern the Walla Walla River Basin per say but
rather the WWWA. Clearly, the Walla Walla River Basin ended up looking quite
different from these other basins, but our theory of “convergence” suggests that, if
anything, the Alliance was both a cause and an effect of the Walla Walla Basin’s
environment. For a more complete explanation of the Alliance’s formation and
evolution, we must examine processes endogenous to the Basin’s social learning
process.
The coincidence of other important planning processes within the Basin
certainly facilitated convergence: by raising general awareness of Basin-scale issues;
by increasing direct engagement between different stakeholders; and by increasing
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the probability that those engagements would overlap and thereby reinforce one
another. During the negotiations leading up to the Settlement Agreement, arguably
the most important boundary spanners were those individuals that, due to their
unique social position, were able to approach both parties simultaneously and
thereby de-escalate tensions. But convergence does not imply consensus – only that
the boundary spanning practices of a few boundary spanners begin to align with the
fields from which the boundary spanners are drawn. In this case, we see how Rupar,
Brown, Scribner, Clubb, Brigham, and a handful of others came to embody a set of
practices that was eventually ascribed to an entire basin community with the label
“the Walla Walla Way.” Of all the different social and policy processes that were
underway in the early 2000’s, starting with the ESA injunction, how did the Basin
come to adopt “the Walla Walla Way” idea, and how did that idea eventually achieve
legislative authorization in the WWWMP?
The story of the Alliance’s formation is in many respects a story of personal
ties and professional associations. A good deal of serendipity came into play, not
only in the path dependence of member recruitment, but also in the coincidence of
inclinations, capacities, and opportunities – the election of Washington Governor
Gregoire and her subsequent appointment of Manning as head of Ecology is just one
example – that facilitated the convergence of innovative thinking and practices.
Networks formed that enabled different forms of capital to be combined in unique
ways. The Alliance board itself was an example. Convergence was set into motion
once these actors learned how to market their product – the Walla Walla Way brand
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– to the larger world. But the case study also shows how the Alliance and its
boundary objects were transformed in the process. It is not simply that the there
was “pushback” from community stakeholders. Interviews suggest that much of this
pushback was relayed back to the board meetings for more deliberation. These
pushbacks were compared to one another, enabling the board (mostly unwittingly)
to construct a kind of composite mental map of the Alliance’s standing in the larger
Basin community from which new actions would be taken, and the social learning
cycle would repeat. A kind of conversation ensued between the Alliance and the
community about its proper role in it; it is a conversation that has been going on for
10 years.
While we find evidence of the kind of convergence of boundary spanning
practices to suggest the Alliance has achieved minimal partnership capacity (PC I),
there is no clear evidence that the conversational structure between the Alliance
and the Basin community has achieved the kind of closure we would associate with
a more resilient community partnership. That is, there is no indication that the
Alliance and larger community agree on under which circumstances the Alliance
should reorganize itself and what that reorganization should look like. Although the
case study reveals instances of alignment between operational, strategic, and even
constitutional concerns, we find no evidence of a pattern of alignment practices that
would indicate PC II.
Let us now summarize our assessment of the WWWA’s capacity to manage
institutional processes of varying degrees of complexity. Table 7 summarizes the
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various boundary spanning practices that were observed in the WWWA process.
The table’s structure follows the methodological criteria contained in Table 2:
Typology of Partnership Processes.”
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Table 7: Boundary Spanning Practices in the WWWA
Boundary Spanning
Practices

Specific
contexts
of
boundary
spanning
Actively listening to partner
peers
Assigning opportunities to a
partner lead
Assigning problems to a
partner lead
Associating with partners
out of work context
Building personal relations
Classifying problems by
strategic objectives
Classifying problems by task
group
Collaborating on other
projects
Converting capital to
promote innovations
Coordinating external
communications
Coordinating the
convergence
Defining boundary spanning
norms
Defining boundary spanning
roles
Defining boundary spanning
values
Defining institutional
accountabilities
Defining institutional roles
Deliberating with partners
in new contexts
Deliberating with
partnership stakeholders in
other contexts
Designing process

Change in
Field
Interactions
All the
storming,
forming, &
norming of
the WWWA
1

Pattern
(PC I)?
Yes

Core
Practices

Change in
Core
”Alignment”
Practices

Operations
and
implementation
1

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
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Pattern
(PC II)?
No
(STOP)

Disclosing interests

1

1

Education

1

Extending favors to partners

1

1

Facilitation

1

1

1

Framing innovations in
terms of need
Framing need in terms of
innovations
Influencing across policy
sub-networks
Innovating (paradigmatic
boundary spanning)
Integrating boundary
objects/innovations
(standardization)
Making
government rules
and regulations
Managing process (budget,
conflicts, surprises, time)
Outreach

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1

Pilot-testing innovations

1

Pitching to decision-makers

1

1

Prioritizing problems

1

1

1

Protecting brand/integrity
of innovations
Respectfully pushing back
(disclosing constraints)
Ritually enacting boundary
spanning
Scanning environment and
reporting issues
Seeking input from relevant
constituents
Seeking input from relevant
decision-makers
Sharing risks

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Staff collaborating across
organizations
Staging group decisions
(lobbying, building
readiness, gauging support,

1
1
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Strategically aligning
partnering organizations
Task-mastering

1

Testing ideas/Vetting

1

1

1

1

Translating across
technical/disciplinary
boundaries between task
Translating
groups

1

1
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It appears that the Alliance’s – and by extension the Basin community’s – struggles
stem from the lingering misalignment of its core values, especially the ideals
associated with local governance, and the practical realities of its implementation.
The state of Washington has certainly extended unprecedented regulatory flexibility
to the Basin. Oregon has also worked with its local partners, although it has not
made as many concessions. The federal government has been even less flexible,
which, owing to its size, culture, and remoteness, is perhaps not surprising. Other
funders bring their own agendas and constraints as well. When it was implementing
projects, the Alliance was frustrated by many of the procedural requirements that
accompanied funding and which it felt unduly limited its ability to innovate new
watershed management practices. The entrepreneurial spirit of the irrigators
especially has helped drive much of the innovation in the Alliance’s work. But this
same spirit also translates to an impatience with bureaucratic procedures and
processes that occasionally puts the Alliance at odds with stakeholders with whom
it must work if it wishes to see those innovations adopted on a larger scale. As
important as technical hurdles are to watershed management, they pale in
comparison to the socio-economic, political, and cultural differences between the
communities that share a watershed. For one thing, a local governance structure,
even one like the WWWMP that relies heavily on incentives, has to devise an
enforcement mechanism that doesn’t exacerbate community divisions. Interviews
reveal that the Walla Walla Basin community is currently struggling with the
dilemma that arises when neighbors enforce against one another. How will the
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Basin come together to solve this problem now that regulators or water masters
cannot be as conveniently called upon to serve as “the bad cop” against which the
community can unify?
Dissolving the 501(c)3 structure is one thing; but the Alliance and its
partners must still learn to work with both outside constraints as well as internal
differences if it wishes to continue to have a significant impact on watershed
management within the Basin. The Alliance has demonstrated a willingness to
change its structure to respond to circumstances, but the question remains whether
the newly streamlined Alliance will help meet the Basin’s new challenges.
The Alliance, but also the Basin, finds itself at an important juncture in its
social learning. Now that much of the Alliance’s innovations have become
institutionalized in the WWWMP (and related initiatives), a significant challenge
will be to achieve implementation on a meaningful enough scale to realize the vision
expressed in the WMI. Here it seems that the Alliance has a role it could play.
Interviews suggest that the Alliance has developed a network of personal and
professional ties that makes it more likely that the innovations it helped spawn will
be adopted. As one board member explains, the Alliance itself has gained a certain
institutional legitimacy that expands its sphere of influence beyond its formal
members:
They're consistent and they're trusted conduits of information. I think it's
gotten way more effective over time. A lot less effort has to go into that
dissemination process now because the pathways are built, you know? […]
Now it is more a conversation of "the Alliance – we talked about this, it's my
opinion that this is this, or this needs to be this way,” or whatever and they're
more inclined to go, “Okay,” because that trust level has been built up over
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time. Then I don't have to go tell the other five guys; he's going to. They also
have gained some trust. That's just a really small example about one
conservation district board, but I'm telling you, I'm sure that exists behind
every one of the Alliance members, that their pathways for dissemination
have become trusted and consistent and acknowledged as pretty important.
So I think the process is just a lot easier.
As the Basin community strives to scale up the WMI, it would do well to use the
social capital that the Alliance and its partners have built over time.
Given its position as a boundary spanning organization, it seems that the
Alliance has a unique opportunity to help the WWWMP realize its vision by
establishing alignment practices that introduce the innovative programs and
practices to the various communities within the Basin while facilitating discussion
and learning about the issues associated with implementation in specific contexts.
As one Basin observer notes:
I think their (the Alliance’s) role is spreading the word, using the tools we
have to help get the word out, coordination in the community.
Communication is very important. If you don't understand it, you can't
support it.
In fact, if the Alliance is able to establish itself as a true community forum where
values and interests – and even the differences – can be explored, then it would rise
to the level of PC III: a learning partnership that facilitates social learning in general.
But in order to play such a role in the Basin, the Alliance would have to shift its
emphasis away from advocacy and focus instead on process, on, say, “the Walla
Walla Way” on a basin-wide scale. Doing so, of course, would require a fundamental
change in the culture of a partnership that has demonstrated far more comfort with
innovation than it has with process, and it would entail the Alliance assuming a
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much more public and perhaps even democratic, role than it has, until now,
assumed.
Finally, the WWCC Water and Environmental Center can serve as an
important center of social learning for the Basin community. Several interviews also
suggest that both the Center and the Alliance are perhaps the two vital links
between the CTUIR and the larger Walla Walla River Basin community. The
expansion of the Center that is currently underway therefore represents an
important opportunity for the Basin. Given the importance of the CTUIR for the
Basin’s successful watershed management, the center and the Alliance are probably
unique places of social learning and should be supported as such.
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Chapter 8
Discussion
Significance of Study Aims
The present study builds on this fundamental insight by proposing a
framework centered on the design view of systems that treats partnerships as
processes organized in a nested hierarchy of boundary conditions. Events are a
function of thresholds which serve to regulate these processes, but as instances of
change, they can also communicate something about the processes that “triggered”
them. This all suggests that partnerships are composed of boundary spanning
processes that are organized into a system of communication. That is, they are
organized into distinct orders, each one communicating something about the order
of processes nested directly within it: the direction of control is, as it were,
“downward” (D. T. Campbell, 1974). Viewed this way, communication is a
management act, and partnership work is communicative. This means, in turn, that
boundary spanning is not only fundamental to partnership processes but also to
social learning. It suggests, among other things, that social learning entails learning
how to span boundaries in a new way and, furthermore, that this “way” refers to a
more encompassing boundary condition.
Several important methodological implications flow from this discussion.
First, if communication entails the management of change (or uncertainty), then the
communication problem we face as scientists or modelers or storytellers seeking to
explain social processes like partnerships is isomorphic to – is structurally identical
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to – the management problem partnerships face. Thus, we are as beholden to the
laws of communication (and consequences of our errors) as practitioners are
beholden to the laws of management. Indeed, as a piece of communication, our
model of a partnership is fundamentally no different from the strategic actions
which its managers take to change its course.35 Our theoretical and methodological
disputes are more closely related to the dramas of the communities we study than
we might like to think: cases of partnership failures should serve as cautionary tales
of poor modeling, while success stories have something to teach us about the rules
of sound explanation. To get our account right, then, we are compelled to identify,
and remain true to, the system-level or model boundary that will serve as our
reference. Once we do, we are in a position to evaluate the significance of boundary
spanning practices with respect to the order of change they represent.
The framework therefore proposes a new typology of boundary spanning
processes which is grounded in the twin problem of communication and change.
The typology builds on the open systems view to posit 3 levels of boundary
spanning: operational or “core practices” (sub-systemic), strategic or “boundary
spanning practices” (systemic), and “alignment practices” that coordinate
operational and the strategic practices (meta-systemic). A fourth type of boundary
spanning concerns the coordination of alignment practices over a still more complex
interface. In systems terms, alignment is akin to self-regulation. Thus, coordination
of alignment practices refers to the coordination of multiple, self-regulating systems

35

If done correctly, the topologies of our mapping of the two processes would be indistinguishable.
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and is communicatively equivalent to (on the same order as) meta-systems or
institutional design.
With this general typology of boundary spanning processes in place, it
becomes possible to derive types of partnership processes according to their
capacity to accommodate boundary spanning processes of varying orders:
Partnership Capacity I (PC I) is a rudimentary capacity to organize boundary
spanning processes around a set boundary condition and function; Partnership
Capacity II (PC II) refers to the capacity to adjust routine boundary spanning
between 2 or more boundary conditions in such a way that the adjustments
anticipate one another, i.e., the adjustments are themselves boundaried; and
Partnership Capacity III (PC III) refers to the general capacity to reorganize
boundary spanning practices as needed (a fourth type – the capacity to generate PC
III structures – is implied but not explicitly examined here). This typology suggests,
in turn, a typology of social learning of corresponding orders: Social Learning I (SL
I), Social Learning II (SL II), and Social Learning III (SL III).
In addition to shedding more light on the nature of partnership formation
and resilience, this study proposes a general way of measuring partnership capacity
and social learning: PC I can be measured in terms of some pattern of boundary
spanning practices; PC II can be measured in terms of some pattern of alignment
practices; and PC III can be measured in terms of some pattern of institutional
design practices. A primary aim is to test the validity of these measures and the
underlying methodology.
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A general methodology for measuring boundary spanning, social learning,
and partnership capacity enables us to begin to compare their associations across
cases. This is because, as already discussed, while the particular forms of
knowledge, communication, and learning will vary, there are fundamental,
epistemological conditions of their production and management which will not. If
Bateson (1972) is correct that the basic unit of information is “difference which
makes a difference,” then by focusing on the problem of change as opposed to
meaning, we can devise a methodology to generalize across cases and specific
contexts. In this way, we can side-step many of the limitations and controversies
associated with more hermeneutic approaches. A second aim, then, is to test our
specific theories of convergence and partnership capacity by evaluating their
predictions. And finally, given the infancy of our inquiry, a third contribution this
study hopes to make is to document the many varieties and associations of
boundary spanning practices in partnership work. By shedding light on the roles
that various boundary spanning practices play in the communication and
management of change, students of partnership processes may begin to identify
patterns in those associations. Insights into patterns will help, in turn, practitioners
to identify strategies for intervention to foster partnership resilience and social
learning.
Findings
Exploratory Findings
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To assess the methodological framework we want to see how well it covers
the range of boundary spanning practices we observe. A second indication of the
methodology’s usefulness is whether our mapping of our observations yields any
new insights into the relationships, if any, between boundary spanning, partnership
capacity, and social learning. First, let us summarize the results of the exploratory
portion of this study. Table 8 summarizes the observations of boundary spanning
practices that were made in the 4 case studies, showing their associations with
different orders of partnership processes. A “1” indicates that a boundary spanning
practice was observed for a particular partnership and process. The grayed out
column reflects the fact that the COTE WG is still undergoing SL I (as of this writing):
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Table 8: Observations of Boundary Spanning Across Cases and Orders
Boundary Spanning Practices
Actively listening to partner peers
Assigning opportunities to a partner lead
Assigning problems to a partner lead
Associating with partners out of work context
Building personal relations
Classifying problems by strategic objectives
Classifying problems by task group
Collaborating on other projects
Converting capital to promote innovations
Coordinating external communications
Coordinating the convergence
Defining boundary spanning norms
Defining boundary spanning roles
Defining boundary spanning values
Defining institutional accountabilities
Defining institutional roles
Deliberating with partners in new contexts
Deliberating with partnership stakeholders in
other contexts
Designing process
Disclosing interests
Education
Extending favors to partners
Facilitation
Framing innovations in terms of need
Framing need in terms of innovations
Influencing across policy sub-networks
Innovating (paradigmatic boundary spanning)
Integrating boundary objects/innovations
(standardization)
Making government rules and regulations
Managing process (budget, conflicts, surprises,
time)
Outreach
Pilot-testing innovations
Pitching to decision-makers
Prioritizing problems
Protecting brand/integrity of innovations
Respectfully pushing back (disclosing
constraints)
Ritually enacting boundary spanning
Scanning environment and reporting issues
Seeking input from relevant constituents
Seeking input from relevant decision-makers
Sharing risks
Staff collaborating across organizations
Staging group decisions (lobbying, building
readiness, gauging support, vote counting,
timing)
Strategically aligning partnering organizations
Task-mastering
Testing ideas/Vetting
Translating across technical/disciplinary
boundaries
Translating between task groups
TOTAL
Average for each process

COTE WG
1

Social Learning I
RWPC
UDRP
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

WWWA
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1

COTE

Partnership Capacity I
RWPC
UDRP
WWWA
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1

1
39

36
29
33.75
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1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
31

0

35

31
27

42

The first observation to make is the sheer number of boundary spanning
practices that were identified. No attempt has been made here to collapse these
varieties under larger groupings, although it is likely that there are significant
relationships between many of the practices that would justify such a lumping and
perhaps reveal some interesting patterns. It is true too that the practices could have
been coded in an infinite number of ways. What is important is that a set of criteria
is selected and adhered to. As described in the Methods section, the present
framework defined boundary spanning as any interaction between 2 or more
practices, ideas, entities, and objects hailing from different fields of practice, or any
process or practice that supports such interaction. The codings were as descriptive
as possible to aid in interpretation and validation of the observations. Future
research could further validate or invalidate the findings in at least 2 ways. First, the
textual data from interview transcripts, meeting observations, and secondary data
could be revisited with this new list of boundary spanning practices serving as a
kind of codebook. Revisiting the data with these categories in mind may change the
results as some observations are discovered while others are dismissed. Second,
interviewees and other sources could be re-queried about the specific categories of
boundary spanning practices, again producing somewhat different results.
The second general observation to make is that the data are noisy. While
there a number of boundary spanning practices demonstrating some variance
across cases (highlighted in orange), a cursory scan suggests no obvious differences
across cases. Furthermore, boundary spanning processes that may have some
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correlations with partnership processes built into their definition have been
highlighted in yellow. Any associations with these processes should therefore
probably be dismissed. But before we dismiss the data entirely, a couple points need
to be made. First, the variables represented in the matrix are binary – either an
observation was made or it wasn’t. While such a gross level of resolution is probably
necessary at this stage until our measures become more accurate, it also means that
subtler correlations will be missed. The second point is, of course, that we have only
4 cases, which makes it difficult to discover any meaningful relationships that might
exist. And finally, while the distribution of boundary spanning practices appears to
be fairly uniformly distributed, either with respect to cases or with respect to
processes, some of this uniformity may suggest that boundary spanning practices
are more universally applicable to cases and processes than might be expected. In
other words, part of the uniformity may stem from the fact that most of the
boundary spanning strategies are being employed, regardless of context.
Still, the noisiness of the data makes any signals we do detect both more
suspect but also potentially significant. Observations of boundary spanning that
vary by a ratio of 1/3 or more, either between cases, or between processes, have
been highlighted in blue: defining boundary spanning roles, defining institutional
accountabilities, defining institutional roles, designing process, facilitation, and
managing process. In contrast to the others, the WWWA continued defining
boundary spanning roles, designing processes, and using facilitation, even after it
had formed, reflecting its social learning as it moved from project implementation to
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facilitation and support. “Defining institutional accountabilities” and “defining
institutional roles” show a similar pattern of distribution to “defining boundary
spanning roles” within the PC I process, but with only 3 observations each, it’s
difficult to make much of RWPC’s contrast. Finally, the table shows that RWPC
continued relying on process management strategies even after it formed, which
reflects the sheer size and complexity of its negotiations.
Assessing the Theoretical Predictions
A second aim of this study is to test the validity of the underlying theory by
evaluating 2 of its predictions. Let us restate the 2 original research questions and
corresponding hypotheses:
Research Question I: How do partnerships form exactly?
Hypothesis I: A socio-technical or policy need creates a structural
opportunity for boundary spanning practices to begin to influence the larger
institutional ecology. Boundary spanning practices will begin to converge with the
ecology of participating fields through an iterative process of social judgments
embedded in communicative practice and capital exchange. If the boundary objects
(innovations) are deemed both technically desirable and culturally feasible, then the
practices and ideas that produced them diffuse along with the innovations, further
reinforcing the convergence. Boundary spanners play an important role in
managing the convergence (however imperfectly) through visioning, strategic
judgments, and steering capital flows, even as they are thereby changed in the
process. The entire process is summarized as “Social Learning (SL) I” and results in
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a partnership with a basic capacity (Partnership Capacity I) to address a fairly welldefined policy problem.
Research Question II: How do partnerships sustain themselves over time?
Hypothesis IIa: To survive in the face of changing policy conditions, a
partnership must learn (SL II) to engage in alignment practices that periodically
allow for the mutual adjustment of core operations and more strategic and even
constitutional concerns. This ensures that partnership goals and strategies are
informed by local practices and conditions and facilitates the partnership’s role in
shaping the community agenda on a policy issue. Therefore: partnerships
demonstrating a pattern of alignment practices will tend to oscillate about a defined
range of “partnership states,” as measured by programs, initiatives, or other
strategic emphases.
Hypothesis IIb: Partnerships that develop the capacity (SL III) to reconfigure
or “design” alignment practices to address socio-technical and policy surprises
acquire a general capacity to learn and adapt that is enhanced with each iteration of
the social learning cycle. Partnerships demonstrating PC III are characterized by a
learning culture that promotes innovation and critical reflection of alignment
practices in experimental settings. Therefore: partnerships demonstrating a
pattern of institutional design practices will tend to persist in varying forms and
under a wide range of environmental conditions.
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Let us review the findings of these 2 basic questions. Table 9 shows the
results of assessing Hypothesis I.
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Table 9: Results of Assessing Hypothesis I
Predicted Factors of Partnership Formation

Intermediary

Predicted outcomes

Counting on the Yes
Environment
WG

Yes

Medium

Medium Medium

Structural
Exchange of Degree of
capital forms adoption of distance between
to promote innovations community of
practice and
innovations?
boundary
spanning
Yes
Medium
Decreasing

Regional Water Yes
Providers
Consortium

Yes

Medium

High

Not detected High

Significant
reduction

Yes

Yes
Upper
Deschutes River
Partnership

Yes

Medium

Medium Medium

Yes

Medium

Some reduction

Yes

Yes

Yes

High

High

Yes

High

Some reduction

Yes

Cases
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Walla Walla
Watershed
Alliance

Pre-existing Boundary Technical Cultural Degree of
spanning desirability feasibility institutional
sociopractices? (fit)
(appropri interest and
technical
ate-ness) support
and policy
need?

High

High

Pattern of
boundary
spanning
practices?
No

The findings offer partial validation with respect to the theory’s predictions
about partnership formation. Generally, there was no disconfirmation of the
hypothesis: for all 4 cases, none of the factors which the model predicts are
important contributors to partnership formation measured negative (“no”) or “low.”
Moreover, COTE WG and the WWWA are identical with respect to the model’s
variables and to-date, anyway, the formation processes have resulted in a
discernable reduction in the structural distance between the boundary spanning
practices and relevant policy community. RWPC and WWWA differed with respect
to 2 of the variables: “technical desirability” of the boundary spanning innovation
(“fit”) and “exchange of capital forms to promote innovations.” Interestingly, RWPC
scored lower on both measures and yet scored a significantly higher reduction in
structural distance during the convergence. This finding reflects the fact that
“structural distance” is only a measure of magnitude and gives no sense how much
either the new joint field or the larger community accommodated the other during
formation. Significant reduction can occur when either the accommodation is very
lop-sided or the convergence is balanced but the initial distance (prior to
convergence) was large, or both. An examination of the “technical desirability” and
“exchange of capital forms to promote innovations” variables suggests that the
RWPC accommodated the water supply policy community more than the other way
around, and secondary data from the case study confirms this interpretation. If this
interpretation is correct, then it suggests that technical desirability and exchange of
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capital forms are important determinants of how balanced the convergence leading
up to a partnership will be.
Still, several important data limitations need to be stated which restrict how
much we can make of the findings. First, of course, we have only 4 cases. While 4
cases enables us to begin to use replication logic for purposes of confirmation or
disconfirmation, it is a not a significant number of cases, particularly given the
complexity of the problem space.36 Second, two of the variables – “pre-existing
socio-technical and policy need?” and “boundary spanning practices?” – were used
as criteria in selecting the cases. Since these variables cannot be regarded as being
“independent” of the predicted outcomes, they should largely be ignored when
evaluating the predictions. Third, measurement of the variables was ultimately
subjective. True, model variables were identified before data collection and could
therefore inform the development of the interview instrument and data collection
more generally (see Appendix A). But those measures like “degree of institutional
interest and support” that could be taken more directly often relied on either my
qualitative judgment or the judgments of others. The general limitations of
interviewing a non-random sample of subjects apply here. The interview
instrument, while pilot-tested on 2 subjects, was not fully tested for measurement
validity. And of course, ultimately, assignment of values was based on an overall
assessment. Finally, as in the cataloguing of boundary spanning varieties, the levels

If we consider just the model’s 6 basic variables: 3 are binary and 3 are ternary, returning a
parameter space = (2³)(3³) = 216.

36

382

of measurement – categorical and ordinal – were crude and likely miss subtler
variances.
Because none of the cases could be classified as PC II or PC III, Hypotheses IIa
and IIb could not be assessed. Table 10 shows the logic used to assess Hypothesis
IIa. Note that the table does not include hybrid conditions.
Table 10: Logic to Assess Hypothesis IIa
Predicted Factors for PC II
Pattern of alignment practices?

Outcome Measure of PC
II
Oscillation through a
range of partnership
states?

Pattern of interaction between
Pattern of interaction between
operational and strategic concerns? boundary spanning functions
(e.g., initiatives or programs)?
Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Only 1 case, the RWPC, demonstrated any traits which the theory predicts will be
associated with PC II (see Table 11). Its decision flow structure enables issues to be
vetted and addressed through multiple iterations of a cycle of committee
deliberations that span operational, strategic, and even constitutional concerns. At
the same time, however, RWPC did not demonstrate a pattern of interaction
between its major program or other functions. The direct measure of PC II –
oscillation through a fixed range of “states” or functions – was not observed. Instead,
RWPC could be characterized by a set of distinct programs and initiatives that
remain largely separated and, it should be added, unevenly implemented.
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Table 11: Results of Assessing Hypothesis IIa
Predicted Factors for PC II
Cases
Pattern of alignment practices?

Pattern of
communication between
operational and strategic
concerns?
Regional Water
Providers Consortium Yes

Outcome Measure of
PCII
Oscillation through a
defined range of
partnership states?

Pattern of interaction
between boundary
spanning functions (e.g.,
initiatives or programs)?

No

No

It would appear, then, that RWPC is kind of hybrid or transitional entity between PC
I and PC II. The theory did not predict such an entity, which may be an artifact of
measurement error or may reflect a theoretical deficiency with the model.
Regardless, the fact that none of the cases rose to the level of PC II might be
interesting in and of itself. The absence may be another sign of a deficiency in the
theory’s account of partnership resilience. But it may indicate instead that PC II is
rarer than the theory would suggest. In addition, the results do not disconfirm the
hypothesis, that is: the absence of a pattern of alignment practices did not produce
any partnerships that fit our definition of PC II.
Table 12 shows the logic used to assess Hypothesis IIb. None of the cases
demonstrated PC III. While therefore Hypothesis IIb could not be directly assessed,
the absence of any cases demonstrating PC III is at least consistent with the theory’s
expectation that partnerships with PC III are probably relatively rare. In addition,
the results do not disconfirm the hypothesis, that is: the absence of a pattern of
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institutional design practices did not produce any partnerships that fit our
definition of PC III.
Table 12: Logic to Assess Hypothesis IIb
Predicted Factors for PC III

Pattern of institutional design practices?

Pattern of Pattern of
innovating critical
inquiry

Knowledge-base of
institutional
designs/models

Culture of learning

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes
No

Outcome
Measure of
PC III
Any
outstanding
partnership
issues?

No
No

The hypotheses assessments also serve to partially validate the
methodological framework. But here again, the validation is weak to the extent that
it relies on subjective interpretation. With regard to partnership formation, of the 4
partnerships that experienced some degree of convergence, 3 of them demonstrated
an established pattern of boundary spanning practices, which is the result the
theory predicts, suggesting that presence of such a pattern is a good indicator that a
partnership field has formed with minimal institutional capacity (PC I).
The study also highlights the awkwardness of using “oscillation through a
fixed range of partnership states” as our direct measure of PC II. We need a more
accessible measure of PC II against which we validate proposed correlates. In fact,
the theory provides such a measure. Given that PC II is conceptualized in terms of
the integration of core and boundary spanning practices, we should expect
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partnerships with PC II to enjoy broad and consistent implementation of multiple
plans or broad and consistent participation in multiple campaigns, initiatives, or
programs. Applying this proxy measure of PC II to the case studies does not change
the findings. However, future assessments of the theoretical and methodological
predictions of PC II would benefit from use of this more accessible proxy measure.
Directions for Future Research
A number of possible lines for future research have already been identified to
build on the study’s findings while addressing some of its limitations. I will now
outline one more that ties together all 3 of the study’s principal aims. Clearly, the
study’s findings would be enhanced by future research. It is too early to draw any
conclusions about possible associations between specific boundary spanning
practices and partnership processes or even partnership types. One way to build on
the findings summarized in Table 8 while also further assessing the underlying
theoretical and methodological framework would be to recode the observations in
terms of alternative typologies – such as Rugkåsa et al.’s (2007) distinction between
boundary spanning “up,” “across,” and “down” – and see whether any new
associations with the partnership processes (i.e., SL I and PC I) emerge. If any do, the
next step is to revisit other studies employing the same boundary spanning typology
and recode the partnership processes in terms of the framework typology of
partnership processes. This would enable us to “back-test” the framework’s model
onto other studies to determine whether any associations between types of
boundary spanning practices (e.g., up, across, and down) and types of partnership
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processes (e.g., SL I and PC I) show a similar pattern across cases. Of course,
variances in patterns across cases would not, by itself invalidate the theoretical or
methodological framework. For example, one possible source of variance is low
inter-coder reliability. On the other hand, any meta-pattern across cases would be a
strong indicator of a meaningful relationship between the proposed types of
boundary spanning practices and the framework’s types of management processes.
It would validate the theories underlying the typologies, including the framework’s
typology of social learning and partnership capacity and suggest concrete boundary
spanning strategies which partnership practitioners could employ to grow and
strengthen partnerships. These and other studies could also be recoded with
respect to our general typology of boundary spanning practices (“boundary
spanning,” “core practices,” “alignment practices,” and “institutional design
practices”) in order to carry out similar back tests, although, without access to the
studies’ data, classification and the associated findings would be more suspect than
would be classification of partnership capacity (and social learning), which, with the
possible exception of PC I, can be assessed with more straightforward outcome
measures. Regardless, these lines of research are outlined to illustrate the
possibilities for theory-building that are opened up by a process-oriented
methodology, even of the qualitative variety like the one proposed here.
Specific Lessons from the Cases
Partnership formation requires the right ingredients
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The cases partially confirm the convergence hypothesis (Hypothesis I). A
review of those cases underscores how important processes and conditions came
together in the right combination and at the right time to allow these partnerships
to form. The cases share some common ingredients, among them: matching of idea
with the times, alignment of BATNA’s and interests, social network of strong and
weak ties, adequate resources and resource mix, and visionary and charismatic
leaders. On this last point, the case studies also suggest that while boundary
spanners are as varied as the boundary spanning practices and processes in which
they engage, they tend to share a set of core traits. Psychologically, boundary
spanners appear to be relatively comfortable working in gray areas characterized by
complexity and uncertainty. Whereas many would find such conditions disturbing
or stressful, many boundary spanners, like the following member of the WWWA,
find them engaging, even if trying:
It's been an experience for me. I've been part of a lot of different groups, but
this is the one group where it's like being part of going to college again
because you're part of a bunch of very intelligent, out-of-the-box thinkers,
proactive, just some really nice people but they're just not...they're normal
but they're not normal, you know what I'm saying? (laughs) It's pretty
amazing what we've accomplished and to get those people together has been
quite a run and quite a ride, you know?
All 4 partnerships reveal similar stories of sacrifices but also intellectual and
spiritual adventure. It should be added, too, that in many cases the boundary
spanners occupied prominent positions within their respective communities that
gave them a certain degree of credibility and means to pull their communities along
for the ride. But each pull brings tension and these tensions interact as the
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partnership forms. Those with considerable collaborative leadership experience
were able to navigate the partnership through the sometimes reinforcing and often
conflicting pulls.
It appears the precise management level of boundary spanners varied in
importance from case to case. For the COTE WG, it was important to secure the
participation of top management and board members to ensure adequate
institutional support of the boundary spanning practices, especially among the
larger and more conservative agencies. The WWWA likewise brought in top-level
managers and board members, as did the RWPC, although it appears that middle
managers such as system engineers and operators were also important in the
formation of the RWPC. In the case of the UDRP, top-level staff members similarly
were the ones to innovate, eventually enlisting many board members, although the
precise role of boards in fostering the partnership would benefit from more
research. The case study suggests that board interlocking and board-level network
played a role in the formation of the UDRP, at the very least by preparing the
institutional and policy “ground” for it in the context of the Pelton-Round Butte Dam
relicensing negotiations.
Innovation is Risky
There was, in fact, a fair amount of both assessing and fostering policy and
ultimately social “readiness” that went into the formation of these partnerships. The
boundary spanning entailed, in a sense, spanning the past, present, and the future
and working to make them meet somewhere in between. It’s difficult enough to do
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this once, let alone on a continuous basis as the terrain of constraints and
opportunities shifts, often unexpectedly, under one’s feet. This is particularly the
case as boundary spanners forge new relationships and identities that can change
the cost-benefit calculus in surprising ways. To address this challenge, boundary
spanners employed different strategies. The COTE WG Project Team designed a
process that has relied heavily on a Technical Coordinating Team that could
anticipate issues while also reading the opportunities for pushing the larger
Working Group members – through strawman documents and other means – just
beyond their comfort zones (the somewhat serendipitous overlap between the
Technical Coordinating Team and the SB 513 WG has facilitated a similar
convergence of theory and practice in the larger policy network). The RWPC’s
Technical Committee similarly employs an iterative decision-making cycle, although
the Consortium’s well-established routines and structure make it more conservative
than the still-new and groundbreaking COTE WG.
Another important strategy for “managing many futures” – to paraphrase the
title of a Ruckelshaus report (2007) on the capacity of the Walla Walla River Basin –
seems to be providing political cover to both the boundary spanners and their
sponsors. Manning’s challenge to the Walla Walla River Basin, groundbreaking as it
was, had in fact been “tested” by a closer circle of basin leaders before he went
public with it. Similarly, Senator Murray and Representative Nethercutt sought
assurances from Alliance representatives that their “alliance” was not just a name.
Alliance members displayed political and even performative savvy in staging tours
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and community circles to demonstrate their authenticity. Thus, the “moment of
selection” that accelerated the formation of the WWWMP was not as top-down as
the term might suggest. In the case of the UDRP, funders like OWEB are only too
happy to disown the political liabilities associated with project-based funding and
review. In both of the watershed management cases, in fact, we can discern a strong
regional theme of local self-determination that carries significant political (and
cultural) legitimacy. In neither case has the partnership been a creature of the state
or of any other interest. And the political favors go both ways. The COTE WG Project
Team showed keen political judgment in securing the support and ultimate
“endorsement in concept” of organizational leaders, an endorsement they have
skillfully converted into symbolic capital as they tout the legitimacy of their ECAS.
And of course, the RWPC probably owes its longevity in large part to an institutional
design that includes locally elected officials on its board. Finally, it should be added
that “political covering” occurred on multiple levels, as boundary spanners also
labored to reassure their “home field” constituents that the partnership in question
was not a mere instrument of competing interests. Jutila’s boundary spanning work
to bring skeptical water providers on the eastside of the Willamette River into the
still-forming Consortium and Rupar and Brown’s comparable efforts to get
irrigators and farmers to approach the CTUIR in the case of the WWWA are just 2 of
many notable examples.
The formation of partnerships appears to entail a complex negotiation of
concessions. Our theory of convergence predicts that concessions are inevitable, but
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the precise configuration of concessions is not a given. Social learning has a certain
undemocratic quality to it, in so far as concepts must be proposed that, by defining
what is relevant and what is not, necessarily foreclose debate to some extent. One
aspect to the art of building partnerships appears to be knowing what the
appropriate level of resolution and participation is for a given deliberation. As
seasoned planners know all too well, if policy ideas or plans are paraded out too
soon without first preparing a context to organize deliberations, they often become
casualties of false issues or political posturing. If they are introduced to the
“community of implementers” well after development, they risk irrelevance or
outright resistance. In the former case, plans get lost in the weeds, while in the latter
they get lost in the clouds. An architect of the RWPC captures the trickiness of, as he
calls it, “that little gray area:”
I think in public policy the failure point so often tends to come in that little
gray area between where you've got enough general support from a few key
people for a concept to think, “I need to move ahead on this and put some
flesh on the bones,” and the point where you have enough flesh on the bones
to get people to start signing up. Between there is where things go to hell in a
hand basket[…] What happens I think is you get good ideas out of the
incubator way too soon if you try to do a public process. You can't get it up in
the air enough for people to be able to comment, make judgments, get good
input, make improvements and things on a real thing. It all just becomes a
bunch of emotional hot air around a concept so it never becomes a real thing.
That is what happened here, I think. But that is the essence of public process
is trying to get it up in the air. That's why not much happens. It's hard.
Making the right call in that little gray area requires considerable political judgment,
but the case studies also suggest that convergence entails a series of judgments that,
to use Koppenjan and Klijn’s (2006) term, “steer” both the innovations and the
readiness for those innovations so that they meet. Boundary spanners and their
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innovations more often than not need incubation. But for successful adoption to
occur, the community of users also need to become owners of them.
Convergence, then, entails a complex alignment of concessions. It is in this
alignment where tradeoffs are defined that much of the negotiations and struggles
take place. In the development of the COTE WG crediting tools, its innovators made
certain concessions to wider institutional concerns, including a bias toward
precision, that left some stakeholders dissatisfied. The RWPC and WWWA were
actually conceived as implementing entities of a previous agreement (the
Negotiated Settlement Agreement) or plan (Regional Water Supply Plan). Thus, both
partnerships started innovating with policy- and other sideboards built in from the
start. In both cases, it seems that part of their struggles has centered on negotiating
this tension between innovating and implementing. The RWPC has been more
accommodative of the political and policy context of regional water supply at the
price of being less innovative, while the WWWA eventually moved away from
managing and implementing projects toward innovating basin-wide policies around
watershed management. Consequently, the WWWA has arguably had a greater
impact on its region’s policy context, but it is also encountering a challenge of
“scaling up” implementation of its vision. The study’s theory of convergence
suggests that diffusion of innovation should be facilitated by a narrowing of the gap
between the innovative vision and the larger community of practice. This would
suggest a common explanation for why neither RWPC nor WWWA have not enjoyed
more consistent implementation of their programs and initiatives. The RWPC has
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been arguably too accommodative while the WWWA has arguably not compromised
enough, with the same result that the larger community of practice tends to
overlook them.
Scaling Up Requires Different Alignment Practices
Embedded in the problem of implementation is a chicken-and-egg dilemma
similar to the one associated with partnership formation: one the one hand,
innovations must be adopted by a sufficient number of “boundary spanners-inpractice,” to use Levina and Vaast’s (2005)term, for them to be taken seriously, but
at the same time adoption requires legitimacy. A COTE WG member summarizes
this dilemma in discussing the building of a multi-credit ecosystem marketplace:
The physical implementation is going to be a lot harder. That is one of the
things we're really struggling with is there's a lot of the chicken and the egg.
There's a lot of things that have to be built ahead of time. It's really hard to
build them without having something piloted to test it against…I think
there's a lot of people who have a bit of a wait-and-see attitude: “Great, we
got through this philosophical conversation and we've got the tools in place,
and the computer programs. Everything looks all hunky dory, but now what
do we do?" When Bobby [Cochran] isn't hand-holding the landowner and a
buyer through a process, how do you actually really make a market system
work? That's a bit of a struggle. It boggles my mind every time I try to get to
that next level. In theory I think people are going to jump right on it. In
reality I think it's just going to take time to get there.
The delicate balance boundary spanners must strike between operational and
strategic considerations has implications for their relationships to the community of
users of their innovations and therefore for their effectiveness.
The UDRP seems to have intuited this balance fairly well. On the one hand,
Heisler and his partners have emphasized the need to secure social agreement
before undertaking any projects, eventually establishing it as a criterion for project
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selection. On the other hand, they have not tried to force funders, regulators,
advocacy groups, or other stakeholders to adopt their strategic matrices,
recognizing that the Basin lacks a unified watershed management framework which
would at least give partners a common language with which to evaluate them, as a
UDRP member explains:
I think that is one of the reasons the whole thing didn't crumble is because
we didn't push that. We recognized that you can look at a creek from the
perspective of a nonprofit, a federal agency, a state agency, a management
agency, a regulator agency, a city and you can be interested in the same
vision and see a bunch of different things. You have your own mandate. We
didn't try to force that. One of the things I see people try to do with
partnerships that just bogs them down is they try to make it so everybody
agrees. I feel like the US Forest Service, under US Department of Agriculture,
has its own set of mandates. There is no way you're going to get those
perfectly aligned with the Upper Deschutes Watershed Counsel. You can get
a lot of alignment in certain areas but you cannot get them perfectly aligned.
To try to get that is a waste of time.
The case studies lend support to the notion that alignment practices play a role in
securing community ownership in a partnership. And because typically
partnerships contend with wicked problems that defy universal formulation,
education and outreach alone are not enough. Deeper community differences will
need to be spanned with visions and metaphors that communicate with, rather than
around, those differences. The absence of such bridging visions may explain the
mixed implementation success of the partnerships in this study. It suggests too that
scaling up a partnership requires learning a different set of alignment practices than
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the ones that are mobilized to form a partnership, lending further support to the
notion that there are qualitatively different kinds of social learning.
SSM Workshop
The SSM workshop, held in September 2010, had 3 primary objectives. First, it
was an opportunity for me to present my preliminary findings, in the form of a
PowerPoint, from the case studies to members of the 4 partnerships who had been
interviewed and were participating in the study. Each of the workshop participants,
then, functioned in a certain sense as expert witnesses/cultural informants who
were in a position to provide partial validation as well as identify areas requiring
fact-checking or more research. And although the change scenario exercises were
driven to a large extent by the individual workshop participants – they selected the
type of process, real or hypothetical, that they envisioned for their partnership –
there usually was enough overlap with their corresponding case studies that the
exercises provided an additional instance of validation. In the case of the change
scenarios, I was able to summarize my appreciation for each perspective in the form
of a rich picture (see Appendix C). Prior to group discussion of each change scenario,
I presented the pictures to the group and solicited feedback from the partnership
representative to provide corrections or additions to the picture and underlying
story. In the case of both my PowerPoint of the case studies’ preliminary findings
and the rich picture exercises, I received general confirmation that my findings were
more or less accurate, although minor changes were recommended that mostly
centered on factual discrepancies as opposed to issues with interpretation.
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However, we ran out of time and were not able to complete 2 of the 4 change
scenario exercises. I estimate that the workshop in its current design requires
approximately 6 hours to complete; ours ran for only 4.
A second major objective of the workshop was to field-test SSM as a
collaborative institutional design and management tool. In this respect, the
workshop suggests that SSM can be very useful for problem-structuring and
preliminary model-building. Participants reported that they found the rich picture
technique especially useful for conveying complex information in a more concise
and visual manner. Judging from the richness of the discussions and post-workshop
evaluations, the rich pictures are effective in stimulating group learning around a
particular problem or class of problems. The SSM process used in the workshop did
not in fact strictly follow the conventional SSM structure (Mode 1), but instead used
a modified process design adapted to the particular objectives and constraints of the
workshop and larger study (Mode 2). Perhaps most significantly, each change
scenario employed a single perspective of a participant designated to represent the
partnership for purposes of the workshop, thus removing an important strength of
SSM: that of comparing and integrating multiple perspectives bearing on a
particular context. Nevertheless, it opened the way for boundary spanning
practitioners from the other partnership cases to identify similarities and contrasts
across different scenarios of institutional change. It furthermore facilitated
discussion and learning across the academic and practitioner divide. The
preliminary case study findings, which were presented immediately prior to the
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change scenario exercises, informed the discussions, but the particular learning that
occurred within and across the exercises also informed my revisits of those findings
long after the workshop’s conclusion. The workshop, then, and its participants,
became an integral part of the research effort.
Finally, the workshop sought to bring together boundary spanners from
different partnership contexts in order to cultivate, following Armistead and
Pettigrew (2004), a community of reflective practitioners. Such a network would
ultimately facilitate social learning by providing resources and support to
prospective or struggling boundary spanners and partnerships. Here, the findings
are less clear. It turned out that most of the participants were already acquainted
with one another and, in some cases, collaborating on various projects or efforts. No
attempt has been made to measure what effect, if any, the workshop had on building
and nurturing relationships, although it seems likely that the impact of a single
workshop is limited. Additional workshops or efforts that engage the participants
would need to occur to establish an enduring network of reflective practitioners
that would begin to support social learning on a larger scale.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This study was motivated by two research questions which sought to address
two distinct gaps in our knowledge with respect to partnership processes. The first
question concerned the formation of partnerships, namely: what is the precise
mechanism by which new joint fields of practice emerge? The second question
concerned the resilience of partnerships once they form, namely: how do
partnerships manage to stay together in the face of change, or contrawise, why do
partnerships so often fail to achieve the outcomes they set out to achieve? Case
studies of partnership formation tend to explain away the process through rational
actor models, structural determinism, or an unconvincing combination of both. Most
of these accounts suffer from an inconsistent application of the concept “agency” to
explain how actors from different fields of practice manage to organize their
disparate perspectives, aspirations, and resources in collective action. Similarly,
theoretical attempts to generalize across cases rely on ad hoc reasoning that
selectively use evidence to support a particular set of assumptions. The same can be
said for accounts of partnerships once they form. While part of the problem is
empirical – our tendency to concentrate on success stories distorts our
understanding of the underlying processes – I argue that the gap in our
understanding reflects a more fundamental problem. It is that, despite our best
efforts to move past them, we still largely rely on dualistic systems of thought that
posit false separations – between mind and matter, subject and object, the ideal and
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the material, agency and structure, and even theory and practice – and thereby
produce false explanations of social organization and change.
A more complete and internally consistent explanation of partnership
capacity and social learning therefore requires a different epistemology and
methodology that can account for collective action that is neither wholly rational
nor mindless. One of the contributions this study hopes to make is a new framework
for examining partnership capacity and social learning, one premised on a concept
of “social mind” that operates through – not on –patterns of social interaction. It
adopts a socio-cybernetic view that posits that societies are held together by
communication and that furthermore this communication is only made possible
through the standardization of differences between “agents.” This view holds that
for there to be communication, there must be some interface that joins differences
in a common language of interaction. In other words, as patterns of interaction,
societies are fundamentally composed of boundaries and only secondarily of agents
and their material conditions.
If our objective is to explain the social patterns we see, then it would seem
that we all too often study, and argue about, the wrong thing. Regardless of whether
that pattern concerns income disparities, a partnership initiative to address those
disparities, or some other social phenomenon, the contention here is that our focus
should be on boundary conditions. By extension, if our objective is to explain social
change, then our focus should be on changes in boundary conditions. If we define
social learning as a special kind of social change that leads to a new boundary, then
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it follows from this that the proper object of study is the standardization of
difference. A more recursive understanding of “social mind” – one located in the
interface of different worlds – leads us to a richer and probably more accurate
understanding of social learning. Instead of focusing on individual and technical
learning, as accounts of “social learning” so often do, we are driven to consider the
emergence and inculcation of norms governing the interaction of classes of social
facts, objects, practices, and identities.
Many insights along these lines have been made before, but these insights
have to date largely been confined to high theory (cf. Bateson, 1972; Bourdieu,
1977; Luhmann, 1995). Perhaps because this work remains largely inaccessible,
there has not been much sharing of insights across disciplines and schools of
thought. The literature on boundary spanning, however, offers a starting point for
the unification of insights that can shed light on particular problems. The term itself
draws our attention to the boundary conditions of social processes. And if social
communication always occurs through boundaries, then boundary spanning is
quintessential communication. But “boundary spanning” also denotes boundary
change, which suggests that there is a deep relationship between communication
and change. Indeed, theoretical work in disparate fields ranging from cybernetics
and information theory to action theory (and action research), practice theory, and
social constructionism have reached the same general conclusion. There are many
social areas where this twin problem is both expressed and addressed. Partnership
work is one of them.
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This study has 3 principal aims. The first aim is to propose a new
methodological framework grounded in a design view of systems to assess and
hopefully facilitate social learning and partnership capacity. It is built on the
premise that social processes and practices are communicative and that therefore
the problem of collective action is also a problem of communication. Specifically,
partnerships are, like all institutional fields of joint practice, shot through with
(communication) boundaries of all kinds, which means that the formation and
management of partnerships entails the generation and management of framing
practices which this study calls “boundary spanning.” Applying a socio-cybernetic
lens allows us to appreciate that these boundary spanning processes introduce
variety into fields which enable them to model their respective environments. They
confer adaptability while being at the same time inherently destabilizing. A central
argument being put forth here is that resilient partnerships are complex adaptive
systems that are organized around addressing the problem of change and that this
organization assumes the form of a recursive hierarchy of communication and
control. Starting from this design view of systems, the framework proposes a way to
explain partnership capacity and social learning based on a general typology of
boundary spanning practices that is couched in a language of orders.
This methodological contribution to measuring partnership capacity and
social learning, if it is substantiated, has real-life consequences for partnership
practitioners. After all, any explanation of partnership capacity and social learning
also suggests strategies for bringing them about. Thus, a second aim of the study is
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to assess the framework’s theory of partnership formation and sustainability. This
aim was motivated by the fact that, despite all the interest that has been directed
toward partnership and partnership work in the past couple decades, we still do not
understand precisely how partnerships congeal from boundary spanning practices
into new joint fields of practice, nor do we understand why some partnerships
thrive while others flounder or even fail. The study proposed 2 basic hypotheses –
the first explaining partnership formation and the second explaining resilience – to
assess the theory and, ultimately, methodology. The theory of convergence predicts
that partnerships form when boundary spanning practices match a socio-technical
or policy need. It generally follows the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to state that
some kind of event in either boundary spanning or the larger field of institutions (or
both) occurs that essentially reverses the direction of influence so that the boundary
spanning practices become objects of considerable attention and interest. If
boundary spanners are able to capitalize on this interest, a process of mutual
influence unfolds that eventually results in a new joint field of core practices
complete with its own set of boundary spanning practices. The second hypothesis
concerns resilience. The paradox of resilience centers on the need to change in
order to persist. The theory predicts that resilient partnerships address this
paradox by enveloping or owning change so that it becomes, as John Paul Lederach
(Fetzer Institute - Wilson Center Seminar, 2008) describes it, a part of their
“character and spirit:”
By its very nature, resiliency as metaphor suggests a journey that is both
internal and outward bound that rises from a quality of character and spirit.
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To place the term in a life journey, resiliency suggests that no matter the
difficulty of the terrains faced by the traveler, s/he stays in touch with a core
defining essence of being and purpose, and displays a tenacity to find a “way
back” as a “way forward” that artistically stays true to his/her very being. We
could say the defining quality of resiliency is the capacity to stay in touch
(emphasis original).
To operationalize this metaphor into a measurable concept, the framework posits 2
forms of resilience: PC II, a more restricted form, is brought about by a pattern of
alignment practices that integrates core and boundary spanning practices across
multiple partnership functions; while PC III is brought about by a pattern or culture
of institutional design and learning. Finally, a third aim of the study is to simply
catalogue the various boundary spanning strategies occurring in different
partnership types and processes.
To assess the hypotheses and the underlying framework’s usefulness in
measuring and explaining partnership processes, 4 case studies of water resource
management partnerships were carried out: the Counting on the Environment
Working Group, the Regional Water Providers Consortium, the Upper Deschutes
River Partnership, and the Walla Walla Watershed Alliance. All 4 partnerships have
been working on water issues within the Columbia River Basin, and all 4 could be
considered regional in their scale and scope. Although contemporaries, they ranged
in age from 1 to 13 years. Three of the 4 would qualify as “permanent and/or
regular coordination” under Mandell and Steelman’s (2003) typology of interorganizational innovations, while the fourth, COTE WG, functions as a “temporary
taskforce.” Data collection consisted primarily of interviews with individuals from
all 4 cases whom were identified by others or me as “boundary spanners.”
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Interviews centered on boundary spanning practices during the formation and
management of the partnership. Interviews were transcribed, coded, and analyzed.
The interviews were supplemented by field trips to the partnership communities,
including observation of partner interactions. Secondary data, including archival
materials, were also collected.
The findings offer tentative support for the convergence hypothesis
(Hypothesis I). All 4 cases demonstrated the general characteristics predicted to be
present in convergence, including: a felt socio-technical policy need and matching
boundary spanning practices, cultural feasibility, technical desirability, exchange of
capital forms to promote innovations, and interest and support. None of the cases fit
the criteria for PC II; thus, the second hypothesis could not be assessed. However,
the RWPC did demonstrate some, but not all, of the traits that are predicted to be
associated with PC II, suggesting the need to refine the theory to accommodate
hybrid or transitional entities. The absence of PC II or PC III does however support
the notion that more resilient partnerships are more rare and is at least consistent
with the theory’s predictions, given the absence of the corresponding factors.
The methodology also demonstrated how boundary spanning practices could
be mapped onto different orders of partnership processes (and social learning). The
methodology calls for a considerable amount of qualitative judgment in the
mapping. To address confirmation biases, coding criteria should be as transparent
and descriptive as possible. Once criteria for coding were standardized, this would
allow for meaningful comparison across cases to determine whether certain kinds of
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boundary spanning practices are associated with certain types of partnership
processes or even types of partnerships (using, for example, Mandell and Steelman’s
typology). Especially, we would be in a position to more fully test the theory
proposed here.
Finally, this study has been an experience in boundary spanning in at least 2
ways. First, the methodology is of course an instance of theoretical boundary
spanning attempting to better integrate institutional theories, cybernetics, systems
theories, and practice theories in a way that will hopefully recast familiar concepts
and problems in a new light. Its emphasis on managing change moves us away from
fallacies of misplaced abstraction that plague much of organizational and social
theorizing. There is a tendency to develop concepts like “partnership,”
“collaborative capacity,” and “social learning” that are divorced from the problem of
change. When these reified concepts are applied to particular contexts, the
applications are often inconsistent and only add to our confusion. Paradoxically
perhaps, partnership practitioners commit a fallacy of misplaced concreteness by
applying these concepts pro forma. This framework suggests that having an
institutional design does not by itself ensure resilience. Similarly, having a rule to
revisit a strategic plan every few years does not by itself ensure resilience. It
compels us to consider how such revisits take place, not simply how often. The
theory predicts that if no serious attempt is made to bring strategic and even
constitutional thinking into alignment with daily practice, particularly with the local
context of implementation, then strategic planning will not add a lot of value. In
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addition, it predicts that partnership-wide resilience comes when these alignments
become routine practice. Adopting a change- or process-oriented methodology
enables us to begin to test these claims across cases. From this social learning, the
expectation is that partnership strategies will emerge.
So What Have We Learned?
Consistent with the view of learning posited here, we can summarize our
learning in terms of the questions this study generates. For one, if partnerships are
in fact composed of boundary spanning practices that communicate something
about the relationships which those practices change, then how can we, as
institutional designers and practitioners, be more strategic in our institutional
change initiatives? And, perhaps more importantly, what are the natural limits to
our interventions? The framework suggests that joint fact-finding should be
accompanied by the joint development of a vision for institutional change – a
Weltanschauung – against which those facts can be judged. This vision will be
characterized by its capacity to articulate the nature of the coordination problem in
a way that is doubly resonant with the universe of stakeholders: both in its own
(technical) terms and in terms of the cultural feasibility of the response that is
implied. Moreover, it suggests that the development of such a vision can usually only
come about through a mechanism of social abduction whereby stakeholders are
given the opportunity to share their understanding of a particular coordination
problem so that the community can begin to search for and compare stories that
don’t gloss over differences in perspectives but rather join them in a common
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narrative. After all, as Argyris and Schön (1978) argue, if mental models drive social
behavior, then these models should themselves be objects of reflection and modelbuilding.
Of course, there are limits to social learning. Not all social differences are
readily reconcilable, especially deep value differences, as Forester (1999) and
others point out. The framework presented here suggests that one reason for this
may be rooted in the condition of social epistemology: to use an ocular metaphor, it
is because communities cannot see their own seeing. Intractable disputes are often
seen as “problematic,” but it is altogether possible that the real problem is in the
framing of the disputes as “problematic” in the first place. If, instead, we looked for
the social purpose that such disputes served, the way is opened for identifying and
removing the underlying barrier to change. But such a reframing is not trivial,
particularly when the reframing involves an entire community. It entails the
community reflecting on itself, but in doing so, it is thereby changed. Like an
explorer walking backward on a landscape changed by her very tread, we are
always one step behind ourselves. All that said: social learning is neither inherently
“good” nor “bad” anymore than resilience is “good” or “bad.” But the framework
does suggest, anyway, that social learning on some level entails a surrendering to
change while resilience buffers against it, in other words, transforms it! If so, then,
for communities seeking to learn, the question becomes: what story are we already
telling ourselves such that our “problems” appear natural and expectable? For
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communities trying to build resilience, the question becomes: what story can we tell
ourselves that will transform our surprises into natural and expectable problems?
This study has hopefully drawn more attention to the socially communicative
dimension of water resource management. Water resource management is about
much more than the management of water resources. In the process of managing
water, stakeholders communicate something about their relationships to one
another, including, or perhaps most especially, to those who are not given a voice.
Embedded in every water management study, plan, or action are assumptions about
what passes for knowledge, who has access to that knowledge and its production,
and the proper distribution of resources, roles, and responsibilities attached to
them. The approach argued for here is not to evaluate the truth or even “goodness”
of such assumptions, but rather to examine the ways in which errors, conceived
here as ruptures in the social fabric of expectations, are “used” to mobilize social
action in service of a still larger (collective) purpose. For example, water conflicts
will often persist to the extent that they support the status quo. It should be
clarified, however, that no conspiracy mechanism is implied here. While it is true
that social actors may occasionally engage in conspiracies or even be influenced by
conspiracy theories, broader community conflicts and controversies reflect a more
distributed social mind operating through diverse contexts of action.
Contrary to Habermasian understandings, all communication is premised on
some distortion. When, for example, someone advocates for environmental interests
in a proposed watershed management planning process, others engaged in the same
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process will tend to “see” him as an environmentalist, while the rest of his story –
father, school bus driver, avid duck hunter, Republican, and so forth – will tend to be
overlooked. And while no particular form of distortion is ever necessary or
inevitable, the survival of social systems, even short-lived ones like planning
processes, depends on presenting their version of reality as just so. The approach
taken here, then, challenges us to reframe water resource management. Ideological
appeals to scientific, technocratic, or rational management notwithstanding –
appeals which, like all ideological claims, only serve the social reproduction of their
management regimes – water resource management is ultimately about a
community wrestling with this paradox of communication, that is: of achieving
conversational coherence through the management of uncertainty partly – and only
partly – of its own making.
But while studies like this one hopefully contribute to our social learning
about, as it were, social learning, practitioners need not wait for theory-building to
occur. They can, and I would argue should, contribute to theory-building by
engaging with researchers in a community of reflective practice by sharing stories
and strategies and searching for connections. In this spirit, I convened a workshop
in the fall of 2010 that brought boundary spanners from the 4 cases together to
discuss the study’s preliminary findings and, just as importantly, imagine
institutional change scenarios, the issues arising from them, and ways to address
them. The exercises afforded us all a chance to try out the Soft Systems
Methodology, especially its rich picture technique, as a collaborative learning tool
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for planning for and managing institutional change. But they also provided a unique
opportunity to span the theory/practice boundary by comparing experiences and
perspectives and deepening our collective understanding of partnership capacity
and social learning and ways to bring them about.
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Appendix A
Interview Protocol
In this interview I will ask you to talk about your thoughts and feelings about
“boundary spanning” and “partnership capacity” generally and as they relate to the
[name of partnership] more specifically. By “boundary” I mean any interface
between different ways of thinking or doing things. I am going to use the term
“boundary spanning” to generally refer to any activity or process that brings
together activities, processes, ideas, people, organizations, objects, and/or resources
from different technical, policy and/or social domains. Similar concepts include
“liaising,” “bridge-building,” and “brokering.” One goal of this study is to build on
this starting definition to gain a clearer understanding of how people and
organizations actually carry out boundary spanning and how they understand their
own work.

I will also ask you to talk about the partnership-building work that you and others
have carried out in forming, implementing, and growing the [name of partnership].
The information and perspective you share in this interview will help to give me a
better understanding of “boundary spanning,” “partnership work,” and “partnership
capacity” in the [name of partnership] but also in water resource management more
generally. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers. If, as we go
along, you think of anything you wish to add to a previous question please feel free
to do so at anytime. You may also decline to answer any question or elect to take a
break or end the interview at any time and for any reason. Do you have any
questions? [Wait for response]. Good. Are you ready to begin? [Wait for response]

For this interview I will use the term “boundary spanning” according to the general
definition I gave in my introduction. To help me assess whether my definition is
clear, can you give me a brief example of boundary spanning that fits my definition?
[Wait for example and clarify definition as needed]. Thank you for that. Please feel
free to elaborate on or otherwise modify the working definition of “boundary
spanning” as we talk, so long as you indicate to me that you are using the term in a
different way.

Finally, I need to define a few more terms that will be used in the questions I will ask
you. I will use the term “technical” to refer to processes and their corresponding
knowledge domains that lend themselves to a precise and often quantitative
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language, such as: the physical environment and associated physical and biological
sciences, the built environment and classical planning, technology and engineering,
the economy and economics, and related disciplines. I will use the term “policy” to
refer to decisions and decision-making processes concerned with legal, judicial, and
administrative functions. These functions may be formal or less formal. Finally, I
will use the term “social” to refer to the rest of societal processes and knowledge
domains not covered by the other two terms, including: institutions, social ties,
politics, ideology, and culture. Here is a list of the key terms with their definitions
[Give respondent list]. Do you have any questions about these terms? [IF NEEDED,
answer any questions]

The first few questions are about the formation and early history of [name of
partnership].
1. How did [name of partnership] first come about? Especially, what was the
water resource management problem that motivated its formation and were
there any events or circumstances, ranging from the local to the global, that
facilitated the formation of the partnership? [PROBE: Were there
opportunities in the general policy and social environment that favored its
formation in any way?]
2. Did boundary spanning and/or boundary spanners play any role in the
formation and early development of [name of partnership]? If so, could you
talk more about it and give some examples? [IF NEEDED: Were various
technical, policy, and social elements from different domains brought
together during its formation?]
3. Did the [name of partnership] face any early threats to its existence and, if so,
how did it overcome them? [PROBE: Did boundary spanning play any role
for the partnership in overcoming these threats?
4. Can you tell me a little more about the relationships that the [name of the
partnership] had early on with the various communities of interest and how
you think those relationships shaped its early history? By “communities of
interest” I mean institutional stakeholders or communities having some kind
of stake in the partnership, whether they have participated directly in it or
not.

The next few questions are about the [name of the partnership] after the early stage
and leading up to the present. [If the partnership has since dissolved, use the past
tense].
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5. What technical, policy, or social innovations would you say the [name of the
partnership] has produced since its inception? By “innovation” I mean any
new contribution either in the form of a tool, model, or similar object, a
process, policy, or even an idea or vision. [IF NEEDED: What new ideas
and/or ways of doing things, along with related products, has the
partnership developed in the process of addressing its water resource
management problem? PROBE for each dimension]
6. Have any of these innovations ever been adopted by the various communities
of interest or beyond and if innovations have been adopted, were any
changes made to them along the way? [PROBE: If changes were made along
the way, have any of these changes impacted the original innovations within
the partnership?]
7. What factors do you think contribute to the spread and adoption of the
[name of the partnership]’s innovations among its communities of interest?
[PROBE: Has boundary spanning played a role? If so, how?]
8. Have the relationships within the communities of interest changed since the
early stages of the [name of the partnership]? In answering the question, I’d
like you to comment on the both the changes in the relationships among
stakeholder-communities as well as changes in the relationships between
those communities and the [name of the partnership] itself. [IF NEEDED: By
“relationship” I mean the ties that define roles, rights, responsibilities, and
identities of the parties to the relationship. These relationships may be of a
technical, policy, and/or social nature.] If so, can you talk more about these
relationship changes? [PROBE for each dimension]
9. [IF 8 = “Yes,” ASK: What do you think are some factors driving those
relationship changes? [PROBE: Has the partnership led to changes in how
stakeholders and communities work together or perceive one another and, if
so, how?]

The final set of questions is about the relationship, if any, between boundary
spanning and the continuing partnership work of managing change and uncertainty.
[If the partnership has since dissolved, use the past tense].
10. Please tell me a little more about the relationship between the [name of the
partnership]’s strategic planning and its day-to-day operations. Especially,
what is the nature and extent of the communication and coordination
between the partnership’s planning and implementation functions? [PROBE:
Among other things: how would you describe the working relationship
between the staff and board or governing body? PROBE: To what extent
does the [name of the partnership] engage in implementation planning?]
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11. How, and to what extent, does the [name of the partnership] address threats
to the partnership and what role, if any, does boundary spanning play in
facing and managing threats? [PROBE: How do you think the partnership’s
own efforts to manage threats across the technical, policy, and social
domains reinforce or work against one another?]
12. Similarly, how, and to what extent, does the [name of the partnership]
capitalize on opportunities to the partnership and what role, if any, does
boundary spanning play in making, finding, and/or acting on opportunities?
[PROBE: How do you think the partnership’s own efforts to manage
opportunities across the technical, policy, and social domains reinforce or
work against one another?]
13. Does the [name of the partnership] position itself in any way to respond to
surprises, be they of a technical, policy, or social nature? If so, what role, if
any, does boundary spanning play in managing uncertainty? [IF NEEDED: By
“surprises” I mean any events or changes that are unexpected. Does the
partnership have a strategy for dealing with surprises?] [PROBE: How do you
think the partnership’s own efforts to manage uncertainties across the
technical, policy, and social domains reinforce or work against one another?]
[Q14: IF the partnership has since dissolved, ASK INSTEAD: “What factors do you
think finally contributed to the dissolution of the [name of partnership] and was
boundary spanning involved in any way? If so, how?”]
14. Would you say the [name of the partnership] drives much of the water
resource management agenda within the community, simply implements
that agenda, or does a little bit of both? Could you elaborate and comment on
what role, if any, boundary spanning plays?
15. That is all the questions I have. Before we end, is there anything else you
would like to add?
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Appendix B
Methodology of Institutional Change
Process/Transformation “T”
Input (Description)

Throughput (Mapping)

Boundary spanning
activities carrying out
Process/T

Order of
Process/T

Outstanding issues that
threaten Process/T (Data) –
Driven by a particular
Worldview37

Output (Description)
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A surprise presents itself which
threatens the partnership (“We
don’t know how to respond to
this”)

Reflexive practices guide the
search for institutional designs
in current knowledge base or
through model-building and
synthesis (Closed
Transformation)

A coherent partnership response
which addresses the surprise (“We
have addressed the surprise”)

Innovation, critical selfreflection, institutional
design through complex
alignment, monitoring and
control of learning

Partnership
Capacity III

Insufficient resources, waning
commitment to learning
(complacency), excessively long
adjustment times

PC = 2; Insufficient resources,
waning commitment, technical
and cultural problems in
partnering fields associated with
partnership, general
vulnerability to surprises (“We
are constantly putting out new
fires;” PC=II)

Learning how to learn how to
partner (Open Process)

PC = III; Capacity of partnership to
appreciate the problem as one of
treating problems as opportunities
for learning (“We generate and put
out our own fires in order to identify
our vulnerabilities;” (PC = III)

Instilling a culture of
learning that combines
creativity and critical inquiry
and reflection, visioning,
setting up laboratories of
social learning

Social Learning
III (Discrete
Change)

How to specifically design
“learning partnerships” (with
PC III)?

In the case of partnership processes, data on issues could be “found” at any of the three system levels: meta-(“Worldview), system(I,T,O), and subsystem (Throughput), but, regardless of their level of resolution, their significance can be uniformly expressed as “Change-in-(given) Process.” Note
that the issues associated with various kinds of social learning do not serve as sources of data for partnership systems; they are in a sense
intractable. Learning is stochastic by nature.

37

Some part of community
chronically “hostile” toward
partnership; conflicting
demands

Complex alignment of distinct
partnership processes (Closed
Transformation)

Widespread community support for
partnership
(“Our disagreements are now
synergies”)

(“We need to turn our
disagreements into synergies”)
PC = I; Insufficient resources,
waning commitment, technical
and cultural problems in
partnering fields associated with
partnership (“We always seem
to be stepping on someone’s
toes”)

Learning how to integrate
multiple perspectives,
priorities, and functions (Open
Process)

PC = II ; Capacity of partnership to
appreciate the problem as one of
integrating perspectives, priorities,
and functions (“We need to turn our
disagreements into synergies”)

Meta-boundary spanning by
aligning across programs
and other functions as well
as between core practices
and strategic and
constitutional concerns

Partnership
Capacity II
(Continuous
Process)

Insufficient resources, waning
commitment, technical and
cultural problems in partnering
fields associated with
partnership, general
vulnerability to surprises

Visioning, setting up
channels of communication
between distinct
partnership functions and
alignment practices

Social Learning
II (Discrete
Change)

Stakeholder differences are too
great, insufficient resources or
commitment, vision and
communication either too rigid
or incoherent

Monitoring and Control
(Boundary maintenance)
through agreements, core
practices, evaluation,
correction in practices as
needed

Partnership
Capacity I
(Continuous
process)

Insufficient resources, waning
commitment, technical and
cultural problems in partnering
fields associated with
partnership

Relationship-building, trustbuilding, innovation,
imagination, steering capital
flows, strategic
communications and
framing

Social Learning
I (Discrete
change)

Excessive or inappropriate
accommodation of boundary
spanning to, or influence over,
institutional ecology; any event
or process that interrupts
mutual adjustment; excessive
adjustment times

Consensus understanding/model of
integration problem
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Objective Input: Community of
Practice lacking coordination
around a specific issue

Organization and “simple
alignment” of innovative
practices to specific policy goal
(Closed Transformation)

Objective Output: Partnership
coordination around the specific issue

Convergence of boundary
spanning practices and
institutional ecology through
“testing” of social
heuristics/matching theorems
(Open Process)

Objective Output: PC = I Capacity to
appreciate coordination problem
(Subjective Output: “A,B, and C need
to talk to one another”)

(Subjective Input: “A,B, and C
need to talk to one another”)

Objective Input: PC = 0;
Disputes and confusion around
a particular issue (Subjective
Input: “It’s your fault. No, it’s
your fault”)

Direction of data flow

(Subjective Output: “A, B, and C are
now talking to one another”)

Consensus understanding/model of
coordination problem

Direction of cybernetic communication and control

Appendix C
Workshop Rich Pictures of Institutional Change Scenarios
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